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In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by 
defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, 
e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or 
should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts 
and properties.  
One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously 
true and nearly universally accepted. But there are influential arguments against moral 
realism, which is analogous to epistemic realism: moral realists think that moral 
judgments, e.g., that something is morally good, or ought to be done, are sometimes true 
because there are stance-independent moral facts and properties. Moral irrealists deny 
this for a variety of semantic, metaphysical, psychological and epistemological reasons. 
They argue that moral judgments are neither true nor false since they are non-cognitive 
expressions of emotion or commands, or are never true since they fail to refer, or that 
their truth is “relative.” 
Drawing on the moral irrealisms of Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Mackie, Harman, and 
more recent thinkers, I construct parallel arguments for epistemic irrealisms. On these 
views, epistemic judgments are also merely expressive, a kind of command, always false, 
or relativistic in truth conditions: even “epistemic platitudes” like “justified beliefs are 
better than unjustified beliefs” and “ideally, one’s beliefs ought to be consistent” are 
understood not as epistemic propositions that might be believed (much less believed 
truly), or as attempts to accurately represent epistemic facts, or as attributions of 
epistemic properties.  
The implications of these claims are highly at odds with common epistemological 
assumptions, even those that moral irrealists tend to accept. I argue that these 
implications are rationally unacceptable and that, therefore, the premises that support 
them should be rejected. Since these premises are those given in defense of moral 
irrealisms, I thereby defend both moral and epistemic realism. Thus, I argue that 
 vii 
“oughts,” “shoulds” and other evaluative judgments are equally legitimate in both ethics 
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CHAPTER 1:  Moral & Epistemic Realisms. 
1.1. Introduction. 
In this work I defend moral and epistemic “realisms,” according to which there are 
objective, stance-independent, moral and epistemic facts or properties that make some 
moral and epistemic judgments literally true and others literally false.1  
Epistemic realism is, simply put, the thesis that epistemic judgments – e.g., 
judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or should be held, 
and so on – are beliefs (not another, non-representational, state of mind), and that some of 
these beliefs are true, and made true, because there are epistemic properties and facts. It 
thus concerns the semantic, metaphysical, psychological, and logical “foundations” of 
epistemic judgments.  
Moral realism is a view on the analogous foundations of ethical judgments; it is, 
simply put, the analogous thesis that moral judgments are beliefs and that some are true 
because of stance-independent moral facts and properties: when a moral judgment is true, 
it is not made true by anyone’s attitude towards that moral proposition; rather it is made 
true by facts other than anyone’s stance toward it.  
I defend moral and epistemic realisms from arguments against them Some of 
these arguments are against realisms and for views that there are no stance-independent 
moral or epistemic facts or properties to serve as truth-makers for these kinds of 
judgments. Other arguments are given to think that such judgments are neither true nor 
false, and so that moral or epistemic judgments are never literally true.  
My defense of these two realisms depends on similarities between moral and 
epistemic judgments. The crucial similarity is that these two kinds of judgments are 
sufficiently similar in their features such that an objection to understanding one kind of 
judgment in a realistic manner is also an objection to understanding the other in a realistic 
manner. Put another way, my arguments depend on these two kinds of judgments being 
                                                          
1 To cast my metaphysical net as wide as acceptably possible, I speak of both facts and properties. For 
anyone who sees this as redundant excess (e.g., thinks that if one posits facts, there is no need to posit 
properties, or vice-versa), he or she can adjust my claims accordingly. What is important, for my position, 
is that there are truth-makers for moral and epistemically evaluative claims and that their existence is not 
dependent on attitudes towards these evaluations: they are, what might be called, “objective,” or better 
(since the obvious contrast to “objective,” viz. “subjective,” is not ideal), “stance independent,” since their 
existence does not depend on anyone’s attitudes, or stance, towards them. 
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sufficiently similar so that this claim is true: an objection to understanding one kind of 
claim realistically is also a plausible, if not equally strong, objection to the other kind.  
Critics of moral realisms claim that moral judgments have various specified 
features and so moral irrealism is true (or likely true). I respond that it is as plausible to 
think that epistemic judgments also have these features and ask whether we should think 
that epistemic irrealism is true (or likely true) also, since having these features seems to 
be the basis for accepting some kind of moral irrealism. I argue that since we should not 
accept a version of epistemic irrealism, we should not think that moral judgments’ having 
these features provides good reason to reject moral realism. This, I argue, shows that the 
standard arguments against moral realism have at least one premise that we should not 
accept.  
In this chapter I make a prima facie case for the similarity of these two kinds of 
judgments in terms of their semantic, metaphysical, logical, epistemic, and psychological 
features. This case is developed throughout this work as I examine the particular 
objections philosophers have given to understanding moral judgments in a realistic 
manner.  
Whether moral realism should be accepted or rejected is a controversial issue. The 
status of epistemic realism is far less controversial (it is accepted by most moral 
irrealists), so if it can used to defend moral realism, then moral realism can be defended 
from assumptions that even most moral irrealists accept. If this can be done, this is surely 
an ideal basis to defend moral realism from, since it’s generally preferable to defend a 
view using premises its critics accept. I intend to do just this.   
1.2. Epistemic Realism: A Sketch. 
Since I use epistemic realism to defend moral realism, I will say more about what 
epistemic realism is. It is a view on the “foundations” of epistemology and reasoning, 
although in a sense different from which most epistemologists typically think of in terms 
of “foundations.” It pertains to the semantic, metaphysical, psychological, and epistemic 
bases of epistemic judgments. It includes the view there are epistemic propositions and an 
epistemic “way the world is” that we try to represent in our making epistemic 
evaluations, and that we sometimes represent this reality successfully. Epistemic realists 
believe that epistemic judgments are beliefs, i.e., attempts to represent information about 
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the world, or propositional attitudes, and that these beliefs are sometimes true. They also 
believe that that other epistemic attitudes (e.g., suspending judgment) can be objectively 
fitting also: it can be true that someone rationally ought to suspend judgment regarding a 
proposition.  
While the foundations of moral judgments have been much explored, these 
foundations of epistemic judgments are a largely neglected topic. One might think that 
this neglect is justified because, as a general view on the foundations of epistemic 
judgments, epistemic realism needs no defense. Many might think this because they think 
that epistemic realism is obviously true and nearly universally accepted: they might think 
that nearly everyone believes that epistemic judgments are beliefs that are sometimes true 
and, when true, true because of stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. They 
might think that since everyone thinks this, there’s no need to defend the view.  
While epistemic realism is nearly universally accepted and few have felt the need 
to explicitly defend it, some philosophers reject moral realism, which is the analogous 
claim about the nature of moral judgments. Moral realists think that moral judgments are 
beliefs that attempt to represent moral reality, that these beliefs are sometimes true, and 
that they are made true by objective or stance-independent moral properties.  
Moral irrealists deny these claims in a number of ways, for a variety of semantic, 
metaphysical, epistemic and psychological reasons. Some moral irrealists argue that 
moral judgments aren’t even, strictly speaking, beliefs. On these kinds of views, moral 
judgments are expressions of emotion, or commands, or some other non-representational 
mental state that admits neither of truth or falsity. Other moral irrealists argue that moral 
judgments are beliefs but that they that are never true because there is nothing to make 
them true; these is no metaphysical foundation for morals. Other moral irrealists argue 
that there are moral truths but that their truth is not stance-independent, but “relative,” 
i.e., dependent on factors such as which moral principles are accepted in a community or 
by the attitudes some contingent being(s) take towards the moral judgments in question. 
And there are other, subtler, ways to deny moral realism also.  
There is some lively debate concerning the status of moral realism, so the issue is 
deemed worthy of conversation. But epistemic realism is analogous to moral realism: 
epistemic realists understand the epistemic in ways comparable to how moral realists 
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understand the moral. So if there is debate concerning foundational questions about the 
nature of moral judgments, then perhaps there should be more debate about the 
foundational questions about the nature of epistemic judgments. This debate might be 
especially called for if moral and epistemic judgments share many of the properties 
which moral irrealists point to in making their cases for moral irrealisms. If moral 
irrealists argue that since moral judgments are like that, and therefore we should 
understand them irrealistically, then if epistemic judgments are often like that too, then 
comparable cases can be made for understanding both kinds of judgments in irrealistic 
manners.   
This is, in fact, how most moral irrealists argue for the positions: they identify 
features of moral judgments and then argue that these features support an irrealistic 
understanding, or are better understood on a version of moral irrealism. The motivating 
thought behind these various arguments for moral irrealism, a thought that is often left 
unstated, seems to be that any judgment having some specified features should be 
understood in an irrealistic manner; of course, the exact manner will depend on the 
particular irrealist theory in question.  
Here I present and examine the more commonly arguments for moral-realisms. In 
the process, I develop a parallel case against epistemic realism. My strategy is to identify 
the major premises of the more common and historically influential arguments against 
moral realism. I argue that when moral judgments have these features, epistemic 
judgments also have these features, or that many epistemic judgments have them to the 
extent that a variety of moral judgments have them.2 Thus, many commons reasons given 
to reject moral realism seem to be comparable reasons to reject epistemic realism.  
Moral irrealists claim that moral judgments have some specified feature and that, 
therefore, they should be understood irrealistically. Sometimes their initial claim about 
moral judgments having this feature is quite plausible: e.g., as logical positivists argued, 
moral judgments are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable. If it were true that 
                                                          
2 Moral judgments about goodness and rightness, although both moral judgments, might differ in important 
ways such that an argument against moral realism might have, e.g., stronger claim against judgments of 
rightness than against judgments of goodness. E.g., it might be more plausible to think that judgments 
about what ought to be done have a motivational quality than it is to think this about judgments about 
what’s good. Similarly, judgments that something ought to be believed and something is known are both 
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judgments that are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable are never true, then this 
might very well be a sound argument for moral irrealism, if were plausible to think that 
both these premises are true.  
Other times, moral irrealists’ claims about what moral judgments are like are 
highly dubious: e.g., the claim that moral judgments have an essentially motivational 
component. Any argument based on this premise is doubtful. For these latter kinds of 
arguments for moral irrealism, I grant the irrealist her controversial and dubious claim, 
but argue that it’s as plausible to think that epistemic judgments also have this feature 
that they point to. After either establishing these common features of moral and epistemic 
judgments (or, in some cases, accepting them for the sake of argument), I argue that 
premises used in arguments for moral irrealisms have implications for how epistemic 
judgments should be understood, given these common features.  
These premises tend to suggest that epistemic judgments are never true. These 
include those mentioned above (e.g., concerning what’s epistemically reasonable, or 
justified, or should be believed), evaluative judgments pertaining to inferences (e.g., what 
one should believe, given, among other considerations, the other things one believes), as 
well as “epistemic platitudes” like “justified beliefs are better than unjustified beliefs” 
and “one ought to believe only what one has good evidence for.”3 That is, these kinds of 
claims should be understood not as epistemic propositions that might be believed, or as 
epistemic facts or descriptions, or as attempts to attribute epistemic properties. Rather, 
they should be interpreted in some emotivist, expressivist, prescriptivist, error-theoretical, 
relativistic,4 or other non-standard way.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
epistemic judgments, but there might be important differences between them such that an argument for 
epistemic irrealism might be stronger for one kind of judgment.  
3 If any of these are intended to be moral evaluations, then moral irrealists readily would agree. However, I 
suspect that most moral irrealists do not see these kinds of intellectual platitudes as moral evaluations: they 
are evaluations of a distinctly intellectual kind.  
4 Moral and epistemic relativists allow for “relative” truth, i.e., that some moral or epistemic proposition is 
true, but only “relative to” a set of other propositions (which themselves are either not true or are true 
“relative” to themselves). There are no just plain true moral or epistemic judgments. Some might think that 
allowing some kind of truth make a position “realist.” While views can be categorized in any manner and 
using any label one likes, on most self-proclaimed realists’ understandings of realism, a meta-ethical 
positions countenancing relative truths is insufficient for that position being genuinely realistic: on most 
realist’s views, non-relative truth-makers are needed for genuine realism. I discuss and criticize relativisms 
in later chapters.  
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Thus, I argue that reasoning parallel to that given in defense of non-realistic meta-
ethics often suggests analogous non-realistic meta-epistemologies as well. This parallel 
has been observed before, but has rarely been developed in great detail. Other 
philosophers have suggested that parallel cases for and against realisms in ethics and 
epistemology can be made. For example, after noting some similarities between ethical 
and epistemic judgments, William Lycan writes:  
It’s interesting that this parallel [between ethics and epistemology] goes generally 
unremarked. Moral subjectivism, relativism, emotivism, etc. are rife among both 
philosophers and ordinary people, yet very few of these same people would think 
even for a moment of denying the objectivity of epistemic value; that is, of 
attacking the reality of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable 
belief. I wonder why that is?5  
His suspicion is that, given the similarities between the two kinds of judgments, we 
would expect that there be more meta-epistemological positions analogous to those found 
in meta-ethics: there should be more epistemic nihilists, relativists, emotivists and so on. 
Here I develop these possible positions and critique them. I then use this critique to 
defend moral realism.  
Epistemic irrealisms are, at least, at odds with common epistemic and intellectual 
assumptions, including those made by most moral irrealists and used by them in their 
making their cases for moral irrealisms. Nearly all philosophers presume that their own 
epistemic judgments are beliefs and, presumably, that their epistemic beliefs are 
sometimes true, and made true by something “in” or “about” the stance-independent 
world: it’s not the case that our epistemic attitudes, when true, are true because we have 
them, or because of our attitudes toward the epistemic propositions under consideration.  
And philosophers tend to accept the following epistemic platitudes as beliefs and, 
perhaps, beliefs that must be presumed for philosophical, or generally rational, thinking: 
“It’s good to have evidence for one’s beliefs,” “All else being equal, it's better to have 
consistent beliefs than inconsistent beliefs”, “It’s bad to be unreasonable,” “You 
shouldn’t believe something unless you have good reasons to believe it,” “The strength of 
                                                          
5 See Lycan (“Epistemic Value” 137). 
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one’s belief ought to be proportional to the strength of the evidence.”6 Most philosophers 
think that, at least sometimes, when one sees that some proposition is a consequence of 
one’s beliefs, one should accept that consequence, and it is as justified as the initial 
beliefs. These kinds of intellectual evaluations are often presumed to be sometimes true; I 
aim to argue that common reasons given to think that moral evaluations are never true 
suggest that these intellectual evaluations are not true either. Insofar as this as a 
surprising suggested implication, this might contribute to reasons to reconsider these 
arguments against moral realism.  
Although analogous views are common about moral evaluations, few 
philosophers think that epistemically or intellectual evaluative claims like these above are 
mere expressions of emotion, or disguised commands, or relative in their truth conditions, 
or some other linguistic expression or mental state that does not admit of literal truth and 
falsity. Again, even moral irrealists who accept these understandings of morality tend to 
reject these understandings of reasoning and epistemic evaluation: they typically do not 
think that their claim that they, or anyone, should accept their arguments about moral 
realism is merely an expression of emotion, or a command, or, of course, a claim that is, 
literally, false.7 And they typically think their rejections of epistemic irrealisms are 
reasonable and justified and that, again, that this evaluation is not an expression of 
emotion.  
Of course, a view’s being unpopular does not entail that it is false or that it ought 
not to be believed. So, if epistemic irrealism is not popular, that’s not necessary a strike 
against it. And that an unpopular view follows from some premises does not entail that 
any of those premises should be rejected. That most philosophers accept epistemic 
realism might not be much in its favor: perhaps nearly all philosophers have assumed a 
view that is, ultimately, indefensible. Also, if some defenders of moral irrealisms have an 
                                                          
6 What exactly an epistemic judgment is is not entirely clear. Perhaps some of these are not epistemic 
judgments, especially the various intellectual platitudes I mention. But they are evaluative judgments of 
some kind, and they are not intended to be moral judgments. My basic argument would seem to apply to 
them, whatever evaluative category they fall into: reasons to think that no moral evaluations are true would 
often apply to these intellectually evaluative judgments or assumptions also.  
7 Allen Gibbard (see Gibbard Thinking How To Live) and Hartry Field (“Apriority as an Evaluative Notion” 
and “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse”) might be exceptions to this claim. I discuss 
their views and their arguments they offer in their favor in my final chapter.  
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inconsistent overall position, this does not mean that moral irrealism is false or their 
arguments for it weak.  
But perhaps those who think that they are justified in rejecting epistemic irrealism 
are mistaken: perhaps the entire common picture on the foundations of epistemic 
judgments is false. There seems to be no reason why epistemic irrealism must be false or 
why it must be unreasonable or unjustified for every person who considers it. Few, if any, 
views are essentially such that they ought to be rejected, and epistemic irrealism does not 
seem to be a contender for that possible class of views. Maybe some kind of epistemic 
irrealism is true: maybe there are no epistemic properties, maybe there are no epistemic 
truths, or maybe epistemic discourse is only expressive.  
I concede that this is possible, in a broadly logical sense. But do I intend to argue 
that irrealist meta-epistemologies are rationally unacceptable for most, if not all, actual 
believers who carefully consider the issues.8 I argue that critical reflection on that which 
seems true about epistemic evaluation reveals that the premises that support epistemic 
irrealisms, which also support moral non-realisms, should be rejected. Thus, I will argue 
that nearly anyone who reasons through this issue should reject the common arguments 
against moral irrealism.  
This claim about how we ought to reason itself is an epistemic judgment; I will 
argue this claim itself is true; it is not an expression of emotion, or a command, or 
anything that an epistemic irrealist might say it is. I argue that there is better reason to 
accept epistemic realism than reject it.  
Thus, I defend moral realism by undercutting the cases against it. I do this by 
arguing that the premises given against it have unacceptable implications in that, in 
conjunction with premises describing the features of epistemic judgments, they entail or 
(for non-deductive arguments) make likely various kinds of epistemic irrealisms. I defend 
epistemic realism by, first, showing that it is need of defense: there are many plausible 
cases to be made against it since most things that have been said against moral properties 
and a cognitive understanding of moral language can be said against the notion of 
                                                          
8 I do not argue that epistemic irrealisms are unjustified for every actual, much less possible, thinker. If 
epistemic realism is true, then, perhaps, there are some people who have very good evidence to think that, 
e.g., there is no good evidence for anything and there is nothing anyone should believe. While I think these 
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epistemic properties and a cognitivist understanding of epistemic language. Second, I 
argue that these meta-epistemologies are false and have other rationally unacceptable 
consequences. My arguments that both these various irrealisms should be rejected yield 
defenses of both kinds of realism.   
My organization is historical and cumulative. I begin with A.J. Ayer and work 
towards the present, discussing C.L. Stevenson’s, R.M. Hare’s, J.L. Mackie’s, Gilbert 
Harman’s, and more recent arguments against moral realism. I also occasionally note 
David Hume’s empiricist influence on some of these philosophers’ positions and 
arguments.  
I apply their reasoning in meta-ethics to epistemology (and reasoning itself), find 
unacceptable implications, and bring these results back to meta-ethics to re-evaluate their 
arguments. For each figure I press similar kinds of objections. I observe that their major 
premises given in defense of their moral irrealisms – in conjunction with premises 
describing features of epistemic judgments – either entail or suggest that epistemic 
judgments are never objectively true. I then argue that this is a false and rationally 
unacceptable consequence, which provides reason to reject the initial major premise. This 
effectively undercuts their cases against moral realism.  
I also observe that epistemic irrealisms seem to yield bizarre consequences for 
argumentation: for one, if an epistemic irrealism is true, then it’s not literally true that it 
(or any other view, including an irrealistic meta-ethical view) should be accepted or is 
reasonable or justified. This might undercut the epistemic support for these kinds of 
views: at least, it renders a highly non-standard view about the nature of epistemic 
evaluations, one which few moral irrealists accept, and one that I argue should not be 
accepted because there are better reasons to reject it than accept it.  
For an example of this perhaps undercutting consequence, if an epistemic 
relativism is true, then although believing that “epistemic relativism is true” might be 
reasonable relative to the epistemic standards accepted by some epistemic relativist, I 
suspect it is not likely to be reasonable relative to the epistemic standards accepted by an 
epistemic realist. Thus, for the realist it will not be reasonable and it will is not true for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
people are mistaken, their view cannot be judged unreasonable for them out of hand, apart from an 
appreciation of their evidence.  
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them that they should change their minds and accept some kind of epistemic relativism. If 
this is so, this at least puts an epistemic relativist in an odd dialectal position since few (if 
any) non-epistemic-relativists will have reason to accept their view.  
While I concede that this might be the way the epistemic world is, I argue that we 
have little reason to accept this picture. I argue that it is more reasonable to believe that 
epistemic judgments are sometimes true than that they are never true, and more 
reasonable to believe that there are ways we ought to reason than it is to believe that 
there are no ways we ought to reason. I argue that it is reasonable to believe that the 
major premises of common arguments for epistemic irrealisms have false implications, 
and so these premises are false. Since the cases against moral realism rest on these 
premises, I effectively undercut them in light of their false epistemic implications. Thus, 
both moral and epistemic realism are defended.  
I focus on Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Mackie and Harman’s objections to moral 
realism. I focus on them because most contemporary work on moral realism and irrealism 
is done in reference to these positions and the kinds of arguments these philosophers 
originally developed in favor of these views. Despite the fact that Harman is still our 
contemporary, we might call these figures “classical” moral irrealists insofar as 
contemporary irrealists are indebted to them for many of the basic arguments that they 
have refined, developed and defended with increasing sophistication (or sophistry and 
evasion, depending on one’s point of view).  
For example, Simon Blackburn and Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have 
developed arguments against moral realism based in concerns about supervenience; 
earlier expressions of this concern, which contemporary authors build on, are found in 
Mackie.9 Allan Gibbard and Crispin Wright have attempted to dispense with moral 
properties because of their alleged causal impotence, a worry which Harman first 
developed.10 Timmon’s and Horgan’s “Moral Twin Earth” arguments against moral 
naturalism are descendents of Hare’s arguments against naturalism.11 And contemporary 
                                                          
9 See Blackburn (Essays in Quasi-Realism), Horgan and Timmons (“Troubles on Moral Twin Earth”), 
Blackburn (Essays in Quasi-Realism) and Mackie (Ethics). 
10 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings), Wright (Truth and Objectivity), and Harman (The Nature of 
Morality).  
11 See Timmons (Morality Without Foundations) and Hare (The Language of Morals).  
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expressivists, like Gibbard and others, are much indebted to the work of Ayer and 
Stevenson in developing their versions of emotivism.  
I discuss some of these contemporary positions, especially in my final chapter that 
addresses Gibbard’s and Field’s epistemic irrealisms, but my focus here are these 
classical moral irrealists. They provide the roots of the contemporary scene, and my aim 
is to “weed out” contemporary moral irrealisms at the root. I attempt to develop a kind of 
objection that shows that the basic standard arguments against moral realism are weak. 
And these basic arguments are not made stronger by the contemporary bells and whistles 
that more recent philosophers have attached to them.  
In my final chapter, I note how a number of contemporary philosophers have 
come to that conclusion about these arguments, based on arguments similar to mine. But 
my focus is on arguments for moral irrealism that have, thus far, remained of interest 
over much of the history of twentieth century meta-ethical thought.  
1.3. Characterizing Moral Realisms & Irrealisms. 
Before surveying the considerations offered against moral realism, which I will argue are 
also often considerations against epistemic realism, it will be useful to briefly 
characterize moral realism in even greater detail. Statements from contemporary 
defenders and critics reveal its central features. Since there are few explicit critics or 
defenders of epistemic realism, that kind of view should be understood as analogous to 
kinds of meta-ethical views that are realistic. 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord understands realism about any domain to simply involve 
just two theses, that “(1) the claims in question, when literally construed, are literally true 
or false (cognitivism), and (2) some are literarily true.”12  He understands ‘literal’ truth in 
terms of correspondence.13 So, on his view moral realism is simply the view that some 
moral claims are literally true in virtue of their correspondence to moral facts or 
properties or in virtue of their being warranted assertions.   
All moral realists agree that some moral claims are literally true: although there 
are disagreements about their nature, they all accept the existence of moral properties. 
                                                          
12 See Sayre-McCord (“Introduction” 5).  
13 See Sayre-McCord (“Introduction” 6). He also suggests understanding truth in terms of warranted 
assertibility, but I will not discuss this notion since, for one, it seems to have difficulty making sense of the 
notion of a justified false belief.  
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But many moral realists consider a meta-ethical position’s meeting Sayre-McCord’s two 
conditions to be necessary, but insufficient, for it to be realistic. This is because his 
conditions imply that subjectivisms, relativisms, constructivisms and ideal-observer 
theories – cognitivist theories that hold that a moral proposition’s truth value logically 
depends on an individual’s, society’s, hypothetical agent’s or someone else’s beliefs 
and/or attitudes towards that proposition – are realistic theories.   
There is no point in arguing whether these theories are really versions of moral 
realism or not, but few moral realists accept theories that make moral truth dependent on 
the attitudes taken towards moral propositions. The most obvious explanation why there 
are strong arguments that these kinds of views are false and/or explanatorily inferior to 
other theories that don’t make moral truth dependent on attitudes toward moral 
propositions: these arguments might take the form of Euthyphro-type dilemmas with the 
suggestion that it’s more plausible to think that some agent would have the moral views 
he or she (or it) does because there are objective moral truths and the agent accurately 
perceive them, instead of the moral truth being created by the agent’s attitudes.  
These theories might be also objected to with the observation that they make even 
core moral beliefs merely contingent truths, dependent on the agent’s whims and nothing 
more. There are other arguments against these kinds of views, so realists tend to reject 
them not merely because they don’t fit into the “realistic” category of theories.   
Realists tend to think that the truth of a moral proposition depends on “objective” 
factors, not the attitudes anyone (or any group) takes (or might take) towards it.14 This 
objectivity will be characterized in greater detail later, and I should note that there are 
important disagreement among realists on what this objectivity depends. That is, realists 
disagree on the ontology of moral truth-makers or facts. Some realists argue that they are 
identical to “natural” facts, facts discoverable by empirical science. Other realists argue 
that moral facts supervene on natural facts but aren’t identical to them. Still others argue 
that they are “non-natural” facts, facts not discoverable by scientific means.15 But most 
                                                          
14 Realists needn’t reject as false a claim like “Acts are right if, and only if, an all-knowing agent approves 
(or would) approve of them.” Realists might accept this logical equivalence but argue that the claim that, 
‘acts are right because the agent’s approves of them’ is false: the agent approves because of objective 
features of the act, not because of the agent’s attitude toward the act or the proposition describing it.  
15 This is the approach I favor. Just as science cannot tell us what we morally ought to do and what is 
morally good, science also cannot tell us what we ought to believe, what knowledge is, and how we should 
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realists agree that meeting Sayre-McCord’s conditions is insufficient for a meta-ethical 
position’s being in the neighborhood of a plausible (and, hence, realistic) view.  
Other statements of moral realism give more details on the kind of view realists 
tend to accept, or the kind of position I aim to defend. Realists David Brink and Nicholas 
Sturgeon all defend similar positions. Brink briefly states the position in this manner: 
[M]oral realism claims that there are moral facts and true moral propositions 
whose existence and nature are independent of our beliefs about right and wrong. 
Moral realism's metaphysical claim suggests the semantic claim that moral 
judgments and terms typically refer to moral facts and properties.16  
Sturgeon’s characterization is quite similar. He explains that moral realists believe 
that: 
[O]ur moral terms typically refer to real properties; that moral statements 
typically express propositions capable of truth or falsity; . . [. . and . .] these moral 
truths are in some interesting sense independent of the subjective indicators—our 
moral beliefs and moral feelings, as well as moral conventions constituted by 
coordinated individual intentions—that we take as guides to them. 17 
These positions meet Sayre-McCord’s criteria of cognitivism and literal truth, but impose 
the additional constraint, that moral truth is not dependent on our moral evaluations, that 
is more characteristic of typical realist positions. 
Michael Smith notes a realist strand in most people’s thinking about morality.  He 
observes that:   
[W]e seem to think that moral questions have correct answers; that the correct 
answers are made correct by objective moral facts; that moral facts are wholly 
determined by circumstances; and that, by engaging in moral conversation and 
argument, we can discover what these objective moral facts determined by the 
circumstances are.18 
Russell Shafer Landau understands realism this way: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reason. The practice of science presupposes that there are truths here, but they are not determined 
scientifically, in any ordinary sense of “scientific.”  
16 See Brink (“Externalist Moral Realism” 24).  
17 See Sturgeon (“What Difference Does it Make” 116-117).   
18 See Smith (The Moral Problem 6).    
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Moral realism is the theory that moral judgments enjoy a special sort of 
objectivity: such judgments, when true, are so independent of what any human 
being, anywhere, in any circumstance whatever, thinks of them . . . At the 
simplest level, all realists endorse the idea that there is a moral reality that people 
are trying to represent when they issue judgments about what is right and wrong.19  
Mark Timmons, a moral “irrealist,” offers a statement of the kind of view he argues 
against: 
Moral realism . . is the view that there are moral facts—facts concerning goodness 
and rightness—and that they exist objectively. . . .  Moral realists . . hold that 
moral properties and facts exist and that their existence and nature are 
conceptually and metaphysically independent of our moral beliefs and theories, 
including our warranted or even ideally warranted moral beliefs and theories.20  
Gilbert Harman, a moral relativist, claims that “moral absolutists” hold that “there is a 
single true morality.”21 And Judith Thomson defends a thesis of “moral objectivity,” viz., 
that it is possible to find out about some moral sentences that they are true.22  Since 
absolutism and objectivism are their names for morally realistic positions, Harman’s and 
Thomson’s brief characterizations provide some further insight into the kind of view I 
will defend. 
Perhaps it is due to its completeness, in terms of the breadth of considerations that 
he addresses, that Peter Railton claims that his position “might well be described as 
‘stark, raving moral realism.’” The view that he has defended is that: 
[M]oral judgments can bear truth in a fundamentally non-epistemic sense of truth; 
. . moral properties are objective, though relational; . . moral properties supervene 
on natural properties, and may be reducible to them; . . moral inquiry is of a piece 
with empirical inquiry; . . it cannot be known a priori whether bivalence holds for 
moral judgments or how determinately such judgments can be assessed; . . there is 
reason to think we know a fair amount about morality, but also reason to think 
that current moralities are wrong in certain ways and could be wrong in quite 
                                                          
19 See Shafer Landau (Moral Realism: A Defence 2). 
20 See Timmons (Morality Without Foundations 35).  
21 See Harman (Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 5). 
22 See Thomson (Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 68). 
 15 
general ways; . .  a rational agent may fail to have a reason for obeying moral 
imperatives, although they may nonetheless be applicable to him.23  
Railton articulates many dimensions on which a theory can be assessed as realistic or not. 
I will not discuss all these dimensions, but some of the themes he mentions are those that 
other authors have focused on in characterizing realism; these are the ones I will focus on 
also.   
Thus, to summarize, moral realists believe that moral judgments are beliefs: they 
are not other states of mind such as, e.g., expressions of desires, emotions, commands or 
attitudes that lack a truth-value. So, realism concerns what is going on in people’s minds 
when they make moral judgments: it is a psychological thesis and a thesis concerning 
philosophy of mind. Since to have a belief is to have an attitude toward a proposition, 
there are moral propositions. Propositions are, of course, either true or false, although 
realism is consistent with the possibility of some truth-value gaps due to vague moral 
sentences. Thus, moral realism is a thesis concerning philosophy of language as well. 
Realists think that some moral propositions are true: they are accurate 
representations of a moral reality, and moral reality includes moral facts or properties that 
are not constituted by the attitudes taken towards them. Thus, realism is a metaphysical 
thesis, although, as mentioned above, realists disagree on the preferred ontology. But, 
whatever moral facts and properties are like, realists agree that their existence is 
conceptually24 and metaphysically independent of anyone’s beliefs and thoughts about 
them. Realists reject that believing something to have a moral property or having certain 
attitudes toward it constitutes the moral property or, in itself, entails something having 
that property.  
Of course, whether moral claims are true will often very much depend on mental 
states; e.g., whether it was wrong for Billy to say what he did to Sally might depend on 
whether it upset Sally and caused her pain, and whether pain is bad will depend on what 
pain is like. So mental states are highly relevant to the truth of moral judgments, but, 
                                                          
23 See Railton (“Moral Realism” 165).  
24 Someone who might deny this might say, e.g., “The concept of ‘being bad’ is that of ‘being disapproved 
of by God.’” On this sort of view, moral concepts are understood in terms of the preferences of, on many 
views, a necessarily existent being. Whether this sort of view should count as a version of realism is 
debatable. Resolving this controversy is not needed for my purposes here.  
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according to moral realism, the truth of a moral proposition is not determined by 
anyone’s attitudes toward it. 
Finally, although I will not discuss this in detail, I should mention that realists 
typically reject epistemological skepticism about morality: they typically think that some 
people have some justified, reasonable beliefs, if not knowledge, about what’s moral. But 
they can differ on their preferred epistemology: among realists we find foundationalists, 
coherentists, reliablists, and defenders of other epistemological positions. One could 
accept moral realism but be a complete moral (or even global) skeptic, but this is not 
common. 
1.4. The Meaning and Use of Moral Terms. 
This provides a basic overview of some of the most important features of a morally 
realistic position. But an especially important issue that isn’t mentioned in any of our 
characterizations above concerns the meanings of moral terms. This issue has important 
psychological and metaphysical implications, which will be explored below.  
Moral realists accept a particular kind of view about the meanings of moral terms: 
they think moral terms’ meanings are “cognitive” or “descriptive.” On this kind of view, 
to make a moral judgment is to attempt to describe something, to say that something has 
some property; it’s to try to convey some information about the world or represent the 
world has having some features.  
Thus moral realisms are also semantic theses. What are these cognitive or 
descriptive meanings, i.e., what do various moral terms like “right” and “good” mean? 
Different realists have different answers, depending largely on which (if any) substantive 
moral theory they accept. But it is important to note that realists, at least, are united in 
rejecting a kind of view about the meanings of moral terms. Explaining this contrast 
provides some understanding of how realists of all stripes understand the meanings of 
moral terms. And this understanding has implications for the psychological and 
metaphysical aspects of the position.   
The nature of “meanings” is controversial: the meaning of “meaning” is less than 
clear. I do not hope to resolve the question of what meanings are here. Therefore, I hope 
to remain as intuitive or theoretically neutral as possible on the issue, ‘naïve’ in the truly 
naïve and non-technical sense of the term. So, when asking what some term means, my 
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methodology is to speculate on what someone would say if asked, “I don’t quite 
understand what you are saying; could you say more about what you mean by that?” 
Insofar as, from a naïve point of view, how someone uses a term is a consequence of its 
meaning (or meanings), I will investigate how moral and epistemic terms are used.  
To understand some views about the meanings of moral terms that some moral 
irrealists are fond of but realists typically reject, it is useful to think about the meanings 
of some non-moral terms. An important observation is that it seems that some words’ 
meanings are such that, if someone, in an ordinary context and using the term in an 
ordinary sense, sincerely utters a grammatical sentence using these terms, she must be 
expressing some emotion or revealing how she feels. If she sincerely utters one of these 
sentences, she could not be affectively indifferent to the subject matter of her sentence. 
This affective response might be indicative of the kind of meaning a term has. 
One example of this phenomenon about meaning might be the use of the term 
“bozo” or a “total, complete bozo.” It seems plausible that one could not sincerely call 
someone a total bozo and yet be completely without any negative feelings about him. 
These feelings might fade and change over time, but if at the initial time of making the 
statement there are no feelings, then we might doubt that the assertion was sincere, or if 
the words “total bozo” were being used in an ordinary sense. This is because to say that 
someone is a total bozo is not merely to describe him (and, in absence, of contextual 
clues, just calling someone a bozo only gives a rather non-specific ideas about what he’s 
like), but it’s also to express one’s dislike of him, to vent one’s emotions. 
A more vivid example of this phenomenon might be a long hyphenated series of 
swear words. Were someone to sincerely say (or even think) of someone, “That guy is a 
total-God-#&*$^-mother--@-son-of-a-(&^%$%-er!!”, she would have to be angry about 
him: she couldn’t have this thought but have no negative feelings about him.  
On a more positive (but, hopefully, non-sexist) note, perhaps it’s impossible for 
someone to sincerely judge a woman to be a “hot, bodacious babe” without having any 
positive feelings or desires for her. Some evidence for this might be that were someone to 
make this judgment but then add that he would have no interest or desire whatsoever in 
meeting her under any circumstance (including, perhaps, one where he was less shy, 
more confident and a snappier dresser), we might doubt the sincerity of his initial 
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assertion. We might think he didn’t really mean what he said: he was just mouthing the 
words but not saying what they ordinarily mean. 
 The point of these examples is to show that it seems, for some words, an affective, 
emotion and desire-oriented component is part of their meaning: their sincere use 
necessitates this kind of emotional involvement. Some philosophers claim that the 
meanings of moral terms are like this. They argue that moral terms’ meanings are such 
that, if someone sincerely uses them in a sentence in an ordinary context, that person 
must be expressing feelings or desires.  
On these views to sincerely claim that something is, e.g., morally right or good is, 
necessarily, to have and express some positive feeling about it: the judgment is the 
expression of that feeling. And just as one cannot sincerely judge someone to be a bozo 
and be without feeling, these philosophers claim that one cannot judge something to be 
right or good and be without feeling towards that act being done, or some state affairs 
being brought about. If one said that something is wrong, but lacked any feeling about it, 
then the judgment is not sincere: it’s not even a real judgment; it’s just a mouthing of the 
words.  
Sometimes this (alleged) emotional phenomenon is described in terms of moral 
“motivation,” or explained using the term. The claim is that moral judgments necessarily 
involve these feelings that provide motivation towards bringing about some end.25 It 
seems possible that someone could be quite emotionally invested her moral judgments 
and so her emotions are always “moved” whenever she judges something to be right or 
wrong – she is always quite “worked up” – it also seems that this person could not be at 
all “motivated” to do much about anything: all worked up, but no action.  
But those who claim that moral judgments have this motivational influence 
usually claim that these emotions always, or perhaps even necessarily, influence one’s 
motivation; their claim is that “motivating” feelings, desires, and/or affective “oomph” 
are “internal” to sincere moral judgments: there is a necessary connection between the 
two. So, Michael Smith claims, “all else being equal, to have a moral opinion simply is to 
find yourself with a motivation to act.”26  
                                                          
25 Difficulties in formulating and defending this kind of view will be discussed below and in later chapters.  
26 See Smith (“Realism” 400).   
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This thesis isn’t that someone necessarily acts or behaves as her moral judgment 
dictates: it typically allows for competing motives to override, weakness of will and, of 
course, the possibility that one is paralyzed or in a full body cast and so is unable to 
physically act as one’s moral judgments would require. And, presumably, this sort of 
view would allow for the fact that, for some moral judgments, there are no obvious 
corresponding actions.  
It is also odd when applied toward moral judgments about the actions of others, 
especially in the very distant past or future, or with rather unspecific moral judgments. 
Say we judge that Socrates was treated wrongly; it’s clear we can’t do anything about 
that now, so it’s not clear what we might be moved to do or how any of our motivations 
would, or should, change. Also, say we expect that in a few hundred years that someone 
will do something horribly evil. It seems we can have that thought but, again, it’s not 
clear how it might motivate us to do anything, since we would have no idea what to do.  
So this sort of “motivationally internalist” view is probably most plausible when 
applied to judgments about one’s own activities at the present time. Ignoring the 
complication about other moral judgments about other kinds of cases, the idea is that 
moral judgment entails some motivation, and this is, at root, a feeling or a desire. Thus, if 
there is no feeling or desire, then a sincere moral judgment was not made.  
This is a psychological thesis again in that it pertains to how moral judgment 
relates to our psychologies. But it is a consequence of a semantic thesis since the 
meanings of the moral terms are taken to explain the affective phenomena: it’s because 
the terms have these meanings that they have these psychological consequences. This has 
the consequence that, insofar as these affective states are not, strictly speaking, beliefs, 
moral judgments are also not beliefs either; they are another, non-representational, state 
of mind. 
The view is that, when used sincerely, moral terms necessarily express feelings 
because of their meanings. Perspectives that claim there is this necessary connection 
between moral judgment and affect describe the meaning of moral terms as emotive, non-
cognitive, expressive, or non-descriptive. These characterizations often differ in meaning 
only slightly, if at all, so for now I will take them as equivalent and take “emotive 
meaning” as shorthand for the other terms that might describe the view.   
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“Emotive meaning” contrasts with “cognitive” or “descriptive meaning.” A term’s 
meaning is purely cognitive or descriptive perhaps if it can be sincerely used without the 
speaker (or, perhaps, thinker or author) expressing any feelings. Some philosophers who 
believe that moral terms have emotive meaning think that their meaning is purely 
emotive: they have no descriptive meaning and so to sincerely use such a moral term is 
never to state (or imply) a sentence that has a truth value. As we shall soon see in 
subsequent chapters, A.J. Ayer’s view was like this. C.L. Stevenson’s final view was like 
this also.27 
Moral realists needn’t deny that emotions sometimes run high when making 
moral judgments: that’s just an empirical truth. And realists needn’t think that’s a bad 
thing, in any sense of bad: they needn’t advocate a Mr. Spock-like, emotion-free 
existence. They can think that having a rich emotional life is morally valuable and 
important.  
“Important for what?” one might ask. At this point an answer in the negative 
might be best: the emotions can be important for things other than there being moral 
judgments. Emotions can motivate, and perhaps they sometimes contribute to epistemic 
insight, but they can motivate us towards, and help inform us of, doing the right thing that 
exists independently of our motivations toward doing that right thing. Emotivists deny 
this: recall that motivational internalists think that moral terms have emotive meaning 
because they think that moral judgments are necessarily motivating. They claim if there 
were no such feelings, there could be no such judgments: they claim that’s impossible.   
Realists deny this impossibility: they think it is possible that someone could make 
a moral judgment and lack corresponding motivation altogether. They might plausibly 
think that in a world with no beings that have an experiential welfare, nothing would have 
any moral qualities since nothing could go better or worse for anyone, but this is not the 
issue.   
Again, realists believe that moral judgments’ truth depends on objective moral 
facts or properties, and that to make a moral judgment is to say that something has some 
                                                          
27 Stevenson originally (in “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms”) offered a mixed theory on which to 
make a moral judgment is both to (a) express one’s approval (or disapproval) and (b) to report one’s 
believe that one approves (or disapproves). He later came to see that his view was more plausible without 
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moral property. But on the standard, Humean view of motivation, affect, or “oomph,” 
believing that something has some property is never, in itself, sufficient to motivate 
someone or rouse someone’s feelings. Motivation comes from other sources, e.g., desires. 
But what someone’s desires are is, presumably, a contingent matter, and it seems at least 
possible that someone could lack any desires to do the right thing. 
While this affective and motivational phenomenon is not easy to pin down in a 
highly concrete manner, it is useful to classify theories of the nature of moral judgment 
along these dividing lines. For each theory, in addition to the more straightforward 
desiderata discussed above, we might ask if it implies that there are any kinds of moral 
judgments that are necessarily motivating or necessarily influence the emotions. If it 
does, that reveals important interrelated semantic and psychological features of the view 
that will, in turn, likely have important metaphysical and epistemic implications.  
Two important implications are that if moral judgments necessarily motivate, this 
would, at least, suggest that moral judgments are not (or not merely) the apprehension of 
properties and so not merely beliefs. These results would have important implications for 
moral epistemology. If there are no moral properties, then there are no moral truths, and 
so no true moral beliefs. And, obviously, if moral judgments are not beliefs, then, strictly 
speaking, there are no justified moral beliefs or moral knowledge, strictly speaking. 
Moral realists resist all these implications.  
Some more recent theorists – realists and not – have challenged the standard 
Humean assumptions about motivation and have argued that beliefs can motivate in 
themselves, or motivate without any related desires.28 But these views are controversial 
and will not be discussed here, as I will be working with the standard assumptions about 
belief and motivation.  
On the more standard conception of moral realism, motivation and affect are 
contingent features of making moral judgments; they are explained by psychological 
factors, not the semantics of moral terms. Thus, any view that claims an essential 
motivating feature to moral judgments is likely unacceptable from the assumptions most 
moral realists are apt to accept and traditionally have accepted. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(b), the reporting function, and thus advocated a pure expressivism. See Stevenson (“Retrospective 
Comments” 210-214).  
28 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism: A Defence).  
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  Although moral irrealisms can be easily understood as denials of moral realisms, 
there are many ways that one can deny moral realisms. One can deny that there are moral 
beliefs, objective truths, propositions, properties or facts. Starting with any of these will 
often lead to many of the others, as the concepts within the cluster are often related.  
For example, if one denies that there are moral beliefs because one thinks that 
moral judgments are purely expressive, one will (and should, I will argue) also deny 
moral propositions and, of course, true moral propositions.29 One might also deny moral 
facts and properties and, while this might eventually lead one to some kind of 
expressivism, it needn’t; one could think that there are moral beliefs, but that they are no 
facts or properties to make any of them true, as J.L. Mackie did.  
Most generally, moral irrealists all agree that there are no positive objective moral 
truths, either because moral language just isn’t the kind of discourse that admits of truth 
and falsity, or there are no moral truth-makers (or they understand these truth-makers as a 
function of the attitudes toward the propositions, a position that realists deny).  
Some recent irrealists have attempted to buck this trend by using the predicates 
“is true,” “is a fact,” “is known” in various “minimalist” senses; these views exploit the 
fact that sometimes these phrases are used to affirm various claims and express one’s 
agreements. These newer positions will be briefly discussed in my final chapter, but it is 
sufficient here to note that they differ significantly from realisms given that realists 
understand these locutions in non-minimalist terms. While minimalists sometimes wish 
to say everything realists say about the nature of morality, if these minimalists did that, 
then there would be nothing to distinguish their position from the realists’ position. I will 
argue that once these differences are revealed, minimalisms are not attractive positions. 
1.5. Epistemic Realisms and Irrealisms. 
This concludes my brief characterization of the kind of position moral realism is. 
In light of this characterization, I will again summarize the nature of an analogous kind of 
view, epistemic realism.  
                                                          
29 On could think that there are (true) moral propositions but that moral discourse is always and only 
expressive and so no one ever states a true moral proposition. On this view, we are prevented from stating 
(true) moral propositions. It’s unclear what the motivations or advantages for this view would be, however, 
and I don’t think it has ever been advocated. 
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By analogy, epistemic realisms are views that hold that epistemic judgments are 
beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, such as suspensions of judgment. Epistemic realists 
hold that while one might express strong emotions in making an epistemic judgment, 
these emotions are not essential to the judgment. Strong emotions might arise in the 
context of making epistemic evaluations, but these emotions are only contingently related 
to the evaluations: emotion and motivation-free epistemic evaluations are possible and, 
seemingly, actual.  
Since there are beliefs about epistemic matters, there are epistemic propositions. 
And some of these beliefs are true because there are objective, stance-independent 
epistemic truths, facts and properties. They are “objective” in the sense that they are not 
constituted, or determined by, our beliefs and attitudes toward epistemic propositions. 
There are disputes among realists as to the preferred epistemic ontology, i.e. whether 
epistemic properties or facts are identical to “natural” facts, supervene on them, or are 
some kind of non-natural facts. Regardless, on all epistemically realistic views there is an 
epistemic reality that can be, and sometimes is, represented and that epistemic terms have 
descriptive or cognitive meaning: their meanings are not expressive or emotive.  
Thus, epistemic realism is a position on the semantics, metaphysics and 
psychology of epistemic judgments. Although epistemic realists typically are not 
epistemological skeptics, they could be: a skeptical epistemology of epistemic judgments 
is possible. Here I will not focus on epistemic epistemology, although much of my 
discussion suggests that we can have rational, a priori insight into the realm of the 
epistemic and that this kind of view is unavoidable; someone could argue against this sort 
of view only by presupposing it.  
 Epistemic realism seems the standard position among philosophers, especially 
epistemologists. Few have denied it. But if anyone denied it, what would his or her view 
be? Irrealisms in epistemology are analogous to non-realisms about morality. Irrealists 
about epistemic judgments would, for the most part, think that no epistemic judgments 
are true.  
Again, the basic division is to think that no positive epistemic judgments are true 
either because epistemic discourse is, in some manner, expressive or non-descriptive and 
so does not admit of truth and falsity, or because there are no epistemic properties or facts 
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to make any epistemic judgments true. “Relativistic” perspectives that allow epistemic 
truths are possible, and on these views the truth-value of an epistemic proposition 
depends on the attitudes taken toward that proposition or the believer’s epistemic 
principles seem possible as well. Standard possible forms of epistemic irrealism take 
either of these options; other possible epistemic irrealisms could be modeled after more 
recent moral irrealists that are subtler in their development of alternatives to the standard, 
realistic view. 
Epistemic irrealisms are rather striking views. Epistemic expressivism, one kind 
of epistemic irrealism, implies that epistemic judgments or evaluations are not, strictly 
speaking, beliefs; rather, they are expressions of approval or desire that something be 
believed or disbelieved. This is a radical implication. Some global skeptics believe that 
we don’t know anything or are justified in believing anything, but if an expressivist 
epistemic realism is true, then the claim, “We don’t know anything and we are not 
justified in believing anything,” is not even a belief; rather, it is a non-cognitive 
expression that is neither true nor false. That is an interesting consequence.  
Other epistemic irrealisms allow that an epistemic judgment like this is a belief, 
but that there are no properties or facts to serve as epistemic truth-makers so it, or any 
other positive epistemic evaluation is never true. On this view, non-skeptics can never 
truthfully insist that some of our beliefs are justified or known, and skeptics can never 
truthfully assert that our beliefs are unjustified (they might be not justified, but this is not 
the same as them being unjustified). While skeptics typically argue that our beliefs don’t 
meet what they regard as the high standards for knowledge, many epistemic irrealists are 
more radical in arguing that there are no truthful epistemic standards at all, and that is 
why we don’t know or have any beliefs that are reasonable. These are uncommon views, 
with surprising consequences. More specific formulations of this kind of view and its 
many rivals will be explained and discussed in greater detail later. I will argue that we 
have better reason to reject these views than accept them.  
Although some might take these views as a reductio of the premises given against 
moral realism, I see no reason to think that epistemic judgments must be descriptive and 
sometimes true (and true because of stance-independent epistemic properties): the world 
isn’t such that epistemic realism has to be true. But I suspect that most of us – given what 
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we believe now – could develop better arguments against epistemic expressivism than for 
it: all things considered, we have better reason to think epistemic judgments are 
sometimes literally true and we can see that this implies that epistemic expressivism is 
false. These arguments, however, will typically imply that various premises in arguments 
for moral irrealisms have at least one false premise and so are unsound. This, of course, 
undercuts many of the cases for moral irrealisms. If we see this, we see that, perhaps, 
there’s little reason to accept ethical expressivisms in the first place. 
1.6. Moral and Epistemic Judgments: Some Similarities.   
Before I turn to the case against moral realism, which I will use to make a case against 
epistemic realism, I should note that premises offered as reasons to reject moral realism 
might be reasons to reject to epistemological realism only if epistemic language, and its 
metaphysical presuppositions, is sufficiently similar to that of moral language. While 
epistemic and moral discourse is, of course, different, the success of my case depends 
mainly on epistemic judgments being similar to moral judgments in ways that moral 
irrealists point to in support of their moral irrealisms.  
My target moral irrealists generally aren’t global irrealists: they don’t think that 
all language should be interpreted irrealistically. But they do think that moral discourse 
and practice has features that are better understood on an irrealistic model and so moral 
realism’s semantic, metaphysical, psychological and/or epistemic presumptions are likely 
mistaken. I will argue that epistemic discourse shares these features. This is necessary to 
argue that if moral irrealists think the presence of these features is sufficient to warrant an 
irrealistic understanding of morality then, to be consistent, they should also think that an 
irrealistic understanding of epistemic matters is warranted as well.  
An interesting aspect of my discussion is that I focus on this “should” in the 
previous sentence and its semantic and metaphysical status. Moral irrealists think that 
moral “shoulds” should be understood irrealistically, but they think that what might be 
called logical, or epistemic, “shoulds” – “shoulds” about how one ought to reason, or 
what we should conclude given various premises – should be understood realistically. I 
aim to argue that this is, ultimately, an inconsistent position, in terms of the reasons moral 
irrealists give in favor of their moral irrealism. They tend to accept the assumptions, 
shared by moral realists and irrealists alike, that one’s beliefs should be consistent and 
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that there is something bad or disingenuous about having inconsistent beliefs, especially 
if they are recognized as such. This might seem to especially be the case if one is a 
professional philosopher since, one might think, philosophers either should just recognize 
the value of consistency or, at least, because that concern just goes with the job: it’s some 
kind of role or occupational obligation.  
These claims above all sound like epistemic or intellectual value judgments. I will 
argue that they are and that moral irrealists are inconsistent in accepting them: their own 
views imply that such intellectual value judgments are false, or merely “relative” truths, 
or expressive and so neither true nor false. So moral irrealists tend to believe something, 
and base their cases for moral irrealism, on assumptions that a premise in their case 
against moral irrealism suggest are not true. This is an inconsistency.  
If they are inconsistent, is it a bad thing? And were this recognized, should moral 
irrealists change their views? I will argue that these questions should be answered in the 
affirmative but that that it is very difficult to answer them affirmatively from a vivid 
awareness of the bases of morally irrealistic positions. I hope this reinforces the 
presumption in favor of epistemic and logical realism and that this presumption can be 
shown to imply that the arguments for moral irrealism should not be accepted, and that 
judgment – that moral irrealism should not be accepted – is true in a robust, realistic 
sense.  
As a brief start to highlight some similarities between moral and epistemic 
judgment, it is often said both moral and epistemic judgments are “normative.”  Exactly 
what this means is not entirely clear, but it seems, at least, that normative judgments 
concern what ought and ought not, or should and should not, be the case.   
This description is not perfect, since it seems to be true that, e.g., it is the case that 
good ought to be promoted, but it seems appropriate since epistemic evaluation concerns 
what one ought to believe, how one should reason and even what kind of intellectual or 
cognitive character traits one ought to have. Ethics concerns how one ought to behave, 
what states of affairs ought to be brought about, what attitudes and feelings one should 
have, and what kind of character one ought to cultivate. So there are both moral and 
epistemic “oughts” and “shoulds.”  
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A related idea is that moral and epistemic judgments are also often described as 
prescriptive and evaluative. Since both seem to concern value or goodness (although 
likely of different kinds) this latter label seems appropriate. And it is commonly supposed 
that are both moral virtues and epistemic virtues, and that some virtues that have both 
moral and epistemic aspects. 
Moral and epistemic judgments also have both seemed subject to “deontic” 
understandings (and there are deontic logics of each kind). These are analyses or 
definitions in terms of what is permitted, required and forbidden from their respective 
perspectives, what is a duty or obligation, what is be deserving or praise and blame, and 
so forth. Many terms like this are common to both moral and epistemic discourse.  
In epistemology, claims like this are associated with a much-discussed notion of a 
“deontic conception of justification.” Objections have been raised to a deontic 
understanding of epistemic terms, mostly along the lines that these conceptions of 
justification falsely presuppose that we are able to decide what to believe, but I will 
defend some versions of this understanding of epistemic terms. In fact, I will argue that, 
in a clear and important sense, we are all epistemic deontologists and that some versions 
of epistemic deontology cannot plausibly be denied. Since much of this dissertation 
concerns the propriety of epistemic “ought” and “should” judgments, addressing some 
common objections to these judgments shall be the focus on my second chapter.  
Another similarity is that what the metaphysical foundations, or the truth makers, 
of both kinds of judgments are not clear. For many, what the moral components of a 
moral fact are not obvious: many are puzzled by what would make a moral judgment 
true. Similarly, what the epistemic components of an epistemic fact are not obvious 
either. At least from many common perspectives, these kinds of facts seem quite different 
from more mundane, empirical facts; it’s not uncommon for people to be mystified by 
what in the world could make something morally right, or good, or such that it ought to 
be done.30  
Comparable curiosity and puzzlement is understandable for alleged epistemic 
facts: what in the world could make it such that I ought to believe some proposition, or 
                                                          
30 Our beliefs and attitudes are, of course, “in the world,” but having these serve as truth-makers for 
judgments will, at least, present a challenge for making sense of moral and epistemic error, among other 
difficulties.  
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that it’s good to have evidence, and so forth? If one is puzzled about how and where one 
would find the moral facts, one should be equally puzzled about the epistemic facts. If 
this puzzlement leads one to reject moral facts or properties, then comparable puzzlement 
perhaps would lead one to reject epistemic facts or properties also, and perhaps it should.  
Many realists in both ethics and epistemology have argued that supervenience is 
involved in there being truth-makers for such judgments: moral truths supervene, or 
depend on, natural features; it is these natural features that, ultimately, make a moral or 
epistemic judgment true (or false). But critics have argued that supervenience is 
excessively mysterious and so have focused an attack on moral realism for its 
dependence on it. But if epistemic properties are also supervenient, then epistemic 
realism is subject to the same kind of attack leveled against moral realism.  
There seem to be related metaphysical concerns about whether moral and 
epistemic properties possess causal powers, as well as how epistemic access to each 
might be achieved. Some have argued that we should not believe in properties that lack 
causal influence: if this is true, then perhaps we should not believe there are moral 
properties, but we should not believe in epistemic properties either. Some philosophers, 
especially those who call themselves “naturalists,” might be equally puzzled about where 
each kind of property is found in “nature.”  
And we also might wonder whether moral and epistemic facts need to be appealed 
to in order to explain our moral and epistemic experiences. Some have argued that we 
needn’t think that there are moral properties in order to explain our moral beliefs: these 
can be explained by our upbringing and background beliefs, not by our detecting moral 
properties. Perhaps there are comparable epistemic concerns: e.g., when it seems that a 
belief is justified to someone, do we need to posit a property ‘justified’ in order to 
account for that experience, or can that phenomenon be adequately accounted for without 
such a property?  
In the moral case, some have argued that the experience can be explained without 
positing the property. Perhaps the analogous conclusion is plausible about epistemic 
properties also. This conclusion, unlike the moral one, has the consequence that if it is 
true, and there is no need to posit epistemic properties, then it’s not true that we should 
not believe that they exist or that our belief would be unjustified: this is because there are 
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no such properties. This would surely be a surprising consequence, and one that might 
lead us to rethink this test for which properties we should acknowledge. This result might 
even give good reason to reject these arguments against moral realism.  
A further similarity between moral and epistemic judgments is that it is plausible 
to think that they at least sometimes have a motivational quality: they impact our 
emotions and what we are motivated toward bringing about. So, sometimes, so it would 
often be odd to make such a judgment without having some correlated desires. This 
phenomenon is more discussed in the context of moral judgment, but it seems that 
comparable claims can be made for some epistemic judgments having the same kind of 
motivational and connotative influence.  
For example, it does seem that it would be odd for someone to judge one of her 
beliefs unjustified or irrational, but for her to have no desire to be rid of that belief. And 
people tend to think that if we convince someone that she has good reasons to believe 
some proposition, she will then desire to believe that proposition and this will change her 
belief set (or it should).  
Although epistemologists rarely investigate the possible emotional and 
motivational qualities of epistemic judgments, it seems at least prima facie plausible to 
think that epistemic judgments have these features. If their association with moral 
judgments is suggestive of moral irrealism, then perhaps their association with epistemic 
judgments is suggestive of an epistemic irrealism also. This is, at least, an under explored 
commonality between moral and epistemic judgments.  
A further possible similarity between moral and epistemic judgments includes the 
sense that they apply to us irrespective of our wishes and desires. Perhaps this is 
controversial, but few people believe that one can “get out of morality” by, e.g., ceasing 
to care about anyone’s well being besides one’s own. Were someone to not at all care 
about anyone else, that wouldn’t make it the case that, were they in a position to easily 
and safely prevent some innocent from enduring horrendous suffering, he or she is no 
longer under any obligation to do so. Ceasing to care about others does not preclude one 
from moral obligations and being subject to moral evaluation: some might express this 
idea by saying that morality (or some aspects of it) is “categorical.”  
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But epistemic evaluation is comparably categorical: ceasing to care about reasons, 
evidence and clear and critical thinking wouldn’t make it the case that one’s epistemic 
situation cannot be truthfully evaluated; ceasing to care about having evidence wouldn’t 
make a belief that “Starbucks’ has become a famous store for selling grape Kool-Aid” not 
unjustified, were the typical person to find herself with that belief.  
Another common, related, yet not optimally clear, way to express this idea is that 
there are moral and epistemic reasons, and their existence is not dependent on our desires 
for our moral and epistemic lives. So, we might say that there are always reasons to 
prevent horrendous suffering when we can easily do so, and reasons to believe what we 
have evidence for, even if we don’t care about or value either of these things.  
A final similarity is that there seem to be widespread disagreements about which 
moral evaluations are correct, and there seem to be widespread disagreements about 
which epistemic evaluations are correct. These disagreements concern both particular 
moral and epistemic judgments, as well as disagreements about more basic, general 
principles. Moral irrealists have appealed to these disagreements in making a case for 
their moral irrealism. If a case for the existence of epistemic disagreements can be made 
that is comparable in strength to the case for moral disagreements, then this might 
suggest analogous arguments for epistemic irrealism.  
If the cases are not very comparable, however, an issue remains: why should we 
accept what we regard as the best explanation of some phenomenon? Answers here might 
point to facts about objective intellectual and epistemic values, the existence of which 
might be hard to reconcile with the premises of arguments against the existence of 
objective moral values.  
These are just a few of the similarities between moral and epistemic judgments. 
To sum them up, both kinds of judgments evaluative and are often made using deontic 
language. The nature of the truth-makers for both kinds of judgments is less than clear, 
and both typically presuppose supervenience on natural features. Both kinds of 
judgments, and the properties commonly presupposed in making them, do not obviously 
seem necessary to explain facts that are clearly “natural” facts. Both kinds of evaluations 
and requirements seem categorical: their application to us does not depend on our desires. 
A final similarity is that there are disagreements about which particular moral and 
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epistemic evaluations are true, and disagreements about the philosophical natures of such 
judgments. More similarities will be noted as I survey the various particular arguments 
given against the morally realist presumption that there are some objectively true moral 
beliefs.  
Since many objections to moral realism appeal to some feature of moral 
judgments or theorizing that the objector claims is best understood on a denial of realist 
presuppositions, I will argue that epistemic judgments share many of these features so 
that the moral irrealist’s premises apply to both. I will then argue that that since this 
feature does not show that epistemic discourse should be interpreted irrealistically, it does 
not show that moral discourse should be interpreted irrealistically either.  
Of course, there are many differences between moral and epistemic evaluation: 
like everything else, moral and epistemic judgments are similar in some ways and 
different in others. In fact, the more the differences are developed, the more it might seem 
that the comparison is strained. This seems especially the case given the extremely 
diverse range of perspectives on morality and moral thinking.  
However, to prevent the comparison from slipping through our fingers, my 
approach is, again, to focus on the fact that epistemic judgments are comparable to moral 
judgments in the way irrealists use to make their cases for moral irrealism. With this 
focus, differences between moral and epistemic judgments will be irrelevant: if epistemic 
judgments have the features that moral irrealists find, what we might call, “objectionable” 
about moral judgments, then it does not straightforwardly matter that epistemic 
judgments have additional features also, since epistemic judgments will still be caught up 
in the net of premises moral irrealists use to try to make their case. If having feature A is 
thought to be a sufficient reason for understanding a judgment irrealistically, that 
principle applies to judgments that have feature A, even if they also have features B and 
C.  
If my arguments are successful they will at least show– if the common 
presumption is correct and epistemic discourse should be interpreted realistically  – that 
many morally irrealists’ criteria for when a kind of discourse should be interpreted 
irrealistically are logically insufficient for a discipline or field not having any objective 
truths in its domain. Thus, that a discourse meets these conditions is not enough to 
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warrant an irrealistic understanding of it since epistemic discourse meets it and, I will 
argue, it shouldn’t be understood irrealistically. This result should, at least, force moral 
irrealists back to the drawing board to produce tighter arguments. Ideally, it will lead 
them to reject their cases for moral realism, and it truthfully should.  
However, I should note that if any moral irrealists perceive a need to revise their 
arguments, then this will only feed back into my defense of moral and epistemic realism. 
For if they think that moral-antirealists who understand these arguments should change 
their arguments or position, or ought to respond in any way, we can ask if this is true or 
why should accept this claim instead of, say, its negation. I suspect that affirmative 
answers to these questions will ultimately be based on evaluative assumptions that are 
inconsistent with premises of arguments given against moral realism. The sense that, 
from an intellectual point of view, we ought to think in certain ways raises many of the 
same philosophical problems that the sense that we ought to act, or change our character, 
in certain ways does also. I will argue that this sense can be developed into provide 
powerful reasons to reject arguments for moral irrealisms. 
1.7. Conclusion. 
In this chapter I have done three things.  First, I characterized the main meta-
epistemological issue that I will address in my dissertation and laid out the basic strategy 
of my argument. Second, I characterized the kinds of moral and epistemic realisms I aim 
to defend, and I have explained my strategy to defend them. Finally, I surveyed some 
similarities and differences between moral and epistemic judgments.  Further chapters 
will involve the development of these positions and careful examinations of the 
arguments for moral irrealisms with an eye towards showing that they suggest analogous 
arguments for epistemic irrealisms. I then argue that these epistemic arguments are 
unsound, and so are the analogous moral arguments, thereby defending both moral and 
epistemic realism.  
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CHAPTER 2:  Defending Epistemic Deontologies. 
2.1. Introduction. 
In this chapter, I develop in detail a comparison between moral and epistemic judgments 
that I briefly mentioned in the final section of my previous chapter, namely that they can 
both be understood in “deontic” terms, such as “oughts,” “shoulds,” “permissions,” 
“obligations,” “requirements,” and so on.  
I argue that common objections to understanding some epistemic judgments in 
some deontic terms are weak.1 Since we often make deontic epistemic judgments, and 
epistemic realists hold that these judgments are literally true or false, it is important to 
defend them from objections. This is especially important since epistemic irrealisms 
suggest that no positive deontic epistemic evaluations are true. If, however, some deontic 
epistemic judgments are true, this implies that epistemic irrealisms are false. This implies 
that some premises given in their defense are false. Since these premises are often used to 
argue for moral irrealism, undercutting them is important for defending moral realism. 
Thus, a defense of epistemic deontology can contribute to a defense of moral realism.  
As we shall see, the exact nature of the deontological conception of justification is 
hard to pin down, in part because many epistemically-evaluative terms have been 
associated with this it. Here I clarify that conception, and defend it from some common 
objections in the epistemological literature. These objections are largely independent of 
the meta-ethical and meta-epistemological concerns that are the main focus of this work 
and articulated in the previous chapter.  
In subsequent chapters I will develop arguments against a version of the 
deontological conception of epistemic justification that are parallel to the arguments 
commonly given against there being truthful deontic moral judgments.  I then defend 
epistemic deontology from these objections. Themes developed in this chapter contribute 
to that defense.   
                                                          
1 The many somes in this thesis make it quite qualified. This qualification is needed due to the wide range 
of both epistemic and epistemically-deontic evaluations: there are so many that I need to restrict myself to 
those that are more commonly used and so I have a clearer sense for what they mean. So my focus here 
includes, for deontic evaluations, ought and should, and, for epistemic evaluations, justified and 
reasonable. Although I discuss other evaluations, some of them strike me more as philosophers’ inventions 
(e.g., being praiseworthy for belief) and so we lack a firm, “real-world” basis for evaluating their possible 
semantics. I discuss this below.  
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2. 2. Basic Objections to the Deontic Conception. 
The deontological conception of epistemic justification (or epistemic deontology) is 
much discussed in recent epistemological literature.2 It is not uncommon to hear 
philosophers claim that they reject the deontological conception of justification.  
Some philosophers reject it because they think it implies doxastic voluntarism, the 
view that, roughly, we have direct voluntary control over what we believe. This objection 
is based in the idea that if there are things we ought to believe (or not believe) or are 
obligated to believe (or not believe), then it must be the case that we can believe them 
(and can refrain from believing them). Critics argue that this latter condition requires 
abilities to influence what we believe that we do not have, so the deontic conception is 
mistaken.  
The deontic conception is also sometimes said to imply epistemological internalism, 
the view that epistemic justification depends on internal, or mental, or accessible states 
alone.  Again, this objection might be motivated by a thought along the lines that if there 
are things we ought to believe, then we must have some access to, or awareness of, what 
justifies our beliefs, and so some kind of internalism must be true. This thought might be 
motivated again by a kind of “ought implies can” principle: for an evaluation of what one 
ought to believe to be true, it must be the case that one can access all of the factors that 
epistemic justification depends on. Those who reject internalism, often because they 
think justification depends on, in part, factors that are not cognitively accessible (perhaps 
because they are non-mental factors), will thereby reject epistemic deontology, if they 
think it has this consequence.  
Although I do not develop this objection in detail, another consideration raised 
against epistemic deontology is that it is also said to imply that some virtue-based 
understandings of justification are mistaken; those who are fond of virtue epistemology 
might then reject it.3 It might also be thought to objectionably divorce justification from 
truth since, perhaps, a deontic epistemic evaluation of someone’s beliefs can be 
appropriate yet their beliefs are not true or, in any relevant sense, likely to be true. Those 
                                                          
2 My discussion in this chapter, however, suggests that debates about the deontic conception of justification 
are not very important since, if we get clear on what we are talking about – especially in a concrete manner, 
we see that we all accept some kind of deontological epistemic evaluations.  
3 See Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind 7-8).  
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who accept some version of a truth-conducive conception of justification might thereby 
reject deontology. Finally, perhaps some might be uneasy with the suggestion that some 
deontologists make, viz. that there are “epistemic duties.” Perhaps they are uncomfortable 
with this kind of terminology because it again might suggest doxastic voluntarism, but 
some think that this makes reasonable belief “too demanding,” much more demanding 
than it really is.   
Many argue that at least some of these implications cast doubt on epistemic 
deontology: they argue that if it has any of these implications, it is likely false. I will 
argue that these judgments are premature. While widely criticized, few writers have 
adequately clarified their understanding of the deontic conception. This clarification is 
needed to successfully argue against it: if the concept of the “deontological conception” 
is unclear, then it is not obvious that it has the allegedly false implications that its critics 
say it does. 
When philosophers claim that they accept, or reject, the deontological conception, 
it is not entirely clear what they have in mind. Here I try to clear this up. Based on the 
wide variety of suggestions given by the critics and defenders of epistemic deontology, I 
develop a number of general interpretations of what it might be. I argue that some of 
these interpretations are implausible. Thus, if this is what some philosophers have in 
mind when they reject epistemic deontology, they are right to do so.  
However, other conceptions are plausible, I will argue, and these conceptions 
seem acceptable and accepted by all.  Furthermore, it would be hard to coherently deny 
some of these deontic conceptions because to argue against them, it seems that one would 
have to presuppose the truth of some deontic epistemic evaluations, or presuppose a basic 
idea motivating many epistemic deontologists, viz. that there are intellectual requirements 
and that if some belief does not meet them, then it ought not be believed. I will argue that 
that idea, or variations on it, cannot easily be denied, especially in a plausible manner.   
Thus, I argue that we all accept some version, or versions, of epistemic 
deontology: we are all epistemic deontologists. I show how this result defuses some of 
the tensions above, focusing on the internalism/externalism debate. I conclude that none 
of the considerations given against a plausible version of epistemic deontology or a 
deontological conception of justification refute it. To relate this result to the main theme 
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of this work, these objections to epistemic deontology provide no reason to think that 
epistemic realism is false and that it ought not be believed. 
The discussion of this chapter has an important general methodological point. 
Here I address a wide variety of claims that all their proponents relate to the 
deontological conception of justification. If we look carefully at what is being said, 
however, we see that many authors have very different ideas of what this conception is. 
Given these differences, we can see that it is often fruitless to categorize views in such 
general terms and for philosophers to attack theories in such sweeping, general terms. 
General categorizations especially of views that do not have an obvious connection – e.g., 
some thesis that they all share – too often results in confusion and philosophers merely 
talking past each other. What would be far more productive would be to simply state 
one’s view in the most careful and precise way one is able to, instead of associating it 
with a label. Once disassociated with a general label, we can more clearly see the merits 
and demerits of individual views and then, perhaps, make progress in understanding and 
evaluating them. This seems true about this debate, and it seems true about many other 
philosophical disputes also. 
2. 3. The Many Epistemic Deontologies. 
As I said, there are many understandings of the deontological conception of justification. 
Below are a large number of representative characterizations of the deontological 
conception of justification. As we shall see, many different ideas share this label.  
Proceeding alphabetically, William Alston characterizes the view this way:  
being justified in believing that p consists in some sort of ‘deontological’ status, 
for example, being free from blame for believing that p or having satisfied one’s 
intellectual obligations in doing so.4  
Alston also presents the deontological conception in these ways:  
[O]n the deontological conception of the epistemic justification of belief . . to be 
justified in believing that p at t is for one’s belief that p at t not be in violation of 
any epistemic principles . .  that permit only those beliefs that are sufficiently 
likely to be true. . . . To say that S is justified in believing that p at time t is to 
                                                          
4See Alston (Perceiving God 72-73).   
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say that the relevant rules or principles do not forbid S’s believing that p at t. In 
believing that p at t, S is not in contravention of any relevant requirements.5 
Michael Bergmann discusses a perspective that 
epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment.6   
Lawrence Bonjour says that 
the concept of epistemic justification . . . has to do with what one has a duty or 
obligation to do, from an epistemic or intellectual standpoint.7 
Anthony Brueckner claims that a deontologist 
conceives of epistemic justification as consisting in the fulfillment of epistemic 
obligation, or duty. . . On a deontological conception of epistemic justification, S 
is justified in believing that P if and only if S’s belief that P is in conformity to S’s 
epistemic duty.8 
Carl Ginet, who, according to Alston, is a “model deontologist” who “sets out the 
conception with admirable directness”,9 presents the view as 
One is justified in being confident that p if and only if it is not the case that one 
ought not be confident that p; one could not be justly reproached for being 
confident that p.10 
Alvin Goldman reports that 
Epistemic deontologists commonly maintain that being justified in believing a 
proposition p consists in being (intellectually) required or permitted to believe p; 
and being unjustified in believing p consists in not being permitted, or being 
forbidden, to believe p. When a person is unjustified in believing a proposition, it 
is his duty not to believe it.11   
John Greco says that 
. . the main idea of deontological theories is that justified belief is a function of [or 
is ‘licensed by’] correct cognitive rules or norms.12 
                                                          
5 See Alston (“Deontological” 258-9). 
6 See Bergmann (“Deontology” 87).   
7 See Bonjour (“Externalist Theories” 55).   
8 See Brueckner (“Deontologism” 527).  
9 See Alston (“Deontological” 259).   
10 See Ginet (Knowledge, Perception, and Memory 28).   
11 See Goldman (“Internalism” 273).  
12 See Greco (“Virtues” 117). 
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Alvin Plantinga says that 
epistemic deontology [is] the view that epistemic duty and obligation are of 
crucial epistemic importance  and that . . being [epistemically] justified is being 
within our rights, flouting no epistemic duties, doing no more than what is 
permitted . . [and being] subject to no blame or disapprobation.13 
And, finally, Matthias Steup reports that 
Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is 
deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible 
belief. . . . Our beliefs are justified if, and only if, what we believe is epistemically 
permissible for us to believe.14 . . . It is a duty-based view of the nature of 
epistemic justification.15  
Epistemic deontology clearly is of interest: many philosophers find it worthy of 
discussion.16 Most are interested in criticizing it; only a few explicitly are interested in 
defending it.  
But there are a number of very different suggestions here about what it is in the 
first place, so many such that, ideally these must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. I 
aim to categorize these claims in order to identify a clear deontological view to criticize 
or defend. I will argue that some of these suggestions are plausible, and others are not.  
Insofar as some of the plausible ones are widely accepted, we are all epistemic 
deontologists.  
2.3.1. Evaluating Epistemic Deontologies.   
Although the topic is sometimes called the deontic conception of justification, I am not 
immediately concerned with how any philosophers would spell out their concept, or idea, 
of what justification is. To avoid concerns about concepts being merely “in the head,” 
                                                          
13 See Plantinga (Warrant: The Current Debate vii, 13-14).  Plantinga attributes this view to Descartes and 
Locke and claims that “the whole notion of epistemic justification has its origin and home in this 
deontological territory of duty and permission . . . Originally and at bottom, epistemic justification is 
deontological justification: deontological justification with respect to the regulation of belief.”   
14 See Steup (“Doxastic” 25).    
15 See Steup (“Epistemic” 231).  
16 Further statements of deontological conceptions of justification include Pryor (“Highlights” 111): 
according to epistemic deontology, “justification should be understood in terms of epistemic blamelessness 
and epistemic responsibility.  . .  [and] whether one is justified depends on how well one has met one’s 
epistemic obligations, whether one is ‘doing the best one can’ as a believer, or at least the best that one can 
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and so perhaps highly idiosyncratic, I will focus on the concern of relations between 
properties, that of bi-conditional entailments between some deontic properties and the 
property of being justified. So, the fact that many epistemologists would not explain their 
concept of justification by appealing to any deontological concepts does not show that 
any epistemic deontologist’s claims about the nature of justification are false. For 
example, Alston claims that the term “justification” is “most naturally understood” in 
deontic terms.17 But for those who do not understand it in these terms, the question 
remains of what relations (if any) these putative deontic properties have to properties 
pertaining to epistemic justification.18  
A first set of suggestions relates the, or a, concept of justifiably believing p with 
the concepts of being “free from blame” or “disapprobation” for believing that p, and/or 
not being “justly reproachable” for being confident that p. Alternatively, in light of the 
suggestion above, claims like these might suggest an essential relation between the 
putative property of justifiably believing p with these latter blame (and, perhaps, praise)-
oriented deontic epistemic properties. I will argue that these deontic conceptions of 
justification are false. A second set of suggestions relates the concept or property of 
justifiably believing p with concepts (or properties) of epistemic duties, obligations, 
requirements and/or permissions. A third kind of suggestion relates justification to 
epistemic rules, norms, principles or requirements. I will argue that these kinds of claims, 
these epistemic deontologies, are true and that, for the most part, we all accept them. 
For each set of suggestions, we can ask what this relation is between an epistemic 
property or concept (e.g., the property or concept of justification) and the deontic 
property or concept in question. Bonjour suggests that the relation is that justification 
“has to do with” epistemic duties and obligations. Depending on what exactly is meant, 
this might be a rather weak relation: there is some connection, some relation, between the 
two kinds of notions or properties. Others make the stronger suggest that justification 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reasonably be expected of one . .”; and Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind 7): a justified belief does not violate 
any “epistemic rules” or “epistemic duties”; it is “epistemically permissible, within one’s epistemic rights”. 
17 See Alston (“Deontological” 257-258). 
18 Here I presuppose that there are epistemic properties. Objections to epistemic deontologies are not 
objections to epistemic properties in general; rather they are objections to some kind of epistemic 
properties, e.g., beliefs having the epistemically deontic property of there being a duty or obligation for 
them to be believed (in a context, by a believer, etc.) and claims that if there are epistemic properties (like 
being justified, etc.) then there are epistemically deontic properties.  
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“consists in” or “is essentially” some other deontic evaluation; thus, some judgment 
about whether a belief is justification is true just in case another deontic epistemic 
evaluation is true also: there is a bi-conditional equivalence. This will be the equivalence 
I will consider. Steup and others suggest this equivalence, and Steup even sometimes 
appears to suggest something stronger in his claim that epistemic deontology “is a duty-
based view of the nature of epistemic justification.” I will present one possible way to 
understand a stronger claim like this, i.e., as a robust theory of epistemic justification, and 
argue that it is false.  
To evaluate these various claims that justification (or the concept) has some 
relation to deontic epistemic properties (or concepts), a concrete place is to begin with the 
variety of possible deontic evaluations. We can ask ourselves if these evaluations are ever 
true and, if so, whether this in any way seems to depend on our judgments about 
justification which, we are presuming, are sometimes true. That is, we can consider cases 
of intuitively justified belief and ask whether a corresponding deontic evaluation would 
seem to necessarily apply also. This is just to ask if these bi-conditionals are true: we 
consider a case of (un)justified belief, conjoin it with the bi-conditional, and see if that 
belief also has the positive (or negative) epistemically deontic status. We could also start 
with the deontic evaluations to accomplish the same task, in terms of evaluating the bi-
conditional.  
2.3.2. Justification, Praise and Blame.  
Let us first consider the first set of deontic evaluations, viz. those that associate 
justification (or lack of justification) with being “free from blame” or “disapprobation” 
for believing that p, and/or not being “justly reproachable” for being confident that p. 
Earl Conee and Rich Feldman provide a further statement of this kind of view: 
“According to deontological conceptions of epistemic justification, one has a justified 
belief in a proposition when one deserves praise (or does not deserve blame) for having 
the belief or when it is one’s duty or obligation to believe the proposition (or believing it 
violates no duty or obligation).”19 Others add to the mix the idea of responsible and 
irresponsible believing.  
                                                          
19 See Conee and Feldman ("Internalism Defended” 239). 
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 These kinds of views are difficult to evaluate since praise and blame-oriented 
evaluations like these for beliefs are not often made. They are unfamiliar. For many of us, 
if we were to try to make a list of the conditions in which we “praise” people for what 
they believe, we would not know where to start because we rarely actually do praise 
people for what they believe. Many evaluations related to praise for belief might actually 
be directed toward something else related to what is believed, but not, strictly speaking, 
the belief itself. 
For example, I currently believe that the lights are on (and they are on). I believe I 
am justified in believing this and that most would agree with this evaluation, and 
justifiably so. However, while I might like the praise, it’s hard to see how I deserve praise 
for believing the lights are on, or my belief is somehow praise-worthy or praise is fitting. 
If my deserving praise for believing this entails that someone ought to praise me for this, 
then that would seem to be a false implication: it’s not true that anyone ought to praise 
me for this justified belief I have. Those around me would be puzzled and annoyed by my 
suggestion that I deserve their praise and they ought to praise me. This mundane example 
could be multiplied many times over to show that, in general, we don’t praise people for 
their justified beliefs: we even don’t think that although they do deserve to be praised, or 
ought to be praised, we’re just not giving them what we deserve: we’re not meeting our 
obligations. Thus, claims to the effect that a belief is justified if, and only if, some praise 
is deserved are highly doubtful, in part due to their unfamiliarity and, in part, due to the 
fact that it just seems false that all justified beliefs should be praised. 
As far as I can tell, the only clearly obvious time we praise people for their beliefs 
is when they, due to some pride or stubbornness or some other vice, they refused to 
believe something that we think they should have. Once this vice is overcome and they 
believe that we think they ought, we might be happy that they have changed their mind 
and think better of them, and praise them, for having done so. But here the praise might 
be for becoming more open minded, or less prejudiced, or for taking the time to think 
hard about a topic: it needn’t be merely for now having some justified belief.  
Praising people for their beliefs is often unfamiliar; for many, criticism is more 
comfortable. It is an understatement to say that some of us think badly about some of 
what others believe. Sometimes, we think badly of others for having what we regard as 
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unjustified beliefs. While it might be odd to say that they deserve blame (e.g., “It’s your 
fault for not believing as the evidence requires!”), we sometimes think that insults, 
criticism and disgust are warranted. Perhaps, in this context, this is just what blame is: 
negative reactive attitudes regarding what people believe. These negative attitudes and 
evaluations are especially common when we think that something of moral importance 
depends on the beliefs, and the fact that this person has an unjustified belief will 
contribute to there being greater evil in the world: if only they would believe what the 
evidence supports, then they wouldn’t do the wrong that this unjustified belief will 
contribute towards doing it. These attitudes also might be common when we think that 
the person just should have known better, or the person is flouting some intellectual 
standard that he or she accepts and even advocates, e.g., when someone professes the 
value of having evidence, but avoids the evidence for beliefs that “hit close to home,” 
e.g., his or her own religious or moral beliefs. This perhaps can sometimes be a kind of 
deplorable inconsistency or, perhaps, hypocrisy for which an attitude of disgust is 
warranted.  
So many people think that sometimes if someone has an unjustified belief then he 
or she deserves blame or “disapprobation” and can be “justly reproachable.” However, on 
this suggested theory of epistemic deontology, justified beliefs are always beliefs 
deserving of such blame. This suggestion is not very plausible. In defense of this, we 
might observe that few of us have blame-oriented reactions, or have these kinds of 
negative reactive attitudes, towards all unjustified beliefs. For some unjustified beliefs, 
it’s just not worth it. We might think that someone’s belief is unjustified, but not blame 
the person or think badly about him or her. We might just think that the person is not very 
smart and that’s why he has such unjustified beliefs, and so there’s no sense in criticizing 
people about that, except in circumstances when something especially important is riding 
on the belief. In response to the insistence that although we do not blame people for each 
unjustified beliefs, they nevertheless are blameworthy, it is hard to see why this is true.  
On a similar theme, for many of us, if we were to try to make a list of the 
conditions in which we “blame” people for what they believe, or think badly about them, 
we would not know where to start because we do not often blame people for what they 
believe, or blame them for every unjustified belief we think they have.  Thinking about 
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when people are “responsible” for their beliefs would be an even more foreign task. But, 
for most of us, the mere fact that a belief is unjustified would not be sufficient for our 
thinking that some kind of blame or negative attitude is warranted. This does not clearly 
show that this blame-oriented deontic equivalence is false, since maybe we are mistaken, 
and maybe we should always blame people for their unjustified beliefs (or, at least, a 
blaming attitude always fits, regardless of whether we demonstrate it).  
But there are reasons to doubt this kind of view, and few positive reasons that 
might be given in its defense. We do not blame people for all their unjustified beliefs and 
we tend to not think that all unjustified beliefs deserve blame (whether we blame or not), 
so there is little to recommend this deontic equivalence. The fact that on many moral 
views, this view is false about moral evaluations (i.e., not all morally wrong actions are 
blameworthy, or all vicious character traits or motives are blameworthy) provides further 
reason to doubt this kind of view about epistemic evaluations.  
A full defense of this kind of equivalence, and its praise-oriented counterpart, 
would require a careful phenomenology and analysis of our reactive attitudes surrounding 
judgments of justified and unjustified belief. As far as I know, this has not been done; 
discussion of these kinds of deontic evaluations has been done on the basis of too little 
epistemic psychology. Finding this data would be a quite interesting project, and it might 
wind up supporting some kind of epistemic deontology, but my quick perusal of the 
issues suggests that they are a lot more complicated than the simple relation the praise 
and blame-oriented epistemic deontologist suggests. Thus, I conclude that we should 
regard these versions of epistemic deontology as false.  
2.3.3. Epistemic Duties and Obligations.  
A second set of suggestions relates the concept of justifiably believing p with concepts of 
epistemic duties, obligations, requirements and/or permissions, terms which, if any, 
clearly should be called “deontological” terms. This is an attempt at stating necessary and 
sufficient conditions for justification. So, Steup writes, “Our beliefs are justified if, and 
only if, what we believe is epistemically permissible for us to believe.”20 Bruekner 
reports that deontologists hold that a belief is justified if, and only if, it confirms to one’s 
                                                          
20 See Steup (“Doxastic” 25).  
 44 
epistemic duties. Many others make similar claims relating epistemic evaluations to 
deontological evaluations.  
There are at least two ways to understand these suggestions. The second way will 
be discussed in the next section. I will argue that this first way yields a true view, and the 
second yields a false view.  
The first interpretation, however, I will call the “deontic equivalences” 
interpretation of epistemic deontology. This is the idea that for each belief that has a 
“justificational status,” that belief necessarily has at least one deontic status as well and 
whenever a belief has some “positive” deontic status, necessarily, it is justified, and vice-
versa (and the same for unjustified beliefs and “negative” deontic statuses).21  Steup 
seems to suggest this idea: “The idea underlying the deontic conception of epistemic 
justification is that, whenever a belief is epistemically justified, no epistemic obligations 
have been violated. The idea . . is that epistemic justification necessarily involves a 
deontic dimension despite the fact that its deontic dimension need not be made explicit by 
giving an analysis of epistemic justification in deontic terms.” 
The common view is some beliefs are justified and others are unjustified; at least, 
some beliefs are unjustified.  And given the wide variety of deontic terms, and, thus, the 
wide variety of epistemically “deontic judgments”—i.e., judgments pertaining to 
epistemic matters that make essential use of a deontic term—that can be made, it seems 
that some beliefs have deontic status as well.  Rich Feldman notes some common deontic 
judgments made about epistemic matters: 
We say that a typical well-informed contemporary American ought to believe that 
the Earth is round and should not believe that the Earth is flat.  A person wrongly 
accused of a crime might say that his accusers have no right to believe that he’s 
guilty since no evidence of his wrongdoing has been brought forth.  In such a 
case, we might say that believing the person is not guilty is permitted or perhaps 
even required.22 
Kornblith notes others: 
                                                          
21 See Steup (“The Deontic Conception” 67). 
22 See Feldman (“Voluntary Belief” 77) and Feldman (“The Ethics of Belief” 667).  The term “deontic 
judgment” is Feldman’s.  
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She shouldn’t have believed him. . . You shouldn’t believe everything you read. . . 
He should have known better.23 
Both Feldman and Kornblith introduce important deontic terminology that was not given 
in our survey of the statements of epistemic deontology above, viz. that of epistemic 
“oughts” and “shoulds.” This terminology is surely more commonly used than any other 
deontic terms: we, especially non-philosophers, often ask whether we should believe 
something. These terms are probably more commonly used than “justification” and 
“rationality,” and are surely related to them. John Pollock writes, “Epistemic justification 
governs what you should or should not believe.”24 I will explore this relation between 
epistemic justification and epistemic “shoulds” and “oughts” below.  
At least some epistemic judgments like those Feldman and Kornblith offer seem 
true, although, given the variety of deontic judgments, the semantics of each term (e.g., 
duties, obligations, requirements and/or permissions) would need to be investigated on a 
case-by-case basis. We definitely sometimes say that we ought to believe this, or we 
should not believe that: we think these claims are sometimes true also. Insofar as there is 
a close, perhaps entailing, relations between the concepts of what ought or should be the 
case and what is obligatory, required and/or permitted, our truthful use of epistemic 
“oughts” and “shoulds” lends support to their being what can be called epistemic 
obligations, requirements and/or permissions. We don’t often ask, “Is believing this 
proposition obligatory for me, or required, or permitted?” But if a judgment that “one 
ought to believe p” entails that p is epistemically permitted, or required, or obligatory, or 
that there is a duty to believe p, then (at least some of) these judgments are true also.  
And it seems that there is such an entailment, despite the uncommon language. 
The existence of such a connection would have some explanatory value: if you ought to 
believe p, this is because believing p is epistemically obligatory, not merely because 
believing p would be epistemically good, or better than not.25 If you should not believe p, 
then that can plausibly be explained by the idea that believing p is not permitted on the 
relevant epistemic standards. More can be said for why believing p is obligatory or 
                                                          
23 Kornblith (“Epistemic Obligation” 231).  He equates “talk of epistemic obligation,” i.e., the truth of 
some deontic judgments, with the deontological conception of justification.   
24 See Pollock (Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 8). 
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permitted, or why you might have a duty to believe p, and on what basis this duty 
depends, but the entailments seem to be there nonetheless. At least, they are there for 
ethical evaluations, which might suggest their plausibility for epistemic evaluations also; 
some reasons to doubt these epistemic evaluations will be discussed below, and I will 
argue these objections are unconvincing.  
The truth of some deontic epistemic evaluations seems compatible with nearly all 
epistemological perspectives: foundationalists, coherentists, reliablists, naturalists, non-
naturalists, and epistemologists of all other stripes agree that some deontic evaluations 
like these are sometimes true. Everyone agrees that some epistemic “oughts” and 
“shoulds” are true; below I explore some unpalatable consequences of denying this.  And 
the truth of these judgments seems to depend on the justificational status of the belief in 
question. When we say that we epistemically ought to believe something, the natural 
explanation for why this is so is that because the belief is justified or reasonable. And if 
you should not believe something, this is because it is unjustified and not reasonable. Of 
course, non-epistemic considerations can factor in, and so it might be the case that, from 
some other evaluative point of view, you should believe something that you epistemically 
ought not, but this does not change the epistemic evaluation. Thus, deontic judgments 
seem to entail judgments about justification, and the truth of deontic judgments would 
seem to be, in part, explained by the truth of judgments about justification.   
Judgments about justification also seem to entail at least some deontic 
evaluations: if S justifiably believes p, then S epistemically ought to believe p: S should 
believe p. It could not be that S justifiably believes p, but yet, from an epistemic point of 
view, S should not believe p. While the truth of deontic evaluations was explained, in 
part, by evaluations of justification, it is less convincing to think that evaluations about 
justification are explained by deontic evaluations. Consider the claim that he is justified 
in believing p because he ought to believe p. Although in this case, it’s true he ought to 
believe p, this does not seem to explain why he is justified. Perhaps he is justified in 
believing p because he ought to believe whatever his evidence supports, his evidence 
supports p, and this is why he is justified. But here the judgment that he ought to believe 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 I restrict this suggestion to cases where you clearly, or definitely, ought to believe p. I ignore possible 
evidential ties and vagueness-induced borderline cases of epistemic evaluation.  
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p seems only to be entailed by the judgment about justification; it is not its basis or what 
makes it true.  
2.3.4. An Objection from Doxastic Voluntarism. 
Some have argued that the truth of at least some of these deontic judgments would imply 
“doxastic voluntarism,” an often not well-formulated thesis that we can directly and 
voluntarily decide what to believe. Since there are so many deontic terms and thus so 
many deontic judgments that can be made, a systematic investigation of each term would 
need to be made to determine whether the term entails, or presupposes, voluntarism and, 
if so, whether it can be successfully “compatiblized” with the falsity or restriction of 
voluntarism.    
Defenders of deontic judgments have generally responded in two ways: first, they 
have argued that (at least some) deontic judgments have no such objectionable 
implications because that they are compatible with the falsity (or restriction) of doxastic 
voluntarism. So, they have argued it can be true that we ought to believe certain things, or 
have epistemic obligations, even if we cannot meet them or influence our beliefs such 
that we meet the obligations. This kind of view denies a common “ought-implies-can” 
principle: it might claim that, sometimes, our inability to fulfill an obligation does not 
make the obligation go away. Financial obligations are like that: we ought to pay our bills 
even if we can’t. They argue that epistemic obligations are obligations like this: they 
apply to us even if we can’t meet them. The relevant ought-implies-can principle is false.  
An alternative way to respond to these objections from doxastic voluntarism is to 
argue that we are, in fact, able to decide what to believe in a manner sufficient for the 
truth of some deontic judgments.26 These arguments turn on subtle understandings of the 
notions of “can,” “ability,” and “decide.” On the first response, it can be true that we 
ought to believe p even if we have no direct control over what we believe; on the second, 
we can, in some relevant sense, decide what to believe (and, typically, sometimes we do 
decide what to believe).  
Although I will not discuss these responses in detail here, it’s not clear that 
arguments from doxastic voluntarism render deontic judgments false or inappropriate.  
                                                          
26 E.g,, Steup (“Doxastic Voluntarism”), Feldman (“Voluntary Belief”), Heller (“Hobartian Voluntarism”), 
and Kornblith (“Epistemic Obligation”). 
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Were these arguments against epistemic deontology sound, they would seem to entail that 
the epistemically deontic judgment that “we (epistemically) should not believe that any 
deontic judgments are true” is false. This is an interesting result: someone fond of 
epistemically deontological judgments could ask the critic, “Are you saying I should not 
make deontic judgments, or I have some kind of epistemic duty or obligation to not form 
these deontically-epistemic evaluations?” The critics’ reflective answer would, 
apparently, be, “No.” An epistemic deontologist should be not troubled by this objection 
then.  
Some deontologists, and their critics, understand epistemic deontology in terms of 
praise and blame for belief. Above I presented doubts against this kind of view since 
there does not seem to be any necessary connection between epistemic evaluations and 
judgments or attitudes of praise and blame. But if arguments from doxastic voluntarism 
showed that these kinds of deontological judgments are false, then nobody would be 
intellectually blameworthy or irresponsible if she thought, “Although I find these 
arguments against any deontic judgments to be quite compelling, but to hell with them—
I’ll believe that some deontic judgments are true anyway.” In practice, arguments against 
some kind of deontic judgments seem to undermine their own epistemic support: if their 
conclusions are true, then it follows, perhaps (at least on some epistemic deontologies), 
that no criticism is warranted for those who continue to (even knowingly) make deontic 
evaluations and it’s not true that they should stop or that there is some kind of epistemic 
or intellectual duty to not make deontic evaluations.  
If epistemic deontology is false, then all that epistemically evaluative talk is false 
also. But critics of epistemic deontologists sometimes make judgments like these of their 
deontic colleagues: they hold that deontologists shouldn’t believe in deontology and that 
they have no right to that belief, given the (allegedly) scathing arguments and evidence 
against it (and also, perhaps, a self-professed intellectual duty as a philosopher, or a mere 
rational believer, to believe on the basis of the best evidence, which deontologists might 
irresponsibly violate in their accepting deontology). Critics might even praise a former 
deontologist for seeing his errors and adopting a non-deontological view. So, as a matter 
of fact, even self-proclaimed critics of epistemic deontology make some epistemically 
deontological judgments. And they seem to make these evaluations based on evaluations 
 49 
about justification. This lends support to the “deontic equivalences” interpretation of 
epistemic deontology and my claim that we are, in this sense, all epistemic deontologists.  
The “deontic equivalences” interpretation of epistemic deontology also has, I 
suggest, a condition that there is a necessary connection between truths about justification 
and deontic truths.  Given the wide variety of epistemic-deontic judgments that can be 
made (or deontic truths that can be stated) and the fact that many seem to depend on 
judgments or truths about justification, these connections are safe to suppose.  After all, 
all justified beliefs (at least those that are currently held) seem to have the mundane 
deontic status of being beliefs that the believer epistemically should or ought believe: this 
status can also perhaps be expressed in an similar manner, but with (perhaps) more 
rhetorical flair and drama, as the statuses of being epistemically obligatory or there being 
a duty to believe them.   
These latter statuses might seem more demanding than a mere “should” or 
“ought”, and so these equivalences might be doubted. But I suspect these doubts are due 
to the simple unusualness and unfamiliarity of evaluating beliefs in terms of epistemic 
obligations and duties: rarely do we talk this way. We do talk of moral duties and 
obligations, and these are rather demanding, and so this sense of strong demand might 
transfer to our thoughts about epistemic obligations, which we might be uneasy with. I 
aim to quickly calm this lack of comfort.  
The idea that there are epistemic obligations or duties can seem more palatable 
once we see that there is not a weaker demand that is a plausible weaker alternative to 
obligations or requirements. About action, the common view is that there are moral 
obligations, but that if one is not going to meet one’s obligations, one should at least 
perform an acceptable alternative. If you are not going to do what you are obligated to do, 
then we might think you should at least do something that’s intuitively morally “neutral,” 
i.e., something that won’t harm anyone. But regarding belief, if you are justified in 
believing that the lights are on, then you ought to believe that the lights are on, and 
there’s no obvious alternative to what you should believe if you are not going to believe 
what you should believe, or what is obligatory for you to believe. One might suggest 
suspending judgment would be a good second option, but here that attitude would not fit 
the evidence at all.  
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So if there are things you ought to believe, in nearly all actual cases it make sense 
to call these things that you are epistemically obligated to believe, or have a duty to 
believe. This sounds demanding, and it is, but it is not clear what the alternatives would 
be. It’s not that it would merely be “epistemically nice” if you believe that the lights are 
on (when it looks to you like they are on and you have no reason to doubt your 
perceptions), or that it would be epistemically fine if you did but fine if you didn’t. No, 
you should believe, and this should is so strong that it can be considered an epistemic 
obligation or a duty. This obligation or duty, of course, can be overridden by competing 
non-epistemic duties or considerations, so this too might lessen any worries about 
equating epistemic “oughts” and “shoulds” and epistemic duties and obligations.   
Thus, since some deontic judgments seem true, and their truth seems to depend on 
truths about justification, and vice-versa, the “deontic equivalences” interpretation of 
epistemic deontology seems plausible and, likely, true. So, in this sense, we are all 
epistemic deontologists. Weaker equivalence views, that only some judgments about 
justification have corresponding deontic truths (or vice-versa) are possible. Also perhaps 
some epistemic-deontological truths that seem to apply to matters concerning belief 
really pertain to related moral or practical-action-and inquiry-based matters.  This view 
might have it that at least some deontic judgments are independent of judgments about 
justification.  Given the wide variety of deontic evaluations, it is not easy to make 
sweeping claims here about the entire class of judgments.  
2.3.5. Deontological Theories of Epistemic Justification. 
A final understanding of epistemic deontology is that it is a view of what justification 
“is”, “is essentially”, or “consists in.”  Goldman, Plantinga, Alston, Bergmann, and others 
suggest this. Epistemic justification is said to consist in fulfilling one’s intellectual 
obligations or duties, or believing what’s permitted or required. Another proposal is to be 
justified is, essentially, to be free from blame. Further proposals along these lines could 
be developed using other deontological terms such as “being within one’s rights,” being 
“epistemically responsible,” and others.  
However, there are at least two relevant interpretations of the “is” or “consists in” 
relation. One is the non-analytic equivalence relation discussed and defended above 
regarding explicitly deontic terminology. This was what I called the “deontic 
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equivalences” interpretation of epistemic deontology, which focused specifically on the 
notions of oughts, shoulds, obligations and duties: I argued that, necessarily, to have a 
justificational status is to have a corresponding deontic property. Before that, however, I 
argued that a conception of justification that equates justification with praise or blame-
oriented considerations was mistaken.    
The second relevant interpretation of the “is” or “consists in” relation, which 
seems to better fit this language, is suggested by Steup’s claim that deontology is “duty-
based view of the nature of epistemic justification.”27 I will argue that if epistemic 
deontological positions are supposed to illuminate the nature of epistemic justification—
what justification depends (or supervenes) on and what makes justified beliefs justified—
they fail. I consider set of propositions that attempt to do this, i.e., have this explanatory 
function, theories of the nature of epistemic justification.  
To see why deontic claims are not theories of epistemic justification (or, if they 
are, are not strong ones), an analogy from ethics might be initially helpful. While 
analogies from ethics to epistemology are often tenuous, one might be instructive to see 
inadequacies in the deontic proposals for what justification “is” or “consists in.” Consider 
a number of ethical views: first, that an action is “morally justified” (or morally right) if 
and only if it is permitted; second, that an action is “morally justified” (or morally right) 
if and only if the agent shouldn’t be blamed for doing that action; and, third, that an 
action is “morally justified” (or morally right) if and only if it is in violation of no 
obligations or duties.  If the question is “What makes morally justified actions justified?”, 
“What makes right acts right?, then deontological answers, even when true, do not 
provide much of an explanation for why an action is justified or what makes it justified.   
Consider an example: suppose Sue has done a good deed by helping her elderly 
and frail neighbor take out his trash. This action, let’s suppose, is morally justified: it’s 
permitted, violates no duties, and she should be praised for it (or, at least, not blamed). 
Let’s suppose the relations here are all necessary: since she’s got one, she’s got them all. 
Even then, we can still ask why her action is justified. Not implausible answers include 
because it brought more happiness into the world than her alternatives, that it was 
something she would have liked done to her, perhaps that the neighbor had a “right” to 
                                                          
27 See Steup (“Epistemic Deontologism” 231).  
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her services, or even that acts of a helping/caring/or generous type are intrinsically right 
or virtuous. These answers provide moral insight where deontic judgments themselves do 
not. They suggest possible plausible reasons why her action violated no duties, it was 
permitted, and she is free from blame in doing it. To say that her action was morally 
justified because it was permitted or because she shouldn’t be blamed lacks explanatory 
power. That it was justified because it violated no duties or obligations is a step in the 
right direction, once the basis of these duties or obligations is specified.  But once this 
basis is specified, we have the makings of an explanatory moral theory, not a mere 
statement of equivalence.   
To return to epistemology, Goldman argued that to answer the question ‘What is 
justified belief?’ “it is not enough for a theory to state ‘correct’ necessary and sufficient 
conditions.”  He claimed that since we “seek an explanatory theory, i.e., one that clarifies 
the underlying source of justificational status . . [a theory’s] . . conditions must also be 
appropriately deep or revelatory.”28 Deontic assessments of beliefs and believers are not 
deep or revelatory. Grant, for the sake of argument, that a justified belief is a 
“permissible” belief or one that we are “free from blame” for or where have “met our 
obligations” and that these relations necessarily obtain. This still does not explain what 
makes justified beliefs justified, or what the underlying source of justificational status is, 
whether it be evidence or reliability or whatever else might make a belief justified. Since 
deontic statuses seem to depend on of whether these basic, underlying justificatory 
factors obtain, these factors are the source for epistemic evaluation, not the deontic status.  
In the analogous ethics case, there were substantive answers that came in the form 
of a moral theory. Substantive answers are found in epistemology as well, and they come 
in the form of explanatory theories that attempt to illuminate the nature of epistemic 
justification. A simple statement of one traditional epistemic theory is that justified 
beliefs are, by their nature, beliefs that are based on adequate evidence: justified beliefs 
are founded on good reasons. Other theories with some intuitive plausibility are that 
justified beliefs are beliefs that result from reliable belief forming processes or cognitive 
virtues. There are other theories as well. And if we were to make lists of what seems to be 
clearly justified beliefs and clearly unjustified beliefs – sets of data that we are seeking a 
                                                          
28 See Goldman (“Reliablism” 307). Emphases mine.  
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hypothesis to explain the pattern – we would see that these theories provide some insight 
and understanding into, at least, what we think the factors that make for justified belief 
is.29 Deontic judgments, even when true, do not provide this insight. Were we to try to 
understand the underlying pattern or rationale of our lists of considered judgments about 
justification only in light of deontic considerations, far too many deep questions would 
remain, the most important being what justification, as well as deontic epistemic 
evaluations, ultimately depend on.   
So, while Steup is, when taken very literally, correct that “what distinguishes an 
epistemically justified belief from an epistemically unjustified belief can . . be explained 
in deontic terms, that is, in terms of what is epistemically obligatory, permitted, and 
forbidden,”30 this explanation is very weak, compared to the alternatives.  So, contrary to 
Steup again, it seems to be a mistake to think that deontology is a view about nature of 
epistemic justification. Only Greco refers to deontology as a “theory,” but my arguments 
suggest that either it is not a theory of justification at all, or that it is an exceedingly poor 
one.   
Following Goldman, a theory of epistemic justification does not merely state 
correct necessary and sufficient conditions: it provides illumination and understanding of 
the underlying basis of justification.  While claim about moral rightness to the effect of 
“an action is morally right if, and only if, it is not morally wrong” does state correct 
necessary and sufficient conditions, I would hesitate calling it a theory because it offers 
no insight into the underlying basis of moral rightness. Comparable claims can be made 
about deontic epistemic evaluations: while some are entailed by evaluations about 
justification, and they likewise entail evaluations about justification, they don’t address 
the basis of justification. Since this is what theories of justification attempt to address, 
they are not theories of justification. And if it is not a theory of justification, then virtue 
theories of justification can’t conflict with it and it implies nothing for the 
internalism/externalism debate. If, however, epistemic deontologies are theories about the 
nature of justification (in the sense Goldman and I articulated above), then even virtue-
                                                          
29 One possibility is that that this methodology only involves identifying and clarifying our concept(s) of 
justification and we are not investigating justification itself. However, no philosophical methodology seems 
able to bypass that worry.  
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based theories are likely superior to it since they offer some explanation for what 
justification ultimately depends on it. Also, were deontology a theory, it is not clear its 
implications would resolve the debate over whether internal or external factors make for 
justification.   
In sum, I have presented a number of ways to understand epistemic deontology or 
the deontic conception of justification. Only the “deontic equivalences” interpretation 
seemed plausible: that some deontic judgments are true and they (necessarily) co-vary 
with judgments about justification. So, at least there are some epistemic duties or 
obligations, and so there are some propositions that you should, or should not, believe, 
given whether the belief in question is justified for you or not.  Some might resist talk of 
epistemic “duties” or “obligations”, but, to my ear, this seems to be just a way of saying 
that there are propositions you ought or should (and ought or should not) believe, given 
your evidence.     
The other interpretations of epistemic deontology, I argue, are either implausible, 
undefended, probably held by very few (if any), and/or couldn’t have the false 
implications that are attributed to them. Perhaps there are other, more plausible 
deontologies or conceptions of the deontic conception than the three I have developed. 
However, as it stands, it appears that much of the discussion surrounding epistemic 
deontology consists in criticizing an unclear and muddled concept which, when made 
clear, is seen to be, on one understanding (i.e., the “deontic equivalences” interpretation) 
quite sensible and, on other the other two understandings, generally implausible.   
2.4. Deontology, Internalism and Externalism. 
To conclude, I will discuss the implications this understanding of epistemic deontology 
has for dissolving one dispute concerning the epistemological internalism/externalism 
debate. One’s position on these disputes are sometimes said to provide reasons to reject 
any epistemic deontological judgments. I aim to show that this is mistaken and so no 
good objections to epistemic deontology, and so epistemic realism, are found in issues 
pertaining to epistemic internalism and externalism.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 See Steup (“Deontic Conception”65) (emphasis mine). He states that he “shall call this the deontic 
conception of epistemic justification” (emphasis mine). 
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The terms “internalism” and “externalism” are relatively new and their uses 
somewhat stipulative. I will briefly explain what I take the basic distinction to be, 
although my response should apply to any understanding of the distinction. Most 
generally, internalists and externalists dispute the “location” of the factors that epistemic 
justification depends or supervenes on. Theories about the justification or reasonableness 
of belief are internalist, roughly, just in case they have it that what makes beliefs justified 
only are factors that are “internal” to the mind: sometimes these are described as elements 
that are cognitively “accessible” to the believer, i.e., can be “accessed” with some kind of 
reflection on one’s mental life. So, what justifies a belief or makes it reasonable is the 
believer’s evidence or reasons, which include how things seem or appear to her, her other 
beliefs, reasoning, memory, and other factors that are all in her mind. 
Externalists deny this and hold, roughly, that what makes for justified belief 
include some “external” factors. So whether a belief is justified depends on, e.g., whether 
it was produced or caused by a reliable belief forming process, mechanism, or 
virtue/ability (where reliability is measured by a relation to something external, like 
truth), or by the obtaining of some other relation between the belief and something non-
mental or “external” to the mind.   
These characterizations are rough and raise many important questions about the 
details of each broad account, but they are adequate for my purposes here.   
According to many critics of epistemological internalism, many internalists are 
internalists because they accept the deontological conception of epistemic justification.31 
These are empirical claims. Goldman claims that deontology is internalism’s most 
“prominent” and “popular” “rationale” and that this rationale has “widespread support.”32 
Plantinga claims that deontology is the “source of the attraction of internalism,” “makes it 
plausible” and that a “deontological conception . . leads directly to internalism.”33 
Bergmann reports that, “It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces [i.e., 
‘provides a good reason for’] internalism,” that there is an “intuitive appeal of the move 
from deontology to internalism” and that although this “(putative) connection is not 
                                                          
31 See Conee and Feldman ("Internalism Defended" 257, note 20) “suspect that deontological arguments 
are more the work of internalism’s critics than its supporters.”  
32 See Goldman (“Internalism Exposed” 271-272.) 
33 See Plantinga (Warrant: The Current Debate 24-25). 
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always explicitly mentioned by internalists, it is the main (and perhaps the strongest) 
reason they have for endorsing internalism.”34 Bergmann then argues that, “the view that 
justification is to be understood deontologically does not provide a good reason for 
endorsing internalism.”35 Goldman concludes that, “the argument from the 
[deontological] conception of justification to internalism does not work.”36   
An internalist, but one who does not accept an argument for internalism that has 
an essential premise involving deontological considerations, has quick and easy reply to 
these critics: “Whatever the merits of these arguments from deontology to internalism 
are, it makes no difference to my reasons for why I’m an internalist since I am not an 
internalist because of any deontological considerations.” This internalist might readily 
agree with externalist critics, and even some internalists, that the link between deontology 
and internalism is suspect and that there isn’t a good argument from the former to the 
latter (or vice versa).37  That one argument for a view fails, of course, does not entail that 
the view is false or that all other arguments for it fail as well. 
A deeper response, which I have developed here, is to question the assumption 
that there are clear conceptions of the deontic conception from which to argue for 
internalism from.  For those deontic conceptions of justification that are implausible in 
their own right (and I have argued that at least two of them have this feature: first, the 
praise-and-blame conception of justification and, second, understanding deontology as a 
robust theory of justification such that it might rival evidentialism and reliabilism in 
terms of its function and goals), possible arguments for internalism that are based on 
them seem doomed from the start.   
Is there a good argument from the plausible “deontic equivalences” interpretation 
of epistemic deontology to internalism?  Perhaps there are, but since there are many 
deontic equivalences, there are many possible arguments to consider. I’ll briefly discuss 
just one kind of argument: consider a possible equivalence of “S is unjustified in 
believing p if, only if, S shouldn’t believe p.” Suppose this equivalence is true and then 
                                                          
34 See Bergmann (“Deontology” 87, footnote 1). Emphasis in original. 
35 See Bergmann (“Deontology” 89). However, Brueckner (“Deontologism and Internalism” 527, 535) 
argues that “Plantinga’s argument to connect deontologism with internalism is unsuccessful . . [and] fails to 
show that deontologism is sufficient for internalism.” 
36 See Goldman (“Internalism Exposed” 292).   
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consider a case of, what for most people, is an unjustified belief and, thereby, one that 
shouldn’t be believed. Perhaps a good candidate belief here would be the belief that 
“Beethoven composed the ‘Hokey-Pokey’ tune.”  
A sketch of some reasoning to internalism might go like this. Given all the 
information that most people have about Beethoven and the Hokey-Pokey tune, most 
people shouldn’t believe that Beethoven composed the Hokey-Pokey tune.38 If that’s so, 
then these believers have access to features about their mental life (which are all internal 
features), can recognize that none of these features provides adequate support for this 
belief (and, in fact, they seem to support for the negation), and so that’s why they 
shouldn’t believe it and why, were they to believe it, that belief would be unjustified. 
Alternatively, to return to the initial data, if people are not justified in believing this and 
so ought to not believe it, it’s because of just how things seem to them, which are all 
internal features. 
This kind of reasoning could be repeated, beginning with many intuitively 
justified and unjustified beliefs and observations of their corresponding deontic statuses, 
and developed into a non-deductive case for a kind of internalistic view to the effect that 
the sole epistemic factors relevant to whether one should believe something or is justified 
in believing are internal ones. Insofar as we often seem to be able to tell whether some 
belief is justified for us, by way of reflecting on our reasons for why we believe, this kind 
of argument for internalism has promise.39  
If this kind of reasoning in favor of internalism from deontic evaluations is 
plausible, then all the better for the internalist, but if it’s no good, she’s still fine. This is 
because the quotes from Goldman, Plantinga, and Bergmann above are empirical claims 
about the basis of, literally, most internalists’ belief. While surveys have not been done 
(perhaps this would be a good task for “naturalized epistemologists”) it’s not clear that 
many, or even any, contemporary internalists are internalists because they are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 See Pryor (“Highlights” 116, 118) argues that there is no clear entailment from deontology to internalism 
or from internalism to deontology.   
38 This information, or evidence, exceeds the fact that most people who are familiar with Beethoven believe 
that Beethoven did not write the Hokey Pokey tune.  
39 More would need to be said about what it is to “tell” that a belief is justified, and what it is to have this 
ability.  
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deontologists of any kind.40 Critics of internalism are probably mistaken in their 
observations here, in addition to not being clear on the nature of the deontological views 
that they attribute to most internalists. 
Probably most internalists are internalists because they accept an explanatory 
theory about the nature of epistemic justification that has it that the factors that make 
beliefs justified are wholly internal factors.  So, they are typically evidentialists or “good 
reasons”-ists, and are thereby internalists.  If this empirical speculation about who 
believes what and for what reasons is mistaken, it is at least clear that there are clear and 
simple arguments from these kinds of internalist theories of justification to general 
internalism.  The strength of these arguments depends on the strength of particular 
internalist theories. The details of these theories are difficult: the nature of evidence, what 
makes for good reasons, the basing relation, whether (and, if so, when) there is a “higher 
level requirement” for justification, and other difficult topics.  Externalist critics should 
turn their attention to these possible difficulties for particular theories of justification that 
say internal states alone make for justification, rather than speculate on mistaken claims 
about the broad motivations for internalism in general.  
2.5. Conclusion.  
If epistemic realism is true, then some version of epistemic deontology is true insofar as 
epistemic realism affirms the truth of judgments like “S should believe p” and “S ought 
not believe p,” and other judgments that entail and are entailed by these judgments. 
Insofar as these judgments, and other judgments like them, are deontic judgments, it is 
important to defend them from existing objections.  In this chapter I have attempted to do 
so and have so defended a version of epistemic deontology from objections in the 
epistemological literature.   
In subsequent chapters I will develop a case against the truth of any epistemic 
deontological judgments that is parallel to cases against the truth of moral deontological 
judgments, i.e., that some act ought to be done, or is permissible, and so forth. I will then 
argue that these objections are not strong and that deontological judgments are acceptable 
                                                          
40 Steup might be the exception, but seems to endorse internalism both from deontological considerations 
and from evidentialism. I argue below that the deontological endorsement, even if it works, is superfluous.  
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in both ethics and epistemology and that some are true because there are objective 
epistemic facts and properties.  
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CHAPTER 3:  Ayer and Stevenson’s Ethical and 
Epistemological Emotivisms  
3.1. Introduction. 
A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson advocated ethical emotivisms, non-cognitivist 
understandings of the meanings of moral terms and functions of moral judgments.  
According to ethical emotivism, to make a moral judgment is to express one’s emotions 
and invite others to share them: it is not to state a moral proposition, be in a 
representational mental state like belief, or attempt to assert moral facts, attribute moral 
properties or describe moral reality.   
I argue that the reasons Ayer and Stevenson gave in defense of ethical emotivisms 
suggest analogous epistemological emotivisms. According to this kind of view, epistemic 
judgments are neither true nor false either: to judge that some belief is epistemically 
reasonable, justified, or known; or that some proposition epistemically ought or should be 
believed; or to that some reasoning is good reasoning is also to express one’s emotions 
and invite others to share some feelings about a belief.  
The common view, however, is that epistemic judgments are propositional 
attitudes: they are epistemic beliefs, attempts to attribute epistemic properties or state 
epistemic facts. Even most skeptics agree: they typically argue only that it is false that 
beliefs are justified or known, not that epistemic judgments are neither-true-nor-false.  
Epistemic emotivism is thus at odds with standard assumptions. For many, it 
might seem obviously implausible and worthy of immediate dismissal: it’s just obvious 
that epistemic judgments are not emotive, and so it’s obvious that epistemic emotivism is 
false and the arguments for it unsound. Other might respond that, although it’s not 
obvious that epistemic emotivism is false, reflection on what epistemic evaluations seem 
to be like reveals evidence that epistemic emotivism is false or, at least, more doubtful 
than not: critical reflection reveals more reasons to reject it than accept it.  
My response to epistemic emotivism will be more along the second lines.1 I find 
no reason why an epistemic emotivism must be false or why it must be unreasonable or 
                                                          
1 In an earlier version of this chapter, I believe I was too quick to dismiss epistemic emotivism as just 
obviously not true. See Nobis (“Ayer and Stevenson’s Ethical and Epistemological Emotivisms”). I now 
believe that stronger reasons can, and should, be given against it.  
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unjustified for every person who considers it. Few, if any, views are essentially such that 
they ought to be rejected, and epistemic emotivism does not seem to be a contender for 
that possible class of views. The meanings of epistemic terms might be emotive or 
expressive: there seems to be little or no reason why they must be descriptive or why 
standard assumptions about the semantics and metaphysics of epistemic judgments must 
be correct. Nevertheless, I will argue that there are better reasons to reject that view than 
accept it, especially when we see its far-reaching implications for epistemic evaluations, 
evaluative judgments involved in reasoning and evaluative presumptions that motivate 
rational inquiry in general.  
I acknowledge that these implications quite literally can be resisted, i.e., someone 
could sincerely affirm all that follows, as a matter of logical consequence, from epistemic 
emotivism for the nature of epistemic, and other intellectual, evaluations. I will argue that 
this, for most people, is an unreasonable position. It strains belief because it is contrary to 
so much else that, for most people, seems true about epistemic evaluations. Thus, most 
people should not accept epistemic emotivism and the arguments that might be presented 
in favor, at least those that are parallel to the arguments Ayer and Stevenson give in favor 
of their ethical emotivisms. Since these arguments for epistemological emotivism are 
parallel to the arguments given in favor of ethical emotivism, and the former arguments 
ought to be rejected as unsound, this provides strong reason to reject the arguments for 
ethical emotivism. Thus, I undercut the arguments in its favor that Ayer and Stevenson 
provide.  
I will argue also that epistemic emotivism has an immediately important 
implication for meta-ethics in that it seems to undercut any epistemic support Ayer and 
Stevenson offered for their ethical emotivisms. This is because if epistemic emotivism is 
true then all epistemic judgments are neither true nor false, so it is neither true nor false 
that anyone should accept ethical emotivism or is justified in believing it (or any other 
view, including epistemic emotivism, for that matter). But if it it’s not true that anyone, 
from an intellectual point of view, should accept emotivism, then no one should.  
Some epistemic emotivists might accept this consequence happily, agreeing that 
there is no truth to their judgment that they, or anyone, ought to accept epistemic or 
ethical emotivism. They might affirm this as their position as the basic nature of 
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epistemic evaluations and respond that objections to this position are based only in 
contrary epistemic expressions which are equally untrue also. That might be the truth 
about such matters, but, again, I will give reasons to think that this position is, for most 
people, unreasonable.  
I argue that while Ayer and Stevenson might have had strong feelings for their 
views, those feelings, if they are expressions of epistemic approval, do not provide good 
reasons to accept ethical emotivism. If that is so then, truthfully, both ethical and 
epistemological emotivisms should be rejected, and that’s not just how we, or anyone, 
might merely feel about it. 
3.2. Ayer on Ethical Naturalisms and Non-Naturalisms. 
Like other logical positivists, Ayer was an ethical emotivist. He also thought emotivism 
was “valid on its own account” apart from positivistic inspirations.2 I will argue that the 
arguments he offers for ethical emotivism suggest analogous arguments for 
epistemological emotivism as well. I then evaluate this result. 
Ayer considered the famous concluding paragraph from Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding an “excellent statement of the positivist’s position”3: 
When we run over [to] libraries, persuaded of these [empiricist] principles, what 
havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school 
metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning 
concerning quantity or number? No.  Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No.  Commit it then to the flames, for it 
can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. 
Positivists accepted Hume’s sentiment: they claimed that a sentence is either true or false, 
i.e., it expresses a proposition and so might be believed, if, and only if, it is either analytic 
or empirically verifiable.4  
A sentence was considered empirically verifiable, roughly, if it was an “observation 
statement” or entailed by observation statements in conjunction with analytic 
propositions.5 Analytic propositions were said to “enlighten us by illustrating the way in 
                                                          
2 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 20).   
3 See Ayer (“Editor’s Introduction” 10). 
4 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 5).  
5 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 13).  
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which we use certain symbols.”6 Too little was said about the meaning of “meaning,” but 
a sentence was considered analytic “if it is true solely in virtue of the meaning of its 
constituent symbols, and cannot therefore be either confirmed or refuted by any fact of 
experience”: tautologies and formal propositions from logic and mathematics were 
considered analytic.7 Sentences that were either analytic or empirically verifiable were 
said to be “cognitively meaningful” or have “cognitive meaning.” Only then might they 
be true or false; only then might they be true.  
Ayer conceded that this criterion was never adequately formulated,8 little 
argument was ever offered in its defense, and it is cognitively meaningless – and so not 
true, since neither true nor false – according to its own standards. But, ignoring these 
problems, if it is combined with the premise that judgments about what is morally 
good/bad, right/wrong, just/unjust and virtuous/vicious are neither analytic nor 
empirically verifiable, it validly implies that these judgments are neither true nor false. 
Ayer accepted that argument. He thought that moral judgments were neither 
analytic nor empirically verifiable. Sentences like “Eve’s beating her baby today was 
wrong” or “Causing pain for fun is wrong” are not analytic since, if true, are not true in 
virtue of meaning (on nearly any view of meaning), are not formal truths or definitions, 
are not contradictory to deny and can be refuted by an empirical fact such as that Eve 
never beat her baby. If analytic, they would have none of these features. 
Ayer’s arguments that moral judgments were not empirically verifiable depended 
on his arguments against ethical naturalisms and non-naturalisms. 
Naturalists defined moral terms in naturalistic terms. They claimed that moral 
expressions are synonymous with empirical expressions and that, therefore, moral 
properties just are natural properties. Utilitarian-naturalists claimed that “x is right” 
means “x produces the most happiness”; subjectivist-naturalists reduced judgments of 
rightness to judgments of individual or collective approvals. Naturalists argued that since 
these latter judgments are verifiable, moral judgments are verifiable as well.   
Ayer argued that naturalistic definitions were not analytic since it isn’t self-
contradictory to deny them and it is an “open question” for competent speakers whether 
                                                          
6 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 79). 
7 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 16, 41). 
8 See Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy 27).  
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acts with some proposed natural property (e.g., maximizing pleasure) have some moral 
property (e.g., being right). If the naturalists’ various definitions were correct, these 
questions would be as “closed” as the question are “right actions right?”9  That question’s 
answer is “obviously, yes!” but answers to questions whether acts with the proposed 
natural property are right are, at least, not obvious, or, according to some critics of 
naturalisms, obviously not what any naturalists thought. 
Ayer concluded that naturalist definitions were not “consistent with the 
conventions of our actual language”10 and, thus, their analytic bridges to reduce moral 
judgments to empirical judgments were burned down. His arguments here did not depend 
on positivism; Moore made the same arguments. But Ayer could have also observed that 
naturalistic definitions (or, sentences where these definitions are offered) are not 
empirically verifiable either and concluded that, according to positivism, they are neither 
true nor false. However, he seemed content with these definitions being only false. 
Non-naturalists, like Moore and Ross, whom Ayer called “absolutists,”11 claimed 
that moral terms were either indefinable or definable only in other moral terms: e.g., “x is 
right” is synonymous with “x produces the most good,” but “good” is either indefinable 
or definable only in other moral terms (e.g., “worth having for its own sake”12). They 
claimed moral judgments were synthetic but that moral properties could be verified by 
non-empirical intuition.   
But Ayer rejected appeals to intuition, calling it “mysterious.”13 Many claim to 
intuitively be able to “see” that something is morally good (or bad). However, there are 
disagreements and since there is no empirical test to adjudicate between competing moral 
visions, Ayer thought these appeals were “worthless.”14 He argued that since there is no 
moral intuition, no terms’ meanings are such that they stand for properties that can be 
verified non-empirically. He concluded that non-naturalists’ epistemology, semantics and 
metaphysics were mistaken. 
                                                          
9 Or, ‘If there are (or were) any right actions, are right actions right?’ 
10 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 105). 
11 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 106). 
12 See Moore (Philosophical Papers 94). 
13 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 106). 
14 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 106). 
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Unlike his arguments against naturalism, these arguments are distinctly 
positivistic.15 But, even if one rejected positivism, one might find appeals to intuition 
independently suspicious and draw not merely a skeptical conclusion (i.e., “There is 
goodness, but unfortunately no belief that something is good is ever epistemically 
justified or known”) but positivist-like semantic and/or metaphysical conclusions. As we 
shall see, Hare, Mackie and Harman do just this.  
3.3. Ayer’s Ethical Emotivism. 
If moral terms have cognitive meaning (i.e., if “cognitivism” is true and so moral 
judgments are either true or false16), their meanings must be the same as either 
naturalistic or non-naturalistic expressions’ meanings. Ayer thought he refuted both 
possibilities (and if moral terms lack cognitive meaning, that’s another reason to think 
that moral judgments aren’t analytic, i.e., true in virtue of cognitive meaning).   
His final assessment was that ethical concepts are “pseudo-concepts,”17 but he did 
not think that they were meaningless, in the sense of being incomprehensible gibberish. 
His proposal was that moral terms were meaningful but that their meaning was of a 
different kind: emotive, not cognitive. The meanings of these terms are such that when 
people use them, to make moral judgments, they are expressing (not describing) states of 
mind that are “simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false.”18 He 
suggested that moral judgments “are calculated also to arouse feelings, and so to 
stimulate action.”19 We might say that he thought there meanings are such that their 
sincere use had these functions.  
He illustrated his position this way: 
If . . I . . say, “Stealing money is wrong,” I produce a sentence which has no 
factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or 
false. It is as if I had written “Stealing money!!”—where the shape and thickness 
                                                          
15 Non-naturalistic definitions are not empirically verifiable, but Ayer did not argue they were not analytic.  
He did not argue that their denials weren’t self-contradictory or that they failed open question tests.  So, he 
had no argument that they were neither true nor false.  Since the definitions do not in themselves imply that 
there is non-empirical intuition, Ayer had no argument that they were false either.  His argument was more 
at non-naturalistic perspectives as a whole; in particular, the moral epistemologies they conjoined with their 
definitions.  
16 Here I am ignoring possible vague moral judgments. 
17 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 107). 
18 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 103).   
19 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 108). 
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of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of 
moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed.20 It is clear that there is 
nothing said here which can be true or false. Another man my disagree with me 
about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same 
feelings about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my 
moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For in saying 
that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual 
statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely 
expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting 
me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So there is plainly no sense in 
asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine 
proposition.21  
Cognitivists, i.e., naturalists and non-naturalists, agree that strong feelings sometimes, if 
not often, accompany moral judgments and that we often voice moral judgments to try to 
influence feelings and behavior. But they deny that this is a necessary consequence of the 
meanings of moral terms; they maintain that one could sincerely make a moral judgment 
that fails to influence any feelings or behavior (including one’s own).  Since emotivists 
think that moral judgments just are the expression of feelings, they deny this possibility. 
This is Ayer’s perspective on ethics. Later I will discuss Ayer’s response to the 
“only criticism which appeared to threaten it.”22 
3.3.1. Ayer, Positivism and Epistemology. 
While many objections have been raised to emotivism, I wish to raise a new objection to 
Ayer’s defense of it.  He said his emotivist analysis applied to aesthetic judgments, but 
my interest is what this perspective implies for epistemic judgments and definitions. On 
                                                          
20 Since “stealing” has a moral connotation, Ayer should have said something more neutral like “Taking 
money” or “acquiring money” or something like that.  
21 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 107-108). Ayer did, however, think that moral judgments have 
some descriptive content when they entail an empirical proposition.  In the preceding paragraph he writes, 
“[I]f I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing the money,’ I am not stating anything more than if I 
had said, ‘You stole the money.’ In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement 
about it.  I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.” 
22 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 112). 
 67 
the face of it, it seems that they would have a similar fate. I will argue that this is a 
rationally unacceptable implication.23 
Consider some particular epistemic judgments, e.g., some of Ayer’s. Surely he, 
like many people, thought of many of his beliefs were reasonable and justified for him, if 
not sometimes known. Using his preferred terminology, he might have said he had “the 
right to be sure” of them.24 But it seems that these epistemic judgments (e.g., “I am 
justified in believing that the lights are on”, “It is reasonable to believe that I have 
hands”, “As a positivist, I have a right to be sure of the emotive account of ethics”, etc.) 
are not analytic since they are not definitions, tautologies, or formal truths: by the 
standards Ayer accepted in ethics, investigating the meanings of the words or linguistic 
conventions would not reveal their truth values. And, at least prima facie, they don’t 
seem empirically verifiable either: scientific observation might one day, presumably, 
reveal that one has some belief but it wouldn’t show its epistemic status.25  
These considerations seem applicable to any epistemic judgment that some belief 
is justified or reasonable, or is something that one should or ought believe, and so on. So 
it is plausible to think that, on positivistic grounds, particular epistemic judgments are – 
like ethical judgments – also neither true nor false.26  Since epistemic platitudes, such as 
Ayer’s suggestion that “certain standards of evidence ought always to be observed in the 
                                                          
23 See Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge 173) for an endorsement of arguments like those I provide below.   
24 See Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge 31-35).  Ayer analyzes knowledge into the conditions that “first 
that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the 
right to be sure” (p. 35, my emphasis).   
25 Science might reveal all sorts of natural features of the belief, such as its deductive and non-deductive 
logical relations to other propositions (and, lets suppose, experiences) as well as, perhaps, which belief 
forming “process” it has resulted from. This is interesting information, but an additional premise must be 
added to propositions stating that information to yield a conclusion about the beliefs justificatory status or 
whether it ought to be held, and that premise will not be empirically verifiable. I develop this idea below.  
26 Ayer says of particular ethical judgments that “inasmuch as they are certainly neither definitions nor 
comments upon definitions, nor quotations, we may say decisively that they do not belong to ethical 
philosophy.  A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements” 
(Language, Truth and Logic 103).  Perhaps these remarks would apply to particular epistemic judgments as 
well (e.g., whether a belief is Gettier case, whether victims of ‘evil demons’ have justified beliefs), and so a 
“strictly philosophical treatise” on epistemology would contain no particular judgments about the epistemic 
qualities of particular beliefs or believers. While there is no point in debating what is “strictly 
philosophical,” insofar as current epistemologists use particular judgments about actual or hypothetical 
particular cases to evaluate epistemic definitions (or analyses or principles), Ayer’s suggestion would, 
surprisingly, seem to suggest that this aspect of epistemological inquiry is not strictly philosophical. And, if 
my arguments are sound, positivism implies that these epistemic judgments – particular and general – are 
neither true nor false anyway. 
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formation of our beliefs,”27 are neither analytic nor empirical either, it’s presumably not 
true that you ought to follow your evidence, and it’s not false either.   
One might resist these conclusions by arguing that they follow only if one is 
sufficiently inattentive to the meanings of epistemic terms. Perhaps, given true definitions 
or analyses of epistemological terms, epistemic judgments meet the positivistic criterion 
for cognitive meaning.   
While the question of moral terms’ meanings has been much discussed, there has 
been little comparable discussion about the meanings of epistemic terms. But if epistemic 
terms have cognitive meaning, those meanings are either naturalistic or non-naturalistic 
expressions. But then they fall prey to Ayer’s objections to ethical definitions. If ethical 
definitions were of no help in making moral judgments analytic or empirically verifiable 
(and hence either true or false), epistemological definitions are of no help either. If, 
however, these objections do not refute epistemological definitions, then they likely do 
not refute moral definitions either.  
3.3.2. Against Naturalistic Epistemological Definitions. 
Let us first consider some naturalistic epistemological definitions or analyses. While any 
would do, let use Ayer’s. He said that “we define a rational belief as one which is arrived 
at by the methods which we now consider reliable” and that “to be rational is simply to 
employ a self-consistent accredited procedure in the formation of all of one’s beliefs.”28 
   These analyses were likely attractive to him since they identified epistemic 
judgments with psychological-causal-logical judgments that (ignoring possible grave 
difficulties in identifying “methods” and “procedures” and understanding “reliability”) 
were, at least in principle, empirically verifiable. In this way they were like naturalistic 
definitions of ethical terms. But then they were, therefore, also subject to the exact same 
objections, which Ayer did not seem to realize or press against them.  
We might grant that the presence of these psychological-causal-logical states is in 
principle empirically verifiable: perhaps brain scanners will one day be able to reveal 
them. However, to deny these naturalistic definitions does not seem to utter a 
contradiction. Although this is not fully clear since Ayer does not define “reliable,” it 
                                                          
27 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 100). 
28 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 100), emphasis mine. Presumably, these weren’t mere stipulations.   
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does not seem that one contradicts oneself by saying “this belief is rational but it was not 
brought about by a method which we now consider reliable.” Linguistic conventions 
surely were never so much in Ayer’s favor to make that claim analytic.  These definitions 
are also subject to “open question” arguments, since one can sensibly (or quite 
confusedly) ask, “This belief has been formed by the employment of a ‘self-consistent 
accredited procedure,’ but is it a rational belief?”  If “rational” meant that, then there 
wouldn’t be a question here. But surely there is, so this definition, even if true, is not 
analytically true.  
Ayer thought that these tests show that naturalistic definitions of ethical terms are 
not analytic, that these definitions are false, and, therefore, that moral properties are not 
identical to natural properties and that moral judgments are not empirical judgments.29 
Unless epistemic definitions are an exception to the semantic rules that Ayer accepted in 
the context of ethics (and there is no reason to think that they are), these tests also imply 
that naturalistic epistemological definitions are also not analytic, are false, and so 
epistemic properties are not natural properties and epistemic judgments are not empirical 
judgments either.30 
So, given what Ayer said about ethical naturalism, he should have rejected his 
own naturalistic epistemological definitions. Although it is not clear what he thought 
about this, if he thought epistemic judgments were empirical judgments, this view was 
inconsistent with his reasoning against ethical naturalism (and if he thought recognized 
inconsistency should be avoided, that too is inconsistent with his principles). Since 
naturalistic epistemological definitions are also not empirically verifiable, it seems that, 
on positivistic principles, they should be considered not merely false, but neither true nor 
false. That also seems follow from Ayer’s position, which he also did not realize. 
3.3.3. Against Non-Naturalistic Epistemological Definitions. 
If naturalistic epistemological definitions are mistaken since they are not analytic, then a 
non-naturalistic definition must be correct, if any are. But Ayer’s objections to ethical 
non-naturalisms apply equally well to epistemic non-naturalisms also.  
                                                          
29 This reasoning was founded on the false assumption that if the claim that “A’s are not B’s” is not analytic 
then A’s are not B’s.  For the sake of argument, here I ignore this.  
30 That seems correct, apart from any concerns about Ayer: even if reliabilism and other naturalistic 
epistemic theories were true, would not be analytically true or true by definition. 
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 If what a person believes can in principle be empirically verified, many aspects of 
beliefs are empirically verifiable as well. The various effects of those beliefs (i.e., causal 
properties of those beliefs) are presumably verifiable, e.g., that it makes someone happy 
or sad, or is financially productive. Beliefs’ psychological properties of being held with a 
certain level of strength, confidence or doubt are empirically verifiable. Formal, logical 
properties of a belief can also be identified, i.e., logical relations to other propositions, 
although positivists would likely claim that these relations can be identified because they 
are analytic.31 
But whether some belief is justified or reasonable, or whether there is sufficient 
evidence for some belief, does not seem to be an empirical matter: observation and 
experiment do not show the epistemic status of a belief.32 At best, lab results could show 
that some belief-forming process has some level of statistical reliability. That beliefs 
formed by these processes (or processes with some specified level of reliability, or 
probability, or any other candidate for a “natural” feature) are justified, or ought to be 
held, however, is not empirically confirmable. Reliabilism, as a philosophical theory, 
cannot be confirmed by science; according to arguments parallel to those Ayer gave 
about ethical naturalisms, it cannot be confirmed by an investigation of our epistemic 
language either, so positivism suggests that it’s neither true nor false. Scientific results do 
not show if some experience or belief is evidence, or if some evidence is sufficient 
evidence, if some proposition ought to be believed, or if some explanation is more 
reasonable than another. In fact, scientific thought and practice depends on antecedent 
capacities for epistemic assessment that do not seem to be ultimately confirmable in any 
straightforwardly empirical manner.33 
Empirical information is often relevant to epistemic evaluation (e.g., whether S 
believes p is relevant to whether S’s believing p is justified). But identifying the epistemic 
                                                          
31 This appears to presuppose some kind of non-empirical intuition that is likely hard to account for on 
positivistic perspectives, but I will not press that point. 
32 This isn’t at all to say that scientific information or, especially common-sense empirical information is 
not or could not be relevant to whether some belief is justified or whether it should be judged as justified.  
33 Some might disagree by arguing that, e.g., a successful track record in terms of yielding truths amounts 
to an empirical defense of the justifiability of a method. This kind of argument would surely appeal to 
empirical observations, but they would never be the whole story. This is because such an argument would 
probably rest on a premise to the effect that if some method has yielded many truths, then it is justified and 
its implications ought to be accepted. If there were evidence for (a more plausible version of) this premise, 
it would be non-empirical or not wholly empirical. 
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status of belief seems to be a matter of something that might be best described as non-
empirical intuition. And Ayer rejected views that appealed to intuition since he thought 
there simply is no such thing. He thought intuition was especially troublesome in ethics 
since there is no test to decide between conflicting intuitions other than further intuitions: 
there is no empirical tie-breaker. But the same is true in epistemology: there is no 
empirical test to adjudicate competing intuitions about what’s reasonable or justified, or 
whether some evidence is sufficient evidence, or if some belief-forming-process is the 
process that justifies some belief. If intuition is “worthless” in ethics, as Ayer thought, it 
is equally worthless in epistemology. 
Ayer rejected ethical non-naturalism because of its intuitionism; he concluded that 
moral terms do not have the same meanings as non-natural terms, there are no non-
natural moral properties and, thus, that moral judgments are neither true nor false.  It 
seems that analogous conclusions would follow for epistemology as well: any theory that 
implies that epistemic terms mean terms that are non-empirically verifiable is equally 
worthy of rejection from positivistic perspectives. In case he did, Ayer should not have 
thought that epistemic terms’ meanings are non-natural expressions. He should have 
rejected non-naturalistic definitions and analyses that claimed that epistemic terms are 
indefinable or definable only in other epistemic terms (e.g., “a belief is rational” means 
the same as “there are good reasons for that belief” or “a belief is justified if, and only if, 
it is supported by the evidence”).   
3.4. Ayer’s Epistemic Emotivism. 
Since naturalistic definitions fail to be analytic and non-naturalistic definitions 
presuppose intuition, it seems that Ayer should have rejected them both. He should have 
concluded that epistemic terms lack cognitive meaning altogether and so epistemic 
judgments are neither true nor false. These results are not idiosyncratic to Ayer’s 
epistemology: on positivistic assumptions, contemporary epistemologies – both 
naturalistic and non-naturalistic – would result in epistemic evaluations being 
“cognitively meaningless” also. 
Unless epistemic judgments are declared completely meaningless, it seems likely 
that, on positivism, their meaning would also be emotive. There are other options, 
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however since there are other non-cognitivist interpretations of epistemic language that 
are, in some sense, “consistent” with epistemic sentences lacking truth values.34  
But on epistemic emotivism, to sincerely judge that, e.g., some belief is justified 
(or unjustified) is to express one’s favorable (or unfavorable) feelings towards that belief 
and to attempt arouse the feelings of others regarding that belief and stimulate them to 
believe (or disbelieve) it. The view would have it that like other “statements of value,”35 
the presence of an epistemic term in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. So, 
in saying “Your belief that p is unjustified and unreasonable” one might not saying 
anything more than ‘You believe p!!??’ in, like Ayer suggested about moral evaluations, 
“a particular tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation 
marks” to express one’s feelings of disapproval and, perhaps, to try to command the 
believer to cease believing p.36  
If epistemic emotivism is true, a seven-day creationist’s saying, “evolution is not 
supported by the evidence; it is unreasonable to accept the theory of evolution,” would 
not be an expression of a proposition; rather, it would be an expression of disapproval of 
belief in evolution and an attempt to persuade others to reject the theory. An 
evolutionist’s response that creationists are irrational and that, in fact, creationism is a 
well-justified theory would be equally emotive. Neither party would be attempting to 
state facts about the epistemic quality of their respective beliefs or attribute epistemic 
properties.37 To judge that one knows that one knows something, or that one is justified 
in thinking some belief is justified, would seem to be expressions of complex feelings: 
some kind of approvals of one’s approvals. That is an interesting result.  
This interpretation of epistemic judgments is strongly suggested by Ayer’s 
positivistic critique of ethics. Since most philosophers think that epistemic judgments are 
propositional attitudes, and epistemic emotivism denies this, it is at odds with common 
assumptions. If it is more reasonable to accept the common, realistic view about the 
nature of epistemic judgments, then it’s more reasonable to reject epistemic emotivism. 
                                                          
34 Should positivists only accept views that are consistent with their position (insofar as propositions can be 
consist with the principle of verification, a sentence that’s seems to fail to be a proposition, on positivistic)?  
While positivists might wish to answer, “Yes,” but below I argue that they truthfully cannot.  
35 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 102).   
36 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 107, 108).   
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This, in turn, might provide strong reasons to reject ethical emotivism and at least some 
arguments that are given in its favor.  
Ayer might have agreed with this claim. As far as I know, not even Ayer and 
other positivists accepted epistemological emotivism, or even noticed that their broader, 
positivistic perspective suggested it. Perhaps this implication, had positivists seen it, 
would have led many to change their view about positivistic principles. Perhaps for many 
non-positivists, is shocking enough – due to its tension with other reasonable beliefs – to 
serve as (yet another) reductio of positivistic principles.38   
3.4.1. Epistemic Emotivism Undercuts Ethical Emotivism. 
For now, I wish to note this emotive consequence for epistemic judgments has interesting 
and important implications for arguments from positivism to ethical emotivism. This is 
because epistemic emotivism has implications for what to think about all arguments and 
reasoning.39 These implications are likely troublesome for positivists and those who 
reject ethical cognitivism for Ayer’s reasons. 
To see this, consider the main argument under consideration in this chapter: 
(1) A sentence states a proposition if, and only if, it is either analytic or empirically 
verifiable. 
(2) Moral and epistemic sentences – particular judgments (and, clearly, naturalistic 
definitions) – are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable.  
(3) Therefore, moral and epistemic sentences do not state propositions.  
Premise (1) is “paradoxical” in that if it is true, it implies that it is neither true nor false. 
Perhaps it was intended to express feelings of approval for analytic and empirically 
verifiable sentences and disapproval for all others, but this is doubtful. I will ignore these 
problems and, for the sake of argument, accept (1) as true. And I have argued that (2) as 
true as well, especially on positivistic assumptions. It has long been recognized as true for 
moral judgments, and I observed that it seems true for epistemic judgments also.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 Perhaps an epistemic emotivist would allow that they are, at least, attempting to state the truth about the 
epistemic qualities of their beliefs, but would think that they never succeed.  
38 Later I investigate in greater details whether this reductio could be resisted and whether epistemological 
emotivisms or expressivisms could be plausibly maintained and defended.  I will argue that it can’t. 
39 I say seems to have implications: although a statement of epistemic emotivism might entail other 
propositions, claims like “those who accept epistemic emotivism ought to accept these implications” are 
neither true nor false, according to epistemic emotivism.   
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So, we have a recognized-as-valid argument with premises that, for the sake of 
argument, we accept as true. Now, the problem: should we accept the conclusion?  
Would we be justified in doing so? That is, are the sentences “We should accept this 
conclusion” and “We are justified in believing (3)” true?  Neither of these sentences is 
analytic or empirically verifiable. So insofar as (1) can have implications, it seems to 
imply that these sentences, as epistemic evaluations, are neither true nor false.40 A 
sentence even like “someone who believes an argument to be valid, thinks the premises 
are true, sees that the premises entail the conclusion, and is more confident of the 
premises than the denial of the conclusion ought to accept the conclusion” seems to be 
neither true nor false either: it is clearly not empirical, does not seem to be analytic, is not 
a logical truth and reflection on the meanings of its terms does not reveal it to be true. 
Given all this, positivism implies that these sentences are not true, since they are neither 
true nor false.  
From positivistic perspectives, naturalistic epistemological definitions that might 
be offered (in conjunction with empirical premises describing psychological states) to 
reduce these epistemic judgments to empirical judgments would be refuted by open-
question arguments; definitions that wouldn’t be refuted this way would require a kind of 
intuition that they found too mysterious. Thus, according to positivism, it is neither true 
nor false that anyone epistemically should (or should not) accept ethical emotivism. A 
response that “you should be an ethical emotivist but you should resist these arguments 
for epistemic emotivism,” would be neither true nor false either.  
So, if epistemic emotivism is true, then it is not true that it ought to be accepted or 
anyone is justified or reasonable in believing it. If positivist-based epistemic emotivists 
would judge that they are reasonable or justified in their views, they would be saying 
something that, on their view, is not true. This is an interesting consequence, one that, 
probably, few positivists and ethical emotivists would have willingly accepted. Whether 
they should have resisted this conclusion and, if so, how they might have done so will be 
discussed below.41  
                                                          
40 However, I argue below that, on positivism, any principle like ‘if someone recognizes that p entails q 
then she ought to believe q’ (or, ideally, a more refined and plausible principle) is neither true nor false.  
41 In my introduction chapter, I note that the claim that someone, from an intellectual point of view, should 
(or should not) resist some argument is a kind of epistemic or intellectual judgment. Throughout this work I 
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 This interesting consequence extends beyond particular epistemic evaluations to 
evaluations about which inferences ought to be accepted. Logical relations among 
propositions are one issue and a fully legitimate one, on positivistic assumptions.42 
Discerning the logical consequences of one’s beliefs is surely part of what’s involved in 
reasoning, and it is the basis of reasoning. But reasoning involves attempting to see these 
logical consequences and attempting to discern which consequences we should accept. 
What you should conclude (given your experiences and other things you believe), how 
you ought to reason, what you are justified in believing, etc. are separate kinds of 
questions from the question of what are the logical consequences of a set of propositions. 
Not all epistemic judgments appeal to logic, and reasoning and evaluating arguments is 
more than displaying sets of statements in various logical relations. And seeing these 
logical relations does not establish what one, epistemically, should believe: it is an open 
question whether some proposition(s) in some logical relations to others ought to be 
accepted or is justified, even when these logical relations – these naturalistic features – 
are recognized. This is true on positivism, and it seems true on non-positivistic 
assumptions also.  
Reasoning typically involves presumptions that “given this, you ought to believe 
that” and “you should drop this belief if you want to retain that belief”43 and “it’s better 
to believe this than that” and so forth. In practice, it seems to presuppose an imperative of 
consistency, a presumption that it’s better to have consistent beliefs than inconsistent 
ones and that, at least sometimes, if one recognizes inconsistency, it should be resolved.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
argue that reasons to think that moral judgments are never true suggest that judgments like these are never 
true also. Thus, if, e.g., some positivist were to think that that he or she ought to respond to objections like 
mine, we need to ask if this judgment is true or not. If it is true, then, I argue this implies that positivistic 
principles are false. If it’s not true, then perhaps it is a kind of non-cognitive expression. I am arguing, 
however, that most people have better reasons to reject this kind of view than accept it.  
42 Ayer’s analysis of judgments of probabilistic logical relations has been subject to the same objections I 
have raised to his treatment of epistemic judgments, so perhaps all he can truthfully make are judgments 
about entailments and their absence. R.F. Atkinson persuasively argues that the positions Ayer takes in 
ethics and probability are inconsistent.  See Atkinson (“‘Good’ and ‘Right’” 242-246).  
43 Some might suggest that what can be called “epistemic imperatives,” such as these I suggest here 
involving reasoning, are hypothetical imperatives: if you want X, believe p (or reason in various ways); you 
want X, so believe p (or reason in various ways). They might claim that this somehow eliminates appeal to 
evaluative language. But this does not because we are still left with the question whether some principle 
like ‘if you want X and Y is a means to X, then do Y’ is a proposition, if it is true, and, if so, what makes it 
true: why should you satisfy your desires and take the best means towards doing so?  Hypothetical 
imperatives presuppose all the metaphysical and semantic baggage that categorical imperatives do; to avoid 
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Typically, these epistemic “should’s”, “ought’s” and other value judgments are 
understood realistically. Few think that we are merely expressing our emotions when 
talking about good and bad reasoning, and what we should believe.44 In cases where we 
might be expressing emotions in making epistemic judgments, few of us think that we are 
only expressing our emotions. Perhaps we are only expressing our emotions, but many 
would deny that and think that their denial is reasonable. There are reasons to think that 
epistemic judgments are sometimes true. Some of these are analogous to some of the 
reasons to given to think that moral judgments are sometimes true. Let me briefly present 
just a few of these reasons, in no particular order of strength or importance.  
First, to many, it seems that epistemic error is possible. Many people think that 
there are propositions that they used to believe, and even currently believe, but that they 
were unreasonable or unjustified in believing them, given the evidence that they had at 
the time. This judgment suggests that beliefs can be unjustified (as well as justified), but 
we can fail to see this. It also suggests that epistemic judgments are descriptive, i.e., are 
attributions of epistemic properties, since we can think that some of our own epistemic 
judgments have failed to describe our own epistemic situations, and that they are made 
true by things other than our own attitudes toward them. Other examples might reveal 
that it seems we can accept general epistemic or intellectual standards that we later come 
to regard as quite mistaken. 
These common insights seem to suggest that there are stance-independent 
epistemic truths. Epistemic emotivisms, and other epistemic irrealisms, might have a very 
hard time making sense of these phenomena: perhaps they could appeal to expressions of 
approval (and disapproval) for various expressions of approval (and disapproval), but, to 
many, this seems to be a strained description of the phenomena. Perhaps such a theory 
could be worked out, but I suspect an epistemic realist has stronger reason to accept his 
or her realistic interpretation of the phenomena of epistemic error.  
Second, it seems that one can make epistemic evaluations without any emotional 
involvement. And it seems that any epistemic evaluations made initially with heated 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a regress, they seem to presuppose a categorical imperative also such as, perhaps, that one’s desires should 
be satisfied (irrespective of whatever one’s desires are).  
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emotions can be restated later, in a cooler frame of mind, but the same thing is said: no 
meaning of the epistemic evaluation is lost. Epistemic realists have a simple explanation 
of how this can be, since they hold that, for any emotional factors related to epistemic 
evaluations, they are only contingently related. But on epistemic emotivism, these 
phenomena are either impossible since there are no emotion-free epistemic evaluations, 
or we are saying different things when we “cool down” and “heat up” in our evaluations. 
Both of these claims seem false, and this provides reason to reject epistemic emotivism. 
Again, while an epistemic emotivist surely has things to say here in defense of his or her 
point of view, I submit that these responses are weaker than the reasons that can be given 
in favor of the realist understanding of these phenomena.  
Third, and related to the previous points, it seems that “a-epistemicists” are 
possible. These are believers who make epistemic and other intellectual evaluations, but 
completely lack any motivation or affective “pull” towards complying with their own 
evaluations: e.g., they judge that some of their beliefs are completely irrational and 
baseless, but this in no way motivates them towards changing their views. This possible 
phenomenon will be characterized in greater detail later in this chapter, but what’s 
important is that epistemic emotivisms would usually imply that such an “a-epistemicist” 
is impossible. However, if there is reason to think that there could be, and even are, such 
believers, this provides reason to think that epistemic emotivism is false. Again, while an 
epistemic emotivist surely has things to say here in defense of his or her point of view, I 
submit that these responses are weaker than the reasons that can be given in favor of the 
realist understanding of these phenomena.  
Fourth, epistemic evaluations seem to behave like other descriptive language: 
they can figure into truth functional operations and can be part of seemingly valid 
arguments. So, this argument seems valid: 
(1) If each person should believe what’s justified for him or her, then Sally should 
believe what’s justified for her. 
(2) Each person should believe what’s justified for him or her. 
(3) Therefore, Sally should believe what’s justified for her.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
44 Allen Gibbard and Hartry Field are notable exceptions: they recognize that the arguments of ethical 
emotivism, and other non-realist meta-ethics, have implications beyond what Ayer and Stevenson saw for 
them. I discuss their views in my final chapter.  
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Epistemic emotivism might make it a challenge to understanding why this argument – or 
other arguments with epistemic terms – is valid, just as ethical emotivism makes it a 
challenge to understand why an argument like this is valid also: 
(4) If lying is wrong, then it’s wrong to get your brother to lie. 
(5) Lying is wrong. 
(6) Therefore, it’s wrong to get your brother to lie.  
The problem is that, if epistemic or ethical emotivism is true, then the meanings 
of (2) and (5) differ from the meanings of these phrases when used in (1) and (4) because, 
put most simply, these are different kinds of assertions. But if this is so, then these 
arguments are invalid, due to, put most simply, equivocations in the premises. If this is 
so, then the arguments are invalid. However, they seem valid, so it seems that the various 
phrases, when stated in the differing premises, have the same meaning. Since epistemic 
and ethical emotivisms imply that they don’t, this provides reason to think that these 
emotivisms are false.  
Again, while both ethical and epistemic emotivists have responses to this 
problem, it’s safe to say that these responses are very complicated and that none have 
been met with much positive response. Perhaps this is due to stubbornness on realists’ 
part, but I submit these negative evaluations of these irrealistic responses to this problem 
are weaker than the reasons that can be given in favor of the realist understanding of 
these phenomena. Thus, it is more reasonable to accept the realist explanation of why 
arguments with epistemic and ethical terms can be, and often are, logically valid.  
 A final point in favor of epistemic realism is that it just seems true. Judgments 
about what’s reasonable, justified, known, and should be believed just sometimes seem to 
be true: intuitively they seem true, and considerations given above and below are reasons 
that support this judgment. Thinking about our options can help. If epistemic evaluations 
are not ever true, then are they always false? Maybe this is the way things are, but this 
does not seem true either, and many have thought that there are strong reasons to resist 
epistemological skepticism, which this view might be a species of. Perhaps there are no 
such good reasons to reject skepticism, but many people would think that we should think 
that only if we have been given strong reasons to think so. But if this happens, then 
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strong reasons have been given to think that there are no strong reasons. But this is a self-
contradictory position that is, for many, unbelievable.  
Epistemic judgments might be neither true nor false, but this does not seem true 
either. When ethical emotivists respond to the problem above with claims that when one 
is expressing the state involved in asserting a major premise of such an argument, and 
then one expresses the different state in asserting a minor premise, then one should 
express some final state also. They make all kinds of evaluative judgments in reasoning, 
and it seems that these are attempts to state truths, not merely expressions of their 
preferences for people accepting various patterns of reasoning (or, to describe reasoning 
in a manner without any evaluative language, accepting various sentences when 
displayed in various relationships to each other). 
It seems that Ayer accepted this common view about reasoning: it does not seem 
that he was merely interested in noting various views about the nature of ethical 
judgments that are consistent with positivism, yet not claiming that some of them (like 
emotivism) truthfully should be accepted. But positivism seems unable to accommodate 
these judgments, since none of these claims about reasoning and what we should believe 
or what is reasonable meet their criteria for being cognitive meaningful. Ethical 
emotivists have been criticized for being unable to account for the role of reason in 
ethics, since they offered no mechanism to explain which emotive responses are 
appropriate (and typically claimed that there were no truths about which feelings “fit” a 
situation) and how one might give reasons for one’s ethical perspectives. But my 
arguments run deeper in that I’m arguing that, if positivism is the basis of their 
emotivism, then they are unable to account for good and bad reasoning simpliciter.   
This is because reasoning involves more than observing the natural facts that 
some propositions of interest are in some logical relations to other propositions of 
interest; it involves making these observations and then making judgments about what we 
should believe in light of them, or whether we ought to accept some consequence of our 
views, or whether we are justified in accepting what we have believed in light of this 
newly seen implication. Since positivism implies that all such judgments are neither true 
nor false, it seems to lack the resources to account for what’s involved in reasoning: it 
implies that the kinds of thoughts essential to reasoning are neither true nor false.  So, on 
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their view, argumentation is based on emotions, never true epistemic principles about 
how we should respond to recognitions of logical truths, and so arguments for ethical 
emotivism are based on emotional expressions, not any true principle about reasoning. 
Ethical emotivists might express strong feelings about believing emotivism and try to 
arouse our sentiments so we might accept it, but it’s not clear how those are reasons to 
accept it, especially for those who don’t accept the view. And, at least if positivism is the 
motivation for ethical emotivism, there’s no truth to the claim that we should be 
reasonable, or ought to have intellectually defensible views anyway.45 Those are also 
merely expressions, and there’s no truth to the claim that one should accept them or deny 
them. Either is equally untrue.  
If positivism undercuts the truth of any epistemic judgments, including judgments 
about what is and isn’t good reasoning – again, since reasoning involves more than 
observing the natural facts that some propositions of interest are in some logical relations 
to other propositions of interest – this is yet another reason to reject positivism and 
undercuts a historically influential motivation for moral non-cognitivisms and irrealisms 
(that I suspect is still lingering in some “naturalistic” and “scientistic” perspectives). This 
is because positive implies something that is false and something, as I argued above, that 
we are reasonable and justified in regarding as false, viz. that there are no literally true 
epistemic evaluations and never any truths about how we ought to reason.  
Below I will consider some ways that positivism-motivated epistemic emotivists 
might try to resist these arguments. First, however, I wish to sketch my general argument 
against arguments for moral irrealism, some of which I have developed above. Although 
I have repeatedly acknowledged that epistemic emotivism, or any other epistemically 
irrealistic view, might be true and more common views about the semantics, metaphysics, 
psychology, logic and epistemology of epistemic judgments false and rationally 
indefensible, I want to make it clear what I concede to be true of possible arguments for 
epistemic irrealisms and the exact nature of my criticisms.  
 
                                                          
45 What if someone desires that she be able to defend her views, give considerations in their favor, respond 
to objections, etc.?  On positivism, that’s not a good thing, or admirable, or an attitude that people ought to 
strive to have. Those claims are all neither true nor false.  
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3.4.2. Criticisms of and Concessions to Arguments for Epistemic 
Irrealism.  
Throughout this work, I observe that we can understand moral irrealists as arguing for 
their preferred version of moral irrealism using a version of the argument stated with 
what we might call the general argument schema for moral irrealism:  
(1) If a judgment has features , then it is not objectively true.46  
(2) Moral judgments have features . 
(3) Therefore, moral judgments are not objectively true.   
From (3), positive reasons are offered to try to establish some kind of moral non-
cognitivism, expressivism, prescriptivism, nihilism, relativism or other meta-ethical 
theory which, if true, implies that moral realism is false. 
While arguments for moral irrealism are rarely formulated as simply and 
explicitly as this schema, the schema can help us clearly identify the basic reasons each 
classical moral irrealist gives for his position.47 For each, we can ask what his basic “” 
is: what features do moral judgments have such that he thinks that, because they have 
these features, an irrealist understanding of them is warranted? Each of these figures’ s 
can be used to state an instance of the general argument schema for moral irrealism.  
These are simplifications that overlook important details which will be developed 
in later chapters, but, as we have seen, Ayer’s basic  is it’s that moral judgments are 
neither analytic nor empirically verifiable; he also offers some non-positivistic-based 
considerations which, as we will see, some later philosophers develop in support of their 
own views. We will see in the concluding section of this chapter that Stevenson’s s 
                                                          
46 Although I do so, I hesitate using the phrase “objectively true,” since that would seem to suggest that 
there is a plausible alternative kind of truth, or that there are at least two ways something can be true, 
objectively and non-objectively. Some (e.g., Harman) have proposed “relative truth” for a non-objective 
alternative. By this, they mean to say that some judgments are true relative to some other propositions – 
they are implied by them, or are somehow supported by them – but are not implied or supported by others, 
and so are false relative to them. To me, it seems misleading to describe this as a way of being true: it 
would be better to just say that no moral judgments are true, yet – perhaps in conjunction with empirical 
propositions – some are implied or supported by other moral propositions (e.g., more general moral 
principles) while they inconsistent with others. This avoids possible confusing concerns about whether 
some truth is true “objectively” or merely “relatively.”  
47 Although this argument schema is that of a deductively valid argument, not all the arguments I discuss 
below and in subsequent chapters are deductively valid. For my immediate purpose here, however, this 
does not matter. In this section, I also evaluate arguments as “sound” and “unsound,” but these evaluations 
should be understood here as pertaining to non-deductive arguments also.  
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include that moral judgments have a motivational quality, that moral discourse has an 
emotional, dynamic aspect, and a Hume-motivated puzzlement about what a moral truth-
maker could be like.  
In later chapters, we will see that Hare’s s include the fact that people can 
disagree about their moral evaluations even when they accept different naturalistic and 
non-naturalistic understandings of the meanings of moral terms: they are not talking past 
each other, as these theories might imply. Mackie’s s include claims that moral 
judgments are intrinsically motivational, that moral properties are commonly thought to 
be supervenient on natural properties, and the claim that there is fundamental, intractable 
disagreement about what has which moral properties, i.e., disagreements about which 
moral evaluations are correct. And Harman’s main s pertain to moral disagreements and 
the judgment that moral properties don’t seem to be appealed to in order to explain our 
moral beliefs and attitudes or any other clearly natural phenomena. Contemporary moral 
irrealists (some of whom are also epistemic irrealists), like Blackburn, Field, Gibbard, 
Timmons, and Wright often accept and build upon many of these s in for their 
arguments against moral (and, sometimes, epistemic) realism. I noted this in my first 
chapter and will look at Gibbard’s and Field’s arguments in my final chapter.  
I argue that all these arguments for moral irrealism have a problem: the exact 
nature of my criticism, and some interesting challenges in arguing for it, will be 
explained below.  
My main objection is against the various first premises – instances of (1) – of this 
argument schema immediately above, so let me make a few remarks about the second 
premises of this kind of argument. For some of these alleged features of moral judgments, 
i.e., claims stated in various instances of premise (2), it’s very plausible to believe that 
moral judgments have them: e.g., it’s very plausible to think that Ayer is right at least in 
thinking that particular moral judgments are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, 
and so this version of premise (2) is true. Some features expressed in alternative premise 
2s, however, are at least controversial: e.g., it is not at all clear that moral judgments have 
an intrinsically motivational quality about them and so, for a variety of conceptual, 
phenomenological and empirical reasons, evaluating a premise like that is more 
challenging than, say, Ayer’s premise.  
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In face of these challenges, however, my general response is to concede that it is 
plausible to think that moral judgments have such features. So, for each given instance of 
(2) from the meta-ethical literature that I discuss, I either sincerely accept it or, for the 
sake of argument, I concede it as true. Thus, I agree with moral irrealists on nearly all 
points about what it’s like to make moral judgments or what moral judgments are like.  
Since I find a major fault with arguments for moral irrealism, my objection then 
must be with instances of premise (1) of the general argument schema above, that if a 
judgment has features , then it is not objectively true. I intend to argue that most actual, 
given instances of this premise are problematic:48 each major premise has implications 
that we have better reason to regard as false, and so reject, than to accept as true. This 
defect renders the entire argument epistemically defective, since it implies that at the 
premise is either false or rationally unacceptable, or both.49  
Before I turn to this objection, I will first discuss one response that I will 
generally not develop or rely on, as it is rather weak. Some instances of premise (1) could 
be challenged by claiming that no good reason, or inadequate reason, is given in their 
defense. A “lazy” version of this response could come from someone of a philosophical 
temperament who takes philosophical arguments seriously only when positive reasons 
have been given in defense of all premises of an argument. Someone like this might claim 
that, as far as she can tell, too rarely is positive defense given for the various instances of 
premise (1).  
As a matter of fact, this is often true since the ideas motivating instances of the 
premise are often only assumed and not explicitly defended: e.g., both Mackie and 
Harman seem to only assume that if there were “objective” moral properties or facts that 
made moral judgments true, then more people would detect these properties and moral 
evaluations would converge, especially when people agreed on (what they agree is) the 
                                                          
48 I do not argue that all possible instances of premise (2) or even every actual articulated instance of 
premise (2) is problematic. I mainly only examine versions of (2) that are commonly discussed or 
articulated by philosophers who I have called “classical” moral anti-realists.  
49 Below I discuss how a premise’s being false is not, strictly speaking, a reason to reject it (or makes it 
such that it is not justified or that it should be rejected), just as a premises being true is not, strictly 
speaking, a reason to accept it (or makes it justified or that it should accepted). Rather, the relevant 
consideration is that it seems false (or seems true), “on balance,” or “overall,” or more clearly false than 
true. The exact phenomenon is not easy to describe.  
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relevant empirical information. Since there isn’t such agreement, Mackie and Harman 
conclude that there are no moral properties.  
So their version of premise (1), roughly stated, that if a judgment has the features 
pertaining to a specific kind of disagreement (a kind of disagreement that they think is 
not better explained in some other manner), then it is not true, or probably not true, is 
based on an assumption for which they provide little or no explicit defense. Their premise 
is not supported by the kind of discussion that would be best to defend it with, such as a 
fully general discussion of what kinds of properties are highly “see-able,” which kinds of 
properties (if any) are not, what we should think about the ontological status of the 
various kinds of properties that have low or no “see-ability,” and an application of this all 
to the metaphysics of moral properties. Something like this would be needed for an 
optimal defense of their assumption behind their premise (1). As it stands, this defense is 
missing, so our “lazy” philosopher might see no reason to take this argument seriously. 
She might not have any positive objection to the premise; it just doesn’t seem true to her 
so she doesn’t accept it.   
 My response to instances of premise (1) is not as lazy as this. Although it does 
seem that too often too little positive reasons are given in favor of the various versions of 
this premise, I intend to argue that we should regard the various instances of these 
arguments’ major premise are false. Someone who understands my arguments would be 
justified or reasonable in rejecting (1), ought to reject (1), and so should think that the 
typical arguments for moral irrealism are not sound. To defend such claims, I argue that 
instances of premise (1) have false implications that, when recognized as such, reveal that 
the premises are false and so ought to be rejected.  
To try to show this, I develop various arguments for epistemic irrealisms that are 
parallel to the arguments for moral irrealism. Epistemic irrealism implies that epistemic 
judgments – e.g., that some belief is epistemically reasonable, justified, known, ought to 
be held, should be rejected, and so on – are never objectively true. To develop an 
argument for such a view, we can construct a parallel general argument schema for 




(1) If a judgment has features , then it is not objectively true. 
(4) Epistemic judgments have features .  
(5) Therefore, epistemic judgments are not objectively true.   
From (5), considerations might be offered to attempt to encourage the adoption of 
epistemic expressivism, nihilism, relativism or other meta-epistemological theory that, if 
true, implies that epistemic realism is false. 
 I have, and will, argue that instances of the argument from (1, 4, and 5) are 
unsound and use this result to argue that the analogous arguments against moral realism 
are also unsound. This argument about these arguments can be presented as the 
following: 
(6) If the discussed arguments for moral irrealism are sound, then analogous 
arguments for epistemic irrealisms are sound.50 
(7) Analogous arguments for epistemic irrealism are not sound. 
(8) Therefore, the discussed arguments for moral irrealism are not sound.  
Conclusion (8), if shown, does not provide positive support for moral realism; it is only 
defensive in showing that common arguments against moral realism are unsuccessful.  
To defend this argument (6, 7, and 8), I will need to defend premise (7): my claim 
that these arguments for epistemic irrealism are not sound. To do that I need to argue that 
the relevant instances of either premise (1) or premise (4) in the schema for arguments for 
epistemic irrealism are false.  
I accept instances of premise (4) as true: epistemic judgments have the features 
that moral irrealists find problematic about moral judgments. Like premise (2) above, 
which describes alleged features of moral judgments, I accept instances of premise (4) for 
features  that moral irrealists appeal to in making their case for their moral irrealisms. 
Moral irrealists say, “Moral judgments are like this.” I reply, either sincerely or for the 
                                                          
50 In this immediate discussion will assume this premise is true, since the two kinds of arguments are 
structurally parallel and concern the same properties. Earlier I discussed how the fact that moral and 
epistemic properties have some different features (as well as some shared, common features) would not 
make an obvious difference to my arguments, since these differences do not change the fact that moral anti-
realists suggest that having these (shared) features is sufficient for irrealism. Later I discuss how a moral 
anti-realists sense that he or she ought to revise his arguments, that he would be justified in accepting them 
only if he re-tinkered with them to meet my objections, might be based on intellectually evaluative and 
deontic assumptions that are ultimately inconsistent with his or her premises given for moral irrealism. 
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sake of argument), “OK, but epistemic judgments are like that also.” These agreements 
are stated through instances of premise (4). 
Thus, my objection is to the shared premise (1), that if a judgment has features , 
then it is not objectively true. If that premise is false, then arguments for epistemic 
irrealism and for moral irrealism are unsound. Those who should believe that this 
premise is false should also believe that the arguments are unsound; those who are 
justified in rejecting it are justified in rejecting the arguments against these realisms as 
unsound.  
To object to premise (1), I argue that epistemic judgments have features  yet 
they are sometimes objectively true. They are “in the same boat” with moral judgments, 
in terms of many of the metaphysical, semantic, psychological, and epistemic features 
that moral irrealists have found noteworthy about moral judgments. However, I claim that 
having these features is not sufficient for them never being objectively true, and so 
premise (1) is false.  
To do this, I show what’s entailed by the falsity of epistemic realism, or the truth 
of (5) above, and claim that we should not accept these entailments: we should regard 
them as false. Many of these entailments, and the argument against them, might be 
summed up with this complex argument: 
(9) If no epistemic judgments are ever objectively true, then either there are no 
epistemic beliefs, or/and there are no epistemic propositions, or/and there are 
no epistemic properties, or/and there are no epistemic facts, or/and there are 
no accurate representations of things as they epistemically are (or/and, we 
never even attempt to represent things epistemically) or/and the only 
epistemic “truths” are those relative to different epistemic frameworks, 
none of which are any better or worse than any other.  
(10) But these consequences are all mistaken; we have better reason to reject 
them than accept them. 
(11) Therefore, some epistemic judgments are objectively true.  
The most important consequence of the truth of (11) is that (1) is false, and if that’s so, 
then the typical arguments for moral irrealism are not sound. Recognizing that they have 
false premises provides strong reason to reject these arguments. If one is antecedently 
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fond of moral realism, at least one might reasonably think that there are no good 
objections to the view.  
 How, however, do I defend (10)? That is, how do I show that there are epistemic 
properties or facts that serve as truth makers for epistemic claims, and even that there are 
epistemic claims, i.e., epistemic beliefs and other propositional attitudes? How do I show 
that epistemic discourse is not (merely) emotionally expressive and not founded on false 
metaphysical, semantic, psychological and epistemic assumptions? After all, it could be 
true that some version of epistemic irrealism is true and some argument for that 
conclusion sound. The claim that there are no epistemic properties and all epistemic and 
intellectual evaluations are purely emotive is not easily seen to be self-contradictory: 
contemplation of the claim itself does not inhibit belief. And there’s no contradiction in 
thinking that an epistemic platitude along the lines of if you realize you have 
contradictory beliefs, then you should abandon some belief to eliminate perceived 
inconsistency is likewise never true (because it’s emotive or there are no truth makers for 
it, or whatever). Someone might accept some kind of epistemic irrealism, with full 
awareness of its implications, even its implications for the epistemic evaluations of her 
belief in the theory itself (and everything else she believes): she might call it “reasonable” 
or “known” but recognize that, on the theory, perhaps, only emotions have been 
expressed, no truths stated. She could accept these implications even her belief that 
epistemic irrealism is true and some argument in its favor is sound: there’s no flat out 
contradiction in doing so and she could interpret all forthcoming negative epistemic 
appraisal in terms of her own theory – as objections that are never true, and are founded 
on untrue presuppositions – and not be troubled.  
So it might very hard to convince some epistemic irrealist that (10) is true, that 
her view is mistaken and that she should reject whatever argument she accepts in its 
favor. An epistemic irrealist might think, or feel, that she has good reasons for her view. 
If asked, “Why believe epistemic irrealism?” an epistemic irrealist might note that it 
follows from her firmly held principles and beliefs (one of which might be premise [1]), 
it coheres well with her other beliefs, she thinks is has resulted from a reliable belief-
forming-process and/or denying it would seem stranger than accepting it.  
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All these claims might be true, but, if epistemic irrealism is true, then – if the 
recognition of various is-ought and natural-evaluative “gaps” in moral discourse provide 
reasons to think that naturalistic moral realisms are false – it is also not true that if any of 
these “natural” facts obtains, then the belief is reasonable or ought to be held, since that 
gap is there also. An insightful epistemic irrealist might see this and, perhaps, embrace it 
as the way the world is: just as the world is devoid of moral value, it is devoid of 
intellectual or epistemic value also; all there is are natural features of beliefs and 
inferences, but no features are objectively more epistemically valuable or desirable, as 
epistemic realists presume they are.51 An epistemic irrealist might respond to nearly any 
objection, any observation of what seems, from common views, to be a crazy implication 
of the view, with acceptance and, perhaps, the claim that the “epistemic world” is not the 
way many have thought it is.52  
 This is a general statement of a possibly true view. I suppose it’s sustainable, at 
least in the sense that an advocate of the view would be able to utter many words in 
response to objections and the discussion could continue for quite a long time. One could 
truthfully observe that if it is true, then nearly all philosophers’ understanding of the 
nature of reasoning and epistemic evaluation is deeply mistaken, including the 
understanding of many traditional radical skeptics. An advocate of this kind of view 
could accuse his critics of begging the question, or merely assuming a position and not 
giving any reasons in its favor (not that there’s anything wrong with that, on this view). 
How then can we argue against it? 
To do this, we begin where, as a matter of fact, we are and with what we have to 
work with. First, we note that – among those who have thought about such views – few 
                                                          
51 I presume an epistemic anti-realist would be a moral anti-realist also. It would certainly be surprising for 
someone to recognize moral values yet disavow epistemic ones. Earlier I discussed attempts to “ground” 
epistemic values in the contingent desires we have, thus turning epistemic evaluations into a kind of 
hypothetical imperative. (This proposal could be involved in trying to argue from the truth that (a) some 
methods of belief formation yield typically truths to a conclusion (c) that we ought to use these methods.) I 
briefly argue that any hypothetical imperative is true only if a categorical imperative (perhaps that one’s 
desires ought to be satisfied) is true also, so the move to hypothetical imperatives does not avoid any 
axiological and metaphysical mysteries it is designed to avoid.  
52 Interestingly, moral realists are sometimes accused of believing in a bizarre ontology. It seems to me, 
however, that epistemic anti-realists would believe in an even more bizarre world: a world without 
intellectual or epistemic values (or, actually, a world where we vividly believed there are no intellectual 
values, nothing that is epistemically better or worse) would be quite strange, if we always told the truth 
about our pursuits regarding belief.  
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people actually believe this kind of view. In itself, this doesn’t count for much, since 
people can be prejudiced and mistaken, but what does count is that the view seems clearly 
false in its implications and in its contribution to a picture of the way the world is. To 
most, it seems clear that there are better and worse ways to reason, that some mental 
states have greater intellectual value or worth than others, and we can have beliefs about 
these states of what’s reasonable, or justified, or known, or should be believed, from an 
intellectual point of view. Emotions sometimes accompany these epistemic evaluations, 
but they aren’t the evaluations themselves. The evaluations are based in evidence, strong 
evidence, of what clearly seems true and nothing that seems false in comparably clear or 
compelling ways.  This provides good reason to think that epistemic irrealisms are not 
true, the arguments for them unsound and, in particular, that premise (1) is false. We can 
see that premise (1) is rationally unacceptable for us by either considering it directly in 
light of counterexamples, or we can see that other kinds of reason beliefs entail that it is 
unreasonable.  
 An epistemic irrealist might respond that if his theory is true (and, I concede that 
it could be true), then all these common judgments are mistaken and we are radically in 
error. In this way, the epistemic irrealist is like a skeptic who notes that if a skeptical 
hypothesis is true, then we lack knowledge or justification. We should agree, but note 
that we have strong evidence that his theory is false and that he has given, at best, little 
evidence or positive reason to think his theory and all its radical implications are true. He 
might then reply that, on his view or if his view is true, we have not said anything that’s 
objectively true. Again, that’s true, but for an epistemic realist to reasonably be 
convinced that epistemic irrealism is true (and for her to, perhaps paradoxically, 
reasonably come to believe that all talk of reasons and other epistemic evaluations is, 
objectively, never true53), she needs to be given reasons that are stronger than the reasons 
she already has for epistemic realism and its metaphysical, semantic, psychological and 
epistemological presumptions.  
It’s possible that an epistemic irrealism is true, but, for most, possible only in a 
logical or metaphysical sense. Relative to what most people reasonably believe, it is not a 
                                                          
53 My guess is that some epistemic anti-realist could engage in some kind of gyrations upon prompting by 
those who would think that troubles with this claim reveal that epistemic realisms are false and rationally 
unacceptable.  
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reasonable option. They have reasonable beliefs about epistemic matters, they reasonably 
believe that these beliefs imply that epistemic irrealisms are false, are reasonable in 
believing (at least in this case) a principle along the lines of that if you reasonably see 
that something is inconsistent with what you reasonably believe, and especially if you see 
that there is little to no antecedent positive reason to accept that something, then you 
should not accept it, so epistemic irrealisms are not something they should accept. Again, 
this might all be mistaken – there is no reason to think the world must have epistemic 
value in it – but we have good reason to affirm the common sense semantic, 
metaphysical, psychological and epistemic foundations of epistemic judgments, and no 
good reason to deny it.  
To apply this theme to positivism, the main view under consideration in this 
chapter, I maintain that we, and I suspect this includes most positivists, had (and had) 
stronger reasons to believe that there are reasons, and justified beliefs, and ways we ought 
to reason, than the reasons ever given to accept positivistic principle and its irrationalist 
implications for epistemic evaluations. It’s possible that positivism is true and that its 
suggested epistemic emotivism is true, but nearly everyone (positivists included) has or 
had stronger reasons to deny than affirm it. And if this is so, this importantly undercuts 
the premise needed to defend a positivistic-based moral irrealism.  
3.4.3. Non-Positivistic-Based Epistemic Emotivism.  
Before I consider objections I will briefly discuss some non-positivistic bases for 
emotivism, both ethical and epistemic. Ayer also thought ethical emotivism was “valid on 
its own account,” apart from positivism. He didn’t say why he thought this, but I will 
briefly mention some of the considerations he gave for ethical emotivism and note that 
they apply to epistemic judgments as well. Some of these overlap with positivistic 
reasons, but one needn’t be a positivist to accept them. 
Ayer calls moral (and aesthetic) judgments “statements of value” and claims that 
they “cannot with any show of justice be represented as hypotheses, which are used to 
predict the course of our sensations.”54 He argues that naturalist definitions are not 
analytic, so moral judgments can’t be reduced to empirical judgments. While some say 
that moral judgments can be verified by “intuition,” Ayer rejects appeals to intuitions 
                                                          
54 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 102). 
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since they can conflict and there seems to be no empirical test to adjudicate between 
them. He notes that what seems intuitively, certainly right or good to someone may seem 
doubtful, or even obviously false, to another. He observes that moral debates typically are 
more contentious and emotionally expressive than debates about empirical matters.55 
Someone might conclude, given all this (and without any thought of positivism), that 
people are just expressing their emotions when making moral judgments: perhaps this 
would seem to be the best explanation of the phenomena.   
But all these considerations apply to epistemic judgments as well: judgments 
about what’s reasonable or justified don’t predict sensations, aren’t empirically verifiable, 
and seem to be the result of “intuitions” which, when conflicting, can’t be resolved by 
empirical tests. Epistemic terms are hard to define in empirical terms: any claim that 
some naturalistic expression is synonymous with an epistemic expression will likely be 
subject to “open-question” objections; Ayer, at least, thought that this refuted the 
definitions. Epistemological definitions that are not said to reveal an analytic or 
synonymous relationship between terms are subject to the same kind of objections 
leveled against non-analytic ethical definitions, e.g., that they have false implications, 
that meeting their condition(s) is neither necessary nor sufficient for having some 
evaluative status, that they do not correctly identify the features that explain something’s 
evaluative status, and so on.  
Finally, debates about whether it’s rational to believe something, something is 
genuinely known, or some evidence is sufficient evidence (and even if something is 
evidence) are often contentious, inconclusive and feelings can run equally high. 
Epistemic judgments also seem to be a kind of “value judgment” anyway: to say that a 
belief is justified or reasonable is to impart some kind of positive value to it.56 There are 
judgments of epistemic virtue and vice, judgments that knowledge is intrinsically good, 
and assumptions that knowledge is better than “mere” (i.e., unjustified) true belief, all 
value judgments in themselves. As suggested above, the presumption that there is good 
                                                          
55 In Logical Positivism, Ayer claims, “[Moral] arguments do not work in the way that logical or scientific 
arguments do” (p. 22).  That might be true, but if my arguments are sound, then logical and scientific 
arguments do not work the way Ayer thinks they do either.  
56 Allan Gibbard, quoting Hilary Putnam states, “The terms that ground our conception of rational 
acceptability—‘coherent’, ‘simple’, ‘justified’, and the like—are often used as terms of praise,” and they 
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and bad reasoning seems to presuppose value judgments as well. So, if these general, 
non-positivistic-based considerations support ethical emotivism, as Ayer believed they 
did, they support epistemological emotivism as well.   
3.4.4. Conclusions on Ayer’s Epistemic Emotivism.  
Thus, I have argued that if Ayer’s reasons given for ethical emotivism are genuinely good 
reasons to accept it, then they are also good reasons to accept epistemic emotivism as 
well. But few are willing to think that there are (or, perhaps, even could be, in light of the 
views implications for itself) good reasons to accept epistemic emotivism. And if an 
Ayer-inspired epistemic emotivism is true, to say that “there are good reasons to believe 
that view” is merely to express one’s feelings about believing it. That might be the truth 
about what epistemic evaluations are. But most philosophers, even positivists, think that 
epistemic emotivism should be rejected, and that’s not just how they “feel” about it. They 
think this is a truth, a literal truth, and that it is quite reasonable to accept it. I have argued 
above that they are reasonable in rejecting it: the evidence in favor of it is stronger than 
the evidence against it.  
Since epistemic emotivism (or some other non-cognitivist interpretation of 
epistemic discourse) seems to follow from positivism, positivists and so motivated ethical 
emotivists might have a dilemma on their hands: accept the consequence and go 
emotivist more broadly to include epistemic judgments (including the epistemic and non-
logical judgments involved in reasoning), or drop positivism. If epistemic emotivism is 
true, it’s not true that they should respond to this dilemma in any way. But a more global 
emotivism seems quite implausible and would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
defend in a plausible manner (due to the fact that epistemic emotivism makes all 
epistemic judgments emotive), so for many that’s an unattractive response. Dropping 
positivism wouldn’t require dropping ethical emotivism since it could be retained on 
independent grounds. But many of these reasons would likely suggest epistemic 
emotivism as well, as I argued regarding Ayer’s non-positivist motivations for 
emotivism.57  
                                                                                                                                                                             
“have too many characteristics in common with the paradigmatic value terms for us to deny that that is 
what they are.” See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 32).  
57 One way to avoid arguments for ethical non-cognitivisms being converted to argument for epistemic 
non-cognitivisms is to make the major premises so ‘narrow’ and non-general that they apply only to moral 
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The easiest response, the one that seems suggested by the best reasons, is to drop 
positivism, especially since there is no good reason to accept it in the first place. But this 
eliminates a traditional justification for ethical emotivism. But since other justifications 
for ethical emotivism likely suggest epistemic emotivism, those justifications should be 
dropped as well. So, I conclude that one should reject both ethical and epistemic 
emotivism and the cases Ayer offered in their favor, as well as the arguments that can be 
developed from his writings.   
3.4.5. Some Objections and Replies. 
As far as I can tell, there is no hope for retaining positivism and Ayer’s case for ethical 
emotivism but resisting the conclusion that epistemic judgments are neither true nor false 
also: the positivistic principle clearly supports epistemic judgments being non-cognitive. 
The only response, besides agreement, then might be that epistemic emotivism is as 
palatable as ethical emotivism. Positivists thought the latter wasn’t a problematic 
position, so why should they think the former is problematic?  But it is very difficult to 
see how epistemic emotivism isn’t anything but a very difficult position to hold. This is 
clear in light of the discussion above, where I argued that epistemic emotivism undercuts 
the possibility of truthful epistemic support for itself (and any other view, including 
ethical emotivism) and, more importantly, conflicts with so much that seems true about 
epistemic evaluations. Adopting epistemic emotivism makes it even more difficult to 
defend ethical emotivism also: adopting epistemic emotivism makes defending ethical 
emotivism from objections all the more challenging.   
To see this, let us discuss the only objection to ethical emotivism that Ayer discussed 
in Language, Truth and Logic. This objection was that if it is true, there are no moral 
disagreements since there are no moral propositions for one party to accept and another 
reject. Since people seem to disagree, and if moral propositions are needed for 
disagreement, the objector concludes that emotivism is mistaken. Ayer responded, 
surprisingly, that people do not disagree about moral matters, strictly speaking.58 He 
claimed that “we do not and cannot argue about . . the validity of . .  moral principles. We 
                                                                                                                                                                             
judgments. This, of course, would make the arguments weaker since they would appear more and more 
‘question-begging.’ 
58 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 110-112). 
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merely praise or condemn them in light of our own feelings.”59 He claimed in all cases of 
what are intuitively called moral disagreements, the dispute is about cognitively 
meaningful questions of logic or empirical matters of fact and their relevance to the moral 
question.  
Positivism would seem to preclude their being truths about what empirical 
information is relevant to a moral issue,60 but it will allow there being truths about 
empirical information and logical relations. But if epistemic emotivism is true, Ayer’s 
even diminished account of moral disagreement is mistaken because we do not, strictly 
speaking, disagree on what we should think about logical and factual matters either: when 
someone says, “No, you are not believing what you should about the relevant empirical 
matters,” one is never saying something that is true. Insofar as empirical and logical 
correction involves making epistemic judgments  
Ayer claims that much moral debate consists in getting people’s particular 
judgments to fall in line with the principles they accept.  He claims that if “a man has 
certain moral principles . . he must, in order to be consistent, react morally to certain 
things in a certain way.”61 Ayer’s remark here is surely more than the trivial claim that 
one has to be consistent to be consistent; he seems to be thinking that revealing some 
inconsistency to someone should result in her changing her moral views: she should do 
something to resolve the inconsistency. But that imperative does not appear to be an 
analytic or empirical truth, so it is presumably neither true nor false. If it is a moral 
principle, Ayer has only praised it in light of his own feelings. So logical correction, in 
terms of how one ought to reason, is not a cognitively meaningful resource for Ayer to 
appeal to. 
Empirical correction is the “attempt to show that [someone] is mistaken about the 
[non-moral] facts of the case . . has misconceived the agent’s motive . . has misjudged the 
effects of the action . . or has failed to take into account the special circumstances in 
                                                          
59 That seems mistaken since it seems we can reason about moral principles since it seems that they can 
figure into truth-functional logical operations. 
60 This is important insofar as many discussions of moral issues involve claims to the effect of “if such and 
such are the non-moral facts, then this ought to be done.” If these kinds of claims are never true, as 
positivism implies, then moral argumentation and discussion – insofar as these kinds of claims are 
commonly made – is founded on many claims that are never true. 
61 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 111), emphasis mine. 
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which the agent was placed.”62 But this activity appears to presume epistemic standards, 
that, given certain experiences and other beliefs, someone ought to have some specified 
belief. As I argued above, these kinds of judgments are cognitively meaningless on 
Ayer’s principles. There is no truth to claims that someone’s beliefs should change if new 
information is presented or that there is something objectionable with someone 
dogmatically refusing to consider this new information.  
Ayer claimed that, “one really never does dispute about questions of value.” But 
insofar as judgments about how one ought to reason, that one should be consistent, and 
that one should accept some empirical judgments are neither true nor false, there are no 
cognitive disputes about them as well, on his principles. People can disagree, in the sense 
that they believe inconsistent propositions. But on his view, for any proposition p, when 
someone says “you should believe p” and someone replies, “no, you should not believe 
p” they do not, strictly speaking, contradict each other: they are expressing contrary 
emotions, but nothing more.  
That’s a more surprising, and damning, implication than what follows from 
ethical emotivism alone. Thus, his response to the objection that emotivism cannot 
account for moral disagreement fails: it can account for it only by appealing to other non-
cognitive factors. And these we also do not and cannot argue about: we merely praise or 
condemn epistemic standards and principles about reasoning in light of our own feelings. 
 It’s unlikely he would have accepted this consequence, but he might have. He 
might have replied that, yes, strictly speaking, all evaluative or prescriptive judgments – 
about what one should, ought or must believe, reason, or react – are neither true nor false. 
However, he might have responded that this was no objection to the view because he had 
no need for epistemic language. He could observe that it is fully legitimate on his 
principles to make descriptive statements, e.g., about what people believe if he’s careful 
to not describe these statements in epistemic terms, e.g. “justified” or “rational” or about 
what one “ought” or “should” believe and so on. And he has logic, although perhaps not 
non-deductive logic, since judgments of probability might also be rendered non-cognitive 
by positivistic principles.  
                                                          
62 See Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic 111). 
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So, in argumentative contexts, he can point out logical relations between 
propositions and what follows and does not follow from what people believe: he can note 
that some propositions are inconsistent with someone’s beliefs or are entailed by them.  
He can observe how confident someone is in some beliefs and report that, oftentimes, 
when people are confident in some belief and see its logical consequences, they are 
confident in these consequences also. He might also make the empirical claim that some 
belief was, or was not, “arrived at by the methods which we now consider reliable” or 
that “a self-consistent accredited procedure” was employed in the formation of some 
beliefs. If he is talking to positivists, he can note that his kinds of positions fit well with 
their views; in fact, for some people he might observe that his positions are their views 
and that denials of these positions are inconsistent with their views and do not all cohere 
with what they think. He can attempt to find out what people’s various goals are and 
make suggestions for what kinds of beliefs would best meet these goals.  
Ayer might claim that making these kinds of observations is all that is needed for 
argumentative discourse: evaluative epistemic talk can be abandoned with no loss.  
However, it seems clear that there would be a loss. All these suggested methods of 
engaging in argumentative discourse without evaluative language consist in making 
naturalistic claims or observations about beliefs. These moves are thereby repeatedly 
subject to “open-question”-related concerns. Competent speakers could easily understand 
these claims have no clue what is supposed to follow from them: they might ask, “Why is 
Ayer telling me this, even if what he says is true? What is supposed to follow, in terms of 
what I believe, from my recognition of this natural feature?” If they are logically inclined, 
they might think that these remarks above are supposed to be premises in some argument.  
In most or all cases, however, a second premise, linking the first to the sought 
conclusion, is left tacit. This premise will either have an evaluative consequent (e.g., “if 
some belief has some natural feature(s), then it is justified”) or it will not (perhaps the 
consequent will be that the belief is true, or probably true). If there is an evaluative 
antecedent, then evaluative language has been admitted and so this response does not 
avoid evaluative language: it fails. If, however, the linking premise and conclusion are 
devoid of evaluative language, we might be left with another open question: what is 
supposed to follow, in terms of what we believe, now that we recognize these 
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propositions in this logical relation to each other? If someone thought that, given her 
understanding of Ayer’s claims, she should then believe or do something then we have 
slipped back into illegitimate “shoulds.”  
Even if Ayer pointed out some inconsistency, the question of what to believe 
seems unavoidable: should they keep a premise, reject a conclusion, or reject Ayer’s 
judgment that there is an entailment?  That’s a question that naturalistic descriptions 
alone couldn’t answer and Ayer’s positivism precludes there being a true answer to. 
Perhaps Ayer would hope that people care about avoiding inconsistency and that this 
would typically lead them to think as he wished, but surely even if a person lacked such 
concerns, epistemic questions about what she should believe, i.e., what is reasonable or 
justified, remain. Perhaps he could offer a theory about good reasoning (perhaps “good” 
is too evaluative, so this should be a theory of “sought” or “desired” reasoning) to the 
effect that person A has reasoned well just in case A has come to believe whatever B 
wishes her to. This theory might be couched in entirely naturalistic terminology, but, 
unfortunately, it would be a theory of persuasion or manipulation, not a theory of what 
would, to most people, be called good reasoning, since it would countenance even the 
most irrational and despicable methods of inducing belief change as “reasoning.” 
 In sum, it seems that epistemic language is practically unavoidable: attempts to 
avoid it will often rest on evaluative presumptions typically along the lines of a belief’s 
having some natural features yields some evaluative status, perhaps its being the case that 
it ought to be believed. Or attempts to avoid epistemic language will depend on our 
contingent desires that our beliefs have various natural features, e.g., that they be true, 
that they be part of a coherent set, that they be produced by reliable processes, and so on.  
For practical reasons (i.e., boredom, frustration and the sense that we have better 
things to do), we might abandon attempts to argue with someone who refused to 
acknowledge any epistemic standards, and, as Ayer observes about some ethical 
disagreements, in some contexts might even resort to mere abuse.63 But we would 
attribute failure of acknowledgment as a failure to see the truth about epistemic standards.  
And it’s not merely that we would do this; rather, from an epistemic point of view, it’s 
                                                          
63 Ayer notes that this is how we might respond to someone who fails to agree with us about some moral 
question, in spite of empirical and logical correction (Language, Truth and Logic 111).  
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true that we should do this. To deny this is, fundamentally, to accept a view that is unable 
to accommodate good reasoning, the common presumptions of epistemic judgments and 
seems to undercut whatever epistemic support it might have (which, if epistemic 
emotivism is true, is either none or only someone’s emotional support). 
 Thus, I have argued that Ayer’s case for ethical emotivism has deep and troubling 
implications for the cognitive status of epistemic discourse. I conclude that, for a variety 
of reasons, the standard, cognitivist, fact-stating interpretation of epistemic judgments 
truthfully should be maintained and Ayer’s principles should be rejected. Thus, his case 
in favor of ethical emotivism is undercut. 
3.5. C.L. Stevenson’s Ethical and Epistemic Emotivisms. 
I now turn briefly to C.L. Stevenson’s ethical emotivism.  Fortunately, Stevenson was not 
a positivist, so his perspective lacked that semantic and metaphysical baggage.  His 
emotivism was much more developed and subtle than Ayer’s, but the basic position was 
similar. He thought that ethical sentences typically express attitudes and invite others to 
share those attitudes.  By “attitudes” he meant, “tendencies to be for or against 
something, as typified by liking, disliking, approving, disapproving, favoring, 
disfavoring, and so on.”64 On his view, attitudes contrasted with “beliefs.” So, e.g., if A 
says that “X ought to be done” but B responds that “X ought not be done,” then – 
according to Stevenson – they disagree in attitude, not in belief (however, this 
disagreement could be a consequence of a disagreement in non-moral belief, but not 
necessarily since Stevenson allows for fundamental disagreements in people’s attitudes, 
i.e., what they approve of and so on). 
 Cognitivists agree that, sometimes (if not typically) when people judge something 
to be right or good, they have certain emotive attitudes about that thing and, were they to 
express their attitudes orally, they would often be trying to influence others. But 
Stevenson thought that the “function” of ethical sentences was the service of this 
expression: there wasn’t a mere contingent connection. On his final analyses of “good,” 
                                                          
64 See Stevenson (“Ethical Fallibility” 199). 
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to say something is good is to say that one approves of something, but said in such a way 
that one’s expression of approval would evoke favorable feelings in their hearer.65  
This position might be illustrated by this case: suppose someone asks if some 
action was right. Someone might respond, “Well, I approve of people doing that!” This 
could be said in a way to express one’s approval of what was done and attempt to 
influence others. This expression of feeling is a consequence of moral terms’ meanings. 
Stevenson said, “The emotive meaning a word is a tendency of a word, arising through 
the history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses in people. It is the 
immediate aura of feeling which hovers about a word.”66 Given these meanings, moral 
judgments are not beliefs, since they have, strictly speaking, no emotive influence in 
themselves; rather, they are non-cognitive expressions.  
Stevenson’s analyses have been criticized as not capturing the correct meanings 
of moral terms, but I will not review those criticisms here.67 I wish to only argue that his 
considerations in favor of emotivism also suggest epistemological emotivism. As I 
argued earlier about Ayer’s emotivism, this is an undesirable consequence in itself and 
had problematic implications for the rational acceptability of emotivism. Stevenson’s 
position (and its defense) has analogous difficulties.   
 Much of Stevenson’s discussion consists of detailed descriptions of what it’s like 
to engage in moral discourse and debate; e.g., what someone would say, how feelings 
might be roused, how one’s interlocutor might respond, how confidence levels might 
change, when disputants might be satisfied and end the dispute, and so on.  Thus, ethical 
discourse has what he calls a “dynamic” aspect.   
If these observations were intended to provide support for emotivism (and if they 
are not, then they are merely descriptive moral psychology), they seem equally applicable 
to disagreements about what’s epistemically justified or rational as well.  One could do a 
phenomenology of epistemic disagreements and observe that heated emotions often get 
                                                          
65 See Stevenson (Ethics and Language 206-226). Some commentators (e.g., Hare [Sorting Out Ethics 103-
104]) have suggested that Stevenson’s initial incorporation of a naturalistic analysis, i.e., that the speakers 
likes (or dislikes) whatever is being evaluated, was unfortunate for the theory for all the reasons, discussed 
below, that naturalisms are problematic. Charitable critics have, therefore, understood Stevenson’s theory 
as a pure expressivism, ignoring the naturalistic condition, which Stevenson eventually eliminated from his 
analysis.  
66 See Stevenson (“Emotive Meaning” 21). 
67 For a summary of these criticisms, see Feldman (Introductory Ethics 223-231). 
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expressed in debates over whether it’s reasonable to believe empirical claims (about, for 
example, the causes of diseases, the utility of various research methods, the age of the 
earth, consequences of tax cuts, philosophical topics and many much more mundane 
issues). And calling a belief “irrational” or “unjustified” can be an attempt to influence 
others and “invite” them to share one’s belief. There are, of course, many more “colorful” 
and obviously expressive terms of epistemic appraisal as well. If the fact that emotions 
often accompany a kind of discourse and it sometimes has a persuasive effect suggests an 
emotivist analysis of that kind of discourse, then epistemic language seems fit for that 
analysis as well.   
Stevenson’s main explicit argument for his emotivism was based on a claim about 
moral terms’ alleged “magnetism.” He asserted that, “A person who recognizes X to be 
‘good’ must ipso facto acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favor than he otherwise 
would have had.”68 Following Hume’s theory of motivation, he thought this showed that 
moral judgments are not beliefs since beliefs do not, in themselves, provide motivation to 
act or influence one’s emotions. He thus concluded that moral judgments were emotive 
attitudes, not beliefs (or solely beliefs).  
In a thorough discussion of these motivational issues, Russ Shafer-Landau 
concludes that, “We are misled if we move from the obvious fact that moral judgments 
are usually motivating, to the stronger claim that they cannot fail to be.”69 He suggests 
that Stevenson was misled in just this way. I agree and I might only add a brief response 
to arguments from motivation: I find them unmotivated. I just don’t find any necessary, 
“internal” connection between moral judgment and motivational or affective 
considerations and find “amoralists,” agents who make moral judgments yet are not 
affective moved or motivated by them, quite conceivable (and, in fact, actual).70 
Furthermore, explanations of moral motivation that acknowledge only a contingent 
relation between moral judgments and moral motivation seem much more plausible, all 
things considered.  
                                                          
68 See Stevenson (“Emotive Meaning” 13). Emphasis mine. 
69 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism: A Defense 161). 
70 Michael Smith asserts that, “all else being equal, to have a moral opinion simply is to find yourself with a 
motivation to act.”  Unfortunately, he does not explain what might not be equal, but I simply deny his 
assertion: I lack this intuition and my moral experience suggests otherwise. See Smith (“Realism” 400).  
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However, for my purposes, it’s only important to note that it seems that if 
someone were impressed by these “internalist” considerations in ethics, she might 
plausibly also think that there’s some kind of necessary connection between epistemic 
judgments like ‘p is not justified for me’ and one’s affective states as well. Consider 
someone, e.g., a religious believer, or a scientist, who comes to think that he doesn’t have 
particularly good reasons for some of his beliefs. Someone convinced that the term 
“morally good” has a “magnetism” might easily, and plausibly, also think that this 
judgment of epistemic badness would necessarily be accompanied by a desire or 
motivation to not have that belief. Similarly, someone might think that judging a belief to 
be justified entails a desire to believe it.  
If one thought either of these, then one might adopt something like a Stevensonian 
analysis of epistemic judgments and conclude that they too are not beliefs and that the 
meanings of epistemic terms is emotive. This position seems as motivated as the more 
common position regarding moral judgments. Thus, if motivational concerns suggest 
ethical emotivism, they suggest epistemic emotivism as well.  
Finally, Stevenson considers a disappointed reader who wants to know the truth 
about whether something is morally good: she doesn’t want mere correction about her 
judgments of various empirical facts or be subject to emotional persuasion, which is all 
Stevenson’s position has to offer. In response, Stevenson asks: 
What is this truth to be about?  For I recollect no Platonic Idea, nor do I know 
what to try to recollect.  I find no indefinable property nor do I know what to look 
for.  And the ‘self-evident’ deliverances of reason, which so many philosophers 
have mentioned, seem on examination to be deliverances of their respective 
reasons only (if of anyone’s) and not of mine. I strongly suspect, indeed, that any 
sense of ‘good’ which is expected to both unite itself in synthetic a priori with 
other concepts and to influence interests as well, is really a great confusion.71 
Later, he rejects what he calls the “ethical analogue of a fact,” stating that he “find[s] 
nothing ‘out there’ for our attitudes to represent,” copy or be faithful to.72 Basically, he is 
                                                          
71 See Stevenson (“Emotive Meaning” 30-31) 
72 See Stevenson (“Ethical Fallibility” 212, 214). 
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saying that he cannot understand what a moral fact or property would be like or what a 
truth-maker for a moral judgment could be.73   
His position seems, in some ways, to echo Hume’s.  Recall his famous passage: 
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in 
all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you 
call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, 
volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice 
entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till 
you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of 
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; 
but ‘tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So 
that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, 
but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of 
blame from the contemplation of it.74 
Despite their differences, both Stevenson and Hume report that can only “see” natural 
properties; they can’t find moral ones. But it seems that if one cannot find moral 
properties, epistemic properties, and facts about what one should and shouldn’t believe, 
should be hard to find as well. This is because, to use Stevenson’s terms, it seems equally 
hard to see what might be “out there” for our epistemic attitudes (or on the common, 
cognitivist presumption, our beliefs about what we should believe) to represent, copy or 
be faithful to. But, if that’s so, it’s not clear what could make it such that anyone 
rationally ought to accept Stevenson’s emotivism, or Hume’s views, or any other view. 
That too would seem to be a matter of feeling, not reason. 
Thus, Stevenson’s arguments from the phenomenology of moral debate, the 
‘magnetism’ of good’ and the mysteries of moral truth and properties suggest analogous 
arguments concerning epistemology: that there are no epistemic truths or properties and 
epistemic discourse is emotive. As I argued earlier, this is a difficult implication in itself, 
since it implies a view about the nature of epistemic evaluation that, for many reasons, 
seems false. And, like epistemic emotivism implied for Ayer’s views, it makes it the case 
                                                          
73 Stevenson also says that he cannot understand what an intrinsically motivating fact would be. That might 
be incomprehensible, but cognitivists or realists needn’t think that anyway.  
74 See Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature 468-469). 
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that it’s untruthful to say we should believe the view, or any other view. Thus it again 
appears that the assumptions supporting ethical emotivism undercut their very defense. In 
light of, especially, these meta-epistemological considerations, I believe we should reject 
the premises that motivate what would be Stevenson’s epistemological emotivism, and 
doing so leads us to reject his arguments for his ethical emotivism also.  
3.6. Conclusion: Brief Remarks on Gibbard. 
I have argued that the reasons Ayer and Stevenson offered in favor of their ethical 
emotivism suggest analogous epistemic emotivisms. This has important general epistemic 
consequences: first, since epistemic emotivism provides a possible way to understand the 
nature of epistemic evaluations, but a way that seems false and contrary to good reasons; 
second, it has interesting implications for the epistemic status of ethical emotivism since 
it implies that it’s not true that it’s a justified view.   
As far as I know, Ayer and Stevenson did not realize that their arguments for 
ethical emotivism suggested these consequences. They seemed content confining 
emotivism to ethics and aesthetics, but I have argued that this is difficult since it naturally 
seems to spill into judgments about epistemology, probability, and critical reasoning. 
Insofar as Ayer and Stevenson, and most of their defenders, probably would not have 
been inclined to accept these kinds of emotivism, and for good reasons, this suggests that 
their cases in favor of ethical emotivism should be rejected.  
 Alan Gibbard, on the other hand, explicitly accepts both kinds of emotivism, or 
expressivism, that he calls “norm expressivism.” Briefly, his view is that “[t]o call 
something rational is to express one’s acceptance of norms that permit it. [It is] . . not to 
attribute some particular property to that thing—not even the property of being permitted 
by accepted norms.”75 He claims that since to call something rational is to endorse that 
thing, these judgments are expressive, neither true nor false. He claims that judgments 
with this “endorsing” aspect are not well captured by naturalistic or non-naturalistic (or 
intuitionistic) theories of moral judgment; he thinks his kind of expressivism does.  
In my final chapter, I argue that the considerations Gibbard offers in favor of his 
“norm expressivism” are unconvincing and that, on Gibbard’s own view, it is very 
difficult to understand why anyone should accept the view.  Either it is true that someone 
                                                          
75 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 7, 8). 
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– given his or her understanding of the theory – should accept it, or it is not.  If it is not, 
then, of course, it is not true that it should be accepted. But if it is true, that would seem 
to be inconsistent with the theory itself. Perhaps judgments about how logical 
inconsistencies ought to be avoided are mere expressions of acceptances of norms that 
don’t permit some kinds of inconsistencies: perhaps there really are no truths like these. 
Perhaps judgments that these kinds of principles should be accepted are also expressions, 
as Gibbard says they are. And perhaps his views about endorsement provide some reason 
to reject all varieties of realism.  
However, as I have argued, and will argue at greater detail later, it seems that we 
have better reasons than not, all things epistemic considered, to reject epistemic 
expressivisms than accept them. While Gibbard’s view may avoid some of the objections 
to Ayer and Stevenson’s theories, I will argue that it is not true that one ought to accept it. 
Gibbard’s own norms might “permit” him to believe it, but that’s no reason why anyone 
should to accept it, or come to share Gibbard’s norms. Epistemic emotivism is as 




CHAPTER 4:  Hare’s Universal Rational Prescriptivism 
4.1. Introduction. 
For over half a century, R.M. Hare developed a non-cognitivist position on the nature of 
ethics called “universal prescriptivism.”1 Although Hare’s position was developed in 
many books and articles over his long career, my focus will be on his most recent work, 
his final defenses of universal prescriptivism.2  
The position and the arguments in its favor are complex due, in part, to the fact 
that universal prescriptivism is both a meta-ethic, i.e., a theory of the semantics, 
metaphysics, epistemology, logic and psychology of moral judgments, and a normative 
ethic, i.e., a theory about what morally ought to be done.3 Thus, it’s a view about what we 
are saying when we say that some action ought to be done, and a view about what we 
ought to do. Unlike many ethicists, Hare thought that answers to these two kinds of 
questions are highly interdependent. While I think Hare was right in thinking that these 
kinds of questions are so related,4 I will argue that Hare’s answers to both kinds of 
questions are mistaken. Thus, I argue that the arguments in favor of universal 
prescriptivism are unsound. 
My first focus will be Hare’s meta-ethic. He argues that universal prescriptivism 
provides a better account of the nature of moral judgments, compared to naturalist, 
intuitionist and emotivist meta-ethical theories. These theories attempt to explain what it 
is we are doing (or trying to do) when we make moral judgments: are we trying to state 
truths? If so, what kind of truths? Or are we (merely) expressing our emotions? Or are we 
doing something else?  
At the time, philosophers who answered these questions saw them as intimately 
related to the question of the meanings of moral terms: different views on the meaning of 
                                                          
1 Although Hare resisted being called a non- cognitivist and an anti-realist, and said that there were 
perfectly good senses in which moral judgments were true and known (see Hare [“Universal 
Prescriptivism” 451]), I will still refer to his position as non- cognitivist and anti-realist because it is clearly 
inconsistent with moral realism. 
2 For Hare’s early work, see Hare (The Language of Morals), Hare (Freedom and Reason) and Hare (Moral 
Thinking). His more recent work, which helpfully summarizes the main arguments of the early work, 
includes Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism”) and Hare (Sorting Out Ethics).  
3 My uses of the terms “judgment” and “evaluation” are intended to be neutral between cognitivist and non-
cognitivist understandings of moral evaluations.   
4 For arguments that one’s meta-ethic has consequences for one’s normative ethic, and vice-versa, see 
Sturgeon (“What Difference Does it Make”).  
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moral terms yielded different understandings of what we are doing (or trying to do) when 
we use them. Hare argues that, although all these theories provide some true insights into 
the nature of the meaning of moral terms, universal prescriptivism is the superior theory. 
His argument for prescriptivism can be seen as, in part, an argument from the elimination 
of the other theories of the meanings of moral terms.  
While, compared to ethics, there has been less concern about the meanings of 
moral terms and what we are doing (or trying to do) when we make epistemic judgments, 
comparable questions can be asked. I argue that Hare’s objections to naturalist, 
intuitionist and emotivist meta-ethical theories suggest analogous objections to naturalist 
and intuitionist and emotivist meta-epistemological theories. I argue that since some of 
these implications for the meanings of epistemic terms are false, Hare’s arguments 
against them are not sound. However, since parallel arguments to these were given 
against realistic meta-ethical theories, this shows that some of these arguments are not 
sound also. Thus, I defend some versions of moral realism from Hare’s objections. As a 
moral and epistemic realist, I have no interest in defending emotivism of either kind, so 
my discussion of emotivisms will be limited to what is required to undermine Hare’s 
arguments. 
  After I defend moral realism by way of objecting to Hare-like parallel arguments 
against epistemic realism, I consider the possibility that this defense fails and Hare-like 
arguments against epistemological naturalist, intuitionist and emotivism are sound. 
Suppose Hare showed that the meanings of epistemic terms are not that what an 
epistemological naturalist, intuitionist or even emotivist says they are. If that is the case, 
then, if epistemic terms are meaningful, we might be left with something like an 
epistemological universal prescriptivism. I briefly attempt to develop what such a view 
would look like, and then argue that is unreasonable to accept: we have better reason to 
think the meanings of epistemic terms are not what epistemic prescriptivism implies they 
are. But if it this is so, then the arguments in its favor (which are parallel to those given 
for ethical prescriptivism) are weak and so at least some of Hare’s objections to ethical 
naturalism, intuitionism and/or emotivism are weak. Again, moral realism is defended by 
way of defending a kind of epistemological or intellectual realism.  
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Next I turn to Hare’s normative ethics. The main concern of what we might call 
Hare’s normative ethics was when a moral judgment, or a prescription, is “rationally 
acceptable.”5 Hare’s focus was moral “oughts.” Here I observe that Hare’s position on 
what we morally ought to do, and what we should believe about what we morally ought 
to do, and the considerations he gives in its favor, seems to essentially depend on claims 
about non-moral oughts, in particular epistemic oughts and other intellectually evaluative 
language. This observation is similar to one of Sturgeon’s observation about Hare’s 
position on reasons for action: 
There is something anomalous about a position like Hare’s . . noncognitivist about 
moral judgments but cognitivist and naturalist about reasons for action.  For talk 
of reasons or rationality displays the same features—difficult controversy, plus a 
typical “endorsing” role for the terminology—that are supposed to support 
noncognitivism about morality; and it is hard to suppose that judgments about 
reasons for action (or for feeling) are so different in this respect from judgments 
about reasons for belief.6  
I aim to exploit this anomaly to undermine Hare’s position. The meaning of these non-
moral oughts and evaluations needs to be understood: I argue that if they are understood 
in a manner comparable to how Hare understands moral oughts, then his overall position 
on the nature of morality is ultimately groundless: there is no reason why anyone should 
accept it. However, if Hare understands these oughts in a more robust, realistic manner, 
then there is no reason why moral oughts cannot, and should not, be understood in the 
same manner. So either Hare’s position undermines its own epistemic justification, or it 
has room to understand moral values as a moral realist does, in which universal 
prescriptivism is false. Yet again, moral realism is defended.  
4.2. Ethical and Epistemological Theory 
Hare took himself to be developing an “ethical theory.” What did Hare mean by that 
term? He explains:   
The expression ‘ethical theory’ covers attempts to say what we are asking when 
we ask moral questions. What do we mean by the words or the sentences that we 
                                                          
5 See Hare (“Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics” 191). 
6 See Sturgeon (“Critical Study of Gibbard” 403).  
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use in moral discourse: what is the nature of the moral concepts or of morality?  If 
successful, these attempts will have implications for another, epistemological, 
question which also belongs to ethical theory: how should we set about answering 
our moral questions rationally?  Or can there be no rational way – is it just a 
matter of how we feel or what the current mores dictate?  On the other hand, if 
there can be rational discussion of moral questions, does it demand that there be a 
truth about them, or a set of facts, that can be discovered?7 
To provide partial and quick answers to these questions, Hare thought that the meanings 
of moral words, sentences, and concepts is such that there can be, and is, a “rational” way 
to answer moral questions: their answers are not just a matter of how we feel or what 
current customs dictate. However, although there is a rational way to answer moral 
questions, he denied there are moral truths or facts to be discovered. So, to consider a 
possible example, if the question is whether any abortions are morally impermissible, 
Hare’s answer might have been that at least some abortions are morally impermissible 
(and that this is answer is, or can be, “rational”), but that it’s not, strictly speaking, true 
that some abortions are morally impermissible or a fact that some abortions are morally 
impermissible. This provides some negative understanding of his position (i.e., in terms 
of what it denies); a more positive understanding of how he understood judgment will be 
provided below.   
 If there are ethical theories, there are then, in the same sense, epistemological 
theories. Following Hare, we would think of the goals of epistemological theory, in this 
sense, in something like the following manner: 
The expression ‘epistemological theory’ covers attempts to say what we are 
asking when we ask epistemic questions. What do we mean by the words or the 
sentences that we use in epistemic discourse: what is the nature of the epistemic 
concepts?  If successful, these attempts will have implications for another, 
epistemological, question which also belongs to epistemological theory: how 
should we set about answering our epistemic questions “rationally”?  Or can there 
be no “rational” way – is it just a matter of what we happen to believe, or what 
most people believe?  On the other hand, if there can be rational discussion of 
                                                          
7 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 451). 
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epistemic questions, does it demand that there be a truth about them, or a set of 
facts, that can be discovered? 
A possible set of answers to these questions would include claims that the meanings of 
epistemic words, sentences, and concepts are such that there can be, and is, a “rational” 
way to answer epistemic questions: their answers are not just a matter of how we feel or 
what we currently believe. And, although there is a “rational” way to answer epistemic 
questions (say, e.g., about whether some belief is rational, or justified, or known, or some 
inference ought to be accepted, and so on), there are no epistemic truths or facts to be 
discovered. That is a possible view, and understanding and evaluating it (as well as its 
moral analogue) would require a fuller understanding of what is meant by “rational.”  
While many of these epistemic concerns in the above passage are familiar to 
epistemological inquiry, I should mention that some of the concerns about ethical theory 
do not obviously transfer to epistemological theory, in the analogous sense. First, while 
concerns about the nature of “morality” are common, it’s not obvious what the analogous 
concerns are: they are certainly not the nature of “epistemology,” since that is a 
philosophical discipline. Perhaps they are concerns about the nature of knowledge or 
justification, or what we ought to believe, or the nature of correct reasoning, or the nature 
of evidence. Perhaps the analogous concern would be the nature of all these concepts and 
all the claims we make using these concepts. Either of these options would make 
“epistemic theory,” in this sense, quite similar to more common conceptions of 
epistemological theorizing, or those conceptions that many epistemologists would offer. 
A second difference here, related to the epistemic upshot of a successful 
understanding of epistemic concepts, is that epistemic epistemology is a field of inquiry 
about itself whereas moral epistemology is an epistemic inquiry about another field or 
topic, viz. morality. Despite this difference, however, we can still ask epistemic questions 
about epistemic concepts and epistemic evaluations, e.g., whether we know that we 
know, and justifiably believe that we justifiably believe. Insofar as, on common views, 
epistemic judgments are of propositions with epistemic properties or predicates as 
constituents, and propositional knowledge is possible (and actual) there seems no deep 
reason why such epistemological knowledge or justified belief is not possible (and actual, 
if there is any knowledge or justified belief in the first place).   
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Thus, although there are differences between ethical and epistemological theory 
in Hare’s sense, comparable questions can be asked. Since this is so, comparable answers 
might be given, although their plausibility might differ. And some comparable answers 
about the meanings of moral and epistemic terms have been given. Let us consider some 
of these answers and Hare’s objections to them. Hare only asked questions about ethical 
theory, but questions very similar to his can be asked about epistemological theory.  
4.2.1. Against Ethical and Epistemological Naturalisms 
In this section I consider Hare’s objections to ethical naturalism and intuitionism, the two 
kinds of what he calls “descriptivist” ethical theories. On these theories, the meanings of 
ethical terms are the same as the meanings of descriptive terms, terms for which their 
meanings are determined, as Hare says, entirely by the “syntax and truth conditions” of 
the descriptive expression.8 The notion of a descriptive expression will be clarified 
below.  
I argue that his arguments against this kind of ethical view suggest analogous 
arguments against epistemological naturalisms and intuitionisms. Thus, if Hare’s 
arguments show that ethical descriptivisms are false, then they might show that 
epistemological descriptivisms are false also. And if epistemological descriptivisms are 
false, then epistemic terms, if they have meaning, have a meaning beyond their truth 
conditions. If this is so, that points us in the direction of an epistemic non-descriptivism, 
either an epistemic emotivism or an epistemic prescriptivism. Whether this implication 
should be resisted will be a focus of discussion later in the chapter.   
First, let us consider naturalistic descriptivisms; later we will consider 
intuitionistic or non-naturalistic descriptivisms. In both ethics and epistemology, 
philosophers have argued that the meanings of ethical and epistemic terms are the same 
as, and exhausted by, the meanings of some naturalistic, in principle empirically-
verifiable expression. These views are naturalisms. So, to say that an action is morally 
required is to say that it has some natural property (e.g., maximizing overall pleasure of 
all affected by the action), and to say some belief is justified or epistemically is to also to 
say that it has some natural property (e.g., being caused by a belief forming process that 
typically produces true belief) and there is no other aspect of their meaning: the terms’ 
                                                          
8 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 42).  
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meanings are “wholly determined by [the] truth-conditions” for the naturalistic 
expression.9 These theories are a kind of what Hare calls descriptivist theories: on them, 
to use a moral term is to describe something, i.e., to say that is has some specified 
property, in this case a natural one. 
Some ethicists, especially those from the early twentieth century, said that claims 
that relate a moral (or epistemic) property and a naturalistic one are analytic and so 
reasonably believed a priori: e.g., some might have said that reflection on the meaning of 
“morally right” reveals a naturalistic analysis. Other philosophers, particularly 
contemporary ones, who accept naturalistic analyses of ethical and/or epistemological 
terms, have claimed instead that these are synthetic claims that are reasonably believed 
not merely by reflecting on their meanings; they might argue that their (alleged) truth is 
seen by way of some argument to the best explanation, or inductive generalization, or 
some manner beyond merely reflecting on the meaning of the terms. Hare argues against 
both these kinds of naturalism in ethics; he doesn’t seem to find the latter kinds of 
naturalism to be much of an improvement over the former.  He writes: 
I have put the distinction between naturalism and intuitionism in terms of the 
different kinds of truth-conditions they impose on moral statements. My 
distinction is therefore broad enough to cover both the old-style ‘refutation of 
naturalism’ due to Moore . . , and the new-style naturalism whose chief habitat is 
Cornell.  . . [T]he way I have put the distinction will make it apply to both the old 
and the new naturalisms.10  
Thus, Hare does not seem to care whether a naturalist claims that her theory is a theory 
about the meaning of moral terms or whether it is a theory that posits an equivalence 
between moral and naturalistic terms (or properties), and yet is not a statement of 
meaning.  For the sake of argument, since Hare believes his arguments are not affected 
by this distinction, I will assume he is right. 
One of Hare’s arguments11 against naturalist descriptivisms is that if they are true, 
then many cases of moral disagreement are, in fact, not moral disagreements; since this is 
                                                          
9 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 452).  
10 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 65).  
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a false implication, this shows the theories to be mistaken.12 To illustrate this kind of 
argument, suppose person A and person B accept different naturalistic analyses or 
definitions of “morally required”: each accepts a different meaning of the moral terms 
and what its naturalistic truth-conditions are. Person A believes that “morally required” 
means “produces the most pleasure of all alternatives” and person B believes that 
“morally required” means “will contribute to the stability of society.” Suppose A and B 
are discussing the morality of a token act of abortion. If A says this act was morally 
obligatory and B says that this act was not morally obligatory, then it would appear that 
they disagree about whether this act was morally obligatory.  
However, as Hare understands naturalism, it falsely implies that they do not 
disagree. This is because, if naturalism is true, according to Hare, then A said that this act 
produced the most pleasure of all alternatives and B said that this act contributed to the 
stability of society. If that is what was said, however, then they are not disagreeing: they 
are simply talking past each other about the morality of abortion, and they even might 
both be saying something that’s true. Or their conversation might lead them to a 
disagreement about the meaning of the term “morally obligatory.”  However, since they 
are disagreeing about the morality of this abortion, and this abortion is not both morally 
obligatory and not morally obligatory, this shows that naturalism is a false view about the 
meanings of moral terms. Since they are disagreeing, they are each saying more than, out 
of one’s mouth, that the abortion produces the most pleasure and, from the other’s, that 
this abortion will not contribute to social stability.   
Hare illustrates this idea in the following using an example of two cultures who 
accept different naturalistic analyses of “wrong”: 
. . if we follow the naturalists, we shall have to say that the sense of the word in 
the two cultures are entirely different.  This will have the consequence that they 
are not contradicting one another; for fighting might be wrong in the sense of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 In his over fifty years of writings on these issues, Hare gives more arguments than I discuss here. My 
focus, therefore, is on his most recent arguments since we might think that he thought these were the 
strongest and most important.  
12 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 52-55, 58-60).  
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word used in one culture, but not wrong in the sense of the word use by the other.  
The people in each culture will be right in their own sense of the word “wrong.”13   
However, if each party to the dispute is right, then they are not disagreeing. But they are 
disagreeing so Hare concludes that naturalisms are false: the meaning of a moral 
expression is, at least, not solely that of the meaning of a naturalistic express (since if it 
were, then these wouldn’t be cases of disagreement), and so to evaluate something 
morally is not merely to say that it is has some natural property. Hare might allow that 
attributing a natural property is involved in making a moral evaluation, but that it is not 
the entire truth, as naturalism says it is.   
One might respond to this kind of reasoning by claiming that, in the dispute 
between A and B, at most only one has the correct definition of “morally obligatory” 
since it does not mean both “produces the most pleasure of all alternatives” and “will 
contribute to the stability of society”: only one of those definitions could be right, at 
most.14 On Hare’s understanding of naturalism and “meaning,” however, this seems to be 
false or irrelevant since they both fully mean what they say, respectively, even though 
their views on the meanings of moral terms are inconsistent.  
Assume, however, that there are correct understandings of the meanings of moral 
terms, that B’s definition is correct and that this abortion will not contribute to the 
stability of society. If so, then this abortion is, apparently, not morally obligatory and so 
B has said something that’s true. And, A, the utilitarian, apparently has said something 
that is false because she accepts a false naturalistic equivalence between “morally 
obligatory” and “maximizes happiness”: she he the wrong view on what the moral term 
                                                          
13 See Hare (Sorting out Ethics 69).  Here is another of Hare’s examples of this point: “If one lot of people 
say that abortion is wrong and another lot says it is not wrong, they are not differing merely in their 
linguistic usage. They are expressing different moral opinions.  This shows very clearly what is wrong with 
naturalism.  What is wrong is that it pretends that what are in fact substantial moral principles are nothing 
more than linguistic rules. Naturalism confuses learning morals with learning a language.  But the two are 
very different. If I have grown up thinking that abortion is wrong, I have acquired more than a mere 
linguistic skill.  I have acquired a moral principle, an attitude to abortion.” See Hare (Sorting out Ethics 
69). 
14 My discussion below is intended to address the worry that the above arguments presuppose (falsely, the 
objector claims) that if naturalism is true, then, perhaps, “right” means “maximizes pleasure” and “right” 
means “is approved by all.” The objector claims that “right” cannot mean both these things.  However, as 
Hare seems to understand naturalism, it allows that, for person A, “right” can mean one thing and for 
another person, “right” can mean something incompatibly different. Hare’s objection is to naturalisms of 
this kind: the objection is that they do not allow for genuine disagreements between people who understand 
the meanings of moral terms differently.  
 114 
means. She just doesn’t understand what ‘morally obligatory’ means and that’s why her 
moral evaluation is mistaken. Hare’s reaction to this case, which is founded on the 
assumption that there are objective meanings to words, seems to be the following: 
What has happened in this case is that a substantial moral principle, that one 
ought to do what will contribute to the stability of society, has got promoted into 
an analytic truth, true in virtue of the meaning of ‘ought.’  But it is not an analytic 
truth. If it were, then the [pro-abortionist] would win the argument because the 
[anti-abortionist] would be contradicting themselves, by saying something which 
the very meaning of ‘ought’ establishes as false.15  
Hare’s thought seems to be that the meaning of a term is determined by how people use 
it, but that no substantive moral conclusions follow from this. Everyone should be able to 
agree that, when some people use the term “right,” they mean “maximizes utility,” and 
when others use the term “right,” they mean “contributes to social stability.” That’s just a 
descriptive truth about linguistic behavior and people’s conceptual backgrounds. Hare 
seems to be thinking, however, that none of these facts entail that rightness is any of these 
natural properties, and so none of the (apparently) disputing parties in the cases above 
can say to the others, “You are mistaken in your moral evaluation because you do not 
accept my definition of the moral terms.”  
So he apparently understands naturalism as a view about what people mean by 
various terms, allowing that different people can accept different meaning and there’s no 
question for which claim about meaning is correct.  Something like that is needed to 
avoid a response in the cases above to the effect of, “Person B simply does not 
understand the meaning of ‘morally obligatory’ so what he says is false. But person A 
does understand the meaning and is saying something that is true, so at least they are not 
both saying something that’s true.” If meaning is understood on an individualistic basis, 
then the “talking past each other” objection holds and shows that there’s more to the 
meaning of moral terms than the meanings of natural terms. If this kind of objection does 
not show this, then objections below will do so in a clearer manner.  
 Before we consider these further objections, we might observe that analogous 
epistemological naturalisms have the same results regarding disagreement. Consider one 
                                                          
15 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 453).  
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naturalist, person C, who understands “justified” as “produced by a reliable belief-
forming process.” Consider another hypothetical naturalist, person D, who understands 
“justified” as “highly probable relative to the believer’s observation.” Let us grant that 
both these latter expressions are naturalistic ones; they could, in principle, be empirically 
verified. Suppose that they are discussing whether some token believer is justified in 
accepting some specified proposition. C says that he is, and D says that he is not. On an 
epistemological naturalism analogous to the moral naturalisms that Hare discusses (and 
thinks he refutes), C has said that a reliable process produced this belief and D has said 
that this belief is not probable, relative to this believer’s observations. These claims might 
both be true: let’s suppose that they are. If so, however, then they are not disagreeing: 
they are merely talking past each other. But since they are disagreeing about whether this 
belief is justified, this shows that epistemological naturalism, in this sense, is false. The 
meanings of epistemic expressions are not solely the meanings of naturalistic 
expressions, and to evaluate something epistemically is not merely to say that it is has 
some natural property. Perhaps attributing a natural property is involved in making a 
moral evaluation, but that it is not the entire truth, as this kind of naturalism says it is.16   
 A number of other considerations suggest that moral and epistemic terms’ 
meanings are not equivalent to merely naturalistic expressions. First, coming to believe 
that some action or belief has some natural property does not seem to “close” the 
question of whether it ought to be done, or ought to be believed. Frank Jackson expresses 
this concern: 
. .  the open question argument has equal putative force in both contexts.  Just as 
no amount of information couched in purely descriptive terms seems to close the 
question of what is morally right to do, so no amount of information couched in 
purely descriptive terms seems to close the question of what it is rational to 
believe or do. It always seems to make sense to ask, even after all the descriptive 
                                                          
16 Hare allows for moral terms to have a naturalistic meaning and that these can vary – these are the non-
moral considerations that a moral judgment depends on, or those to which we will appeal to in making or 
justifying a moral judgment – but that the “prescriptive” meaning (explained below) is universal for moral 
judgments. It’s this prescriptive meaning that enables people from different societies to disagree, even 
though they relate moral terms to different natural terms.  
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information is in, what one ought to do [or believe], independently of whether the 
ought is given a moral or [epistemically] rational slant.17 
This suggests that the meanings of, on the one hand, naturalistic expressions and, on the 
other, moral and epistemic expressions are not the same. If they were, then the question 
of whether some belief with some specified naturalistic feature(s) are justified, or have 
some other epistemic status, would be “closed,” in virtue of the very meanings of the 
terms.  But these questions are not “closed”, i.e., it can make sense for competent 
speakers to ask them about any naturalistic property that a moral or epistemic property 
might be identified with, so these kinds of naturalisms are false.  
 A final concern that some have used to argue against naturalisms involves the 
motivational factors that they find strongly connected to evaluative judgment.18 To many 
it seems that if one judges that one is morally required to do some action, then one must 
have some motivation towards doing that action. This suggestion has some plausibility, 
since, intuitively, it would be odd for someone to judge that he really ought to do 
something, but feel no “pull” at all towards doing that action. Similarly, we might think 
that it would be odd for someone to judge that some belief (which she currently does not 
accept) is rational or justified for her to have, but feel no pull or desire towards believing 
that proposition.  
These phenomena suggest, however, that naturalisms are mistaken. This is 
because, according to many critics of naturalism, describing something in naturalist terms 
does not even seem to have this related motivational impact: to say that something has 
some natural property is, apart from background desires, motivationally inert. This seems 
true with moral naturalisms, and it also seems true with epistemological naturalisms. To 
think that a belief is produced by a reliable process, or is in conformity with the design 
plan for some module of the mind, or is highly probable, or has any other naturalistic 
feature does not have the motivational impact that thinking it has some epistemic 
property does. To the former, naturalistic observations, an indifferent, “So what?” 
response is unremarkable; for the latter, epistemic observations, an indifferent, “So 
what?” response would be remarkable. Motivational indifference to natural properties is 
                                                          
17 See Frank Jackson (“Non-Cognitivism, Normativity, Belief” 100). 
18 I develop this concern in Chapter 5 in a discussion of Mackie’s views.  
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understandable, but motivational indifference to moral and epistemic properties is 
puzzling. This suggests that the two kinds of terms don’t mean the same thing and so that 
naturalisms are false. 
 Thus, Hare provides some good reasons to think that naturalistic ethical theories 
are mistaken, in terms of capturing what “we mean by the words or the sentences that we 
use” in moral discourse and the nature of these concepts. These good reasons, however, 
seem to apply to epistemological theories also: the meanings of epistemic terms are not 
identical to the meanings of naturalistic terms. Thus, if any descriptivism is correct, it 
would have to be a non-naturalistic, intuitionist descriptivism. 
Before I move on to these theories and Hare’s arguments against them, I want to 
note that Hare gives an argument against naturalistic descriptivisms that is peculiar and 
unconvincing. (He gives a similar argument against intuitionist descriptivisms also, and I 
will present this below, after I present his strong arguments against intuitionism.) He 
claims that naturalism “collapses” into moral relativism, that moral relativism is false, 
and so naturalism is false also.19 He seems to think that if any kind of naturalism is true, 
then “what will determine the truth or falsity or moral judgments will be the particular 
truth conditions accepted in a given society as determining the moral words”20 or “the 
linguistic usage of native speakers of the language.”21 This, of course, would make moral 
truth relative to, i.e., metaphysically determined by, community acceptances or linguistic 
practices. And this might imply that what’s right in one society would be wrong in 
another, merely because of different linguistic usage and what moral concepts are 
accepted. Hare thinks this result is false and that even descriptivists would agree.  
Hare seems to assume, however, that on any naturalism the majority’s view on the 
truth conditions of a term determines the truth conditions of the term, or somehow makes 
the analysis true by definition and thereby unquestionable. While some naturalisms might 
accept that, it’s not clear that all naturalisms do or would have to.  Furthermore, since it 
seems that some naturalists could easily think that the majority of society fails to 
understand what a moral term means or has a false understanding of what it is for 
something to be right (obviously, many utilitarians think that), Hare’s criticism is 
                                                          
19 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 65). 
20 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 453).  
21 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 66). 
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misplaced: it might refute some naturalisms, but not all kinds of naturalisms that reject 
this assumption. Since this argument against moral naturalism is pointless, and there are 
so many other arguments to try to show that moral (and epistemic) terms do not mean 
natural terms, I will not consider analogous versions of it against possible 
epistemological naturalisms.  
4.2.2. Against Ethical and Epistemological Intuitionisms 
Hare argues that ethical non-naturalism, or intuitionism, is mistaken: it provides a false 
view of the meaning of moral terms. Hare describes intuitionism as “the view that [the 
truth conditions of a moral statement] are the possession [by actions, people, etc.] of 
specifically moral, sui generis properties which cannot be defined without introducing 
some moral terms into the definiens.”22 So, one possible intuitionism might say that the 
truth conditions for “rightness” are determined by the truth conditions for “goodness,” 
and that the truth conditions for something being good (or the meaning of “good”) can 
only be stated in other moral terms, e.g., perhaps being valuable, being admirable for its 
own sake, being such that it ought to exist, and so on. These latter moral terms, 
intuitionists claim, either cannot be defined, or they can be defined only in other moral 
terms.   
There are analogously non-naturalistic, or intuitionist, epistemological views. On 
these views, the truth-conditions or meanings of epistemological terms likewise cannot be 
defined without introducing some epistemic terms into the definiens.  So, on a possible 
non-naturalistic view, the meaning of “justified,” or its truth conditions, is the truth 
conditions of “there is sufficient evidence for,” which might be further explicated in 
terms of “ought to be believed,” which, in term, might be either claimed to be not 
definable or definable only in further epistemic terms. These explications might lead to a 
web of interrelated epistemic concepts, none of which can be defined, or can reasonably 
be defined, in purely naturalistic terms.   
Hare’s objection to intuitionism in ethics is that he thinks it implies an 
objectionable sort of moral relativism.  He thinks intuitionism provides a relativistic-
resulting understanding of how we tell that something is good that can lead to logically 
incompatible, yet equally truthful implications, which is impossible. He explains: 
                                                          
22 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 82). 
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Intuitionism is the view that the truth conditions of moral judgments, which give 
them their meaning, consist in conformity with the data on which we have to base 
our moral reasoning, and with which its conclusions have to square; and these 
data are the common moral convictions that all morally educated people have. 
Since these convictions will vary from one society to another, the effect of 
intuitionism is, again, to anchor our moral reasoning to something relative to 
particular societies. True, there are convictions which are common to most 
societies; but there are others which are not, and no way is given by intuitionists 
of telling which are the authoritative data.23 
He thinks that to support their moral judgments, “intuitionists are appealing to nothing 
objective, but only to their own and other people’s thoughts, and these will vary from one 
person and society to another,”24 thus resulting in an unacceptable relativism. He 
basically thinks that intuitionists’ view about the meanings, or truth conditions, of moral 
terms gives rise to a false moral epistemology that shows that the view of meaning is 
mistaken. If the meaning of “morally good” cannot be identified with the meaning of any 
naturalistic expression, then to identify that some state or condition (e.g., being happy) is 
morally good is, on some intuitionisms, just to carefully consider that state and just “see” 
that it is good. Moral terms’ meanings are such that well educated people can just see 
when something is right or good: that’s how they know or reasonable believe that 
something is good. But different people and societies sometimes just “see” things 
differently and intuitionism provides no way to adjudicate these competing visions other 
than by appealing to further intuitions. To add to the problems arising from moral 
conflict, Hare claims that intuitionists claim moral infallibility: he thinks they claim that, 
“the mere occurrence of the experience [i.e., a moral intuition] guarantees the truth of the 
moral statement.”25 However, it is doubtful that an intuitionist has to think that, that they 
should think that (since they surely realize that intuitions can conflict, which casts strong 
doubt on infallibility) and that many intuitionists even did (or do) accept this kind of 
infallibility. 
                                                          
23 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 454).  
24 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 454). 
25 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 94). 
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To return to the initial questions of “ethical theory,” asked above, Hare thus 
thinks that intuitionism implies that there is no way to answer our moral questions 
“rationally” since (on Hare’s interpretation of ethical intuitionism) what’s right and good 
is “just a matter of how we feel or what the current mores dictate,” and so nothing 
rational. Since Hare thinks moral questions can be answered rationally, and thinks this 
irrationalism follows from the intuitionistic theory of the meaning and truth conditions of 
moral terms (i.e., he seems to think that accepting epistemological skepticism about 
moral judgments is inconsistent with accepting the intuitionistic theory of meaning or 
truth conditions), he rejects intuitionism.  
Ethical intuitionists would likely resist this argument, in part by arguing that Hare 
oversimplifies and misrepresents their positions. For now, however, for the sake of 
argument I will concede that it is a good argument against intuitionism in ethics, or at 
least against the kind of position that Hare calls intuitionism.  However, if it is a good 
argument, then the comparable argument can easily be made against the analogous 
epistemological intuitionism. How can we tell that a belief is justified, or that there is 
sufficient evidence for some claim, or that some belief is rational, or that some inference 
is warranted, or that some theory ought to be accepted, or some explanation is the one we 
should believe, or that some belief is, in fact, known?  A kind of epistemological 
intuitionist would argue that, given the meanings of these epistemic terms, we just look, 
reflect and see whether something – typically, some belief and believer-in-context – has 
any of these properties: intuition tells us so. Intuition, or what might also be called 
rational insight, seems to be the best way to describe the phenomena of coming to see 
that some belief has some epistemic quality.   
A Hare-like response to epistemological intuitionism is to observe that since 
intuitions about what’s reasonable, justified and known sometimes vary from one society 
to another, and among individuals, the effect of epistemological intuitionism is, again, to 
anchor our epistemic judgments to something relative to particular societies and 
individuals. While there are epistemic convictions that are common to most people and 
societies, there are others that are not, and no way is given by intuitionists of telling 
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which the authoritative data are.26 Some might respond to this by observing that different 
people might evaluate beliefs differently because they have different evidence and that all 
these evaluations might be correct because of the differing evidence.  
To avoid the full effect of this response, for one, we can observe that some 
epistemological intuitions can vary even among people with very similar backgrounds 
and so, we might think, have similar evidence. Second, we can focus our attention to 
cases where we might think the evidence is about the same for all, e.g., philosophical 
examples where what it sought is a verdict on whether some belief would be justified or 
known, or a judgment on what the person should believe, and so on: here intuitions about 
what epistemic evaluation is correct would vary also. A defender of epistemological 
intuitions, a critic of the Hare-like response above, would have to argue that there are no 
cases of competing epistemological intuitions. It is unlikely that this argument would 
succeed; the arguments might imply some kind of false epistemological infallibilism, and 
they might also falsely imply that evidence is essentially “private” so we cannot see and 
evaluate others’ evidence. So it seems that Hare-like doubts about epistemic intuitions are 
as strong as his doubts about ethical intuitions.    
Although this gets complicated since it turns epistemic theory upon itself, one 
might think that epistemic intuitionism implies that (to return to the initial questions of 
“epistemological theory,” asked above) there is no way to answer our epistemic questions 
“rationally” since (on this epistemological intuitionism that is analogous to Hare’s 
understanding of ethical intuitionism) something’s epistemic status is just a matter of how 
we feel (or how things seem to us) or what the current epistemic standards or popular 
opinion dictate. If this kind of view should be rejected, and it follows from the kind of 
intuitionistic theory of the meaning and truth conditions of epistemic terms that we are 
discussing here, then this view about the meaning and truth conditions of epistemic terms 
should rejected. Since I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that the analogous 
argument against ethical intuitionism showed ethical intuitionism to be mistaken, I will 
assume that this parallel argument shows epistemological intuitionism to be mistaken. 
                                                          
26 For arguments from these considerations to the conclusion that epistemic intuitions are unreliable, see 
Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (“Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”) and Nichols, Stich and Weinberg 
(“Meta-Skepticism: Meditations on Ethno-Epistemology”).  
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Epistemological intuitionism yields a false epistemology, which shows it to be a false 
view about the meaning and truth conditions of epistemic terms.  
Some of the arguments against naturalism in ethics and epistemology suggest 
similar arguments against intuitionisms. First, two intuitionists who appear to be engaged 
in moral debate might actually be talking past each other if each accepts a different 
version of intuitionism and so is attributing (or denying) a different sui generis moral or 
epistemic property. Since we might suppose that these intuitionists would really be 
disagreeing, this would show, at least, that there’s more to making a moral evaluation 
than attributing a non-natural property. Second, if moral and epistemic judgments have an 
intrinsically motivational quality about them, then there is more to the meaning of a 
moral term than whatever meaning sui generis, non-natural terms have, if these terms 
stand only for non-natural properties. On standard views, properties (or apprehension of 
them) do not have any motivational influence on their own, so if moral and epistemic 
judgment necessarily involves motivational factors, then there is always something going 
on more than attributing properties.  
Thus, the considerations Hare gives against naturalistic and intuitionistic ethical 
descriptivisms suggest comparable arguments against naturalistic and intuitionistic 
epistemological descriptivisms. Since we have tentatively found the arguments against 
epistemological descriptivisms to be as strong as the arguments against ethical 
descriptivisms (which we have presumed to be strong, in part to see how Hare reasons to 
his universal prescriptivism), we are left only with the option of some kind of 
epistemological non-descriptivism, if we wish to acknowledge that epistemic terms are 
meaningful in some manner. Some might take this as a reductio against Hare’s 
arguments: if arguments parallel to those he gives against ethical descriptivism take us to 
epistemological non-descriptivism, then something has gone wrong. While this response 
might be attractive, I hope to bolster it with positive concerns against epistemological 
non-descriptivism, which I develop below, as well as the considerations against 
epistemological emotivism – another kind of non-descriptivism – that I developed in the 
previous chapter.  
In rejecting ethical descriptivisms, both naturalisms and intuitionisms, Hare 
concluded that “there is a further element in [moral terms’] meaning, the prescriptive or 
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evaluative. . which is not so determined [by truth conditions], but expresses prescriptions 
or evaluations or attitudes which we assent to without being constrained by truth-
conditions.”27 My concern now is whether a position on the meaning of epistemic terms 
that incorporates such a feature is plausible. I will try to develop such a position and 
argue that it is not plausible. If epistemological non-descriptivism is not plausible, this 
suggests that there is something wrong with the arguments above against epistemic 
descriptivisms. But if there is something wrong with Hare’s arguments against epistemic 
descriptivisms, this suggests that there is something wrong with Hare’s arguments against 
ethical descriptivisms, since the arguments are parallel.  
I will argue that Hare’s arguments against both ethical and epistemological 
intuitionism are weak. The acceptability of a kind of ethical intuitionism is further 
bolstered by the fact that Hare’s position presupposes a kind of epistemological 
intuitionism, and its defense depends on it. Since epistemological intuitionism (a version 
of epistemic realism) is an acceptable view (independently, and even according to Hare, 
apparently), ethical intuitionism (a version of moral realism) would seem to be acceptable 
also. The arguments against it were not as strong as they might have seemed and so Hare 
does not provide good reason to reject moral realism.  
4.2.3. Against Ethical and Epistemological Emotivisms. 
Before we consider Hare’s preferred version of ethical non-descriptivism, we should 
briefly consider his arguments against emotivism: our treatment can be brief since I have 
no interest in defending emotivism of any kind. Furthermore, I developed and criticized 
versions of epistemic emotivism in my previous chapter.  
According to Hare, emotivists believe that moral judgments are “the expressions 
of irrational or at least non-rational attitudes of approval or disapproval” and that “the 
only questions one can reason about are factual ones.”28 He claims emotivism implies 
then there can be no rational argument about fundamental moral questions: people have 
their emotional responses and no responses are better or worse than any others, none are 
more or less rational than others, and there is no way to argue that someone’s responses 
are mistaken (because they cannot be mistaken). Emotivists like Ayer and Stevenson 
                                                          
27 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 452).  
28 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 455).  
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agreed, but since Hare thinks that there can be rational arguments about ethics, in virtue 
of the meanings of moral terms, Hare thinks emotivism is false: he calls it an 
“irrationalist” doctrine.29 This assessment seems correct. If to judge something to be 
wrong or right is just to express one’s positive emotions about it, as the “Boo! Hooray!” 
caricature of emotivism has it, then it is not at all clear how one might reason about 
fundamental moral matters.   
 In my previous chapter, I argued that the considerations Ayer and Stevenson give 
in favor of their emotivisms suggest epistemic emotivism also. I argued that we have 
better reason to reject such a view than accept it, once we reflect critically on what seems 
true about epistemic evaluations. I argued that this too is an irrationalist doctrine, since it 
implies that judgments about what’s justified, known and reasonable are only expressions 
of emotion. That this is an irrationalist theory becomes is especially clear when we apply 
it to our understanding of the nature of argumentation. If epistemological emotivism is 
true, then to judge that some claims provide a good reason for another claim, or that 
some set of premises justifies a position (which is not merely to say that the position is a 
logical consequence of the premises), is just to express one’s emotions in favor of having 
some belief, and to disagree with these assessments is just to express contrary emotions. 
Jonathan Kvanvig offers a related observation: 
[A]rguments and explanations presuppose the truth of epistemic norms, and if the 
norms themselves are given nonalethic status, then the explanations and 
arguments are simply defective in virtue of the fact that their presuppositions are 
not true. Good arguments presuppose logical and epistemic norms.30 
In sum, if epistemological emotivism is true, then we are in fundamental error about the 
nature of reasoning, since there are no truths about how we ought to reasons: there are 
merely different emotional preferences that people have about accepting and rejecting 
various complex claims involving logical relations, none of which are better or worse 
than any other. This is a consequence that is hard to accept. If Hare accepts it, it will 
surely make a difference for how we should understand his insistence that we should be 
consistent in our judgments, as we shall see.  
                                                          
29 See Hare (Sorting out Ethics 117).  Here Hare also mentions Gibbard’s views and states that, in his view, 
they are not “irrationalist” like Ayer and Stevenson’s are. 
30 See Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge 176).  
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Fortunately, however, there is little antecedent reason to accept epistemological 
emotivism, since there is little to recommend the premises that might be given in its 
defense (and so there is little to recommend the premises given in favor of ethical 
emotivism). Fortunately, also, however, if epistemological emotivism were true, then 
there would also be little or no reason to accept it. If the doctrine were true, then to say 
that “epistemological emotivism is the most reasonable view,” or one “we ought to 
accept,” would be for that someone to merely express his or her positive emotions about 
our believing epistemological emotivism, or to say that to try to cause us to accept the 
view. But it wouldn’t be true that, in response to such expressions, we should change our 
views, so there would be no problem in ignoring such expressions.  Thus, epistemological 
emotivism generates many puzzling implications, none of which have any force beyond 
people’s emotional expressions. In my previous chapter, I presented a number of reasons 
to think that epistemological emotivism is false, all of which are applicable here also.  
Since these irrationalist implications follow from premises given in defense of 
ethical emotivism, this provides further reason to reject the view, and Hare might have 
agreed. Hare had more arguments against emotivism, but since I have no interest in 
defending emotivism, I will move on to his preferred version of non-descriptivism. 
4.3. “Rational” Universal Prescriptivism? 
Thus far, I have argued that Hare’s arguments against ethical descriptivisms suggest 
analogous arguments against epistemological descriptivisms, and that if the former are 
sound, then the latter are sound.  Someone might respond that since arguments against 
epistemological descriptivism are not sound, the arguments against ethical descriptivism 
are not sound either. For example, someone might think that a kind of epistemological 
intuitionism is true: there are some propositions which, when examined carefully, one can 
just “see” that they are justified and that they ought to be believed, just like (some might 
argue) that there are some states of affairs that that one can just “see” are morally good.  
Although Hare thought otherwise, an advocate of this kind of epistemological and 
ethical intuitionism could be a fallibilist; she can, and should, admit that she might be 
mistaken in her intuitions: she can be open to the possibility that she has missed 
something and isn’t seeing things as they are. If this intuitionist perspective is a viable 
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one about epistemic evaluations, then it would seem to be a viable one about ethical 
evaluations. If that is so, then Hare has not refuted ethical intuitionism.  
I will attempt to develop this response in light of critical discussion of Hare’s 
universal prescriptivism. I will argue that this position and the considerations Hare gives 
in its favor support this response. To do this, I must explain the main feature of universal 
prescriptivism.31 The view is not as easy to present because it is not always ideally clear 
whether Hare intends to state, on the one hand, how moral terms are used and how they 
can be used and, on the other hand, how they should be used. I will argue that if Hare has 
claims about how they should be used, these claims ultimately undermine his ethical non-
descriptivism.  
However, if the position has no claims about how we should use moral language, 
then his position is a merely descriptive “logic” of the relations between moral terms and 
so has no implications for which moral evaluations we ought to accept, or how we ought 
to reason in light of our understanding of these logical relations between moral terms. If 
that’s true, then universal prescriptivism does not appear to be an ethical theory in the 
sense Hare claims it is. Furthermore, Hare does not seem to take himself as a mere 
“moral logician”: he does not seem to take himself to be merely observing various logical 
relations among moral evaluations, but never saying what judgments people ought to 
accept. Either way, universal prescriptivism is so doubtful that it should not be seen as a 
viable alternative to some version of moral realism.  
One of Hare’s main concerns is showing that moral thinking can be a “rational” 
enterprise. Exactly what he means by “rational” is never entirely clear (and so I must 
work with an intuitive, undefined notion of the term, although I think it can often be 
linked to a distinctly epistemic sense of the notion), but he thinks moral thinking can be 
rational, i.e., we can reason about the acceptability of various moral evaluations and 
principles because of the meanings of moral terms.  
                                                          
31 Another feature of prescriptivism is its motivational internalism.  See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism 
457-458): “A speech act is prescriptive if to subscribe to it is to committed, on pain of being accused of 
insincerity, to doing the action specified in the speech act, or, if it requires someone else to do it, to willing 
that he do it.” Although this would establish, on standard assumptions about motivation, that moral 
evaluations are not (purely) beliefs, since my arguments below do not concern motivational issues, I will 
not address them any more.  
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Hare thought that the meanings of moral terms are such that they are “governed 
by logic.”32 This seems to be a descriptive claim; it is a claim that there can be logical 
relations between moral judgments: moral judgments might logically imply other moral 
judgments in conjunction with other moral judgments and non-moral premises. Hare 
thinks, as we have seen, that moral judgments are not descriptions; he thinks they are 
closely related to commands, or are a kind of command. And commands can have logical 
implications. Consider this set of sentences: 
(1) Take all the boxes into the house. 
(2) This is a box. 
(3) Take this box into the house.  
Sentence (3) is, in some sense, a logical consequence of (1) and (2), even though (1) is a 
command and so is neither true nor false. The claim that this box should not go into the 
house would be, in some quite plausible sense of the term, inconsistent with (1): they 
can’t be jointly performed or satisfied. 
 As mentioned above, Hare thinks that moral judgments, which he calls 
“prescriptions,” are like commands, i.e., that they are commands with special features 
that not all commands have (these features will be explained below). Consider the moral 
judgment “We ought not to hurt babies for fun.” Hare would understand this judgment as 
something like the following:33 
(1) No hurting babies for fun, please. 
Consider this empirical, descriptive claim: 
 (2) Maggie is a baby. 
And from (1) and (2) it follows, logically, that  
 (3) No hurting Maggie for fun, please.  
Sentence (3) is, in some sense, a logical consequence of (1) and (2), even though (1) a 
command is neither true nor false. The claim that Baby Maggie ought to be hurt for fun 
is, in some sense, inconsistent with (1).  
For those who would claim that, since a “premise” in these “arguments” is neither 
true nor false, the “argument” cannot be “valid” (or that it isn’t even an argument, strictly 
                                                          
32 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 42).  
33 This locution is one concrete way to present what Hare thinks someone means when they make a moral 
judgment. This meaning can be presented with alternative formulations of the imperative, however.  
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speaking), Hare would likely suggest that this person needs to expand their notion of 
argument and validity beyond the common merely truth-functional notions. The common 
definition needs to be amended to reflect the fact that there are valid logical relations 
among prescriptions.  
 So Hare’s basic claim is that there are logical relations among moral terms, and 
that set of sentences containing a moral prescription can be logically inconsistent or 
inconsistent. He writes: 
. . if (as is certainly the case) there can be logical inconsistency between 
contradictory prescriptions, someone who wants the totality of the imperatives, or 
in general prescriptions, that he (or she) accepts to be self-consistent will have to 
observe the rules which govern consistency.34   
An important thing to note about this claim, however, is that it is only the observation 
that for a set of prescriptions to be consistent, these prescriptions have to conform to the 
logical rules that determine consistency. That’s just to say that someone who wants 
consistency will need to have consistency to get consistency. These are uncontroversial 
claims about the logical nature of prescriptions.  However, they are not claims about 
prescribers, or the people who make prescriptions. Should they want consistency in their 
imperatives, or ought their imperatives be consistent, or should they believe that their 
imperatives should be consistent? These questions need to be explained, but both 
affirmative and negative answers are not helpful for Hare. I develop this response in a 
number of ways below, in response to a variety of Hare’s claims about consistency. 
Negative answers to the question of whether our imperatives should be consistent 
suggest that, ultimately, all Hare has done is observed the natural fact there are logical 
relations among imperatives, but has not claimed that recognition of these relations 
should influence our behavior or which prescriptions we should accept. If that is all Hare 
has done, however, his theory has no implications for which moral evaluations we should 
accept. If that is so, then Hare (and others) have been very mistaken about the reach and 
power of his theory. His theory is only this: “here’s what’s consistent with what, but I 
have nothing to say about what you should do.” This wasn’t Hare’s theory.  
                                                          
34 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 455) 
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If observation of these natural, logical features should influence our behavior, 
however, that might vindicate naturalism in ethics and epistemology because that would 
suggest that natural features can be identified with an evaluative characteristic. If this is 
true, this undercuts Hare’s main arguments against ethical naturalism and, by extension, 
epistemological naturalism.  
And if people should want consistency in their imperatives, i.e., their imperatives 
should be consistent, Hare has a dilemma on his hands: if this “should” is a moral 
“should,” then, on Hare’s view, it’s an imperative. We can ask whether we, morally, 
should accept it. This question might take us down a regress of further moral “shoulds,” 
i.e., moral imperatives, which are based on only further imperatives. This would be a 
puzzling consequence, and might also lead to the kind of relativism that Hare (and others) 
likely reject. The reason for this relativism is that imperatives are not an objective feature 
of the world: rather, they originate in people and people make different imperatives. If 
moral judgments were based in imperatives “all the way down” and different imperatives 
can be accepted all the way down, the incompatible prescriptions might be equally 
justified. This is hard to understand, and Hare’s view is designed to avoid this result. So it 
is doubtful that moral imperatives depend on further moral imperatives “all the way 
down,” so to speak.  
If, however, people should want consistency in their imperatives, i.e., their 
imperatives should be consistent, and this is not a moral should, then we can ask what 
kind of should it is. Hare seems to describe it as a “should” of “rationality,” albeit of an 
unspecified kind. We can then ask if these kinds of “shoulds” are imperatives/commands, 
or if they are ever literally true. If they are merely imperatives or commands, then 
“rationality” is founded solely on commands. Again, this is a counterintuitive and 
puzzling consequence, which might lead to a kind of relativism about rationality, which 
Hare seems to reject. 
If, however, if it is literally true, as a matter of “rationality,” that we should have 
consistent beliefs and imperatives, then there are going to be facts or properties that make 
propositions that express these truths true. But if there are such facts and properties, then, 
some kind of “rational” or epistemological realism is true and the arguments against 
versions of it, developed earlier, are not sound. But if some kind of epistemological or 
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rational naturalism or intuitionism is true, it is hard to see why an ethical naturalism or 
intuitionism could not also be true. These morally realistic views claim that there are 
moral facts or properties. Hare states, like Stevenson and Hume, however, that “as soon 
as we start asking what it is for a moral quality or fact to exist in the world, we get lost” 
(p. 451). But if we “get lost” looking for moral qualities and facts, we get equally lost 
looking for the epistemic, intellectual, or “rational” facts that Hare’s position seems to 
appeal to in generating practical implications. But if these kinds of facts or qualities can 
be found, then it would seem that moral qualities can be found also.  
Hare says something that might be seen as a response to the kind of objection I 
am raising to his position. He says: 
[T]here do not have to be moral facts in the world in order for us to develop a 
theory of moral reasoning any more than there have to be logical facts to 
substantiate logical reasoning. The necessities which constrain our reasoning are 
formal necessities.35 
Logical claims are made true by formal necessities. However, claims (if they are claims) 
to the effect of our beliefs ought to conform to these formal necessities, or we are 
unjustified in accepting claims that do not conform to them are not formal necessities. If 
claims like these pertaining to belief are true, they are not true in virtue of form or syntax. 
If they are true, however, then there are aspects of the stance-independent world that 
make them true. And if there are such aspects of the world to make claims like these true, 
then it would seem that there could also be aspects of the world that can make it the case 
that some moral judgments are literally true. If that is so, then Hare’s arguments against 
descriptivism are unsound.  
 Related to the claim that moral prescriptions can be in logical relations is Hare’s 
claim that moral judgments are “universalizable.” Hare explains this notion in the 
following manners: 
A statement is universalizable if and only if it commits anyone who assents to it, 
on pain of inconsistency, to accepting that there is a universal principle which 
holds, and which applies equally to any situation exactly similar in its universal 
properties. . . [Universalizability] has the consequence that one cannot without 
                                                          
35 See Hare (Sorting Out Ethics 7).  
 131 
self-contradiction say that someone ought to do something in a situation, but that 
a precisely similar person ought not to do it.36  
Again, we see in this statement a descriptive claim about the logical relations that hold 
between prescriptions and the “universal principles” that hold between them. However, 
Hare seems to assume that someone’s assenting to inconsistent prescriptions would be 
that is bad and ought to be avoided: perhaps it is for this reason that he describes 
inconsistency as a “pain,” not a merely neutral state. However, if inconsistency is bad and 
ought to be avoided, and this is literally true or a fact, then that might suggest that all the 
arguments against there being moral truths or facts were not unsound after all.  
 Let us consider another statement of universalizability: 
One cannot with logical consistency, where a and b are two individuals, say that 
a ought, in a certain situation specified in universal terms without reference to 
individuals, to act in a certain way, also specified in universal terms, but that b 
ought not to act in a similarly specified situation. This is because in any ‘ought’ 
statement there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all 
precisely similar situations. This means that if I say, ‘That is what ought to be 
done; but there could be a situation exactly like this one in its non-moral 
properties, but in which the corresponding person, who was exactly like the 
person who out to do it in this situation, ought not to do it’ I contradict myself. 
This would become even clearer if I specified my reasons for saying why it 
ought to be done: ‘It ought to be done because it was a promise, and there were 
no conflicting duties.37   
Should we not contradict ourselves? If not, then there’s no problem doing so: Hare has 
made the novel observation that moral commands can contradict and be consistent, but it 
is not true that consistency should be sought, or that consistence is better than 
inconsistency.  If we should avoid contradicting ourselves, and we should strive for 
consistency, and these claims are literally true, i.e., they do not consistent in someone’s 
urging “All commands being consistent, please!” then it would seem that there can be 
room for moral judgments being straightforwardly true also.   
                                                          
36 See Hare (“Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics” 192-193). 
37 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 456). 
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 Let us consider one final statement of Hare’s, to better understand the view: 
These purely logical features of moral statements have the consequence that if we 
accept a set of universal moral principles, and accept that the facts of the situation 
are as they are, then we cannot avoid assenting, at the bottom end of the structure 
to a set of singular prescriptions for actions. To refuse to assent to these would be 
to involve ourselves in self-contradiction.  . . [W]e are constrained to assent to the 
prescriptive conclusions if we assent to the premises. If we do not want to assent 
to the conclusions, we have to alter the premises; and if we do not want to do that, 
we have to put up with the conclusion.38 
Again, we can ask whether Hare is merely making a descriptive point about the logical 
relations among moral concepts, or if he is saying that it is better for one’s prescriptions 
to be in one logical condition (e.g., consistency) over another (e.g., inconsistency, 
especially recognized as such). If he is merely doing the former, then his position has no 
substantive implications for how we ought to reason about moral matters.  But if he’s 
doing the latter, and making a “rational” evaluation, and this is not itself a neither-true-
nor-false prescription, then, again, we might wonder why moral evaluations couldn’t be 
either true or false also, and so either ethical naturalism or intuitionism is true. 
 What I have tried to argue is that, if Hare’s position is true, then there are truths or 
facts about rationality. This notion of rationality has been left undefined (since Hare does 
not define it), but it seems to be related to epistemic or intellectual evaluations. And I 
have suggested if epistemic or intellectual evaluations can be literally true on Hare’s 
position, then that would make room for moral evaluations being literally true. That 
would, of course, imply that Hare’s position is false.  I have also argued that if Hare’s 
position does not allow for epistemic or intellectual truths or facts, then it is an 
irrationalist position: if that is so, then it should not be accepted either.  
 I have not yet considered, however, what an epistemic prescriptivism would look 
like. Alan Millar and Jose Luis Bermudez suggest a characterization of such a view.  
They explain: 
On this account if, for example, you condemn someone’s reasoning as irrational 
you are saying, in effect, ‘Let me not reason that way if in his shoes.’ Two people 
                                                          
38 See Hare (“Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics” 193). 
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could agree on the naturalistic properties possessed by a thinker but disagree on 
whether that thinker is rational. What would they be disagreeing about is how to 
reason in that thinker’s shoes. But the disagreement may not be one which can be 
resolved by appeal to norms which are treated as objectively authoritative by 
everyone.39  
This is a possible view that is somewhat similar to Hare’s prescriptivism since it yields 
epistemic imperatives. It is hard to see how it could be conclusively refuted, especially in 
what some would describe as a non-question begging manner, as the theory might call 
into question some of the most basic assumptions about reasoning. The final claim of the 
passage is unclear: perhaps everyone would not treat some epistemic or intellectual 
norms as objectively authoritative: perhaps there are no norms that everyone would treat 
as objectively authoritative. But those are empirical claims about people’s acceptances.   
The important question is whether there are epistemic or intellectual norms that 
are objectively authoritative for everyone. The common view is that there are; and if 
there are not, then some kind of intellectual or epistemic relativism or nihilism would be 
true. Elsewhere in this work I discuss these kinds of views and reject them, in part 
because they are epistemically self-undermining: if they are true, then it’s not 
(objectively) true that they are reasonable to hold. I also presented reasons to regard them 
as false: there are many epistemic phenomena for which they do not easily jibe with and 
the realist picture more readily accommodates.  
However, since there is little positive reason to accept the kind of Hare-like 
epistemic view that Millar and Bermudez suggest (but do not defend), then it is 
reasonable for most people, probably, to continue believing that there are epistemic 
norms that are objectively authoritative for everyone. However, if the semantics, 
metaphysics and epistemology of these claims can be adequately secured, then 
comparable semantics, metaphysics and epistemology for moral claims can likely be 
adequately secured also. 
4.4. Normative Ethics and Normative Epistemology. 
In my introduction I said I would discuss Hare’s normative ethic, i.e., his theory on which 
moral judgments we ought to accept and what we morally ought to do. This is useful and 
                                                          
39 See Millar and Bermudez (Reason and Nature 9).  
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necessary since there are normative epistemologies, or theories on which beliefs ought to 
be accepted.  Hare’s theory about what we ought to do stemmed from his view about 
universalizability. Basically and very, very roughly, he thought that like cases should be 
treated as like cases and so, given the “logic” of moral terms, we should make the moral 
evaluations we would be willing to make, were we in the shoes of anyone affected by our 
actions.  In effect, it’s a kind of “golden rule” ethics. Hare states it simply: 
What maxims we can adopt, or what moral judgments we can accept, will then 
depend on what we are prepared to prescribe for all like situations (whether, for 
example, were we the unfaithful husband or his deserted wife.40  
This is not entirely clear since Hare does not seem to want to be making only a 
descriptive claim about what maxims we “can” adopt, but rather which maxims we 
should adopt. The idea is that if one can accept a principle and its results from all affected 
perspectives, then it is “rationally” acceptable, and if, and only if, it is rationally 
acceptable should one accept it. Hare got into trouble with the “can” in this claim because 
it seems possible that someone could accept principles that would cause him or herself 
severe harm: e.g., perhaps a committed Nazi would be willing to accept principles that 
would require him to be executed even if he turned out to be a Jew. Hare’s theory might 
not have adequate resources to say why this is a bad principle; if so, some would regard 
this as a refutation of the view. This might lead us to reconsider morally realistic 
positions, and re-assess Hare’s arguments against them.   
My objections to this kind of “golden rule” ethics is not that it is false, but that, 
first, if it is true and, second, we intellectual ought to believe it, then it is hard to see why 
there couldn’t be true moral evaluations also. If we ought to judge like cases as like cases 
and this is true – it’s not merely a prescription or an expression of emotion – then it is 
hard to see why there couldn’t be true moral evaluations also. If Hare’s theory is 
epistemically justified for somebody or rationally ought to be believed by somebody, 
then there are facts of this kind also. But, as I argued earlier, if we recognize evaluative 
facts of this kind, then it’s hard to see why there could not be facts of a distinctively 
moral kind as well.  
                                                          
40 See Hare (“Universal Prescriptivism” 460). 
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If, on the other hand, it’s not true, or neither true nor false ought that one to be 
consistent, then Hare’s position might be ultimately groundless. If no evaluative “oughts” 
or “shoulds” of any kind are true, the implications of this would be astounding. I’ve 
argued, however, that we have good reasons to think that some evaluative judgments are 
true. I think that these often simple reasons are far stronger than the complex ones Hare 
gives in favor of his universal prescriptivism. Thus, while the evaluative world might be 
prescriptions “all the way down” so to speak, we have better reason to deny this than 
accept this. And if is correct, then while we might find great epistemic value in golden-
rule considerations and trying to see things from others’ points of view, the truth might 
well be these maneuvers can put us in a better position to see the independent moral facts.  
4.5. Conclusion.  
I have argued for all of the following: first, that Hare’s universal prescriptivism and the 
arguments in its favor presuppose epistemic or intellectual evaluations: Hare’s 
understanding of the nature of moral evaluations depends on an understanding of 
epistemic or intellectual evaluations. I have argued that Hare’s arguments against ethical 
descriptivism suggest analogous arguments against epistemic descriptivism. I have 
argued that understanding epistemic or intellectual evaluations in a non-descriptivist 
manner leads to rational unacceptable consequences; my discussion from the previous 
chapter on Ayer supports this also. Since epistemic evaluations are meaningful and 
rational, they therefore should be understood along descriptivist lines. But since this is so, 
then moral evaluations can be understood along descriptivist lines also. Thus, the 
arguments against ethical descriptivism are not as strong as Hare thinks: the various 
considerations he has offered against these theories can, and should be, resisted.  
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CHAPTER 5:  Mackie’s Epistemic Nihilism 
5.1. Introduction. 
John Mackie argued that no positive moral judgments are ever true, that every positive 
attribution of a moral property is false.1 This is because, he argued, there are no moral 
properties, no moral facts, to make them true: nothing in the “fabric” or “furniture of the 
world” “backs up” and “validates” any moral claim.2 His thesis was that “there do not 
exist entities or relations of a certain kind, objective values or requirements, which many 
people have believed to exist.”3  
Mackie’s position is called “moral nihilism” because it effectively annihilates 
morality. If it is true, then nothing is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, 
or virtuous or vicious.  If true, the world is without moral value.  We make moral 
judgments, but they uniformly fail to state truths since there is no metaphysical 
foundation of morals, nothing for them to correspond to or represent. 4 
His view implies that any version of moral realism is false. Moral realists believe 
that moral judgments are sometimes true and that they are made true by moral properties 
or facts that are “objective.” This objectivity of moral properties is most readily 
characterized in the negative: they are not constituted or determined by the attitudes of 
any actual or idealized believer(s) towards any moral proposition; they are ontologically 
independent of that. 
Here I examine Mackie’s arguments for his moral nihilism. They focused only on 
moral evaluations, but I investigate what their arguments’ major premises suggest for 
                                                          
1 What is meant by “positive” is illustrated with the following: on Mackie’s view to say, “Pleasure is 
morally good,” is to say something false since there is no property of being morally good for anything to 
have. However, to say, “Pleasure is not morally good,” is to say something that’s true, on Mackie’s view.   
2 See Mackie (Ethics 16, 22). This is the common interpretation of Mackie’s overall thesis.  Other passages 
of his, however, suggest that he thinks there are moral properties (e.g., to be good is to be “such as to 
satisfy requirements of the kind in question”) but that nothing has these properties and so all (positive) 
moral judgments are false.  Here I ignore this interpretation since all other contemporary commentators do 
so as well and it does not make a substantive difference to Mackie’s overall thesis that moral judgments are 
founded in an erroneous metaphysical presupposition.  
3 See Mackie (Ethics 17).   
4 Mackie realizes that we can distinguish acts that are typically called “cruel” from those typically called 
“kind” on their basis of their empirical, descriptive differences.  He considers this a “hard fact,” but asks “is 
it an equally hard fact that actions which are cruel in such a descriptive sense are to be condemned?” See 
Mackie (Ethics 17).  Since he thinks there is no property “deserving condemnation,” his answer is no.  
Similarly, he thinks that we distinguish justice from injustice but denies that “there is any objective 
requirement to do what is just and refrain from what is unjust.” See Mackie (Ethics 27).  
 137 
non-moral evaluations,5 focusing on epistemic or intellectual judgments and principle 
(not moral judgments and principles) such as, but not limited to: 
“You should believe this.” 
“You ought to believe that.” 
“This is evidence for that.” 
“This is good, sufficient, evidence for that.” 
“This belief is justified, or reasonable, or known.” 
“There is good reason to believe that.” 
“You should believe something if, and only if, you have good evidence for it.”  
“Given that you believe this, you ought to also believe that.”  
“This implies that, so you should not believe this.”  
I argue that Mackie’s premises suggest an understanding of evaluative epistemic 
judgments that is comparable to his understanding of the nature of moral judgments.  
Thus, his arguments in the moral realm suggest analogous arguments for epistemic 
nihilisms: that epistemic judgments are never true because there are no epistemic 
properties or facts.  Whether his position and any arguments that might be given on its 
behalf should be accepted (an epistemic judgment in itself) will be a focus of this chapter.  
I will argue that his arguments should not be accepted, for many of the reasons I 
articulated in my previous chapter. There I provided reasons to think that meta-
epistemological views that imply that epistemic judgments are neither true nor false are 
false. The reasons I developed in the previous chapter were reasons to think that 
epistemic judgments are sometimes true; these reasons – or many of them – imply that 
positions like Mackie’s are false and the arguments for them unsound. If we have better 
reason to think that epistemic judgments are sometimes true than never true, then we 
have good reasons think that Mackie-style arguments for an epistemic nihilism are not 
sound. The arguments from my previous chapter, as well as my discussion of Mackie’s 
views in this chapter, provide support for these conclusions about what we should think 
about moral and epistemic nihilisms.  
 
                                                          
5 Mackie says that his arguments would apply to non-moral values, but he only mentions aesthetic values as 
an example of non-moral values. See Mackie (Ethics 15). I suspect that Mackie would have resisted 
 138 
5.2. Mackie’s Conception of Moral Properties. 
Earlier non-cognitivists, like Ayer, Stevenson and Hare, agreed with Mackie that moral 
judgments are never true, but they believed this for reasons different than Mackie’s. They 
argued that the meanings of moral terms are such that, when one makes a moral 
judgment, one is doing something other than attempting to describe, or attribute 
properties, or state a proposition, and, thus, that sentences like these are neither true nor 
false. Of course, if moral judgments are neither true nor false, they are never true.   
These non-cognitivists’ arguments often hinge on controversial semantic claims 
about the nature of moral language and detailed, sometimes tedious, analyses of how 
people use it. Mackie, however, described his view as an “ontological thesis, not a 
linguistic or conceptual one.”6 Unlike the non-cognitivists (but like the realists), he pretty 
much accepted moral language at face value: he did not delve deeply in the questions of 
meaning that, he thought, distracted the non-cognitivists from the real issue. He thought 
the real issue is the ontological status of moral truth-makers.   
Mackie thought, like many do, that when we judge, for example, that something is 
morally right, we are at least trying to say something that is true and true because there is 
a quality or property actions can have – in this case, “being right” – and that this action 
has it.  So Mackie accepted a somewhat ordinary understanding of what people are trying 
to do when they make moral judgments; at least, his account was cognitivist.  He argued, 
however, that this ordinary understanding was in error because there are no such moral 
properties, qualities, or facts: moral discourse presupposes entities that do not exist.   
Mackie’s case against moral properties depends on a conception of what moral 
properties are like. He develops what he thinks is the common conception of moral 
properties, or the common view about moral properties would be like, were they to exist.  
He then argues that things like that, things with those features (or that combination of 
features), do not exist.  So what are moral properties or facts like, according to Mackie?  
His position – which he thinks is supported by much of the philosophical tradition (Plato, 
Aristotle, Kant, Sidgwick, Clark) and common moral thought – might be summed up as 
the view that moral properties are, first, “objective” and, second, that “seeing” them will 
                                                                                                                                                                             
extending them to epistemic matters.  
6 See Mackie (Ethics 18). 
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influence one’s motivations and affections, irrespective of one’s antecedent psychological 
dispositions.  A number of considerations go into unpacking these notions, especially 
those concerning motivation. 
First, for moral properties to be objective is, to use Mackie’s textile metaphor, for 
them to be “part of the fabric of the world”: they exist independent of our beliefs about 
them.  When we judge that something is morally required or obligatory, we hope that our 
belief is true and true because it’s required or obligatory; it’s not required or obligatory 
because we judge it to be so.  According to Mackie, the idea of moral properties is that 
they are “requirements which are simply there, in the nature of things, without being the 
requirements of any person or body of persons, even God.”7 To think that moral qualities 
are objective is to think that there is a moral reality that is, as he puts it, “simply there,” 
independent on our attitudes and beliefs about it.8 A Kantian expression of this idea about 
objectivity is that apprehension of moral properties yield moral demands that are 
“categorically imperative . . action-directing absolutely, not contingently . . upon the 
agent’s desires and inclinations.”9  Moral properties make it the case that there are things 
we ought to do, whether we want to or not.  
This objectivity might contrast with views that Mackie calls “subjective.”  Were 
someone to think that moral properties are “subjective,” he might think that moral 
judgments are, as Mackie puts it, “simply attitudes and policies . . that he and other 
people held”10 with no pretense that they are true or accurate or in any way represent the 
way things are, morally.11 Or perhaps another kind of subjectivist would think that moral 
judgments are sometimes true, but true because he, or his community, or whoever, says 
so. On this kind of view, moral truth would depend on the subject’s, or subjects’, 
evaluations.  
                                                          
7 See Mackie (Ethics 59).  
8 This independence is not easy to characterize.  Many think that moral reality is such that causing 
innocents to suffer for the entertainment of others is wrong.  If this is true, this depends on contingent facts 
about those who are able to suffer; what suffering is like, for one.  However, the thought motivating this 
independence of the moral is that it’s not because of anyone’s attitudes towards the proposition “causing 
innocents to suffer for the entertainment of others is wrong” that this is true.  Its truth is independent of 
that.  
9 See Mackie (Ethics 29). 
10 See Mackie (Ethics 16). 
11 To me, this view seems incoherent – perhaps thinking that, e.g., although such and such is wrong but that 
there really is no quality ‘wrong’ that things might have – but I will not press this since nothing discussed 
here depends on challenging it.  
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The second feature of moral properties that Mackie believes is built into both 
ordinary and the philosophical conceptions of them is that apprehending, perceiving or 
seeing them will necessarily influence one’s motivations. He reports that many 
philosophers – Plato, Kant, Sidwick, and others – have said about moral properties that 
“just knowing or ‘seeing’ them will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that 
they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations.”12 Although Stevenson did not think that 
there are moral properties, this motivational suggestion is similar to his claim that moral 
judgments have a “magnetism”: judging something to be right or good will, like a 
magnet, have a pull on one’s affections and desires. Another suggestion from Mackie, 
which he claims is part of the traditional concept of moral properties, is that those who 
“see” that something is good, right or morally obligatory will, “without any further 
motivation, be impelled to pursue and promote these ideals.”13 And this motivation will 
be “absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his own or 
anyone else’s.”14   
Thus, Mackie thinks that the ordinary conception of moral properties is that of 
objective entities that have incredible powers over people’s desires, motivations, and 
affective concerns. Merely thinking that something has a moral property such as being 
good or wrong will necessarily cause one’s attitudes and feelings about it to change; if an 
action is involved, one will feel pulled toward doing that action.15 And, again, this is 
supposed to be true regardless of how one felt before having this alleged moral vision. 
If “seeing” moral properties necessarily motivates us in these ways, they are quite 
remarkable. If they are like this and “objective,” so that their existence is independent of 
our beliefs about them and attitudes toward them, they are even more remarkable: were 
there existence somehow due to our beliefs and attitudes, their alleged influence on our 
emotions and motivations might be easier to explain. Mackie thinks the ordinary and 
                                                          
12 See Mackie (Ethics 23). 
13 See Mackie (Ethics 24). 
14 See Mackie (Ethics 33). 
15 This sort of view is probably most plausible when applied to judgments about one’s own activities at the 
present time. It is odd when applied toward moral judgments about the actions of others, especially in the 
very distant past or future, or with rather unspecific moral judgments.  Say I judge that Socrates was treated 
wrongly; it’s clear I can’t do anything about that now, so it’s not clear what I might be moved to do or how 
any of my motivations would, or should, change.  Also, say I expect that in a few hundred years someone 
will do something horribly evil. I think I can have that thought but, again, it’s not clear how it might 
motivate me to do anything, since I would have no idea what to do.   
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philosophical conception of moral properties has these two elements. He argues that this 
conception is in error: there are no such things like this, so common moral sense 
presupposes things that don’t exist, so it is founded on error, and thus (positive) moral 
judgments are uniformly false.    
5.2.1. Responding to Mackie’s Conception of Moral Properties. 
Before I present Mackie’s arguments for conclusions that imply that all positive moral 
judgments are false, I should note that Mackie’s claims about the common conception of 
moral properties can be resisted.  
One could deny that moral properties are objective by arguing that the ordinary 
and philosophical conception of moral properties is that they are subjective, or that they 
are relative, or that that some kind of non-cognitivism better captures the features of 
moral thought and discourse. If any of these arguments were sound (or their conclusions 
true), then Mackie would be mistaken in thinking that the ordinary conception of morality 
is that it is objective because there are objective moral properties. But these arguments 
are not likely to be successful, in terms of capturing the empirical facts about what most 
people and most philosophers have thought about the nature of morality, e.g., that there 
are correct answers that we can discover, that we can be mistaken, that moral truth isn’t 
necessarily identified by doing an opinion poll, etc.  And this route to respond to Mackie 
wouldn’t be one a moral realist would want to take, since realists think that morality is 
objective in Mackie’s sense. Since I intend to defend moral realism, I won’t develop this 
response.  
An easier route to respond to Mackie, especially for a realist, is to deny that moral 
properties have the motivational qualities he claims they do. To do this, one might argue 
that Mackie’s conception is false since it appears that people at least can (and, it seems, 
sometimes do) make moral judgments but lack related motivation and emotional affect. 
“Amoralists,” beings who make moral judgments yet are not at all moved by them, seem 
conceptually possible, if not actual. If this is the case, this refutes Mackie’s sense that 
there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgments.16  
                                                          
16 For complete developments of this kind of response, see Brink (Moral Realism and The Foundations of 
Ethics 37-80) and Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism: A Defence 119-164).  Both provide thorough 
taxonomies of possible motivationally internalist positions and argue the possibility of amoralists shows 
that moral motivation, in any important sense, is not an essential aspect of a moral judgment.  
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To reinforce this argument one could also point out that Mackie has done very 
little to make a convincing case in favor of motivational internalism. His case basically 
consists of some arguments from authority: he notes that some famous philosophers have 
said that this is what “seeing” moral properties is like. But famous philosophers have 
been mistaken, and they might very well be mistaken here. Also, some famous 
philosophers have surely denied these claims, so these arguments from authority might 
end in a stalemate. And many of these claims from tradition, although obscure in 
meaning and dubious in themselves, are not obviously applicable to most moral actual 
agents anyway. Perhaps seeing moral properties necessarily motivates only those who 
have undergone decades of philosophical training and moral development. So even if this 
elite group would be become motivated by moral judgments in themselves, it wouldn’t 
obviously imply anything for the rest of us who haven’t undergone such an intense 
philosophical workout. 
While these are the responses to claims about motivational internalism that I 
favor, for my purposes here they stop the discussion too soon. On this response, we don’t 
even get to Mackie’s arguments against moral properties: a realist might think, “Since 
Mackie wrongly assumes that moral properties are necessarily motivating, or necessarily 
impact one’s emotions and desires, he has a mistaken notion of moral properties. 
Therefore, there’s no need to look at his arguments designed to show that things like this 
don’t exist (for we might even agree with him). This is because, even if he is right, that 
has no implications for whether moral properties, under a better conception, exist or not.” 
This response comes down to thinking that Mackie has not made a strong case for his 
position, starting with his conception of moral properties. His arguments are unsound 
because he has a false description of what it’s like to make moral judgments.  
I will, however, initially grant that Mackie’s conception of moral properties is 
correct. I will concede that the concept of them is that they are objective and intrinsically 
motivating. I will then argue, however, that the ordinary conception of epistemic 
properties is comparable to Mackie’s conception of moral properties: the concept of 
epistemic properties is such that they also have the features Mackie finds ontologically 
problematic for moral properties. I then develop arguments for an epistemic nihilism or 
“error theory” that are parallel to those Mackie makes about the moral. I argue that if the 
 143 
arguments for moral nihilism are sound or strong, then the arguments for epistemic 
nihilism are sound or strong also.  
I argue that these arguments for moral nihilism are unsound or weak, so his 
arguments for his meta-ethics are weak also. I argue that since some (positive) epistemic 
judgments are true (because there are objective epistemic properties), the arguments 
against them are not sound and so neither are their analogous arguments against moral 
judgments (and objective moral properties) either. Thus, I conclude that Mackie’s 
arguments do not show that there are no moral properties: if they do, comparable 
arguments show that there are no epistemic properties either. But there are epistemic 
properties, so Mackie’s arguments do not show there are no moral properties. 
5.2.2. Epistemic Properties: Objective and Motivating? 
While, compared to moral properties, much less has been said about conceptions of 
epistemic properties and their metaphysical basis and psychological characteristics, I 
believe a case as strong (which might not be very strong) can be made that epistemic 
properties are also “objective” and “motivating,” in Mackie’s senses. Recall some of the 
epistemic judgments from above: 
“You should believe this.” 
“This is good, sufficient, evidence for that.” 
“This belief is justified, or reasonable, or known.” 
“There is good reason to believe that.” 
“This implies that, so you should not believe this.”  
Ordinary and philosophical thought often presumes that judgments like these, and their 
negations, as well as other “deontic” epistemic evaluations, are sometimes true.   
If common thought is correct about this, does common thought suggest that their 
truth is “objective,” or non-objective?  Non-objective views to the effect that epistemic 
evaluations are true when, and only when, and because, the believer accepts them or feels 
good about them, or her community does the same, are not very popular. Perhaps this 
unpopularity is due to the fact that, for any epistemic evaluation, we can ask why it is the 
correct one. Various answers that appeal to “objective” considerations – factors and 
features that seem to explain why epistemic evaluations are correct (if and when they are) 
– will imply that the answer, “because I (or we) believe it,” is false. Perhaps these views 
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are also not so popular because of a sense that we can be mistaken in what we take to be 
good reasons, or adequate justification for a belief, and these sorts of non-objective 
theories might make accommodating that sense very difficult, if not impossible.  
However, non-objective epistemic views might be true, but insofar as we are 
seeking the common conception of what makes epistemic judgments true, ordinary 
thought does not endorse a non-objective basis for epistemic truths.17 Rather, it appears 
that people tend to think that epistemic and intellectual demands are, as Mackie puts it 
about moral demands, “requirements which are simply there, in the nature of things, 
without being the requirements of any person or body of persons, even God.”18 Some of 
these demands, or plausible candidates for epistemic demands, include demands that 
one’s beliefs fit the evidence, that one have reasons for one’s beliefs, that one’s beliefs be 
justified or reasonable, and that one’s views change when inconsistencies are identified. 
These demands apply to particular contexts: for some believer, in some context, with 
some particular experience, the demand is that p is believed, that p is disbelieved, or it is 
that judgment be suspended on p. And the natural understanding of these requirements is 
that they are due to properties or facts that are part of the world, parts beyond our 
attitudes taken towards the propositions in question.  
To think that epistemic qualities are objective is to think that there is an epistemic 
reality that is independent of our attitudes and beliefs about it. On many views, this 
objective reality, in conjunction with the varying non-epistemic facts about our 
experience – i.e., how things seem to us, our memories, our experiences, and so on – 
which determines what we each ought to believe. But part of this independent reality is, 
on some views, that we ought to believe what, and only what, we have good reason or 
sufficient evidence to believe. Hard as it is to analyze these terms, they refer to an aspect 
                                                          
17 Some people sometimes endorse a non-objective basis for epistemic or intellectual evaluations. This is 
most common when people feel personally threatened by some new claims that conflict with their present 
beliefs.  These new claims trouble their convictions that their present beliefs deserve high epistemic marks 
and so they might exclaim, “Well, this is what I believe!”  Apparently, this remark is meant to amount to an 
either “Leave me alone! I don’t like these criticisms!” and/or a suggestion that since the person believes it, 
he or she should be criticized since her belief is justified.  I mention this since the fact that moral discourse 
has, as Stevenson put it, a “dynamic” aspect is sometimes used to try to justify some kind of non-
cognitivism.  If it is relevant there, it is also relevant in the epistemic case, since intellectual discourse is 
equally dynamic: high emotions often accompany discussions of epistemic evaluations.  
18 See Mackie (Ethics 59).  
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of objective reality nevertheless.  Thus, ordinary epistemic discourse seems to presuppose 
its own objectivity.   
Does it presuppose a motivational quality? That is, is the ordinary conception of 
epistemic judgment such that we tend to think that epistemic judgments, like moral 
judgments, will influence motivation? Of course, unlike some moral judgments, judging a 
belief to be justified, or that one ought to believe something, or that some view is most 
reasonable, does not obviously suggest an action be done. But, many moral judgments do 
not obviously suggest an action either, so this goes to show that associating this alleged 
motivational influence only with action is to too narrowly construe the phenomena. In its 
broader form (which would explain its impact on action, when it might have some), it 
concerns one’s desires and the affective or emotional “pull” one might feel towards 
certain states of affairs being the case.  
This is just a sketch of what this motivational phenomena is like, but typical 
descriptions of this alleged phenomena are not much less sketchy: often a philosopher 
just notes that it would be it be odd or puzzling for someone to judge that she ought to do 
something but have no motivation or inspiration to do it, or judge that something is good 
but be totally indifferent to whether it exists or not.19 The thought inspiring this sense that 
these would be odd situations is the thought that, necessarily, moral judgments engage 
our emotions and desires and attract or repulse us from the objects of moral judgment.   
This, of course, is a rough statement of the basic idea, and this kind of position 
about the natural moral properties is the one that that Mackie claims is the common one. 
For the sake of argument, I am granting that it is plausible. And I am granting that it is 
the common one, although I do not think it is: I think it is a philosophical fantasy created 
by those who lack concrete experience of finding out what most people think about 
morality. Many ordinary people do not find it at all surprising that people are not 
motivated by their own moral judgments.  
The question for my purposes, however, is whether an analogous view about 
epistemic properties is plausible also, or whether if one thought that moral judgments are 
motivating, one should (or would) find this motivational element in epistemic judgments 
also.  I believe this is plausible: if one found the motivational claims about moral 
                                                          
19 See Michael Smith (Moral Problem 6-7). 
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judgments to be plausible, one should also find motivational claims about epistemic 
judgments plausible also.   
My defense of these claims is primarily intuitive, but it is comparable in strength 
to typical defenses of the analogous view about moral judgments. This defense consists 
primarily in asking whether assertions like the following would seem odd and surprising: 
• “I believe that p is strongly supported by the evidence, but I have no inclination at 
all towards believing p.” 
• “I see that p is implied by many other propositions I confidently believe, but I feel 
no ‘pull’ towards accepting p (or rejecting some of my antecedent beliefs).” 
• “I believe p but realize that I don’t have good reason to believe p, yet I don’t at all 
feel like I shouldn’t believe p.”  
• “I realize this is the justified belief here, but I have no interest in believing it.” 
• “My believing p is simply irrational, but I have no desire to stop believing p.” 
For the person who thinks that moral judgment are intrinsically motivating and so thinks 
that, e.g., a claim like, “I morally ought to do this, but I have no inclination, motivation or 
desire to do so” is (at least) odd, I suspect that this person would find the analogous 
epistemic claims above to be odd also.   
And I think she should: there is some intuitive plausibility to the thought that 
epistemic evaluations – purported perceptions of epistemic properties – necessarily 
influence motivation and desire. To see this, one can tell more very short stories like 
those above where someone sees that what she believes (or does not believe) is at odds 
with her epistemic judgments about those beliefs.  It is plausible to suggest that, 
necessarily, this person would have some motivation to change her beliefs, or a desire 
that this happen.  If someone lacks this motivation, it’s plausible to conclude that she just 
isn’t sincerely making the epistemic evaluation: if she completely lacks the desire to stop 
believing p, even though she professes that believing p is irrational for her, then we might 
doubt her sincerity, just as we might doubt that someone who lacks any motivation to do 
action A, but claims that he ought to do A, is sincere also.  These claims are also 
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reinforced by the expectation that, if we convince someone that her view is unreasonable, 
we expect her to change her view, or at least her attitude about her view.20  
Our inability to, in various senses, decide what to believe does not seem to make a 
difference here to whether it can be true that we, or someone, ought to believe something. 
People make epistemic evaluations all the time.  Some people, especially philosophers, 
offer cases for why their preferred epistemic evaluations of various propositions are the 
correct ones. Other people sometimes make positive suggestions for more reasons to add 
to the case, while others criticize these reasons, arguing that they are not as strong as they 
might seem.  These critics expect that their objects should change their mind in light of 
the objections, unless they have an adequate response. A response to criticism, “Sorry, I 
am unable to control what I believe, so I don’t see why your criticisms – even if I 
happened to become convinced that they are sound and that my position is utterly 
baseless – should influence what I believe,” would reveal confusion: the fact that our 
beliefs should be influenced by reasons does not depend on whether we have control over 
our beliefs. And sometimes, we can at least indirectly control what we believe: extended 
reflection on the epistemic qualities of a belief can, and should, lead to corresponding 
change in belief. This fact might be supported by an inchoate sense that, necessarily, 
judging a belief to have a negative (or positive) epistemic value will result in a 
motivational desire not to have it (or to have it) and that’s at least a start to a better 
overall epistemic state.  So doubts about stronger forms of “doxastic voluntarism” do not 
seem to make a difference to the plausibility of the claim that epistemic judgments are as 
motivating as moral judgments are.   
I concede that this discussion is murky and phenomenological: it appeals to one’s 
sense of what it’s like to make evaluative judgments, in both moral and epistemic realms, 
and the feelings, desires and motivations that typically accompany them. The position I 
am sketching claims that there is a necessary connection between evaluations and 
motivations. While I deny that there is such a connection – whatever connection to be 
                                                          
20 On this theme, Paul Horwich writes, “There appear to be facts about what it is rational to do, to want, to 
feel and to think. . . We are far from impervious to such facts.  That is, our recognition of them has 
motivational force; . . However . . we cannot find any account of the underlying nature of the normative 
facts that would explain this motivational force. We do not see what it is about the nature of rationality that 
makes it conceptually anomalous—perhaps even incoherent—to think that someone might regard a norm as 
rational and yet have no inclination to conform to it.” See Horwich (“Gibbard’s Theory of Norms” 69).  
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found here is only a contingent one – I am asking the reader to try to see things from the 
perspective of someone who finds such a necessary connection between moral 
evaluations and moral motivation. My suggestion is that a person like this, like Mackie 
and those who have followed him in thinking that moral judgments are intrinsically 
motivating, would (and should) find this phenomena in epistemic evaluations also. If 
Mackie and those who agree with him don’t find this position intuitively attractive, they 
should at least have some sympathy for it, since it is plausible that comparable cases can 
be made for the intrinsically motivational character of both moral and epistemic 
properties.   
If this case can be made, or if this case can be made in a manner at least as 
strongly as Mackie’s case for moral motivational internalism is, then this provides reason 
to think that that the common and philosophical concept of moral and epistemic 
properties is that they are similar in the ways that Mackie finds suggestive for his moral 
nihilism. Both are thought to be objective, and both are thought to have a motivational 
quality. Since Mackie has arguments designed to show that moral properties don’t exist, 
since nothing has these qualities, analogous arguments can be developed to try to show 
that epistemic properties don’t exist also. He offers what seem to be sufficient conditions 
to think that some judgment is never true and both moral and epistemic judgments seem 
to meet these conditions.  
Here I develop these arguments for epistemic nihilism and attempt to criticize 
them. These arguments have interesting consequences, however, since if they are sound 
or cogent, then all positive epistemic evaluations are false. So, any claim to the effect that 
one should not accept these arguments will be false, if epistemic nihilism is true. But, if 
epistemic nihilism is true, so also will any contrary claim that one should accept them. So 
if epistemic nihilism is true and our ordinary practices of epistemic evaluation are 
founded on the false presupposition that there are objective epistemic properties, then 
many of the claims made in argumentation and reasoning are uniformly false claims.  
While there will be truths about the truth values of propositions and the deductive and, 
let’s grant, even non-deductive logical relations between them, there won’t be any truths 
about how one ought to respond to them when one recognizes these truths. This might be 
the truth since, again, it’s hard to find any reasons why there must be truth-makers for 
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epistemic judgments, including “intellectual oughts.” However, as people who reason, 
accepting this position might put us in an awkward situation, since to accept it is to think 
that, really, there are no ways we ought to think, no ways how people ought to respond to 
our claims, and no ways we ever should change our beliefs. I will discuss how we might 
best respond to this possible awkwardness once I argue that Mackie’s arguments against 
moral realism suggest analogous arguments against epistemic realism. I turn to that task 
now.  
5.3. From Disagreement to Nihilism. 
To see how Mackie’s arguments for moral nihilism suggest analogous arguments for 
epistemic nihilism, we must briefly present the arguments for moral nihilism. So far, we 
have only been trying to understand his basic position, not the arguments in its favor. We 
know that Mackie thinks that moral properties, if they existed, would be objective and 
intrinsically motivating: he claims this is part of their ordinary and philosophical 
conception. Thus, the conclusion of these arguments is that there are no moral properties 
or facts or, as Mackie puts it, objective moral values. Why are we supposed to think this?  
Mackie seems to think he offers two main arguments, but he offers many more 
considerations than that in favor of his position. I will consider this first argument in great 
detail and then address the other arguments.  
 His first argument he calls “the argument from relativity,” which has come to be 
known as an argument from disagreement.21 It is a non-deductive argument for the 
conclusion that there are no moral properties. It is based on empirical observations about 
the variety of moral judgments and principles people accept, and have accepted. It might 
be presented in the following manner: 
(1) There are “radical” disagreements, or differences in belief, about which moral 
properties actions, societies, people, and so on have; these moral disagreements 
are within and between contemporary societies, as well as societies from the near 
and distant past.  
(2) If there were moral properties, then, probably, there wouldn’t be such “radical” 
disagreements about which moral properties actions, societies, people, and so on 
                                                          
21 See Mackie (Ethics 36-38). 
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have. E.g., if there were a property ‘being morally right’, then there wouldn’t be 
such radical disagreements about what is morally right. 
(3) Therefore, probably, there are no moral properties.   
This argument might be challenged in a number of ways. First I will consider some 
objections to quasi-empirical premise (1) and Mackie’s responses them. I will agree with 
Mackie in thinking that (1) true but argue that it is plausible to think that some analogous 
premise concerning epistemic properties is true also. So, I argue that there are at least 
some, perhaps many, propositions for which there are comparably intractable 
disagreements over their truth values. I will then consider some objections that moral 
realists might raise to premise (2) and some possible replies Mackie might offer. I will 
argue that someone who accepts (2) above should also accept the analogous epistemic 
premise, and that this person should conclude that, given the facts about epistemic 
disagreement, that this new argument strongly supports the conclusion that there are no 
epistemic properties.   
Thus, I argue that the considerations that might be given in favor of the argument 
above suggest an analogous argument, an argument for epistemic nihilism from 
“epistemic relativity.”  This argument might be presented in this manner: 
(A) There are “radical” disagreements or differences in belief about which epistemic 
properties beliefs and patterns of reasoning have; these epistemic disagreements 
are between contemporary people and within contemporary societies, as well as 
people and societies from the near and distant past. 
(B) If there were epistemic properties, then, probably, there wouldn’t be such 
“radical” disagreements about which epistemic properties beliefs, believers and 
patterns of reasoning have. E.g., if there were a property ‘being known’, then 
there wouldn’t be such radical disagreements about what is known. 
(C) Therefore, probably, there are no epistemic properties.   
This argument has a surprising consequence in that if it is sound, it is not true that anyone 
should believe that it is sound. After explaining this argument, I will then discuss how we 
might respond to it, whether there’s any truth to how we should respond to it, and 
whether this should influence our evaluation of Mackie’s argument for moral nihilism.  
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Before we consider this argument for epistemic nihilism, let us first consider the 
argument for moral nihilism above.  
First, however, let me note that, as Mackie and most others formulate it, the initial 
argument from moral disagreement to moral nihilism is not presented in very precise 
terms. It is, in part, due to this imprecision that an analogous argument for epistemic 
nihilism has some plausibility or, at least, is worthy of consideration. This consideration 
might, in turn, lead us to reconsider, and reformulate, arguments from moral 
disagreement in more precise terms. Let me explain this imprecision and its significance 
for the arguments.  
While everyone should all agree that there is some moral disagreement, Mackie 
seems to think that there is a great breath of disagreement, i.e., much disagreement about 
many kinds of issues and disagreement about many moral claims at all levels of 
generality and particularity. He also seems to think there is great depth to such 
disagreements: it’s not that most people accept similar moral principles, but disagree on 
the relevant non-moral facts. The disagreement is such that, even if nearly everyone 
agreed on the non-moral facts, there would still be a great breadth of disagreement.  
It is not easy to measure the breadth and depth of moral disagreement. It is not 
easy to measure the breath and depth of moral agreement either. And it’s not easy to 
measure the breadth and depth of epistemic disagreements. Given this, it is hard to tell if 
disagreements about epistemic matters are as wide or as deep as disagreements about 
moral matters. For this reason, it might be easy to doubt that the arguments for moral and 
epistemic nihilisms would be strongly analogous. I concede this, but believe that, 
nevertheless, since there are at least some epistemic disagreements that seem as 
intractable as some moral disagreements, this is enough to make the issue worth 
exploring. This exploration, I hope, should at least force us to recognize that more work 
could be done to formulate arguments for moral nihilism in a more precise manner, in 
terms of being more careful about what exactly the alleged data concerning moral 
disagreement is.  
Besides this fruitful upshot for ethics, questions about epistemic disagreement are 
independently interesting: given that there are some disagreements about epistemic 
evaluations – both particular evaluations and in terms of moral general principles – what 
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explains this? E.g., do global epistemological skeptics truly see that the standards for 
knowledge are never met? Or do non-skeptics see the truth about knowledge? This is just 
one example, but it raises interesting questions: if the skeptics are right, do they have a 
kind of “philosophical perception” that enables them to see truths that few others can? Or 
does the fact that things seem to them this way explained by factors other than 
“philosophical perception,” e.g., temperament, influences of their teachers and peers, 
psychological gratification from holding perverse views, or what? Insofar as there are, at 
least, some seemingly deep disagreements about some epistemic judgments, this is 
enough to raise our interests. And since there has been much discussion of this kind of 
issue in ethics, perhaps thinking through some of the parallels will be useful for both 
fields.  
Let us now return to the argument from moral disagreement, articulated above. 
First, regarding premise (1), one might ask what Mackie means by “radical,” since he 
does not explain this and one might doubt that there is such radical disagreement. At least 
in contemporary society, while we disagree about many complicated moral issues, we 
agree in a lot of our moral judgments also. E.g., there is little disagreement about the 
moral status of torturing babies for fun, raping three year old girls, abusing nursing home 
residents, and husbands’ killing their pregnant young wives. There is “radical” agreement 
that all these actions are wrong and that the people who do them are bad: anyone who 
seriously disagrees with any of these judgments is considered to be “beyond the pale.” 
We don’t know what Mackie means by “radical,” but this at least suggests that 
disagreement is not as great as he thinks it is.   
Perhaps he would argue that, at some time in history, some societies made the 
morally opposite evaluations of all these actions, but we would need to learn much more 
about these societies to be confident that he is right and these cases help make his point.  
Mackie, might, however concede that there is “radical” agreement about many issues, but 
note that there is still radical disagreement about many other moral judgments, say those 
involving issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and whether the rich are obligated to help 
the poor. And this seems to true: there is a lot of disagreement about many aspects of 
these complicated moral issues.  
 153 
Someone might respond that resolving these issues depends on understanding 
complicated non-moral information and knowing the relevant non-moral facts, that too 
few people possess this knowledge, and this is why there is such disagreement. This is a 
decent reply, but Mackie would respond that sometimes more non-moral information 
results in agreement, but that in other cases moral disagreement survives between parties 
even when they are fully, or equally, informed on and agree about the non-moral facts.   
He might argue that this disagreement is sometimes due to basic disagreement 
about general moral principles, for examples, such as whether killing is worse than letting 
die (and if there is a genuine moral distinction to be made between those actions), how 
much we are obligated to help others (if at all), what the value of humans’ lives depends 
on, and whether (and to what extent) we might give moral preference to our friends’ and 
family’s interests over those of strangers. And there are disagreements about which (if 
any) ethical theory is correct and which methods are the best to use in thinking about 
moral matters. So there are moral-theoretical disagreements to account for; all moral 
disagreements are not due to empirical disagreements.   
Mackie might also might note that, as a matter of moral psychology, moral 
judgments are typically not made by explicit reasoning from moral principles in light of 
judgments about the non-moral facts: he writes, “‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an 
initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgments 
than ‘reason.’”22 And it seems that, for many moral propositions – at all levels of 
particularity and generality, abstractness and concreteness –one person (or a society) just 
“sees” that they are true, while another person (or a society) just “sees” that they are 
false.  This is true regardless of whatever moral principles a person accepts.  
Thus, premise (1) seems secure: there is some “radical” disagreement. 
Furthermore, there is little reason to think that there could not be radical disagreement: 
maybe if everyone was more acquainted with the relevant non-moral facts all 
disagreement would go away, but it is not at all safe to suspect that that would happen. 
After all, it seems that there could easily be incompatible moral outlooks that 
fundamentally resist convergence, and there seems to be little reason why that couldn’t be 
the case. Thus, Mackie’s premise (1) seems quite plausible. We might make it more 
                                                          
22 See Mackie (Ethics 38).  
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precise by revising it to state that it applies only to a limited, but still large, class of moral 
judgments. This avoids the possible misinterpretation that Mackie thinks that nearly 
every moral judgment is highly controversial.    
5.3.1. A Case for Epistemic Disagreements. 
Before we consider Mackie’s premise (2) in his argument for moral nihilism, we should 
consider whether a premise like (1) but pertaining to epistemic evaluations can plausibly 
be developed. This is important since we will be developing an argument for epistemic 
nihilism that is structurally analogous to Mackie’s argument for moral nihilism. If moral 
disagreement is a good starting point for moral nihilism, then epistemic disagreement, if 
it exists, might be a good starting point for epistemic nihilism also. To determine whether 
there is such disagreement, we might as whether a premise like the following is true: 
(A) There are “radical” disagreements or differences in belief about which 
epistemic properties beliefs and patterns of reasoning have; these epistemic 
disagreements are between contemporary people and within contemporary 
societies, as well as people and societies from the near and distant past. 
To assess this, we need to ask whether there are and have been (and if so, to what extent) 
disagreements about what’s reasonable to believe, justifiably believed, known, or such 
that we (or someone) ought to or should believe it. We should also consider 
disagreements about whether some something is evidence for something else, or a reason 
for something else, and, if so, whether it is sufficient, or good, or conclusive, evidence or 
reason for the other thing. We can also consider whether there is disagreement about 
epistemic principles, judgments about what’s intellectually valuable, judgments about 
what kinds of beliefs we should be most confident in and the cogency of certain manners 
of reasoning. 
For many judgments that express epistemic judgments like these, it seems that 
there is great disagreement about their truth value. And this is true about judgments 
pertaining to a wide range of issues, not just a few subject matters. People often claim to 
know or reasonably believe claims made within the domains of politics, sports, religion, 
history, philosophy, dieting, cosmology, medicine, and science, to name just a few areas. 
And there are other people who will deny these knowledge claims, or affirm that the 
opposite claim is what is, in fact, known or justifiably believed.  For nearly any topic, 
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there are claims which some will affirm as reasonable but others will say are 
unreasonable.   
Disagreements between people over extended periods of time might not be the 
best examples, since one can plausibly say that each was working with such different 
information, or things seemed so different, so it might be best to work with contemporary 
disagreements where all the parties share more, if not all, information. Some respond 
that, in light of all this disagreement, we should suspend judgment on many (or all) 
propositions, or not make any epistemic evaluations about them, but, again, there would 
be serious disagreement about the truth values of that suggestion also. Some 
epistemological skeptics – contemporary and historical – might make a suggestion like 
the former, and there is disagreement about the epistemic credentials of that kind of view 
itself.   
Thus, prima facie, it appears that disagreements among epistemic judgments are 
as common as disagreements about moral judgments. This is especially true for 
philosophers, including epistemologists who, presumably, are quite well acquainted with 
what is said for, and against, various philosophical, including epistemological, claims. 
Earlier I mentioned responses to skeptical arguments as possibilities that there is some 
deep disagreements about. This case would be strong if there were more actual skeptics, 
but even among non-skeptics there is disagreement about whether there is very good 
reason to reject skepticism. Some philosophers think this, but others think that, although 
they reject skepticism, they don’t think there is particularly good reason to reject it.  
Other possible examples concern response to the internalism/externalism debates 
and the status of reliabilism. Regarding the latter, internalists think their views are 
reasonable, despite being familiar with nearly everything externalists offer as evidence in 
favor of their position, and externalists think the same about their views. Probably there 
are even “turncoats,” philosophers who have switched sides and have experienced what 
it’s like to hold either kind of position; even with these experiences, they come to regard 
one position and reasonable and the other unreasonable. These disagreements seem as 
intractable as any in ethics; perhaps these, and other philosophical examples, constitute 
disagreement of depth and breadth comparable the disagreements about moral 
evaluations and principles.  
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Like moral judgments, however, there is a core of epistemic judgments that most 
people accept and find uncontroversial, e.g., the seemingly trivial judgments that we 
know other people have minds and that we are reasonable in believing we have hands 
(for those of us who have hands). But there are some who reject the common epistemic 
judgments that most people accept, and there is a wide range of controversial cases where 
we find wide disagreement.  
Just as there are disagreements about moral principles, there seems to be 
comparable disagreement about epistemic principles also.  One commonly suggested 
principle is that, for any proposition, we should believe it only if we have good reasons 
for it.  Setting aside the controversial, and disagreement-inducing, questions of what 
“reasons” and “good reasons” are, some people accept this principle, others reject it 
completely, and others apply it for some beliefs but allow that some kinds of propositions 
are exempt from its reach.  So there is disagreement here.  A rival epistemic principle 
popular among some philosophers is that we should believe only that which is produced 
by “reliable” belief forming processes.  But there are disagreements as to whether this 
proposal has ever been stated in a satisfactory manner, and disagreements about whether 
it has (or would have) the right epistemic implications, so there are disagreements about 
whether anyone should accept it.  For many topics, there is disagreement about whether 
something is a reason pertaining to it, whether it’s a good enough reason to believe 
what’s in question, and whether some knowledge claim is, in fact, true. 
Concerning reasoning, there are disagreements about whether certain forms of 
argument are cogent or not. And there are disagreements about whether, and when, one 
should accept the logical implications of one’s own beliefs. For example, some say that 
we should respond to arguments for skepticism by claiming that since we are more 
confident that we know something than we know nothing, we should reject arguments for 
skepticism, even if the premises are ones we find attractive and can find no fault with. 
That might be a case where many would judge that we should not accept what follows 
from what we already believe. Other people might disagree and claim that we should 
“follow the argument” wherever it leads, even if that requires rejecting previously held 
beliefs. Whether, when and why we should ever change what we believe is a matter of 
considerable disagreement. 
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Thus, given all this disagreement, it seems that much can be said in defense of 
premise (A). The premise states that these disagreements are “radical” in nature and, 
while Mackie did not explain what he means by this term, it seems that epistemic 
disagreements – again, at all levels of particularity and generality – are as radical as 
moral ones.  This is especially the case if we consider skeptics, who claim that little, or 
nothing, is justifiably believed or known.   But this disagreement remains even if we 
consider the epistemic judgments of a wide range of non-skeptics.  
However, it should be noted that while there is great epistemic disagreement, just 
as there is great moral disagreement, there is also quite a lot of epistemic agreement. For 
example, most people agree, or would agree, that our ordinary empirical beliefs about 
medium sized items are justified. And there is a core of considered-reasonable beliefs 
about historical, scientific, psychological, and economic matters that most people to agree 
on, at least in contemporary American society. So, if someone were to deny some of 
these beliefs, say by becoming a serious global skeptic, they might be considered as 
beyond the epistemic pale as someone who denied that there was anything wrong with 
molesting children would be in the moral realm. The point is that, in terms of our moral 
and epistemic evaluations, there are many things we agree on, but also many things that 
we disagree on.   
If, despite the agreements we have, there also exist “radical” epistemic 
disagreements, then we are half-way to an argument for epistemic nihilism that might be 
as strong as Mackie’s argument for moral nihilism. I have argued that the suggestion that 
there is deep and wide epistemic disagreement is plausible and worthy of consideration. 
Before we consider the second premises of this argument, and the premise from the 
analogous moral argument it is parasitic on, let us consider some objections to premise 
(A). Maybe it only appears that there are epistemic disagreements, but there really are 
none. Some of these objections will be analogous to the objections to premise (1) and 
others will not.  
5.3.2. Responding to the Case for Epistemic Disagreements. 
First, someone might deny that there are epistemic disagreements by observing that 
epistemic evaluations often take the form of an “epistemic operator,” a sentential 
operator, such as “It is reasonable that”, “It is known that”, “It ought to be believed that”, 
 158 
and so on, applied to a believed sentence.23 Once this is recognized, the objector might 
claim, we see that epistemic disagreements are over the truth value of the object of the 
operator, not whether the operator “fits” the believed sentence.  If this is the case, then, 
the objector claims, the disagreements are just over the truth value of the belief in 
question, not its epistemic status, so there aren’t epistemic disagreements.  
So, for just one example, there is considerable disagreement about whether 
religious beliefs are epistemically rational. Although these disagreements are often 
public, a private example will help. Consider some philosopher who wonders if his own 
theistic belief is rational. He is on the fence: sometimes he thinks is and other times 
thinks it is not. So he is having something of an internal disagreement about whether this 
proposition is true: ‘it is epistemically rational for me to believe that God exists.’  But, 
the objector might claim, his internal disagreement is not about whether that claim is true, 
it’s just about whether God exists or not: his internal disagreement about whether it’s 
reasonable to believe that God exists is just a disagreement about whether God exists. 
The suggestion would be, in general, epistemic disagreements (internal and, more 
importantly, public) are not over the which epistemic evaluations apply to various 
propositions and believers; rather they are just over the truth values of the proposition 
that are the objects of the epistemic operators themselves.  
This thought might be motivated, in part, by the thought that, for any proposition 
p, it would odd for someone to affirm p, but fail to affirm, or even outright deny, that her 
believing p has some positive epistemic status, and vice-versa. Thus, the objector might 
claim, if someone believes p then, invariably, she is going to believe that p is justified for 
her. So once the question of whether she affirms or denies a given proposition is 
answered, so is the question about what epistemic evaluation she will give to it. So, there 
really are no epistemic disagreements, there are just disagreements about the truth values 
of the beliefs that we evaluate epistemically.   
In friendly response, I concede that this might sometimes be the case, but not 
always, for every believer and for every kind of epistemic evaluation. For it clearly seems 
that someone could believe p, but not believe that her believing p is justified for her. For 
                                                          
23 To present these operators in a more plausible manner, we would pack believers and their context in, e.g., 
“For S, in context C, it is reasonable to believe that __”. 
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example, someone might realize that he believes he has a hand, but not believe that his 
belief is justified. Or perhaps he would wind up thinking that his belief is downright 
unjustified. He might lament that fact since he realizes that he believes something that he 
thinks she ought not.  Some might think that lamentation would suggest an ‘internal” 
connect between epistemic appraisal and motivation. Or he might not be troubled by this 
at all. So this critical response to the claim that there are epistemic disagreements is 
founded in a mistake: assessments of truth (and falsity) and positive (and negative) 
epistemic evaluations can diverge.   
Possible objections to the effect of, “Worrying about an belief’s epistemic 
credentials is just to worry about its truth,” can be defused more vividly by focusing on 
third-person epistemic evaluations where, e.g., two parties disagree about whether 
something (say, a wall’s looking red) is, say, sufficient evidence for someone else’s belief 
that the wall is red, or if it is justified. Surely here we find such disagreements, in actual 
life and with “toy” philosophical examples where all and only the relevant details of the 
case are stipulated for all to see, yet disagreements remain. Evaluating cases from 
outsiders’ perspectives can make the divergence of belief (and disbelief) and positive 
(and negative) epistemic evaluations salient in a way they might not be if one reflects 
merely on one’s own beliefs and evaluations of them. Thus, objections based around 
these concerns to not show that there are no epistemic disagreements.  
 A second objection to the claim that there are epistemic disagreements is to 
respond that, although people give different epistemic evaluations to beliefs, these 
seemingly-contradictory evaluations needn’t be contradictory and so disagreements are 
merely apparent, not real. This is because, sometimes, different epistemic evaluations of 
the same proposition can all be true: e.g., for someone, p is justified, but for another 
person p is not justified, yet for another person suspending judgment is the justified 
attitude. On this response, epistemic evaluations depend on the relevant non-epistemic 
facts, and since these facts vary, the truth about which epistemic evaluations are true 
varies also.  
So, the objector urges, in disputes about whether p is justified (or has whatever 
epistemic status is in question), we need to realize that these judgments are elliptical for 
whether p is justified for S, given S’s situation. So, if someone says “p is justified,” while 
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another says in response, “No, p is not justified,” they might both be saying something 
true about themselves, or some different people or groups. And if that’s the case, then 
they are not disagreeing and so there aren’t radical disagreements.   
 This objection might apply to some cases of apparent disagreement about 
epistemic evaluations and, in effect, it dissolves the disagreement. However, this 
“dissolution” solution has the cost that, in these cases, the parties to the dispute are 
simply talking past each other. This is sometimes an accurate assessment of a case, but it 
does seem that we can sometimes directly engage each other about the epistemic merits 
of our beliefs. And this objection does not go as far to show that there are never 
disagreements about the epistemic status of a particular proposition for a subject.  
The objection seems to presuppose that we can never share evidence or provide 
others with sufficient access to our evidence so that they might make a reasonable 
assessment of whether our beliefs are reasonable or not. But this seems to be a mistake: 
different people can sometimes get the same conclusion in mind and be adequately 
acquainted with the arguments for and against that conclusion in order to make a 
judgment about whether that conclusion ought to be accepted (or whether we ought to, at 
present, suspend judgment on that that conclusion) on the given basis.  If we couldn’t 
ever do this because evidence is essentially “private,” public inquiry into the epistemic 
credentials of a belief would always be pointless since everyone would be “talking past” 
each other.  But public discussion is not always pointless; we can sometimes engage each 
other and see each others’ reasons.  But even then, we can disagree.   
Peter van Inwagen illustrates this point using philosophy as the subject matter, but 
it could be made with nearly any other field or topic, from the mundane to the esoteric.  
He asks: 
How can it be that equally intelligent and well-trained philosophers can disagree 
about the freedom of the will or nominalism or the covering-law model of 
scientific explanation when each is aware of all of the arguments and distinctions 
and other relevant considerations that the others are aware of? How . . can we 
philosophers possibly regard ourselves as justified in believing much of anything 
of philosophical significance in this embarrassing circumstance? How can I 
believe (as I do) that free will is incompatible with determinism or that unrealized 
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possibilities are not physical objects or that human beings are not four-
dimensional things extended in time as well as in space, when David Lewis--a 
philosopher of truly formidable intelligence and insight and ability--rejects these 
things I believe and is already aware of and understands perfectly every argument 
that I could produce in their defense?24  
He then immediately responds to his questions: 
Well, I do believe these things. And I believe that I am justified in believing them. 
And I am confident that I am right.  
van Inwagen’s point is he thinks we can sometimes fully share our evidence (or, at least, 
he could share his evidence with Lewis), but yet still disagree. And he thinks that, despite 
this recognized disagreement, his beliefs are still justified.  Presumably he thinks this not 
because of anything special about him (although that might be true), but because he 
thinks it’s possible for many people’s beliefs in such circumstances to be justified: 
recognized disagreement does not, in general, preclude justification.  
Others will surely disagree with him on that point, and argue that in these cases 
that we should suspend judgment since these are cases where the evidence is about equal 
in strength for incompatible propositions. Some might fully understand that perspective, 
but yet agree with van Inwagen because they just don’t “see” why they ought to suspend 
judgment in these cases. So there again would be disagreement, even when there is 
shared understanding of everything that might be offered in defense of each perspective.  
Some of this understanding might be tacit, and unable to be articulated, due to 
what we might call our different “frames of mind” around the evidence. van Inwagen 
expresses this idea as some “sort of philosophical insight” that he has, but Lewis lacks 
(but Lewis might have appealed to his own philosophical insights that, for all his merits, 
is denied to van Inwagen). Perhaps this “frame” should be considered part of one’s 
evidence itself, and an important question is whether any “frames” are objectively better 
or worse than others and, if so, why. However, we ordinarily do not think that this 
“framing” prevents us from pursuing, together, the question of what we ought to think 
about something, or whether someone knows something, or whether any other epistemic 
evaluation applies in some case. We don’t think that even though we each have different 
                                                          
24 See van Inwagen (“Quam Dilecta” 41-42).  
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minds and see things in slightly different ways, these differences always prevent us from 
assessing others’ reasons. So, again, these considerations do not show that there are no 
epistemic disagreements.  
Some might respond to the case for epistemic disagreement by arguing that 
although there is radical disagreement about some particular epistemic judgments, most 
people do accept the same objective epistemic principles. This person might claim that 
most people accept, e.g., that they should believe what, and only what, is supported by 
the evidence, but then claim that there are disagreements about what the evidence is and 
that this is the basis of the disagreement.  So, this objector claims that if people were to 
see things in light of the epistemic principles that they all accept, there would be far less 
disagreement.  This response is intended to be analogous to the response to moral 
disagreement that involves claiming that all, or many, moral disagreements are due to 
disagreements about the non-moral facts and that if these were corrected moral 
disagreement would fade.  
But this response for the epistemic case is inadequate and, in fact, supports the 
epistemic nihilist’s position. This is because part of his case involves the observation that 
that there often are disagreements about what the evidence is, what it is evidence for, how 
strong the evidence is, what would defeat the evidence, and so on. And the nihilist is 
asking what explains these disagreements, in addition to what explains disagreements 
over epistemic principles. And the empirical suggestion that everyone accepts 
evidentialism, or any other particular epistemic principle, is just empirically false. At 
best, most people are selective evidentialists, demanding evidence and reasons for some 
kinds of beliefs and ignoring it for other kinds. So this response to the claim that there are 
epistemic disagreements fails. The case for epistemic disagreement can be made with 
disagreements about particular epistemic judgments as well as fully general epistemic 
principles.  
A related response to the claim that there is epistemic disagreement is to argue 
that there is such disagreement, but that it’s based on surface considerations that could be 
cleared up. So, it might be claimed that there would be less epistemic disagreement if 
people had more information, or the same information. This might be true, depending on 
what is meant by “having more information.” That phrase has to be understood in a non-
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epistemic manner: it can’t be that understood as the suggestion that people would agree 
more on epistemic matters if they all believed what they ought and reasoned the way they 
should.  While an epistemic realist thinks that that is true (e.g., in cases where people 
have very similar evidence, if they all believed what they ought, then they would all 
accept the same epistemic evaluation), but since the ultimate question here is whether 
there is any truth to the notion of “believing how one ought to,” this response will not do 
for the epistemic nihilist. It assumes that there are true epistemic evaluations, which is 
what’s at issue.  
If the suggestion is that there would be less epistemic disagreement if people had 
more of the same beliefs, this would be trivially true: there is disagreement only when 
people do not agree on the same beliefs, or enough of them. If the suggestion is that there 
would be less disagreement if everyone believed the truth about whatever propositions 
they considered, then, yes, there would be less disagreement about many propositions 
since, again, attitudes toward many propositions would be the same.  Would they agree 
on epistemic evaluations? If there are truths about them, then they would.25 So this 
response to disagreements about epistemic evaluations comes down to “there is such 
disagreement about which epistemic evaluations are the correct ones because too few 
people, if any, are making true epistemic evaluations.”   
This response to the nihilist again merely assumes that there are such truths.  This 
is illegitimate. The nihilist tries to use disagreement as a basis for thinking that there are 
no epistemic truths. This realist response concedes that there is disagreement, but that 
there wouldn’t be if everyone believed the truth about what ought to be believed (is 
justified, is known, etc.) by them, in their context.  But the nihilist is asking what explains 
the fact that there is such disagreement about epistemic evaluations: this disagreement 
cannot be explained by the claim that some of them are making incorrect evaluations 
since the question is whether any such evaluations are correct in the first place.  
Thus, it seems that premise (B) above is true: there are “radical” disagreements, 
or differences in belief, about which epistemic properties beliefs and patterns of 
reasoning have.  So there is disagreement in ethics and epistemology about particular 
                                                          
25 And they might agree that they are in an epistemically sorry position since they are believing the truth 
about any proposition they consider, even when they ought not believe the truth (say, because their 
evidence does not support belief).   
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judgments and general principles. Mackie claims that this disagreement is the basis of a 
strong argument for moral nihilism. I will argue that if it is, it is also the basis for a strong 
argument for epistemic nihilism also.  
5.3.3. Explaining Moral Disagreements. 
We have agreed with Mackie that there are such radical differences in people’s moral 
judgments, and I have argued that the same is true of epistemic judgments.  
The question for us now is whether we might argue, in at least equally plausible 
ways, from these facts about disagreements to the absence of any moral properties and to 
the absence of epistemic properties. Of course, one might think that Mackie’s argument 
from moral disagreement to moral nihilism is weak and so, probably, also think that any 
analogous argument for epistemic nihilism is weak also. Or one might think that this sort 
of argument would be plausible in the moral case, but not in the epistemic case; this is 
probably what Mackie would have thought. Or one might think that both kinds of 
arguments are equally strong and so that moral and epistemic evaluations are never true.   
As I discussed above, it is not easy to compare the strength of these arguments 
since it is not easy to determine, in any precise manner, how comparable moral and 
epistemic disagreement are in their depth and breadth.  However, I will argue that, 
especially given this imprecision, it is plausible to think that Mackie-style arguments 
from disagreement for moral and epistemic nihilisms are comparable in strength. This is 
because the same considerations given against moral properties can plausibly be given 
against epistemic ones. Thus, if these considerations do not amount to a successful case 
against epistemic properties, they do not amount to a successful case against moral 
properties either. If this is mistaken, my discussion at least suggests that much more work 
would need to be done by the advocate of an argument from moral disagreement to show 
that the arguments are not comparable. This moral nihilist would have to make his or her 
argument more precise, in its estimation of the nature of moral disagreement, to show that 
there is not comparable epistemic disagreement. Again, my hope is that discussion of 
epistemic disagreements might help illuminate the nature of moral disagreements.  
Let us now consider the premise that Mackie combines with his observations 
about moral disagreement to reach his nihilistic conclusion. Mackie suggests that, 
“radical differences between first-order moral judgments make it difficult to treat those 
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judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.”26 He claims that if there were moral 
properties, then, probably, there wouldn’t be such “radical” disagreements about which 
moral properties things have: whether the war is just or not, whether some soldier 
deserves such a harsh punishment, and so on. He thinks that such disagreement is 
evidence that there are no moral properties: if there were such properties, more people 
would “track” them. More people would perceive moral properties and perceptions of 
them would guide their thinking, feelings and actions. These ideas are expressed in 
premise (2) above.  
Mackie does not offer much explicit in favor of this premise. He seems to assume 
that all properties would be equally salient, or that the conception of moral properties is 
that they are equally salient to everyone. But these are only assumptions and, perhaps, 
dogmas of some moral traditions (but not others). And this assumption, that if there were 
moral properties more people would perceive them, can be denied. If there are moral 
properties, it is not obvious why they would have to be equally salient to everyone, or 
nearly everyone.27 
Perhaps moral properties can be seen clearly only by those who have undergone 
decades of philosophical or moral training. Perhaps this is not quite right, but on the right 
track in that moral properties can be seen more clearly, typically, only by those who have 
had some training in logic and acquaintance with ethical theories and the kind of 
reasoning taught in philosophy courses. Training in discerning what non-moral 
considerations are, and are not, relevant to ethical issues often helps people think about 
ethics, so maybe that training helps people see moral properties. A better recognition of 
the possible emotional, visceral and financial and political-induced psychological barriers 
to better moral thinking – e.g., arrogance, smugness, depression, apathy, being dogmatic, 
having one’s job depend on the moral positions one takes, and so on – can be helpful also 
                                                          
26 See Mackie (Ethics 36).  
27 Perhaps considerations about “fairness” would motivate the idea that moral (and epistemic) properties are 
equally salient: if it is “fair” to evaluate people morally, then they must have epistemic access to the moral 
status of their acts, intentions, characters, etc. If they do not have such access, then negative evaluations are 
unfair because the people could not have realized they were doing something wrong or being bad in some 
way and corrected themselves. But moral and evaluations are fair, so people do have such access.  This 
kind of argument could be developed in many ways (and these notions of “fairness,” “access” and the 
relevant sense of “could” would have to be explained), but however it is developed it is not clear how it 
could in any way support moral nihilism since it, ultimately, seems to be an argument for objective moral 
properties that all have access to. 
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in understanding why people sometimes disagree on moral matters. And this recognition 
might again help us see what’s right and wrong, good and bad, and so on.  
Perhaps moral properties can be seen more clearly only when one has had 
traumatic personal experiences of (what many would call) evil, either as a victim or as a 
witness. And perhaps often one has to have personally done something seriously wrong 
to better see the nature of morality (the story of David and Bathsheba comes to mind 
here): perhaps doing evil can put one in a better position to see evil. On the other hand, 
perhaps experiencing doing something courageous or compassionate has a similar effect 
in terms of improving one’s moral perceptions. There is no reason to assume that one’s 
emotions cannot ever improve one’s moral beliefs or reasoning abilities; one’s moral 
outlook is more than just the moral propositions and arguments one accepts.  
Thus, there are responses to Mackie’s assumption that moral properties would be 
more visible to all and that there would be more agreement. There are reasons to doubt 
his premise (2), especially since little positive was said in its favor. Mackie would likely 
reply, however, that even when actual people are, what we might call, “improved”28 in 
nearly every non-moral way we can think of (especially in terms of acquiring the relevant 
non-moral information), some (albeit fewer) moral disagreements still remain. And he 
would wonder what explains that: why is it that people who agree on all the non-moral 
facts can still disagree about the final moral evaluation of a case?  He would again argue 
that these especially cases suggest that there are no genuine moral properties and so the 
nature of morality must be understood in a nihilistic manner. The plausibility of such an 
argument might depend on how many deep moral disagreements remained after these 
various non-moral improvements.  
A realist can respond. One less than ideal response is to insist that, in these cases, 
what we need is yet still more non-moral improvements in people: once get more 
empirical information, take more logic courses, and watch more tragic documentaries to 
                                                          
28 My main argument of this chapter would imply that, on Mackie’s view, judgments that someone has 
“improved” (or regressed) in these ways are, ultimately, false, or rest on false presuppositions. One could 
stipulate a set of ideal non-moral conditions for moral thinking and say that as one approaches those 
conditions on is “improving.”  Mackie’s view could allow that. But it could not allow any truth to the 
judgment that one should improve or should try to move toward those standards.  And, of course, any 
thought to the effect of “If I meet these standards my moral thinking is likely to improve, i.e., I will more 
likely discern what I am supposed to do,” implies that there is something you are supposed to do, which 
Mackie argues is false.  
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cultivate their sympathies, they will finally agree. While this might be true (and we might 
hope it is), one risk is that the realist will be painting a picture of possible persons who 
would have exactly the same experiences, beliefs, feelings and patterns of reasoning. And 
if they really are exactly alike in all ways (except being in different possible worlds), it’s 
not at all surprising that they would agree on moral matters.   
So this response, that people would agree if they were (nearly) exactly alike, does 
not address disagreement as it stands among actual people. And it also only expresses a 
mere hope that people would agree were these non-moral changes to happen. But it’s 
surely possible that disagreements would remain: it’s surely possible that people could 
have fundamentally different moral outlooks that resist convergence even with empirical 
agreement. Thus, to respond to Mackie, the realist needs to allow that people can be 
maximally informed and “improved” in non-moral ways (yet not so much that they are 
not identical in all beliefs, feelings, perceptions, etc.), but still allow the possibility that 
they will still disagree morally even after that.   
To this possible case, the realist might only be able to say that, for some moral 
issues, some people just aren’t well placed to see the true answers to some moral 
questions: they just have an undeveloped or warped moral sense or way of seeing things 
morally. Some people just can’t “see” mathematical or logical truths, and perhaps there 
are people who just can’t see moral truths (or epistemic truths either). Perhaps this is 
because of emotional issues, or they deeply desire that some moral truth be false, or 
somehow they just aren’t able to process all the relevant information, or for some other 
reason they are “blind” to some moral truths. So, realists might claim that in some cases 
of moral disagreement, something (perhaps unidentifiable and unable to be altered) 
accounts for some party (or all parties) failing to see the truth of the moral matters. But, 
in these cases, if there is a moral truth (which there might not always be if, due to 
vagueness, truth-value gaps are allowed in the moral universe), the fault is with those 
trying to see it, not with moral reality itself.   
So the realist has a response to understand what’s going on in some cases of 
fundamental moral disagreement: sometimes people just fail to see what’s really there, 
morally. The question is whether this response is better than the nihilists’ response, viz. 
that these cases support the hypothesis that there is nothing, morally, to be seen and 
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moral experience really consists in people understandably “seeing” things that really 
aren’t there. While Mackie clearly thinks the nihilistic explanation is the better one, his 
reasons for thinking this are not as explicit as they could be. To raise an epistemological 
issue, he also surely does not make it clear why one should accept what one regards as a 
better explanation either. Later I will try to use that fact to undermine Mackie’s 
arguments for moral nihilism.  
5.3.4. Explaining Epistemic Disagreements. 
To help assess the plausibility of the realists’ final response to moral disagreement, we 
might consider how it fares in response to epistemic disagreement. If analogous debate 
about what best explains epistemic disagreement leads a similar response and this 
response is plausible, this suggests that it might be an acceptable response in the moral 
case also. If in epistemic cases it is more reasonable to think that some people just fail to 
see the truth about which epistemic evaluation fits a particular belief and believer, or that  
one epistemically-ought to have evidence for one’s beliefs, then this response might not 
be as unpalatable in the moral case as some might think it is. If this is so, then realist has 
an adequate response to Mackie’s argument from disagreement. And if this is so, then 
Mackie’s argument for moral nihilism from moral disagreement is not so strong. On the 
other hand, if, for independent reasons, an error-theoretic explanation of epistemic 
disagreement is a good one and ought to be accepted instead of the realistic explanation, 
this might buttress an error theoretic explanation of moral disagreement also. 
I have argued that, like disagreement about morality, there is at least some radical 
disagreement about what’s rational, justified, known, how one ought to reason, what is 
good and valuable from the intellectual point of view, and so on.29 Like Mackie, we can 
ask what explains this: why isn’t there more agreement about particular and general 
epistemic evaluations and principles, principles of reasoning, intellectual goals and 
                                                          
29 Mackie states that “disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that 
there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about.  But such scientific 
disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence.” 
See Mackie (Ethics 36).  This pushes scientific disagreement to epistemic disagreements about whether 
some inference is “speculative” or whether a hypothesis is based on “inadequate evidence” or not.  And 
here we can ask what explains these disagreements: does “the fabric of the world” include that an inference 
is “speculative,” or that a hypothesis is based on “inadequate evidence,” and some just fail to see this?  And 
is “seeing” that an inference is speculative or a hypothesis based on inadequate evidence supposed to 
motivate one to change one’s beliefs?  These are important questions that Mackie overlooked.  
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values, and so on? If there are truths about such matters, why don’t more people “see” 
them? The epistemic nihilist’s view is that there is such disagreement, such differences in 
what people “see,” because there are no epistemic properties for people to perceive: since 
there are no such properties to guide or restrain people’s thinking, their evaluations 
diverge greatly. This is why people disagree about what ought to be believed, what is 
known, whether we should reason in various ways, and so on.  
This nihilistic response contrasts with the realist hypothesis that epistemic 
judgments, in Mackie’s words, “express perceptions, most [or, at least, some] of them 
seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective [epistemic] values,”30 or properties.  
The realist claims that there are, or could be, cases where all parties are maximally 
informed on the relevant non-epistemic information, but some people see the truth about 
the epistemic status of a belief (for a person, in a context) and others simply do not (or 
everyone fails to see it). So, to put the matter in a concrete manner, two people can agree 
about all the non-epistemic factors of a case, but disagree about the epistemic evaluation 
that applies to the case, and what explains this is that one party “sees” the epistemic truth 
while the other, for all her merits, does not.  
The epistemic nihilist claims that this is not the best explanation of why there is 
epistemic disagreement. The nihilist would argue that better explanations of this 
disagreement imply that this “epistemically realist” hypothesis is false. This nihilist 
claims that if there were epistemic properties, then more people would see when these 
properties are instantiated and there would be less disagreement about them.  But since 
there is such disagreement, the nihilist concludes that there are no such properties.  
Thus, this nihilist would be arguing for this conclusion from premise (A), 
articulated above and concerning epistemic disagreement, and this premise, the epistemic 
analogue to (2) above: 
(B) If there were epistemic properties, then there wouldn’t be such “radical” 
disagreements about which epistemic properties beliefs, believers and patterns 
of reasoning have.  
From (B) and (A) we can infer, albeit non-deductively, that there are no epistemic 
properties, just as we could infer that there are no moral properties from (1) and (2).   
                                                          
30 See Mackie (Ethics 37).  
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Should we, or anyone, accept premise (B), and thus the conclusion that there are 
no epistemic properties? Premise (B) seem to be rooted in the assumptions motivating 
(2), viz. that all properties are equally salient, or that epistemic properties would be 
among the salient properties. Again, this assumption can be denied, and we can ask why 
we should accept it since it’s not at all clear why we should: it’s not at all clear why 
epistemic properties, if they exist, would be such that (nearly) everyone would see them.  
But those who find (B) unconvincing, especially since it seems that few reasons 
might be given in its behalf, will likely also find its moral analogue, premise (2), 
unconvincing, and for similar reasons: why assume that everyone would see moral reality 
with equally clear vision?  For those who haven’t seen what they regard as a good answer 
to this question, neither of the arguments for nihilism from moral or epistemic 
disagreement will be convincing. They will think that there are objective moral and 
epistemic properties but that not everyone sees them accurately. They might also think 
that nobody has given much in the way of a good reason to doubt this.  
5.4. Accepting and Rejecting Epistemic Nihilism. 
My target, however, is a philosopher who thinks that Mackie’s argument from moral 
disagreement to moral nihilism as a strong argument. I claim that this moral nihilist 
should also see the analogous argument from epistemic disagreement to epistemic 
nihilism as strong also. This is because epistemic judgments seem to have the features of 
moral judgments that the Mackian thinks are relevant to making the case for moral 
nihilism: epistemic judgments appear to be as “objective” and “motivating” as many 
moral judgments are. Thus, the epistemic argument might be as strong as the moral 
argument: I say “as strong” because it is hard to tell how strong the moral argument is, 
given our imprecise understanding of the breadth and depth of moral disagreement.   
So, those who think the moral argument is strong should thereby think the same 
about the epistemic argument, and those who think the epistemic argument is weak 
should thereby think that the moral argument is weak also. I claim that someone who is a 
moral nihilist because of a Mackie-style argument from disagreement should also be an 
epistemic nihilist. This is because the features about moral judgments that are presented 
as evidence against moral realism (and in favor of nihilism) apply to epistemic judgments 
also. The analogy is not perfect, but it is plausible to think that there are some strong 
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similarities, especially since it seems as plausible to think that there is some intractable 
epistemic disagreement as it is plausible to think that there is some intractable moral 
disagreement. Those who deny this have their important work cut out for them, in terms 
of showing in a precise way that the depth and breadth of moral and epistemic 
disagreements are not comparable.  
The Mackian moral nihilist can either agree or disagree with that claim about 
what he should believe about moral and epistemic nihilisms. However, neither response 
helps his position. First, consider the ways he might agree. This response will consider a 
few possible branches in reasoning. First, he might agree that moral and epistemic 
properties are similar in the ways that Mackie detailed as interesting about moral 
properties.  But then, second, if he agrees that, in light of this similarity, he is justified in 
accepting epistemic nihilism, he has said something which, if epistemic nihilism is true, 
is false. If epistemic nihilism is true, then it’s not true that any view is justified: all 
positive epistemic evaluations are false because there are no epistemic properties to make 
them true.  On epistemic nihilism, people have their beliefs, but there is no truth to claims 
that some beliefs are epistemically better than others.  
Of course, some beliefs will be true, or perhaps even probably true (in various 
senses, and given logical relations to other propositions), or meet some other 
conventional epistemic standards, but it will not be true that we ought to have true 
beliefs, or should believe what’s probably true, or that our beliefs should meet any of 
these standards in the first place. These assumptions seem to be based on there being 
objective epistemic values, and nihilism says there are none. Just as there is no moral 
goodness, badness, and better and worse-ness, nothing that morally ought to be, there’s 
objectively good, bad, and ought be the case in the realm of belief and reasoning either.  
This is a surprising view, since, among other implications, it that implies that it’s 
not true that anyone should believe it or that it is ever justifiably or rationally believed. It 
might be true, but insofar as we have reasons to think that epistemic judgments are 
sometimes true, i.e., that an epistemically realistic theory better captures more of what 
reasonably seems correct about the nature of epistemic evaluations, this provides reasons 
to reject epistemic nihilism. The mere fact that epistemic nihilism might be true and that 
it implies that our reasons are no good is no threat to the quality of our reasons now, 
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given our current evidence. We already know that if it’s true, then the common realistic 
meta-epistemology is mistaken. However, if we don’t have good reason to think it’s true, 
then we don’t have good reason to doubt that epistemic judgments are sometimes true.  
If a moral nihilist were to accept epistemic nihilism, he would be accepting a view 
that implies that it’s not true that anyone should accept moral nihilism. This would put 
him in a very odd and, perhaps, an epistemically self-undermining position, since if he 
were to tell himself the truth about what he thinks, he would say would be that he 
believes moral nihilism to be true, but that it’s not true that he believes it reasonably. He 
would also say that if he were to tell anyone else that they should believe it (say, instead 
of realism) he would be saying something false also. But perhaps these would all seem 
strange only if one thought that, except in certain circumstances, one should be truthful 
and one should believe what, and only what, is reasonable. But epistemic nihilism implies 
that there is no truth to those common epistemic assumptions: are all in massive error but, 
interestingly, it’s not true that we should do anything about it about it or that we should 
rethink our views.   
Thus, it appears that accepting epistemic nihilism, especially in clear view of its 
implication, leads one to a bizarre position that either undermines its own epistemic status 
or yields a highly non-standard epistemic view. If epistemic nihilism is true, then it is not 
justified or reasonable or ought to be held, and that’s what a truthful advocate of the 
position would say. At the very least, the position would be highly at odds with common, 
realist assumptions about the nature of reasoning and rational belief: these might be 
mistaken, but the mere fact that epistemic nihilism implies that they are false is not a 
good reason to reject these assumptions, especially since much can said in their favor. 
One could deny these assumptions and claim that these epistemic value assumptions are 
not made true by anything objective, but rather that they are, as Mackie thought about 
moral values, “constituted by our choosing or deciding to think in a certain way,”31 or are 
“simply attitudes and policies”32 with regard to belief, and nothing more.   
Perhaps that’s true. But if that is the way the epistemic world is, then it’s not true 
that anyone (especially anyone who isn’t Mackie) should accept Mackie’s epistemic 
                                                          
31 See Mackie (Ethics 30).  
32 See Mackie (Ethics 16). 
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standards and what he thought was required by them. He apparently thought moral 
realism provides an inferior explanation of moral experience and so concluded that he 
shouldn’t accept it, or neither should anyone else who carefully looked at the arguments 
against it. But if epistemic nihilism is true, someone could just “choose” or “decide”33 to 
accept different epistemic standards and perhaps think that inferior explanations should 
be accepted, since they are the justified ones; on nihilism, neither epistemic outlook is 
any better or worse than the other.  
This is very hard to believe. And it seems that Mackie didn’t believe it either. He 
said about his moral error theory that it 
goes against assumptions ingrained in our thought and built into some of the ways 
in which language is used, . . it conflicts with what is sometimes called common 
sense, [and therefore] it needs very solid support.  It is not something we can 
accept lightly or casually and then quietly pass on.  If we are to adopt this view, 
we must argue explicitly for it.34  
He might have thought that these statements (and the intellectual principles that might be 
developed from them) were merely his own intellectual preferences, but it doesn’t seem 
like that.  He seems to think that they were objective truths, and other epistemic nihilists 
think that also. They think that whoever rejects these intellectual values is failing to see 
something that is really there: it’s objectively true that counterintuitive ideas with 
startling implications must be argued for and need to be defended, not merely assumed, 
and that people who reject this standard are objectively intellectual inferior.35  
But if this is true then epistemic nihilism is false, and the argument for it is no 
good. And if it’s reasonable to think that there are ways we ought to reason and believe 
(as I have argued earlier), then this provides reasons to reject the argument as unsound. 
We should reject it at premise (B), the claim that, if there are epistemic properties, they 
are equally salient to all. But if premise (B) is false, then it’s not clear why the moral 
premise (2) – which asserts that moral properties are salient to all (or many) – is not false 
                                                          
33 To avoid worries related to doxastic voluntarism, this point could be made by just noting that if someone 
has standards that don’t jibe with anything Mackie says, it’s not true that these standards should change. 
34 See Mackie (Ethics 35).  
35 Something like this might also be true for some people who do not accept (what they take to be) the best 
explanation of some phenomena. As I noted earlier, Mackie seems to think that people should accept what 
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also. And if that’s so, then the argument for moral nihilism from diversity is no good 
either.  
Thus, if a Mackie-style moral nihilist accepts epistemic nihilism, then he adopts a 
position that implies it’s not true that he should accept moral nihilism, as well as other 
unattractive implications that many would regard as false.  But if he rejects the argument 
for epistemic nihilism because he rejects premise (B), then it would seem he also has to 
reject his premise (2) in the argument for moral nihilism. At least, if we should be 
consistent (and it seems that sometimes we should), then he should reject (2), or revise 
the premise to eliminate the inconsistency. But if he rejects (2), then he rejects his 
argument from moral disagreement to moral nihilism. Thus, he is no longer a moral 
nihilist (or, at, least, not for this reason). If he thinks that he should revise (2), then, 
apparently, he thinks that there are objective epistemic requirements. And if thinks that, 
it’s hard to see why he couldn’t also think that there are objective moral requirements 
also since they seem equally mysterious from an ontological point of view. Whichever 
way the reasoning goes, it does not bode well for the arguments for moral or epistemic 
nihilisms. 
 Let us briefly return to our possible options of response, which can be addressed 
more quickly in light of the discussion above. A moral nihilist might respond to my 
arguments with the claim that moral and epistemic properties are not similar in the ways 
that Mackie detailed as interesting about moral properties, or that there is some relevant 
difference that I have overlooked.  From this point, the nihilist could argue that Mackie’s 
major premises yield no implications about the nature of epistemic properties or facts 
because of these differences in the kinds of judgments. This moral nihilist would then 
likely think that, were I to become aware of these claims and could find no fault in them, 
then my claim that Mackie’s case for moral nihilism suggests an epistemic nihilism also 
would be unjustified, and one that I ought not hold.   
However, this response would seem to ultimately presuppose that there are 
objective epistemic principles about epistemic evaluations and how we ought to reason 
and that those who disagree, or fail to see these principles, are simply blind to them.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
they take to be the best explanations; this seems to be his reason for accepting moral nihilism, since he 
argues it’s a better explanation of disagreement than realism.  
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Here the relevant principle would be, very roughly stated, that if someone believes p for 
certain reasons and so thinks he is justified in believing p, but then comes to believe that 
these reasons are not strong (and has no response to these reasons), then that someone’s 
believing p is no longer be justified and he should no longer be confident that p is true. 
But if there can be truths like this, truths about what beliefs and attitudes people ought to 
have and how they should change in response to new information, it would seem that 
there can also be comparable truths about morality.  
So this moral nihilist’s response might undermine the arguments this moral 
nihilist accepts as the basis of his position. The response presupposes basic normative 
truths about reasoning and justified belief, but if one’s metaphysics allows for this kind of 
normative truths, then that metaphysic would allow for moral truths also. If the epistemic 
nihilist concedes that, on his view, there are no truths about how he should reason, then 
we can rightly ask this nihilist why we should accept his reasoning in favor of his 
position. For those who have reasons to think that epistemic evaluations are sometimes 
true, they have reasons to think that the nihilistic position is mistaken. The fact that it 
entails the falsity of their view makes no difference, unless there are stronger reasons to 
believe nihilism than deny it. I have argued that there are no such reasons; furthermore, 
its not clear how there could be such reasons, since epistemic nihilism suggests such a 
bizarre view of reasons such that there never are ways anyone ought to reason about such 
matters. 
My arguments might also send a moral nihilist back to the drawing board to 
develop less sweeping arguments than Mackie’s which would catch only moral values 
and leave epistemic values as objective properties. But, again, if the nihilist thinks that he 
should do this (or that it is bad for him to accept a position but on the basis of an 
argument that he now views as no good, because his view is not unjustified), then he must 
either understand these evaluative notions in objective terms or subjective terms. But if 
there are objective values here, it’s not clear why there couldn’t be objective values in the 
moral realm also, or why this couldn’t be objective true: if you believe there are objective 
epistemic values (and you should), then you should believe there are objective moral 
values also.  
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If these values are merely subjective, it’s not clear why anyone else should care 
about them since it’s just someone’s idiosyncratic quirk that he doesn’t like believing 
things without arguments that he doesn’t feel good about any more.  But that’s his 
problem, not ours, an epistemic nihilist might think, since he thinks that any standards are 
as good as any other, since none are objectively good.  However, epistemic realists, and 
even most moral irrealists, disagree with that evaluation.   
 Thus, in conclusion, I have argued that if the argument for moral nihilism from 
(1) and (2) above is a strong argument, then the argument for epistemic nihilism from (A) 
and (B) is strong also. I have tried to argue that this argument for epistemic nihilism is 
not strong, and that I suspect that most moral nihilists would agree. They would reject 
moral nihilism in light of its bizarre and, especially, self-undermining epistemic 
implications; I have argued that nearly anyone should think that it should be rejected 
because of these implications, which are unreasonable, given what else they reasonably 
believe. It should also be rejected because its premise (B) is false: it seems that some 
people can sometimes see the epistemic truth while others cannot.  Denials of this – that 
either that all epistemic evaluations are true, or that none are – lead to absurdities which 
few even moral antirealists are apt to accept. However, if some people have better 
“epistemic vision,” and moral irrealists can concede this, then this opens the door to some 
people having better “moral vision.” And this conclusion effectively undercuts Mackie’s 
argument for moral nihilism from moral disagreement. 
5.5. Mackie’s other Arguments for Moral Nihilism. 
The other considerations Mackie presents in favor of moral nihilism can be presented in a 
much briefer manner. This is because these considerations are, for his part, often only 
merely suggested, not fully developed or defended. However, for each suggestion 
intended to help show that there are no moral properties, we see that analogous 
suggestions can plausibly be given to try to show that there are no epistemic properties 
either.  These suggestions are not fully developed, but they could be. We have seen the 
bizarre consequences that follow from there being no epistemic properties, or follow 
from thinking that, e.g., that there’s nothing that ever ought to be believed (including that 
claim itself).  Hopefully these consequences go to show that the position that there are no 
epistemic properties is false and ought to be rejected. But since epistemic nihilism 
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follows from the same considerations Mackie gives for moral nihilism, this goes to show 
that the assorted considerations that Mackie offers in favor of moral nihilism are not 
compelling, or should not be compelling.  
 Second to his argument from moral disagreement, Mackie has what he calls “the 
argument from queerness.” This argument is actually a number of arguments along both 
metaphysical and epistemological lines, and their basis is this assertion: 
If there were [moral] objective values, they would be entities or qualities or 
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the 
universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by 
some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of knowing everything else.36   
Mackie does not state the premises that need to be added to these assertions to validly 
conclude that there are no objective moral values. But he clearly thinks there are no such 
“entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything 
else in the universe”: he thinks nothing is objective and intrinsically motivating in the 
manner he claims the common conception of moral properties says they are. And he 
thinks that we have no “special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different 
from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.” From these claims, in conjunction 
with those of the quote above, we can infer that there are no objective moral values.   
In response to this these arguments, we could, either genuinely or for the sake of 
argument, agree with the first set of premises – which are statements about what moral 
values would be like – but ask why we should accept this second set of premises. Since 
Mackie does not say why, if we wish to resist moral nihilism, we might offer parallel 
suggestions directed against objective epistemic properties, or values.  If these 
suggestions are palatable in the epistemic case, they might be more palatable in the moral 
case than Mackie thought they were.  
First, if epistemic properties exist, it would seem that they too would be quite 
different from many other things in the universe. The properties of “being justified” or 
“being such that one ought to believe it” seem to be a quite different kinds of property 
than, say, being solid, or five pounds, or red. They appear to be like “necessary relations 
                                                          
36 See Mackie (Ethics 38). 
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of fitness” between situations and beliefs, and Mackie rejects analogous moral relations 
between situations and actions.37 However, that these properties and relations are 
different from ordinary, mundane empirical properties doesn’t seem to be much of reason 
to think that they don’t exist, especially since, as discussed above, bizarre conclusions 
seem to follow from thinking that there are no epistemic properties and, thus, that no 
epistemic judgments are ever true.  
Second, it seems that if we are ever aware of epistemic properties, it would be by 
some “special” faculty, perception or intuition that is different from our “ordinary” ways 
of knowing things. While Mackie thought this was a “lame” position about moral 
properties, it seems highly plausible for epistemic properties: if we “see” that we are 
believing as we ought (or ought not), or that we should have reasons for our beliefs, this 
perception seems best described as something like intuition, or reasoning based on 
principles that are based, ultimately, on intuition. Mackie rejects these notions, but they 
seem indispensable. Epistemic evaluations certainly are not wholly empirical: there is no 
scientific experiment that can be done to determine if a belief is reasonable, or known, for 
someone. In fact, science presupposes that epistemic evaluations can be made, but not 
made wholly on the basis of science. Again, the best way to describe the source of 
epistemic evaluations seems to be intuition, or intuitions about principles in conjunction 
with non-epistemic information.  
Thus, although Mackie didn’t realize it, it seems that moral and epistemic 
properties are, as he put it, “companions” in guilt, in terms of these metaphysical and 
epistemic features. Mackie mentioned that some philosophers have claimed that 
metaphysical notions like number, identity, substance, necessity and possibility, and 
causation raise the same epistemic challenges that moral notions do.  He denies this, 
however, claiming that “satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical 
terms.”38   
But it’s not at all clear that “satisfactory accounts” of epistemic terms can be 
given in empirical terms: if someone judges a belief to be reasonable or justified, it’s not 
at all clear what empirically detectable property is being attributed to that belief. Perhaps 
                                                          
37 See Mackie (Ethics 40).  
38 See Mackie (Ethics 39).  
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there is such a property, but it’s safe to say that there is no consensus on what this 
property is. Some theories of justification analyze that notion in wholly empirical (or 
quasi-empirical) terms, but however successful these analyses are, the questions of 
whether one ought to have justified beliefs, or the beliefs with those natural features, are 
still open and not amenable to empirical resolution. Mackie states that any metaphysical 
notion that resists understanding in wholly empirical terms “should [be] included, along 
with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness.”39 This 
principle would seem to pertain to epistemic values and eliminate them.  But, again, if 
epistemic values are eliminated, and so no epistemic judgments are true, that has the 
bizarre implications discussed above.  If these bizarre implications should be rejected, 
then so should Mackie’s rejection of intuition, in the moral or epistemic realms. 
Mackie has another kind of metaphysical objection to the traditional conceptions 
of moral properties.  The objection is that, on most views, moral properties depend on or 
supervene on the natural features of an act or object: these natural features determine 
whether it is good or bad or right or wrong, and so on.  But Mackie finds this relation 
between the moral and the non-moral mysterious.  He asks: 
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of 
deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is 
wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic fact. Yet is not merely 
that the two features occur together.  The wrongness must somehow be 
‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it a piece of deliberate 
cruelty.  But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?40  
He also asks how we could “see” this entire relation, the “mysterious consequential link 
between the two,” i.e., the natural and the moral. Plainly, he thinks we can’t, and his 
sense that we can’t is motivated by his empiricist presuppositions. And he finds 
supervenience all too metaphysically and epistemologically mysterious to be believed 
and so opts for what he considers a simpler view which is that moral judgments are 
merely subjective responses (with no analogously complicated moral epistemology). 
                                                          
39 See Mackie (Ethics 39).  
40 See Mackie (Ethics 41).  
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 One could meet this objection, or this response, with an explanation of what 
supervenience is and why it is not as mysterious Mackie thinks it is (perhaps, because it 
is not mysterious at all, some might argue).  My response to Mackie avoids this hard 
work.  I respond that if ethical properties should be rejected because they are presumed to 
be supervenient, since epistemic properties are also presumed to be supervenient, then 
they should be rejected also. However, they should not be rejected; we should believe 
that there are epistemic properties that make some epistemic evaluations true, even if 
these properties are supervenient. I have argued earlier than we should think there are 
epistemic properties. So it’s not true that moral properties should be rejected because they 
are supervenient.  
Remarks from Jaegwon Kim provide some support for this quick argument.  He 
writes: 
. . we believe in the supervenience of epistemic properties on naturalistic ones .. 
[I]f a belief is justified, that must be so because it has certain factual, non-
epistemic properties, such as perhaps that it is “indubitable,” that it is seen to be 
entailed by another belief that is independently justified, that it is appropriately 
caused by perceptual experience, or whatever.  That it is a justified belief cannot 
be a brute fundamental fact unrelated to the kind of belief it is [i.e., in terms of its 
natural features].  There must be a reason for it, and this reason must be grounded 
in the factual descriptive properties of that particular belief.41 
Clearly, supervenience is central to epistemic evaluations: the truth of an epistemic 
evaluation depends on psychological facts about believer’s mind (e.g., her perceptions, 
memories, thoughts, and so on) or on the processes that her beliefs resulted from or some 
other non-epistemic features of the situation. Kim claims that the role of supervenience in 
ethics and epistemology is entirely parallel; this seems true. And he concludes that, 
“Unless we are prepared to disown normative ethics as a viable philosophical inquiry, we 
had better recognize normative epistemology as one, too,” and that “epistemology and 
normative ethics share the same metaphilosophical fate.”42   
                                                          
41 See Kim (“Naturalized Epistemology” 235).  
42 See Kim (“Naturalized Epistemology” 236). 
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If Kim is right, then Mackie’s arguments have interesting and troubling 
implications for epistemic evaluations. Kim claims that we should recognize normative 
epistemology as a viable philosophical inquire only if we are willing to recognize 
normative ethics as one. Mackie was unwilling to do so, and he thought the 
“metaphilosophical fate” of ethics is nihilism. If Kim is right about the parallel between 
ethical and epistemic evaluations, then Mackie’s view implies that normative 
epistemology should be understood in a nihilist manner also and not recognized as a 
viable philosophical inquiry either.  
Why think normative epistemology is not viable, on the view suggested by 
Mackie’s remarks about supervenience in ethics?  Because, on standard views, epistemic 
properties depend on natural properties: a belief has the epistemic properties it has 
because of its natural properties. But a Mackian thinks that there is nothing in the world 
signified by this ‘because’: the relation here is mysterious, and they don’t see how to 
explain how epistemic features could be consequential or supervenient on natural 
features.  
This epistemic nihilist would also ask how we could “see” this entire relation, the 
“mysterious consequential link between the two,” i.e., the natural and the epistemic. He 
would think that we can’t, and conclude that supervenience of this kind is too mysterious 
to be believed. While someone might claim that there are no epistemic properties, but if 
this is true then the view, for anyone, lacks the property of being reasonable, or justified, 
or having anything to recommend it as worthy of belief, since there are no such 
properties. And if that’s so, then it’s not true that anyone should believe it, or its negation, 
either. Hopefully these consequences are unacceptable enough, and conflict with enough 
of what we reasonably believe about epistemic evaluations, to show that the fact that 
some notion employs supervenience is not good reason to reject it.  But if that’s so, then 
Mackie’s argument for nihilism from the mysteriousness of supervenience is no good.  
Mackie makes a number of other brief remarks that seem to be relevant to his case 
against moral properties.  However, these same gestures can be made against epistemic 
properties also.  If they are not good reasons to think that there are no epistemic 
properties, then, in absence of further reasons, they wouldn’t appear to be good reasons to 
think that there are no moral properties either.   
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First, Mackie notes that Hare said that he “cannot frame for himself any clear, 
detailed, picture of what it would be like for [moral] values to be part of the fabric of the 
world.”  Mackie then suggests that, “The difficulty of seeing how values could be 
objective is a fairly strong reason for thinking that they are not so.”43 These suggestions 
are common: people are often puzzled by what a moral fact would be like, since they 
seem so different from other facts.  
Some might respond to this claim with the observation the just because something 
is hard to see doesn’t entail that it’s not there.  But what’s important for my purposes is 
that many philosophers would agree that they cannot, or cannot easily, “frame” for 
themselves a clear picture of what it would be for epistemic values to be “part of the 
fabric of the world” either. Just what exactly is one supposed to “picture” to display the 
facts, if they are facts, that some belief is known, or justified, or reasonable, or that 
something is a reason or some evidence, or that we should make interferences in certain 
ways, or that we should reasons for what we believe? What kinds of things would make 
these judgments true is not at all clear; in fact, it’s about as opaque as what would make 
moral judgments true. So, for many, it’s difficult to see how epistemic properties could 
be part of the world. However, denying that they are has bizarre consequences. And 
moves to avoid these consequences broaden one’s metaphysical and epistemological 
framework so that moral values are allowed in also. But if one does this, then this 
consideration is not a good one to use to try to show that there are no moral properties.  
Mackie writes that, “If there were something in the fabric of the world that 
validated certain kinds of concern, then it would be possible to acquire these merely by 
finding something out, by letting one’s thinking be controlled by how things were.”44 
Presumably, he thinks that it is not possible to find out what validates certain kinds of 
concern merely by letting one’s thinking be controlled by how things were, and so would 
conclude, based on this remark, that that there are no moral properties. These remarks are 
obscure, but it’s doubtful that anyone has ever thought that “seeing” moral reality would 
be easy as, perhaps, “spacing out” and letting one’s thinking be “controlled” by how 
things are, morally. Few have thought that moral knowledge or understanding is so easy, 
                                                          
43 See Mackie (Ethics 24) 
44 See Mackie (Ethics 22). 
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or so mystical. But maybe Mackie is mistaken and it is, in some sense, possible to gain it 
by merely letting one’s thinking be controlled how things are. To evaluate this 
suggestion, we would need to know more about the relevant sense of “possible” was at 
work here, of course. If some people are able to sometimes see moral truths, then it surely 
it possible that this can be done.  
Setting these considerations aside, suppose this was a good objection to moral 
properties. If it were, then it would be a good objection to epistemic properties also.  
Consider someone concerned about having evidence, or who thinks that knowledge is 
more valuable than unjustified, yet true, beliefs. These are concerns and one might think 
they are “validated,” by the facts that one ought to have evidence and that justified beliefs 
are better than unjustified beliefs, even when they are false. The thought is that these are 
aspects of the “fabric of the world” which back up these concerns. But then one might 
object that, “If there were something in the fabric of the world that validated certain kinds 
of [epistemic] concern, then it would be possible to acquire these merely by finding 
something out, by letting one’s thinking be controlled by how things were.” One then 
could claim that this is not possible and so conclude, analogously to the argument above, 
that there is no epistemic fabric of the world. However, again, if there are no epistemic 
facts, unacceptable consequences follow, so this gives reason to reject the previous 
suggested argument against moral properties.  
 Finally, Mackie states a number of consequences that follow from accepting 
objective moral values: 
It would make a radical difference to our metaphysics if we had to find room for 
objective values – perhaps something like Plato’s forms – somewhere in our 
picture of the world.  It would similarly make a difference to our epistemology if 
we had to explain how such objective values are or can be known, and do our 
philosophical psychology if we had to allow such knowledge . . to direct choices 
and actions.”45 
These claims are all true, but analogous claims are made with equal plausibility about 
epistemic values and properties and their metaphysical, epistemological and 
psychological status. If these consequences are intolerable for moral values and 
                                                          
45 See Mackie (Ethics 24-25). 
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properties, they are intolerable for epistemic ones also. But they are not in the epistemic 
case, so, in absence of further reasons, they are not intolerable for moral properties either.  
5.5. Conclusion.  
In his conclusion, Mackie sums up four basic kinds of reasons to think that there are no 
moral properties. I have argued that, for each of these reasons, analogous reasons can be 
given against evaluative epistemic properties. Insofar as there are good reasons to think 
that there are epistemic properties, and earlier I argued that there are such reasons, this 
provides grounds to reject Mackie’s arguments for moral nihilism.  
First, for both kinds of evaluations there is seems to be a diversity of evaluations 
at all levels of particularity and generality, and these disagreements seem to resist 
convergence. A related, although not discussed, claim is that one’s moral and epistemic 
commitments, as well as the evaluations and principles one makes and accept, tend to be 
influenced by one’s “way of life”: different communities and families sometimes accept 
different standards. So, as just one example of this, people with some backgrounds are 
apt to view religious leaders as both moral and epistemic authorities, whereas people 
from anti-religious backgrounds are apt to view religious leaders as morally and 
intellectual incompetent. If empirical truths like these about moral matters support moral 
nihilism, then they might also suggest epistemic nihilism.  
Second, ordinary conceptions of moral and epistemic values seem to presuppose 
that they are “objective”: someone’s, and even everyone’s, believing something to have 
some moral or epistemic property does not make it have that property, since this is 
determined by objective conditions. Thus, the conceptions are similar. Also, if one 
concedes that it’s plausible that some kinds of moral evaluations are intrinsically 
motivating, then it’s also plausible to think that some kinds of epistemic evaluations have 
a comparable necessary consequence in terms of affective or motivational change. Insofar 
as Mackie argues that objectivity and having motivational qualities are an ontologically 
problematic combination of features, both moral and epistemic evaluations raise similar 
concerns.  
Third, both notions employ supervenience, so if that is damning in one case, it is 
damning in the other. Fourth, both moral epistemology and epistemic epistemology give 
rise to similar problems and challenges.  However, if a response to moral epistemology is 
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that the challenges of the subject are so great that there probably are no moral properties, 
then the analogous conclusion – that there are no epistemic properties either – would 
seem to follow also. However, again, if epistemic nihilism is true, this conclusion or 
inference would not be justified, or reasonable, or warranted, because there are no such 
properties to make these claims true.   
 Thus, for everything Mackie says against moral properties, analogous claims can 
be made against epistemic properties to try to show that they don’t exist. Since, as I 
argued earlier, we have stronger reason to think that there are epistemic properties, we 
have reason to reject his arguments. But trying to show that epistemic properties do not 
exist is a mighty challenge since, as far as I can tell, it can’t easily be done without 
epistemic presuppositions and epistemic language. What’s particularly indispensable are 
judgments about what one ought to believe, how one should reason, what conditions of 
mind are better than others (e.g., recognized consistency versus recognized 
inconsistency), and so on.   
To try to persuade without using epistemic language, an epistemic nihilist could, 
of course, just yell at people, “Don’t accept any epistemic evaluations!” or walk around 
crying, telling people how unhappy he is about people’s accepting epistemic evaluations. 
But we could ask why epistemic evaluations make him sad, what’s so bad about them 
and why we should reject them. If he explained his view, we would see that it’s not true 
that we should accept it. And we would see that, even if we really liked it and provided 
the best explanation, it would not be true that we should accept it: that’s a consequence of 
the view. 
Hopefully, all these consequences are so intolerable that we would, and should, reject 
the premises that were given its support. And that’s just to reject Mackie’s case for moral 
nihilism and against moral realism.   
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Chapter 6: Harman’s Epistemic Relativism 
6.1. Introduction. 
Gilbert Harman rejects moral realisms, Mackie’s moral nihilism, and the non-
cognitivisms like those developed by Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. Harman’s view is that, 
contrary to all these positions, there are moral truths, but they are “relative” truths, not 
“objective” truths. Harman is thus a moral relativist.  
On moral relativism, the truth-values of moral sentences are (metaphysically) 
determined by the speaker’s moral framework, i.e., her set of moral values, standards and 
principles. A result of this theory is that since which moral frameworks are accepted can 
(and do) vary over distance and time, what is true, morally, is also relative: there are no 
universal, necessarily true moral claims. Thus, what’s morally required in one community 
might be morally impermissible in another and this might be due solely to each accepting 
different moral frameworks. 
Here I examine Harman’s arguments for this form of moral relativism, as well as 
his arguments for some earlier forms of moral relativism that he has defended. While 
Harman advocates relativism for moral evaluations, I investigate what these arguments’ 
major premises and motivating concerns suggest for non-moral evaluations, focusing on 
epistemic or intellectual judgments and principles (not moral judgments and principles) 
such as, but not limited to: 
“You should believe this.” 
“You ought to believe that.” 
“This is evidence for that.” 
“This is good, sufficient, evidence for that.” 
“This belief is justified, or reasonable, or known.” 
“There is good reason to believe that.” 
“You should believe something if, and only if, you have good evidence for it.”  
“Given that you believe this, you ought to also believe that.”  
“This implies that, so you should not believe this.”  
I argue that Harman’s premises suggest an understanding of evaluative epistemic 
judgments that is comparable to his understanding of the nature of moral judgments: his 
various arguments for moral relativism suggest analogous arguments for epistemic 
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relativism, a view that epistemic judgments are sometimes true but that their truth is 
“relative,” not objective or stance independent, as epistemic realists hold they are. If 
epistemic relativism is true, then epistemic realism is false. Since I think epistemic 
realism is true, it is worthwhile to defend it from reasons related to relativism. 
On an epistemic relativism comparable to Harman’s moral relativism, the truth 
value of an epistemic judgment is determined, in part, by the “epistemic framework” the 
believer, or perhaps her community, accepts, i.e., her epistemic or intellectual values, 
standards and principles. The truth values of epistemic judgments would not be 
determined by epistemic facts, properties or principles that are not constituted by 
anyone’s attitudes towards epistemic propositions.1 
I argue that these epistemic relativisms are false and the arguments for them 
weak: insofar as we can develop an understanding of what epistemic relativism would be 
like, we have reasons to reject it, especially if we are not epistemic relativists now, since 
much of it and its implications reasonably seem untrue to the facts about epistemic 
evaluation. Since these arguments are weak, I argue that analogous comparable 
arguments for moral relativism are weak also. Thus, I argue that Harman has not shown 
that moral realism is defective and that moral relativism is a more plausible alternative to 
it.  
Unlike the other authors I have discussed, Harman realizes that the considerations 
he gives in favor of moral relativism point toward epistemic relativism. He rejects 
epistemic relativism, however, but I argue he rejects it for inadequate reasons.  
6.2. A Moral Relativism Consistent with Moral Realism.   
In Harman’s earliest writings on these issues, the version of moral relativism he 
advocates is consistent with moral realism.2 This version of moral relativism and its 
defense are worth discussing, however, because themes developed in its defense play into 
Harman’s defense of a later form of relativism that is, in fact, inconsistent with moral 
                                                          
1 This distinction is not easy to formulate since, on any plausible epistemic realism, the epistemic principles 
– or one’s intellectual worldview, we might say – can make a difference to what one epistemically ought to 
believe. These kinds of beliefs can contribute to one’s total evidence. Epistemic relativisms, however, 
suggest a more dramatic role for epistemic principles, worldviews and “frameworks,” a role that I argue is 
mistaken.  
2 See Harman’s “What Is Moral Relativism?” and “Moral Relativism Defended” in Harman (Explaining 
Value 3-19, 20-38). 
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realism. Understanding this earlier version of relativism will help us understand the later 
version.  
Harman claims that there’s a sense of “morally ought” such that, to his ear, it 
sounds “odd” to say that Hitler ought not to have killed the Jews and Southern 
slaveholders ought to have let their slaves go free.3 This is because this sense of “ought” 
is fixed by the agents’ beliefs and desires: its truth conditions are determined by what is 
consistent with them, or what actions are supported by them or, we might say, “make 
sense” in light of them. So Harman claims that if Hitler’s beliefs and desires provide no 
“reason” to not kill Jews then it would be false, or “odd,” to say that he ought not to have 
killed them. Similarly, if upon critical reflection on their beliefs and desires, slave owners 
found nothing that would support their freeing their slaves, then it would be false to say 
that they ought to have set them free.  This is Harman’s insight on one sense of term 
“ought.” 
We could agree with Harman that there’s a sense of “ought” for which this is true: 
there is the “ought” that is fixed by, and relative to, the evaluated agent’s beliefs and 
desires.  The claim can certainly be made that, for Hitler, perhaps nothing in his mind 
suggested to him that what he was doing was wrong, and that that no moral evaluations 
like that would have occurred to him even if he had had more information about all the 
relevant non-moral considerations, had thought about his plans more, had tried seeing 
things from his victims’ points of view, and so on. That might be a fact about Hitler’s 
mental life: perhaps his views were so fixed that he would have never found any belief or 
desire that would lead him to change them or alter his behavior. Perhaps relative to his 
own beliefs and desires, nothing else besides killing the Jews would have “made sense,” 
so to speak: changing his plans would have been, in some sense, “inconsistent” with who 
he was, in terms of his “core” beliefs and desires. 
But showing that this sort of claim is true, i.e., that there is this sense of “ought,” 
is no threat to moral realism. For Harman’s theory allows that, in spite of the truth of 
these relative-ought judgments that he identifies, we can still truthfully say that Hitler 
was objectively evil and that slaveholding is objectively wrong, irrespective of how 
Hitler and the slaveholders might have ever felt about it. So it’s not at all clear how 
                                                          
3 See Harman (Explaining Value 7).  
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Harman’s observing that there is this sense of “ought” which is relative is a threat to 
moral realism, since there are other moral evaluations that are not relative to the 
perspectives of the agents in questions.  
Harman’s critics could appease him by just granting him this useful sense of 
“ought” but then just use other morally evaluative vocabulary to make the objective 
moral evaluations they’d like to make. They could see Harman’s claim as an interesting, 
but not very morally significant, observation that we can ask whether someone is doing 
what is consistent with, or supported by, her beliefs and desires and whether her mental 
state would support doing anything else. When there are affirmative answers to either of 
these questions, we might stipulate a sense, i.e., Harman’s sense, in which the person is 
doing what she “ought” to do: perhaps we might say that her actions harmanonize with 
her beliefs and desires. But even in these cases of harmonization, we can still realize that 
there are other senses of the term “ought” on which someone objectively ought to not be 
doing what she’s doing, regardless of whatever she might believe or feel about it. Thus, 
moral realists should find no serous threat in this version of moral relativism. Let us now 
consider versions of moral relativism that are inconsistent with realism.  
6.3. A Moral Relativism Inconsistent with Moral Realism.   
Some later versions of Harman’s moral relativism include the above version of 
relativism, but unlike it, include a rejection of moral realism. These defenses of relativism 
echo Harman’s previous suggestion that a moral judgment, or a moral principle, applies 
to someone only if that person has “reason” to accept it. Although he is not entirely clear 
on what he means by a “reason,” Harman seems to think that for someone to have a 
reason to accept something is for her existing beliefs and desires to support it, or that they 
would support it with minor changes.4 Harman argues that since people’s reasons differ, 
what moral demands they are subject to differ as well. This is a form of moral relativism 
and, unlike the previous version of relativism, Harman considered it to apply to all moral 
judgments, not a restricted class, as it was earlier. So this version of relativism is 
inconsistent with moral realism. 
                                                          
4 I ignore the difficulties that Harman would have in spelling this idea out and explaining why and when, in 
cases of perceived doxastic tension (due, perhaps, to recognized inconsistencies), one ought to resolve this 
tension, as well as on what basis this tension should be resolved (e.g., why retain p and drop some other 
proposition[s] rather than rejecting p and retaining some other proposition[s]?). 
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This version of moral relativism is based on two of Harman’s assumptions: the 
first is a highly controversial moral assumption; the second is a quasi-empirical claim 
about people’s beliefs and desires. This first assumption is that, “Moral demands have to 
be acceptable to those whom they apply to in a way that legal demands do not,” i.e., that 
“a moral demand applies to someone only if it is rational for that person to accept that 
demand.”5 Harman’s second assumption is that, “it can be rational for different people to 
accept different moral demands ‘all the way down.’” From these two assumptions we can 
conclude that fundamentally different moral demands can apply to different moral 
people; that there are no universal, necessarily applicable or binding moral demands or 
requirements.  
Harman’s first assumption, that moral demands have to be acceptable to those 
whom they apply to, is striking. It contrasts with common views that claim that some 
moral demands apply to every moral agent, irrespective of their antecedent beliefs and 
desires or what is rational for them to accept. On this common view, even if there were 
someone whose beliefs and desires were supportive of, e.g., child-molesting, he still 
ought not to do it. Harman might say that this person has no “reason” to refrain from 
molesting children, but some critics would see this as simply irrelevant to the fact that he 
shouldn’t do that: the fact that this molester fails to find any reason why he should not 
molest children, and would not see these reasons with further information, imagination, 
and thought, might be seen as just further indication of this person’s faults.6 So Harman’s 
first assumption, that moral demands have to be acceptable to those whom they apply to, 
is not one that many people would share. It would be acceptable only if a very strong 
argument was given in its favor, but Harman provides no such argument.  Thus, this 
assumption is quite out of line with most people’s assumptions about moral demands; 
most people have little reason to accept it. 
Harman’s favorite characters to illustrate his second premise, that “it can be 
rational for different people to accept different moral demands,” include “successful 
criminals,” “cynical politicians,” and certain business executives whom Harman claims 
                                                          
5 See Harman (Explaining Value 30, 33). 
6 I should note that Harman is not arguing that what we can do is determined by our reasons, i.e., our 
epistemic situations, and that some epistemic situations would make it seem that not molesting children is 
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might not have any “reasons” to conform their behavior to the moral norms that most 
people accept.7 Harman claims that these people might have fundamentally different 
moral outlooks that would resist change in light of more information, careful reflection 
and reasoning, and any other non-moral improvement. For these people, because they 
accept different demands, Harman thinks it’s not true that they ought not perform their 
criminal deeds and lie and steal from their constituents and shareholders.  Harman again 
claims that since they have no “reason” not to do so, i.e., they are not moved by the same 
moral concerns that many of the rest of us are, it’s not true that they should not lie, steal 
and cheat.  
This is a very surprising perspective. Many would find Harman’s arguments for 
this kind of relativism and its resulting implications entirely unconvincing.  But this is 
because his assumptions are entirely unconvincing: you don’t get off the moral hook, so 
to speak, by it being the case that none of your beliefs and desires would support doing 
something.  Judith Thompson has an amusing illustration of this point in response to 
Harman’s relativistic analysis of moral statements: 
It is a good heuristic in philosophy to be suspicious of views that would shock 
your grocer. [Suppose] I order a bushel of applies from my grocer and he send 
them round straightaway. The following week he sends round his bill. I phone and 
say “Something interesting just happened. I now find that my wants have 
changed: I now find that I have no wants that would be met by my paying your 
bill, and that I have wants that would be met by not paying your bill.” . . 
“Moreover,” I go on, “my mental state is not due to any epistemic failure, as I 
have gone into this manner very carefully.” I explain: “After all, you haven’t any 
proof that you delivered the apples, and even if you did, there’s nothing you could 
do about the matter since I’m leaving for Bolivia in the morning [and so no harm 
will come to me by not paying the bill]” . . “So it follows that morality doesn’t 
require me to pay you.”8  
                                                                                                                                                                             
impossible and so it’s false to say that, for this person, he ought not molest children.  Harman’s arguments 
do not explicitly appeal to any “ought-implies-can”-type concerns. 
7 See Harman (Explaining Value 33).  
8 See Thompson (Moral Relativism 211-212) 
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Thompson regards this case as a reductio of Harman’s claim that a person morally ought 
to do something only if her beliefs and desires support doing it or, as Harman sometimes 
also suggests, it is in one’s own interest to do something. While there are likely some 
kinds of standards that apply to a person only if his or her own beliefs and desires support 
that application, moral ones do not seem to be that kind. It does not seem that the truth 
(and falsity) of moral evaluations depends on whether the evaluation serves the acting 
agents’ beliefs and desires. Perhaps they are, but Harman gave very little reason to think 
otherwise; he did not defend his assumptions. Given their shocking implications, it’s 
unfortunate that he did not do so.  
 One way to defend Harman’s moral assumptions, however, is to argue that they 
follow from, or are an instance of, a general principle that is justified. Why do moral 
demands have to be acceptable to those whom they apply, or why does a moral demands 
apply to someone only if it is prudential for that person to accept that demand?  This is 
because, it could be said, in general, all demands – all normative requirements – have to 
be acceptable to those whom they apply; they apply only if it is prudential for that person 
to accept those demands. Although there is little to recommend this principle, it is a 
possible view. And if it were justified, then Harman’s view about moral demands might 
also be justified. 
However, this general principle, insofar as there are normative epistemic and 
intellectual requirements (and I have, along with many other philosophers, argued that 
there are), suggests that, like moral requirements, these epistemic and intellectual 
requirements apply only when they are acceptable to the evaluated person. This view 
would imply that an epistemic judgment, or an epistemic principle, applies to someone 
only if that person accepts it, or has “reason” to accept it, i.e., her existing beliefs and 
desires support it, or it is in her interest to believe it. Since “support” appears to often be 
an epistemic term, we would want to understand it in a manner that has no normative or 
evaluative implications; so, for someone’s beliefs and desires to “support” an epistemic 
principle is merely for the person to believe that it does, or it be the case that (upon 
reflection) she would believe it, or perhaps that it’s entailed by what she believes.  
“Support” could be understood along these lines all with no question as to whether this 
believing would be justified or reasonable or have some other positive epistemic status.  
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This sort of claim above would be analogous to Harman’s first assumption about 
moral evaluations, viz. that they apply only if the evaluated person accepts them. We 
could to this assumption the further assumption that is analogous to Harman’s second 
assumption about moral demands, i.e., that it can be rational, i.e., prudential, for different 
people to accept different epistemic demands or principles “all the way down.” If we 
combine these two assumptions we would have a version of epistemic relativism.   
So, what should someone believe, if an epistemic relativism like this is true? The 
relativistic answer would be that it would depend on the person. First, it would depend on 
what epistemic demands a person has “reason” to accept. Second, the relativist would 
claim that since people accept different epistemic demands, there is no universally correct 
answer for what people should believe, even in cases where, intuitively, their experiences 
– what we might think of as their evidence – are very similar, if not phenomenologically 
identical.   
This perspective, however, leads us to what seem to be false implications for 
epistemic evaluations. Consider two possible people who have very similar beliefs and 
experiences at a time, but one accepts very high epistemic standards (say, Cartesian 
standards) and the other accepts very low epistemic standards (say, a standard to the 
effect that, necessarily, if she believes something then it’s justified). On epistemic 
relativism, the believer with high standards would have few, if any, justified beliefs. The 
believer with very low standards would, presumably, have many justified beliefs, but her 
accepted epistemic principle might also result in many (intuitively) unjustified beliefs 
being falsely counted as justified. This would be the case if she has, like many people do, 
many beliefs that are actually unjustified: on epistemic relativism, her merely believing 
an exceedingly “low standards” epistemic principle would make these beliefs justified.  
These differences in epistemic evaluation in this case would be merely because of 
what standards they accept; the case is set up so that they have comparable evidence, or 
things seem the same to them, from each of their points of view. On common non-
relativistic epistemic views, what standards one accepts can change what one is justified 
in believing, since accepting some standards, i.e., accept some epistemic propositions, 
involves believing new propositions.  That might change, at least subtly, one’s evidence 
or how things seem. Despite these facts, however, it does not seem that one can make all 
 194 
of one’s beliefs unjustified merely by accepting very high epistemic standards, or by 
believing that the demands for justified belief are so high. Similarly, it does not seem that 
one can make one’s beliefs justified, or make (intuitively) unjustified beliefs justified, 
merely by accepting very low epistemic standards.  
Some who are epistemic contextualists might disagree here. However, there is a 
distinction here that might be relevant to addressing their concern.  First, coming to 
accept very high epistemic standards could serve as a defeater for the justification of 
one’s beliefs: one could come to believe that justification requires very high standards 
(e.g., the impossibility of error) and see that one’s beliefs generally do not meet these 
standards and so come to believe that one’s beliefs are not justified. But for this to be a 
defeater it’s not merely that one accept these high standards that might defeat one’s 
justification: it’s that one accepts the standards and that one sees that these new standards 
preclude justification because one sees that one’s beliefs fail to meet the standard.  I 
maintain that this sort of claim about how accepting standards can defeat justification is 
plausible: if epistemic contextualists accept this point, then good for them. Contrast this 
view with the view that the mere acceptance of higher (and lower) standards can make all 
the world of an epistemic difference, even when the acceptance of these standards is not 
recognized.9  
As I am developing the position, epistemic relativism includes this claim. I claim 
that this is false. But this version of epistemic relativism seems to imply that it is not. 
According to epistemic relativism, there are no universal, necessarily true epistemic 
standards, such as those that theories like evidentialism or reliabilism at least attempt to 
identify; the only standards are those which the believer accepts (or would accept), which 
can vary and these varying, relative standards determine the epistemic status of a token 
belief. However, epistemic standards do not vary in the manner, or to the degree, that 
epistemic relativism implies they can and do. Therefore, epistemic relativism is false.  
Since this sort of epistemic relativism is motivated by an obvious principle that 
one might give in defense of Harman’s moral relativism, this shows that the basic idea 
that normative demands apply to people only if they accept them is mistaken.  This 
                                                          
9 This will become clearer as the presentation of Harman’s moral relativism unfolds below, but Harman 
does not seem to require that one recognize what moral framework one accepts for that framework to apply 
to, or generate moral implications for, oneself.  
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undercuts a possible defense of Harman’s moral relativism. Since no other defense was 
provided, this makes relativism all the more doubtful, especially in light of its highly 
counterintuitive implications.  
Let me re-present these considerations in a more concrete manner using an 
epistemic principle. Consider some epistemic principle to the effect that for any 
proposition, one (epistemically) should believe it if, and only if, one has sufficient 
evidence for it. For many people, that principle implies, in conjunction with other truths 
about their situation, that there are some propositions that they now believe which they 
should not believe, and that there are propositions they should believe which they do not.  
Someone might resist this conclusion, or any other epistemic evaluation, by 
claiming that it does not apply to her because she does not accept the initial epistemic 
principle: this person would claim that these judgments about what she should believe are 
not true because she does not accept what we might call “evidentialism.” She might 
claim that that she has no “reason,” in Harman’s sense, to accept evidentialism and would 
not find a reason even if she had more information, thought more about the issue, and so 
on.  She might therefore claim that it is not true for her that she should always believe 
only what fits the evidence. She might say about epistemic demands what Harman says 
about moral demands, viz. that they have to be acceptable to those whom they apply to in 
a way that legal demands do not and that they apply to someone only if it is rational for 
that person to accept that demand.  
However, it is not clear why an epistemic requirement applies to someone only if 
that person accepted it. Some skeptic might refuse to accept any epistemic standards that 
will allow for some justified beliefs in the actual world, yet it seems that it still might be 
true that some of his beliefs are justified. A foolish person’s beliefs do not become 
justified merely by his thinking that “anything goes” in terms of belief. But if one 
assumed that moral requirements applied only when the person has a “reason” to accept 
them, it seems easy enough to make this assumption about epistemic requirements also. If 
Harman’s observations that some people (criminals, executives, etc.) don’t accept the 
basic moral principles that the majority of society does accept is supposed to support his 
moral relativism, then comparable observations that there are people who don’t accept 
 196 
common epistemic and intellectual principles would seem to provide comparable support 
for an epistemic relativism.  
However, again, it does not seem that one can make it the case whether some 
epistemic judgment is true (or false) of oneself merely by adopting, or having, different 
epistemic standards.  This response is analogous to Thompson’s reply to her grocer and 
the point is similar: you can’t get out of a demand, moral or epistemic, by merely ceasing 
to accept a principle or it not being in your interest for you to conform to it.  
Thus, I find this motivation for relativisms, moral and epistemic, implausible. 
Were stronger cases made in their favor, and a more direct, careful case given why 
exactly it’s implausible to think that there are moral and epistemic requirements that 
apply to everyone, then these relativisms might be worthier of greater consideration. As it 
stands, there is little to recommend this version of Harman’s moral relativism.  Moral 
realists should find no threat in it, and epistemic realists should find no threat in the 
analogous epistemic relativism.  
6.4. From Disagreement to Moral & Epistemic Relativisms.   
I now turn to a second strategy Harman uses to defend moral relativism. Like Mackie, 
Harman is impressed by moral disagreements. He thinks that such disagreement casts 
doubt on moral realism, although, like Mackie, he does not explain why he thinks moral 
properties would be so salient that nearly everyone would agree in their moral 
evaluations.  
Moral realists are not as troubled by moral disagreement; Harman notes that they 
might respond to moral disagreement, even when all the relevant non-moral 
disagreements that cause some moral disagreement are resolved, with the claim that 
“some people are simply not well placed to discover the right answers to moral 
questions.”10 Realists would use this response to argue that this, ultimately, explains what 
is going on in some cases of fundamental moral disagreement: some people, for various 
reasons, just fail to see the objective moral values that are there. Although he does not 
explain what is faulty with this realistic response, Harman rejects it. 
Harman thus rejects morally realistic claims to the effect that some moral 
framework is, as Harman puts it, “objectively privileged as the one true morality.” But 
                                                          
10 See Harman (Moral Relativism 12).  
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Harman also rejects Mackie’s moral nihilism and its related explanation for moral 
disagreement, viz. that there are no moral properties to constrain moral thinking and so 
this is why there is so much disagreement. He rejects nihilism because he thinks it 
implies that morality should be “abandoned.”11 Unfortunately, Harman does not explain 
what he means here. Even Mackie did not seem to think this; he thought that moral 
judgments would, and even should, continue, even when its false presuppositions are 
recognized. Mackie’s response might not easily gibe with Mackie’s own theory, i.e., 
there is perhaps some tension in a view that says no moral judgments are true yet we 
should (from a moral point of view?) go on making moral judgments, but Harman rejects 
it nevertheless.  
Instead, Harman advocates what he calls “moral relativism,” which he claims “is 
a reasonable inference from the most plausible explanation of moral diversity.”12  
According to Harman, moral relativists accept the following: 
For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, it would be 
wrong of P to D, has to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in 
relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D.  Similarly 
for other moral judgments.13   
And moral relativists like Harman also think that: 
There is no single true morality.  There are many different moral frameworks, 
none of which is more correct than the others.14  
Moral relativists believe there are moral truths. But they think what is true, morally, 
depends on the moral framework. A moral framework is, in Harman’s terminology, a set 
of values, standards and principles. Relative to some moral frameworks, a judgment will 
be true, yet on other frameworks it is false, but no framework is objectively true or false.  
So if someone were to ask if something is wrong, what can be said is that it’s wrong in 
relations to some frameworks and not wrong in relation to others. There is no wrong, 
period, or wrong apart from a framework, or wrong according to the objectively true, 
correct framework.  
                                                          
11 See Harman (Moral Relativism 6). 
12 See Harman (Moral Relativism 8). 
13 See Harman (Moral Relativism 4). 
14 See Harman (Moral Relativism 8). 
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Harman sees an analogy to judgments about motion: nothing is moving, period; 
all judgments about motion are relative to a particular spatiotemporal framework: relative 
to some framework, something might be moving, yet relative to another it is standing 
still.  Similarly, relative to one set of values, standards and principles, an action might be 
allowed, yet it would not be permitted relative to another set. Realists, of course, can 
make this observation (“Relative to a common Catholic morality, abortions are almost 
always wrong, but relative to utilitarianism, abortions are often not wrong”) but they 
think that at least one of these positions – Catholic morality or utilitarianism – is 
objectively false. Relativists, of course, deny that there are any objectively, universally 
true or false moralities. 
 This is a basic statement of moral relativism. I will attempt to elucidate the 
position in greater detail below, but for now I will suppose that an adequate 
understanding of the basics of the view has been provided.  My focus will be the 
argument that Harman provides in its favor. I will consider the main argument he 
provides and argue that a parallel argument can be given to support an analogous 
“epistemic relativism,” a view like the following: 
For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, it would be 
epistemically reasonable, rational or justifiable for S to believe p, has to be 
understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in relation to epistemic 
framework E, it would be epistemically reasonable, rational or justifiable for S to 
believe p.  Similarly for other epistemic judgments. 
Epistemic relativists who hold a position analogous to Harman’s moral relativism would 
also think that: 
There is no single true epistemology.  There are many different epistemic 
frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others.  
I will argue that if Harman’s argument for moral relativism is a strong one, then the 
analogous argument for epistemic relativism is strong also. I argue that the main 
considerations that Harman offers in favor of his moral relativism apply to epistemic 
judgments also and so would provide comparable epistemic relativism as well. I have 
already argued that a version of epistemic relativism is false, and some of these 
arguments would seem to transfer to this new version of relativism, but I will offer 
 199 
additional considerations to reject this version of relativism. Since this epistemic 
relativism follows from the same kind of reasoning given for moral relativism, and this 
epistemic relativism is an implausible position, this shows that the analogous reasoning 
given in favor of moral relativism is weak. Thus, I undercut Harman’s main argument for 
moral relativism. Since Harman’s position has been deemed worthy of attention and is 
considered by some to be a live alternative to morally realistic positions, showing that the 
main argument in its favor is weak is a significant accomplishment. 
6.4.1. Arguments for Moral Relativism.   
Harman’s argument for moral relativism is brief, and not developed or defended in great 
detail. In fact, the argument is strikingly simple. It has two steps: first, he argues that 
moral realism is false, given moral disagreement: he argues that “the rejection of moral 
absolutism . .  is a reasonable inference from the most plausible explanation of the range 
of moral diversity that actually exists.”15 We have seen how these arguments go, and how 
realists might respond to them. For now, I will assume, for the sake of argument, that 
these arguments are strong.  
Second, he argues from the falsity of moral realism and so there not being 
“objectively” true moral judgments to there being “relatively” true moral judgments. To 
complete this step, Harman surveys the alternatives to absolutism, which he sees as 
nihilism, emotivism and relativism. He rejects nihilism, since he thinks it falsely implies 
that morality should be “abandoned”16 and so concludes in favor of relativism.  He briefly 
discusses emotivism, and he seems to reject it for Frege-Geach type problems, i.e., since 
it does not provide a plausible way to understand conditionals with moral terms and valid 
arguments that contain moral terms it is false.17 He then concludes that moral relativism 
is true. 
This inference from the falsity of “absolute moral truth” to the truth of “relative 
moral truth” is, unfortunately, not well defended: Harman really does not say why, if we 
think that no moral judgments or moral principles are “absolutely” true, we should think 
that some judgments are “relatively” true. The inference from the former to the latter 
appears to be a great leap. Let us try to think this through, to try to see how a reflective 
                                                          
15 See Harman (Moral Relativism 10). 
16 See Harman (Moral Relativism 6). 
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relativist might get from the rejection of moral realism to relativism. This might lead us 
to be puzzled about what the doctrine of moral relativism is; our puzzlement might be so 
great that it might be hard to judge the view as false, since we wouldn’t have a clear view 
in mind.  
Suppose one came to reject moral realism and so believed that there are no 
objective moral truths. This idea might be explained as, in part, the idea that there are no 
moral principles that apply to everyone. While some of us might have thought that 
torturing babies for fun is necessarily wrong, if we rejected realism we would believe that 
that is a mistaken belief: this conviction is not an objective truth about the world, rather it 
is merely a feature of our own moral framework. And our framework, our moral 
perspective, is only one of many moral perspectives, none of which are objectively, or 
necessarily, true. A moral nihilist would agree with this statement so far, and many non-
cognitivists would agree also. 
A moral relativist, however, believes that although there are no objective, 
necessary truths in ethics: there are only “relative” truths. So, if someone thinks, “Torture 
for fun is always wrong,” then the relativist would understand this person as saying, if 
speaking sincerely, that torture for fun is always wrong on her moral framework. The 
relativist would realize that there are, or could be, other frameworks where torture for fun 
would not always be wrong. A relativist could say that for those who accept frameworks 
where torture is condemned, torture is wrong, or on some frameworks, it is true that 
torture is wrong, and on other frameworks it is false that torture is wrong. 
One question is why to use a “is true relative to a framework” and similar 
locutions. A reflective moral nihilist can recognize that people have moral frameworks 
and that there are logical relations among the various (what she regards as false) 
propositions that make up people’s moral frameworks and the various moral judgments 
they make. And nihilists can recognize that we can discern the implications of false 
principles: falsehoods, in conjunction with other premises, can imply further falsehoods. 
Why not leave it with the recognition that there are a multitude of false frameworks, 
instead of introducing this notion of relative truth, which seems to amount to little more 
than belief?  Harman’s answer here is not clear. So it’s not clear why rejecting realism 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 See Harman (Moral Relativism 33). 
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should lead us to relativism, instead of a nihilism that recognizes different moral 
frameworks.   
Sturgeon responds to this by arguing that moral relativism “may just be moral 
nihilism plus circumlocution.  It’s the view that there is no such property as moral 
wrongness, so that no actions have it: no actions are morally wrong.”18 The relativistic 
circumlocution is to describe people’s judgments as true “relative to” their framework 
(and, somehow, that a framework is true “relative to” itself), but that no framework is 
objectively true. This locution is obscure, and it’s not at all clear how this relativistic 
circumlocution is an improvement over the nihilist’s way of understanding comparable 
phenomena, especially if, as Mackie does, nihilists are able to continue making moral 
evaluations.  The nihilist can, like Harman, observe that certain moral judgments will be 
supported by, or at least consistent with, some frameworks but not others, and that some 
judgments will seem true to those who accept some frameworks but seem false to those 
who accept other frameworks. This is way of describing the phenomena is clearer than 
with the notion of relative truth. Thus, it seems a nihilist can say everything that Harman 
would like to say, but in a clearer and more plausible manner.  
Is there any reason to prefer relativism over nihilism? Again, Harman rejects 
nihilism because he thinks it implies that we should not make moral judgments. Harman, 
however, thinks that we should make moral judgments and thinks that his notion of 
relative truth enables us to do this. But since Mackie thought that we should make moral 
judgments, so we can think that we should continue to make moral judgments even if we 
come to believe that moral realism is false. Harman thinks that morality is “needed for 
reasons similar to the reasons for which law is needed.”19 This sounds like a normative, 
perhaps moral, judgment, viz. that we ought to keep making moral judgments. Why is 
this? Perhaps because it would be bad for us if we didn’t. These too, presumably, on 
Harman’s view are “relative” judgments, and they won’t be true on all frameworks. 
Perhaps they are true on Harman’s, but not others’ frameworks. Thus, if the claim that we 
need to make moral judgments is a motivation for relativism, it appears to itself be 
relativistic: on some moral frameworks, we should make moral judgments and on others 
                                                          
18 See Sturgeon (“Harman on Objectivity and Moral Relativism” 7). 
19 See Harman (Moral Relativism 6).  
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we should not. If Harman’s claim is not a relativistic judgment, and is based in some 
absolutist sense that we ought to make moral judgments, then we might wonder why we 
shouldn’t just accept absolutism.   
But since we clearly quite literally can make moral judgments if nihilism is true 
or even if we believe nihilism to be true, Harman’s objection to it along these lines is no 
good. A nihilist, in effect, might say something very much like what a relativist would 
say: 
I believe that moral realism is false and there are no (necessary or contingent) 
moral truths.  However, as a matter of fact, I still have my moral framework: I 
still have my preferences for how I would like to see things go, how I think things 
ought to be.  I believe that there’s nothing in the world that “backs up” my 
preferences, but I have them nonetheless. And I certainly prefer my preferences 
over the preferences of others. Although it’s not true that my (or anyone’s) 
preferences should be satisfied, I will try to see that mine are satisfied.  That’s 
part of what I do when I make moral judgments, but all the while I clearly realize 
that there is no literal truth to any of this: things only seem true, morally-speaking, 
to me, but that’s almost just what it is to have a moral belief, i.e., for it is to seem 
true that something is right or wrong. And my theory about ethics does not imply 
that it is morally bad that I continue doing this (i.e., making judgments that, upon 
reflection, I uniformly judge to be false) or that it’s wrong that I do this, since my 
theory says there is no such thing and, furthermore, I can’t help myself from 
having the reactions I do. 
Since a nihilist could say something like that, Harman is mistaken in thinking that 
nihilists must “abandon” making moral judgments. So this argument from elimination, by 
ruling out nihilism, does not help relativism. There is little reason to accept it over 
nihilism, once we come to accept nihilism.   
Harman also tries to support relativism by claiming that relativism jibes well with 
some common moral convictions, e.g., that it’s worse to initiate harm than to not help 
someone and that it’s worse to exploit animals than human persons.20 He thinks that if 
morality is entirely conventional, as relativism implies since it makes moral truth 
                                                          
20 See Harman (Moral Relativism 23-27).  
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dependent on the accepted moral framework, we would expect that these kinds of moral 
judgments would often be accepted. This is because these judgments are in the interest of 
those who have the power to influence which moral standards are widely accepted.21 This 
might be true, but these kinds of judgments are also consistent with moral absolutism 
also, and other absolutists regard them as false and unjustified. So it’s not clear how these 
considerations help relativism. 
Harman also thinks that there is a strong analogy between relative judgments 
about motion and relative moral judgments.  However, an important disanalogy between 
relativistic judgments about motion and morals is that nearly all people are perfectly 
comfortable with motion being relative, but very few are comfortable with morals being 
relative. Arguments from analogy are often weak, and they are weaker the more 
differences there are between the two kinds of things that are said to be similar. Insofar as 
moral judgments and judgments about motion seem, despite whatever similarities they 
share, quite different, Harman’s argument based on the analogy does not seem to be 
strong. 
This is a basic statement of the considerations Harman gives in favor of moral 
relativism.  As I mentioned above, the argument is that since moral realism, moral 
nihilism and non-cognitivism are false, moral relativism is true. Critics have found this 
argument wanting; in particular, they have wondered, as I have, what the justification is 
for the inference to moral relativism from the alleged failure of all these other positions. 
Sturgeon has concluded that that “even if moral disputes are rationally unresolvable, I 
don’t see that [Harman] has a compelling argument from that premise to what he calls 
moral relativism. In particular, I don’t see that his relativism contributes anything to his 
explanation of rationally irresolvable disagreement.”22 As far as I know, Harman has not 
addressed any of these concerns about his argument for relativism. All and all, it is not a 
well-defended position.  
 
 
                                                          
21 See Harman (Moral Relativism 26). He writes, “morality represents a compromise between different 
people of different powers and resources.” Since animals have no power, Harman suggests this is, in part, 
what explains, why they are often considered to have an inferior moral status. He writes, “animals cannot 
get together to put pressure on people” to change their morality (p. 26).  
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6.4.2. Arguments for Epistemic Relativism.   
Harman claims that moral relativism “is a reasonable inference from the most plausible 
explanation of moral diversity” but, as we have seen, it is not at all clear why this 
inference is reasonable. However, if it is a reasonable inference, then epistemic relativism 
is also a reasonable inference from the most plausible explanation of epistemic diversity.  
I will argue that this is not a reasonable inference, so the inference from moral 
disagreement to moral relativism is not reasonable either.  
In the previous chapter I argued that there is epistemic diversity: people disagree 
about what’s reasonable, justified, and known, and some of these disagreements survive 
even when we share our evidence. One explanation for some of these disagreements is 
that some people are not well placed to see the epistemic facts. Harman rejects this 
explanation about moral disagreement, although we are not told why. We might suspect, 
however, that someone who rejects this explanation regarding moral facts would also 
reject this explanation for epistemic facts: if one thought that moral facts, if they existed, 
would be quite salient to most people, one would easily also think that epistemic facts, if 
they too existed, would also be quite salient to most people. Observations about epistemic 
disagreement would then suggest that there are no epistemic facts, i.e., that epistemic 
realism is false. 
From here, it’s a short step to epistemic relativism, as (too) short a step as it was 
to moral relativism as it was from moral disagreement. It is plausible to think that are 
different epistemological frameworks, i.e., sets of epistemic or intellectual values, 
standards and principles. E.g., some people attach great value to reason and evidence, 
while others do not; among philosophers, some accept evidentialist principles whereas 
others accept various kinds of reliabilism; some people give great weight to science, 
while others do not; some people think that much evidence is required for rationality, 
whereas others think far less is required; some continually fret about the possibility of 
error, whereas others do not care much about this. All these ways to spell out an 
epistemological framework could be presented as differing propositions that some people 
accept and others do not.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 See Sturgeon (“Harman on Objectivity and Moral Relativism” 10).  
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People can (and do) accept difference epistemological frameworks, and these 
frameworks will have different results for particular beliefs. For example, one might 
observe that relative to some possible Plantinga-inspired epistemological framework (or 
theory), belief is God is always rational without any explicit argument. And one might 
also observe that relative to some, say, “classical foundationalist” epistemological 
frameworks, argument is always required for belief in God to be rational. To put this in 
another way, on some frameworks, belief in God is always properly basic, and on other 
frameworks it never is and cannot be. For another example, relative to some reliablistic 
epistemic frameworks, beliefs of those who are victim of skeptical scenarios are not 
justified; relative to many non-reliablist epistemic frameworks, these same (or very 
similar) beliefs are justified. To move away from frameworks that have specific 
epistemologies in them, some frameworks will give evidential weight to what scientists, 
politicians, and/or religious leaders say, and others accept different epistemological 
frameworks.  Some frameworks will give high greater evidential value to one’s own 
experiences and reasons; others will defer to the experiences and reasons of various 
authority figures. These are just some possible dimensions on which a framework could 
be described.  
 Everyone can accept that different standards or frameworks, both moral and 
epistemic, can have different implications for particular cases.  Everyone can agree that 
some beliefs would “make sense” on some epistemological or intellectual frameworks, 
and not make sense on others. People who reject moral relativism and think there are 
universal moral truths – moral absolutists – however, think that once it is observed that 
different moral frameworks often justify different moral conclusions, there is the further 
question of which framework is the correct, or more correct, one. For example, are 
frameworks that could allow framing the innocent morally correct or is any framework 
that could allow that a false moral framework? Moral relativists, however, deny the 
legitimacy of these questions. They believe that there are many different moral 
frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others.  
Epistemic relativists would have the analogous response: relative to one epistemic 
framework, a particular belief will be justified; but relative to another framework, that 
belief would not be justified, and there is no question of which framework is more 
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correct. How would someone arrive at this kind of view? Perhaps by reasoning parallel to 
that which was given in defense of moral relativism: epistemic disagreements make it 
implausible to think that there are objective epistemic properties; but since epistemic 
nihilism would (falsely) imply that we should not make epistemic judgments it is false; 
epistemic non-cognitivism has Frege-Geach problems that show it to be false23; and, 
therefore, there are relative epistemic truths, in the sense articulated above. 
Most epistemologists are not epistemic relativists in any sense analogous to 
Harman’s moral relativism: they think either that (for a particular believer, in his or her 
situation) belief in God is either properly basic or it isn’t, and that someone’s beliefs in a 
skeptical scenario are justified or they are not. They do not think that, “According to 
Plantinga’s theory, belief in God is properly basic for this person in this context, but 
according to some other theories it is not properly basic for this person in this context, 
and according to some versions of reliabilism, the demoner’s beliefs are unjustified, but 
on some non-reliabilist frameworks they are justified and there’s no question which 
epistemic framework is objectively correct.” Of course, what is justified, and even 
“properly basic,” can differ from person to person, but this is not explained by appealing 
to anything like epistemic relativism: plausible explanations of this are consistent with 
the falsity of epistemic relativism.   
So most epistemologists reject an epistemological relativism that is analogous to 
Harman’s moral relativism. They do not believe that there is no single true epistemology, 
or theory about what knowledge and justified belief are, and that although there are many 
different epistemological frameworks none are more correct than the others. As far as I 
know, nobody advocates these statements of epistemic relativism, even Harman. I only 
offer it as a possible view. Most epistemologists are epistemic absolutists: they think that 
there is a single true epistemology, and that it is often difficult to discern exactly what it 
is. Most epistemologists think that it is clear that some epistemological frameworks are 
more correct than others: e.g., a framework on which affirming the consequent and 
denying the antecedent were deemed reliable methods of inference would, all else being 
equal, an inferior epistemic framework. 
                                                          
23 See Geach (“Ascriptivism”) and Geach (“Assertion”).  
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 This is what most epistemologists think, but, beyond this appeal to their opinions, 
are there good reasons to think that epistemic relativism is false? That is, are there are 
good reasons to think the following claims are false? 
For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, it would be 
epistemically reasonable, rational or justifiable for S to believe p, has to be 
understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in relation to epistemic 
framework E, it would be epistemically reasonable, rational or justifiable for S to 
believe p.  Similarly for other epistemic judgments. 
And: 
There is no single true epistemology.  There are many different epistemic 
frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others.  
There are good reasons to deny these claims, although it is most important to 
acknowledge that there is no good, positive reason to accept them, and since the reasons 
given to try to justify it also do not justify its moral counterpart.  
But epistemic relativism should be rejected because, first, it seems clearly true 
that some epistemological frameworks are “more correct” than others: the suggestion that 
all epistemological frameworks are on equal par is deeply implausible. The frameworks 
of flat-Earthers, astrologers, and Holocaust deniers is less correct than those who deny 
their frameworks, in terms of those particular judgments and whatever epistemic 
principles and reasoning that would support those judgments. Possible frameworks that 
affirm that it’s better to believe a contradiction (if one can) than to not believe a 
contradiction are worse than frameworks that deny this.  
Harman sometimes explains a notion of a moral framework as someone’s 
“corrected” values, principles, and judgments, i.e., “the values that would result if the 
person were rationally to revise his or her values in light of the facts, adjusting the values 
in order to make them more coherent with each other and with the facts.”24 Perhaps 
“rational” revision would prevent this (we cannot tell because we are not told what this 
is), but other than that it seems that there is no reason to think that a “corrected” 
framework could not still include positive evaluations about rape and torture for 
entertainment. Similarly, a “corrected” epistemic framework could include deeply 
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implausible epistemic judgments and principles: a cult member might be convinced that 
all that is certain is what the cult-leader says and revise, or “correct,” all his other 
epistemic convictions around that core belief.  Insofar as epistemic relativism implies that 
no other epistemic perspective is “more correct” than this one, epistemic relativism is 
clearly false and conflicts with what we have good reason to believe about epistemic 
evaluations. This kind of example could be made with a number of minimally acceptable 
epistemic frameworks also; we do not need to only concern ourselves with totally 
implausible frameworks to make the point that frameworks can be better and worse in 
various ways.  
 Second, if epistemic relativism is true, then epistemic disagreement is difficult.  
This is because, on epistemic relativism, when we state our epistemic evaluations, we are 
only stating that, relative to some epistemic framework (likely our own) some belief is, 
say, justified. The truth conditions for our statements are determined by these relative 
facts. But this theory could allow that, when evaluating a case, I say that “S is justified in 
believing p” and someone else says that “S is not justified in believing p,” and we have 
not contradicted each other, we have not disagreed. This is because we have each only 
reported what epistemic evaluations our own frameworks support, and both our claims 
might be true. However, we can genuinely disagree about epistemic evaluations; we can 
even disagree about which epistemic framework is correct (or more correct), i.e., which 
particular epistemic judgments, epistemic principles and which views about the nature of 
knowledge and justification are more justified. Since epistemic relativism seems to imply 
that in such cases we are not engaging what each other says, and this is false, this is 
another reason to regard epistemic relativism as false. 
 These are two reasons to reject epistemic relativism, in addition to the basic 
reason that there is little to recommend epistemic relativism in the first place. The 
“reason” to accept epistemic relativism was a leap from the rejection of epistemic 
realism, which was based on the recognition of fundamental epistemic disagreement.  
This leap is implausible, and since this leap is implausible here, it is also implausible in 
the moral case.  Facts about disagreement provide no support for relativism, moral or 
epistemic. Harman did not show that moral relativism is a reasonable inference from 
moral disagreement or a rejection of moral realism.  
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6.4.3. Harman on Epistemic, or Evidential, Relativism.  
In one essay, Harman attempts to, in a fully general way, “indicate the conditions under 
which relativism is a plausible hypothesis.” 25 He then “argue[s] that these conditions are 
met in morality.” In this same essay, he briefly discusses “evidential relativism,” a kind 
of epistemic relativism, and rejects it. I argue that he rejects evidential relativism for 
arbitrary reasons, given his general claims about when relativism is a plausible 
hypothesis and the facts about epistemic diversity and disagreement. 
 Harman’s general claim about when relativism is a plausible hypothesis is the 
following: 
It makes sense to appeal to relativism under the following conditions. [1] We 
envision certain differences of opinion about the application of an absolute notion 
like absolute simultaneity or absolute goodness, [2] differences that we cannot see 
how to resolve. [3] We can see how these differences might arise because of the 
differing salience of certain relations. Simultaneity with respect to one’s own 
reference frame might be more salient than simultaneity with respect to another. 
Goodness with respect to one’s own moral framework might be more salient with 
respect to a different moral framework. This suggests that it may be an illusion 
that an absolute notion of goodness or simultaneity has any application, an 
illusion that arises through confusing the absolute notion with a salient instance of 
the relative notion.26  
This thought process applies well to epistemic evaluations. First, we can “envision” 
differences of opinion about the application of an “absolute” notion like justification, or 
knowledge, or reasonableness, or it being the case that a belief epistemically ought to be 
accepted, or the judgment that something is evidence or strong evidence. We can 
envision this because there are genuine epistemic disagreements and we are aware of 
some of them. Second, it can seem that we cannot see how to resolve some of these 
disputes: insofar as, regarding some issues (especially epistemic ones) there seems to be 
intractable debate concerning which epistemic evaluations are more reasonable than 
others, this condition seems satisfied. Third, we can see how these differences might arise 
                                                          
25 See Harman (“Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism” 14). 
26 “Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism,” p. 18.   
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because of the differing salience of certain relations: we can see how some people would 
judge a belief’s relation to “objective” evidence to be the salient relation that determines 
epistemic status, while others might regard (what we might call) non-evidential relations 
to be the salient relation: faith-based relations, emotional considerations, reliability of 
belief-forming processes, and so on. For some people, one relation seems more salient 
and, for others, different relations will be salient. Following Harman, we might conclude 
that this suggests that it may be an illusion that an absolute notion of any epistemic 
evaluation has any application, an illusion that arises through confusing the absolute 
notion with a salient instance of the relative notion. 
 If this reasoning is promising in the moral case, then it is promising in the 
epistemic case. However, it is not at all promising in the epistemic case. People do have 
different epistemic frameworks and some relations seem more (and less) salient to people 
in their epistemic evaluations, but this in no way indicates that there are no objectively 
correct relations that make epistemic evaluations objectively true or not. In the epistemic 
case, it’s plausible to think that some people are sometimes not well placed to see these 
relations: perhaps they lack the relevant experiences or training, perhaps they have 
psychological or emotion problems or perhaps they are just epistemically blind to 
epistemic qualities that exist. The fact that they fail to see them is not good reason to 
think that they are not there. If this response is plausible in the epistemic case, then it is 
plausible in the moral case. Therefore, Harman has not “indicate[d] the conditions under 
which relativism is a plausible hypothesis.” 
 Later in this essay, Harman discusses epistemic relativism in light of 
consideration of the possibility that all normal people who were fully and vividly 
informed of the relevant non-moral facts would converge on the same moral evaluations, 
no matter which moral framework they initially accepted.  Harman say that if this were 
the case, then the moral evaluations would depend solely on – or be relative to – “human 
nature” alone, not on which moral frameworks are accepted. Harman does not explain 
what he means by this, but he then discusses epistemic judgments in light of this concern: 
A view such as this, seeing relativity to human nature but nothing beyond that, 
has some plausibility for normative epistemology. What counts as good evidence 
or good reasons in ordinary real life situations may be fixed by a common human 
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nature that has resulted from evolution. (The genes of people with inferior 
standards of evidence may simply lose out in the evolutionary battle for survival). 
Given your beliefs, your innate procedures for evaluating evidence may determine 
what further things you have reason to believe. We can imagine that there are 
people with different procedures who would not have reasons to modify their 
views in the way we do; if so, evidence would be relative to human nature but not 
to anything more. 
 For myself, I am inclined to accept a strong form of moral relativisms and 
only a weak form of evidential relativism. In my view, what is right and wrong is 
not just relative to human nature, it also varies with particular moral frameworks; 
but what counts as evidence depends only on innate mechanisms that are part of 
human nature.  But in this paper I will not say anything more about evidential 
relativism.27 
There is much that is not clear or explained in this passage, including exactly what the 
issue is. Insofar as there are people with inferior standards of evidence, they clearly have 
not lost out in the “evolutionary battle for survival.” This suggests that it is doubtful that, 
“What counts as good evidence or good reasons in ordinary real life situations may be 
fixed by a common human nature that has resulted from evolution.” Perhaps this suggests 
that there is not a common human nature that, as Harman suggests, determines whether 
something is good evidence for some belief. Perhaps Harman is correct that “what counts 
as evidence depends only on innate mechanisms that are part of human nature,” but 
epistemic disagreements might make that hypothesis implausible. Is it that there are these 
innate mechanisms that determine whether something counts as evidence, but – since 
estimates of the existence and quality of evidence can vary greatly, even when much 
evidence is shared – some people’s mechanisms are not working well, or other concerns 
are able to influence them for the worst? Since Harman’s remarks are short, and their 
meaning obscure, it is not clear how we should answer these questions.  
What is most important, however, for my purposes here, is to observe that 
Harman at least seems to have considered the possibility of epistemic relativisms and 
rejected them. I have argued that concerns about disagreements and the application of 
                                                          
27 See Harman (“Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism” 19-20).  
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Harman’s general conditions for the plausibility of relativism support belief in epistemic 
relativism, if they support belief in moral relativism. The fact that Harman at least 
discusses epistemic relativism gives some support to my claim that the reasons for moral 
relativism point toward, or are suggestive of, epistemic relativism. If Harman had 
explained and developed “evidential relativism” and gave his reasons to reject it, this 
might have helped us see what faults my arguments might have. This also would have 
helped us see, in more precise detail, under what conditions Harman thinks relativism is a 
plausible hypothesis since, apparently, he does not accept his own criteria since they 
seem to apply in epistemic case, but he rejects epistemic relativism.  
As it stands, however, although the arguments for moral relativism have little 
positive to recommend them, they seem to have unacceptable implications for epistemic 
relativism, a view that conflicts with so much that we reasonably believe about epistemic 
evaluations. Therefore, we should reject these arguments. Again, Harman’s moral 
relativism is no threat to moral realism.  
6.5. Moral and Epistemic Explanations. 
To conclude my discussion of Harman’s moral irrealism, I will briefly address his much-
discussed concerns about whether moral facts explain or cause natural facts and what 
difference it might makes either way for whether we should believe there are moral 
facts.28 I argue that a comparable worry can be raised about epistemic properties and 
facts: it not obvious that they explain or cause any natural facts. However, an important 
consequence follows from rejecting epistemic facts on this basis: if there are no epistemic 
facts, then any standard that would rule them out is not justified or reasonable to accept. 
Since many, like Harman, have tried to use this very standard to argue that there are no 
moral facts, but this standard would imply that the standard itself is not justified, these 
arguments fail to justify the rejection of moral realism. Again, moral realism is defended: 
Harman provides no reason to reject it. 
The issue of moral and epistemic explanations can be discussed in great detail and 
with complex metaphysical sophistication, but I intend to discuss it in the most basic, 
metaphysically neutral manner I can. My goal is to merely present the issue in its most 
simple form and develop one plausible response to it. Those who favor alternative, and 
                                                          
28 See Harman (Nature of Morality 1-10) and Harman (“Moral Explanations”).  
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more combative, response to Harman might develop responses that rely on explicitly 
defended moral and epistemic ontologies: e.g., those who are especially interested in 
defending a kind of “naturalism” in ethics (or epistemology) might feel the need to 
develop a naturalist ontology of moral (or epistemic) properties. My response, however, 
will be metaphysically neutral since this neutral response is all that’s needed to undercut 
Harman’s arguments. 
Harman argues that moral facts do not explain or cause natural facts, or that they 
are not needed to explain natural facts, or that they do not figure into the best explanation 
of natural facts. These claims are all different, and Harman can be interpreted as making 
any of them, but for my purposes these differences do not matter. What is important that, 
on the basis of (any of) these claims, Harman concludes, at most, that there is insufficient 
reason to believe that there are moral facts and, at least, that this is a problem for those 
who think there are moral facts. To make the issue more concrete, let us consider a 
sample non-moral fact: that Jim believes that all wartime beheadings are wrong. This 
fact pertains to moral matters, but it is a non-moral fact insofar as it is a merely 
descriptive fact about what Jim believes. Harman asks what explains this non-moral fact 
or what causes it to be the case that Jim has this belief. An especially good time to ask 
these questions is just after Jim watches another wartime beheading on the Internet and 
now confidently believes that what he saw was wrong. Harman’s question is why Jim 
believes this.  
Here is one possible kind of answer: Jim believes that beheadings are wrong 
because beheadings are wrong. It is a fact that beheadings are wrong: beheadings have 
the property of being wrong.  Furthermore, Jim has observed this: the perception of this 
moral property or fact caused him to have this belief. Thus, the non-moral fact that Jim 
has the beliefs he does is explained, in part, by appeal to independent moral facts or 
properties that cause him to have the beliefs he does.  
Here is a second kind of answer to the question of why Jim believes what he does: 
Jim has a set of moral principles such that, whenever he sees beheadings, or killings or 
acts of brutal violence that seem needless to him, he concludes that they are wrong. His 
principles are be quite deeply embedded in his psyche, so much that the reasoning, i.e., 
his processing this non-moral information in light of his moral principles, might be done 
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non-consciously and so quickly that it seems that Jim just immediately judges that what 
he’s seeing is wrong. This kind of explanation is importantly different from the previous 
explanation. On this explanation, the non-moral fact that Jim has the moral beliefs he 
does is explained only by Jim’s moral principles or moral sense, his non-moral 
observations, and other background information. There is no appeal to independent moral 
facts or properties: they are not required to explain why Jim has the beliefs and feelings 
he does about beheadings.  
Harman claims that all our moral beliefs and feelings can be explained in this 
manner: for any moral belief, we might best explain the fact that we accept it only by 
appealing to facts about our psychological make-up, our perceptions about the relevant 
non-moral information and whatever mental processing results from the conjunction of 
these two sources. The claim is not merely that we can explain non-moral facts these 
ways, but that these explanations are better than those that appeal to moral facts. Why are 
these explanations better? Presumably, this is because to introduce moral facts is to 
introduce a new kind of fact to our ontology and Harman thinks, following Occam’s 
razor, that we should do only this if we need to. And Harman thinks we do not need to: 
positing moral facts and properties does not provide any edge in explaining any non-
moral phenomena.  He therefore concludes that there is this is a problem for those who 
believe that there are moral facts.  
Harman think that the failure to pass the “explanation” test undercuts one 
important kind of reason to think that a thing does not exist. Some philosophers, in 
particular, Nick Sturgeon, have argued that moral facts do explain non-moral facts, or 
that they are required to explain non-moral facts, or that they provide better explanations 
of various non-moral phenomena than a morally nihilist ontology would provide.29 All 
these claims are slightly different, but for my purposes these differences do not manner. 
So, Sturgeon argues that Hitler’s being evil figures into explanations, good explanations, 
for why he orchestrated the Holocaust and slavery’s injustice contributes to explaining 
why the Civil War occurred: an explanation that appeals to injustice is better than one 
that does not. This response does not challenge Harman’s claim that the failure to pass 
                                                          
29 See Sturgeon (“Moral Explanations”) and Sturgeon (“Harman on Moral Explanations”).  
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the “explanation” test shows that a thing does not exist; it accepts this test and claims that 
moral facts pass it with flying colors.   
 I will return to Sturgeon’s response shortly. My main concern is whether 
epistemic facts or properties explain or cause natural facts, or whether they are needed to 
explain natural facts, or whether they contribute to the best explanation of natural facts.  
Again, I will overlook the important differences in these concerns, as the differences are 
not important for this general discussion and the points I wish to make. Consider a 
candidate non-moral fact, viz. my believing that it is rational, or justified, for me to 
believe that I am typing at a computer. What explains the fact that I believe this? What 
causes this fact to obtain? 
Here is one possible kind of answer: I believe that my belief is rational or justified 
because it is justified or rational. Perhaps certain types of beliefs are rational or justified, 
I somehow perceive this, and somehow perceive that my current belief falls under that 
type. So it is a fact that this token belief is justified in my circumstance: it has the 
property of being justified. Furthermore, I have this belief because I have observed this: I 
have somehow perceived this epistemic property – perhaps with a kind of intellectual 
intuition – and the property then, among other things, caused me to have this belief. 
Thus, the non-moral fact that I believe my belief is justified or rational is explained, in 
part, by appeal to independent epistemic facts or properties that are part of the causal 
ancestry of the beliefs I have.  
Here is a second kind of answer to the question of why I believe what I do: I have 
an epistemic framework, a set of principles and values, such that when I have these kinds 
of experiences and form beliefs about them, I believe that these beliefs are justified. 
These principles are deeply embedded in my psyche, so much that the reasoning, i.e., my 
processing my perceptions in light of my epistemic framework, might be done non-
consciously and so quickly that it seems that it immediately seems to me that my belief is 
justified, if I reflect on whether my belief is justified. 
This kind of explanation is importantly different from the previous explanation. 
On this second explanation, the non-moral fact that I have the epistemic beliefs I do is 
explained only by my epistemic principles and sense of what I ought to believe, my non-
epistemic observations, and other non-epistemic background information. There is no 
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appeal to independent epistemic facts or properties: they play no part in the explanation 
for why I have the epistemic beliefs I do about by current beliefs; my epistemic beliefs 
are not caused by my perception of epistemic properties.  
 I have only developed two examples: a moral example concerning beheadings and 
an epistemic example concerning my present belief that I am at a computer. But these 
examples are arbitrary; other beliefs could have been used to motivate the concern about 
whether moral or epistemic properties explain natural phenomena or whether they cause 
any natural phenomena. The epistemic case might be made more vividly by considering a 
belief with more controversial “content,” such as a belief in the positive (or negative) 
epistemic status of a political or religious belief. Perhaps for these kinds of epistemic 
beliefs we would sometimes be more willing to explain their occurrence by appealing to 
people’s epistemic frameworks and background beliefs, not that they perceive objective 
epistemic properties.   
But ordinary mundane epistemic beliefs can work as well: some, especially 
ancient, skeptics might explain our making positive judgments about rationality and 
justification not by claiming that we (successfully) somehow perceive the epistemic facts, 
but because we have “internalized” highly permissive epistemic frameworks. It’s these 
frameworks, in conjunction with our experiences, which cause us to judge beliefs as 
justified. This type of skeptic would typically see this type of framework as a false 
framework, and would think that, on a more demanding framework, we would see 
epistemic reality for what it is.   
But someone who is thinking about epistemic explanations along the lines 
Harman thinks about moral explanations might come to similar conclusions. Upon 
reflection upon numerous cases, we might conclude that epistemic facts and properties 
are, at least, not needed to explain any non-epistemic facts.  For any non-moral facts that 
we might typically explain by appealing to what someone knows, or is justified in 
believing, or is reasonable, or should have concluded and so on, we might think that we 
can explain these facts purely by appealing to what is believed, believed with a sufficient 
level of confidence, with the truth of the belief and, perhaps, with luck (e.g., “They were 
confident that p and by luck p turned out to be true”).  We often try to explain what 
people do by appealing to what they know and reasonably believe.  But it appears that 
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these notions could be dispensed with in favor of purely psychological descriptions and 
the truth of what’s believed. Some might think that the best explanation of the relevant 
non-epistemic facts would appeal only to these further non-moral facts about our 
psychologies and epistemic frameworks.   
If one thought either of these things, one would have come to a conclusion about 
the explanatory power of epistemic facts that is parallel to Harman’s conclusions about 
moral facts. That is, one would conclude that neither kind of fact or property explains or 
best explains or is needed to explain non-moral phenomena. One might think that moral 
properties do not explain or do not provide explanations comparable in quality to those 
that don’t appeal to moral properties and, on that basis, conclude that there are no moral 
properties or we are not justified in believing that there are any or that there is some 
problem for those who think there are moral properties. But if epistemic properties do not 
explain, then similar conclusions would seem to be warranted: there are no epistemic 
properties or we are not justified in believing them or those who think there are epistemic 
properties have a problem.  
I will argue that this surprising conclusion shows the entire “explanations”-based 
approach to eliminating properties, moral or epistemic, is mistaken. Even if moral or 
epistemic properties do not explain non-moral or non-epistemic facts that is not a good 
reason to think that they do not exist.  
As I mentioned above, some have challenged Harman’s claim that moral facts are 
non-explanatory of non-moral phenomena: they have replied that moral facts do explain, 
or best explain, various non-moral phenomena.  Evaluating these responses is challenging 
in part because these responses depend on the plausibility of various sophisticated 
naturalistic metaphysics of moral properties; here I will avoid these metaphysical details.  
However, I will register my skepticism with these approaches: it is not implausible to 
think that all non-moral phenomena, including people’s moral beliefs and feelings, can be 
explained without positing objective moral properties. That is a plausible view.  
I only sketched a case in favor of thinking that epistemic facts are non-
explanatory. I find this case plausible, since that it seems that the existence of our 
epistemic beliefs and attitudes can be explained in a manner that denies the existence of 
epistemic properties. However, this case could be challenged. One could argue that there 
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are some natural phenomena that would not obtain, or would not be caused, if there were 
no epistemic facts. Developing a response like this might require one to develop a  
metaphysics of epistemic properties, and again, I will avoid these details and hard work.  
However, I will again register my skepticism with this approach: it is not implausible to 
think that all non-epistemic phenomena, including people’s epistemic beliefs and 
feelings, can be explained without positing objective epistemic properties. This view is 
counterintuitive and has surprising implications, which I discussed in previous chapters, 
but it’s a possible view.   
 My favored response, however, to the overall issue of whether moral or epistemic 
facts would explain non-moral facts (and what difference is would make if they do not) is 
not to argue that they do explain, or that they provide the best explanation, or that non-
natural phenomena cannot be explained without them. My response is to argue against 
principles used to get from the failure of a kind of fact to explain non-moral facts to the 
conclusion that we are unjustified in believing in this kind of fact, or facts of these kinds 
are ontologically problematic. I argue that these principles are not justified, not 
reasonable, and such that it ought not to be accepted: we have better reason to reject them 
than accept them. Since this is the case, there is no need to worry about any arguments 
against moral realism from the failure of moral facts to explain, since we are not justified 
in accepting these arguments, since we are justified rejecting this kind of premise.    
Harman’s many commentators and critics have argued that he is not optimally 
clear in presenting his principle motivating his discussion of moral explanations, so they 
develop versions of this principle that seem to be supported by Harman’s discussion. 
These principles differ, but they point to a similar idea. Sayre-McCord presents it in this 
way: 
A hypothesis should be believed only if the hypothesis plays a role in the best 
explanation we have of our making the observations that we do.30  
Joel Pust presents the principle as the following: 
S is justified in accepting a proposition p only if the truth of p plays a necessary 
role in the best explanation of the occurrence of one or more of S’s observations 
or intuitions.31 
                                                          
30 See Sayre-McCord (“Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence” 267). 
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And Shafer-Landau has developed it in the following two similar manners.  First: 
If a putative fact causes nothing, then we lack any reason for justifiably believing 
that it exists. 
 And, second; 
If a putative fact purposes to cause something that is better explained by 
something else, then we have good reason to deny the existence of any such 
fact.32  
Call these principles the Test. The Test, in its various formulations, offers a necessary 
condition for it being the case that we should believe some proposition, are justified in 
believing it, or have a good reason to accept it and the existence of all that is entailed by 
it. We might agree, sincerely or for the sake of argument, that moral and epistemic facts 
do not meet this test: they do not explain anything that might be better explained without 
appealing to them. If this is true and a premise that stated The Test is true also, then these 
two premises would imply or make it likely that there are no epistemic facts.  
But should we think that the premises that might be derived from the Test are 
true? Is there good reason to accept the test? Or is there better reason to reject it? Some 
reasons to reject it follow from seeing what its implications are, in conjunction with the 
claim that epistemic properties do not cause or explain. From this it follows that there are 
no such properties or that we should not believe there are such properties or that some 
other negative epistemic evaluations of beliefs that entail such properties are true. From 
this it follows that no positive epistemic evaluations are true or that no epistemic 
evaluations ever themselves should be evaluated positively, since there are no epistemic 
properties to make these true.  
This might be true – perhaps there no epistemic properties and perhaps no 
epistemic evaluations are reasonable or unjustified – but it is a highly skeptical view. 
Insofar as we have reason to think that epistemic evaluations are sometimes true, and that 
the best explanation of what makes them true is that there are stance independent 
epistemic properties, we have reason to reject premises that would support the denial of 
this. Thus, I argue that we have better reason to reject the Test than accept it. Thus, we 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 See Pust (Intuitions as Evidence 77). 
32 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism 105).  
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have better reason to reject arguments against both moral and epistemic properties on the 
basis of their alleged explanatory or causal impotency. These arguments provide 
insufficient reason to reject moral realisms.  
Joel Pust also argues in favor of rejecting the Test. He first notes that Harman, 
and others who have advocated similar views (he calls them “explanationists”), gives 
very little positive argument in the Test’s favor: very few reasons are given for why we 
should accept this criterion for properties, and few philosophers investigate its 
implications for a wider range of properties, especially epistemic ones.33 Pust then argues 
that the Test is “reflectively self-undermining,” by which he means that if someone 
adequately understands the Test, one will see that the Test provides its own reasons for its 
rejection. This is because it fails to meet its own standards: if the Test is true and 
epistemic properties are non-explanatory or non-causal, then there are no such epistemic 
properties that would make it such that the Test ought to be believed. He writes that the 
Test “cannot be justifiably believed by explanationists [like Harman] even if they 
(wrongly) eschew the need for any positive support of it. [W]hen conjoined with other 
propositions the explanationist skeptic accepts, [the test] generates its own defeater and is 
therefore epistemically self-defeating. So even if one could come to rationally believe it, 
one could not reflectively maintain such belief.”34 This is, at least, a problem for 
philosophers like Harman who try to use this to raise doubts about moral realism.  
Russ Shafer-Landau makes a similar point: 
. . if normative facts do not exist, because of their lack of independent causal 
power, then there is not fact to the effect that we ought to believe the causal test, 
disbelieve moral realism, etc.  But if there are no such facts, then those who reject 
the causal test may be epistemic faultless. All the evidence and argument there is 
would point in no direction at all—for such pointing would amount to a case for, 
a justification of, a warrant to believe, the causal test (or its rejection). Yet such 
things are normative facts. If we bar them from the ontology, we eliminate the 
possibility of accrediting any belief about such matters. Once we recognize that 
the epistemic standard associated with the causal test—that one ought to believe 
                                                          
33 See Pust (Intuitions as Evidence 84).  
34 See Pust (Intuitions as Evidence 91). 
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only what the test warrants—is itself normative, then (following Harman et al.) 
the standard can only have the non-cognitive or relativistic force. Yet on this 
alternative, opponents need be making no error [in the sense that they should 
change their views] in rejecting it.35 
He concludes by noting that if explanationists were to allow epistemic facts into their 
ontology, or allow them to be an exception to the Test, then there’s nothing to bar moral 
facts from the same ontology. If there are epistemic facts, truths about what we ought to 
believe, that don’t explain any non-moral phenomena, which opens the door to moral 
facts that are equally unexplanatory. If epistemic facts are, at least, ontologically 
tolerable, then moral ones should be as well.  
Sayre-McCord notes that explanationists already accept the existence of epistemic 
facts: they think that recognized as better or, ideally, best, explanations should be 
accepted over inferior explanations.  He then writes that, “Either there is a fact of the 
matter about which explanations are best, or there is not. If there is then there are at least 
some evaluative facts (as to which explanations are better than others); if not, then the 
criterion will never find an application and so will support no argument against moral 
theory.”36 Here we must be careful to not think that by “best explanation” he merely 
means an explanation that has some (often hard to specify) natural features, in terms of 
simplicity, fruitfulness, entrenchment, and so forth.37 These natural features are 
important, but also essential to something being the best explanation for Sayre-McCord’s 
purposes is that if some explanation has these natural features, then it should be accepted 
over an explanation that lacks them: we are justified, or more justified, in accepting 
explanations with these features than those that lack them. His point is that if we are 
willing to acknowledge that there are truths like that then there is no reason to not 
acknowledge moral truths either. He writes, “Once it has been granted that some 
explanations are better than others, many obstacles to a defense of moral values 
                                                          
35 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism 113). 
36 See Sayre-McCord (“Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence” 277). 
37 Sayre-McCord also considers and rejects psychological and sociological notions of “best explanation” 
such that what determines whether an explanation is best is whether we, or someone, “like” it or approve of 
it.  He notes that if “explanationists” were to take this route, they would simply be reporting that they don’t 
like or approve of trying to explain non-moral phenomena by appealing to moral considerations.   He notes 
that, even if that were true, that isn’t a reason for anyone else to agree with them. See Sayre-McCord 
(“Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence” 278). 
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disappear. In fact, all general objections to the existence of value must be rejected as too 
strong.  Moreover, whatever ontological niche and epistemological credentials we find 
for explanatory values will presumably serve equally well for moral values.”38   
In light of these many objections to the crucial premises in moral explanations 
argument, it is clear that it is not clear anyone should accept them, especially those who 
are not antecedently committed to it. Since this is the case, arguments from concerns 
about explanation can be reasonably rejected, and we can reasonably think that they do 
not provide good grounds for rejecting moral or epistemic facts. Thus, moral and 
epistemic realists have nothing to fear from Harman’s arguments, and nothing to fear 
even if arguments like Sturgeon’s fail to show that that moral (and epistemic) facts are 
explanatory. There are other ways to argue for this similar conclusion, but this kind of 
argument suffices to make the point.  
6.6. Conclusion. 
In this chapter I have discussed a number of considerations Harman gives in favor of his 
preferred brand of moral irrealism, i.e. his moral relativisms. I have argued against these 
arguments for moral relativism by raising objections to epistemic relativisms that are 
analogous to moral relativisms. I have argued these epistemic relativisms would appear to 
be justified, if they can be justified, by the same kind of reasoning Harman gives for 
moral relativism. By constructing parallel arguments for epistemic relativism, I have 
argued that epistemic relativisms are false and that we have reasons to reject them. I have 
argued that none of the arguments he gives in favor of moral relativism are strong: earlier 
relativisms are based in entirely implausible assumptions that should be rejected; later 
versions of relativism are poorly defended since we are given no reason why we should 
prefer relativism over a sophisticated nihilism if we were to reject moral realism. Finally, 
I have argued that the crucial premise in Harman’s argument to the effect that there are 
no moral facts because they are fail to explain non-moral phenomena is epistemically 
self-undermining and so there is no good reason to accept it. If an epistemic relativism 
that is inspired by Harman’s arguments for moral relativism is false and unreasonable, 
then Harman’s arguments for moral realisms are unsound and unreasonable to accept 
                                                          
38 See Sayre-McCord (“Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence” 278). 
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also. Again, nothing in Harman’s work provides a good reason to reject moral or 
epistemic realism. 
 224 
CHAPTER 7: Contemporary Moral and Epistemic Irrealisms  
7.1. Introduction. 
In this work, I have presented and explained the arguments that Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, 
Mackie and Harman give in favor of their moral irrealisms. Since nearly all contemporary 
work on moral realism and irrealism is done in reference to these positions, we might call 
these figures “classical” moral irrealists. I have argued that their arguments suggest 
analogous arguments for epistemic irrealisms. I have presented reasons to think that 
epistemic irrealisms are false and the arguments for them unsound. Since these arguments 
share major premises with arguments for moral irrealisms, I hope to have undercut the 
common arguments given against moral realism.  
As far as I know, all these figures would have resisted (or, in Harman’s case, 
resist) the implications I argue follow from their premises, and they would not have 
accepted epistemic irrealisms of any kind. And most contemporary moral irrealists (most 
of whom are emotivists or expressivists of various kinds1) would resist also: they would 
claim that although moral judgments are never literally true, epistemic judgments are 
sometimes literally true. They would maintain that there are important differences in 
moral and epistemic judgments and so, despite possible appearance to the contrary, their 
reasons for moral irrealisms have no implications for the semantic, metaphysical and 
epistemic status of epistemic judgments.2  
However, Russell Shafer-Landau and others have argued that this response is 
unsustainable and that, contrary to the judgment of many contemporary moral irrealists, 
their positions are subject to the same kinds of objections I have raised against classical 
irrealisms. Shafer-Landau has raised this objection to the contemporary moral irrealisms 
developed by Mark Timmons, Simon Blackburn, Crispin Wright and others. 3 Below I 
                                                          
1 There seem to be few contemporary moral nihilists. One might wonder why expressivism has come to be 
the more popular version of moral irrealism.  
2 I have argued that this resistance can be used to undercut their arguments: if they think there’s a way they 
should respond my arguments concerning epistemic irrealism, e.g., intellectual integrity somehow 
“demands” a response (e.g., recasting their major premises so they do not suggest epistemic irrealism), then 
that judgment will be ultimately inconsistent with the major premises used in their arguments for moral 
irrealisms: if they truly ought to respond some way, then their initial premise is false. See below for a 
summary of this strategy. 
3 See Blackburn (Spreading the Word, Essays in Quasi-Realism and Ruling Passions), Timmons (Morality 
Without Foundations) and Wright (Truth and Objectivity). And see Shafer Landau (Moral Realism) and 
Terence Cuneo (Normative Web).  
 225 
summarize his method of attack and conclusions on these positions. Both are similar to 
those that I have developed regarding the meta-ethical positions I have focused on in this 
work.  
My focus of this final chapter, however, is to present and evaluate the views of 
two contemporary moral irrealists who, unlike most of their peers, accept epistemic 
irrealisms. These two philosophers are Allen Gibbard and Hartry Field.4 They think that, 
given the moral and epistemic discourses’ similarities, i.e., they are both what they call 
“normative” or “evaluative” discourses, arguments for either position suggest comparable 
arguments for the other, or that the same kind of argument justifies a general kind of 
irrealism about the normative or evaluative. Gibbard is an epistemic expressivist, and 
Field is a kind of epistemic relativist, and they both explicitly endorse these positions and 
deny epistemic realisms.  Since they think this, I do not need to summarize their 
arguments for their positions in great detail; unlike earlier figures who do not advocate 
epistemic irrealisms, I do not have to display Gibbard’s and Field’s premises to show that 
they suggest epistemically irrealists conclusions since they accept this implication.5 I 
don’t need to convince them, or anyone, that their premises suggest epistemic irrealism, 
since they realize this.  
For those who have reasons to think that some kind of epistemic realism is true, 
they will see that those reasons imply that epistemic expressivisms and relativisms are 
false. In my previous chapters, I developed some of these reasons. I argued that the 
hypothesis that epistemic judgments are, first, either true or false (i.e., cognitivism) is 
more plausible than its denial (i.e., non-cognitivism) and that, second, that there’s more 
reason to think that epistemic judgments are sometimes true than never true and, third, 
that the best candidates for these truth-makers are stance-independent epistemic facts. If 
these are good reasons, then there are good reasons to regard Gibbard’s and Field’s meta-
ethics and meta-epistemologies as false, and their arguments for them as not strong. 
                                                          
4 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings and Thinking How to Live) and Field (“Apriority as an 
Evaluative Notion” and “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse”).  Blackburn purportedly 
accepts epistemic irrealism (or epistemic “quasi-realism,” as he would prefer to call it), but since he has not 
developed this position in print, I will not discuss it.  
5 Even if, due to some logical blunder by Gibbard and Field, their premises in fact do not yield these 
epistemically anti-realist conclusions, i.e., they have somehow misunderstood their own arguments, they 
accept these epistemically irrealisms. I will argue below that these epistemically irrealisms have false and 
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These reasons for these claims also can provide reasons to think that at least some of their 
arguments’ premises are false. In this chapter I will look at these arguments and evaluate 
them.  
It’s possible that Gibbard and Field might not have given good positive reasons 
for their views: perhaps they haven’t offered enough in favor of their position to move a 
neutral observer. They might provide proposals for how things might be, but not much to 
think that this is how things are actually in the moral or epistemic realm. This is not a 
criticism I wish to directly make. This is because that criticism could have been raised to 
any of the moral irrealists I have discussed, since each position rested on, at least, 
doubtful arguments and assumptions: positivism for Ayer, motivational “magnetism” and 
a dubious phenomenology of moral judgments for Stevenson and Mackie, the assumption 
that moral properties are equally salient for Mackie and Harman, Hare’s assumptions 
about the value of consistency and rationality, and so on. If, for each theory, we 
responded merely that inadequate positive reasons were given on its behalf and then left 
it at that, we wouldn’t have found any positive reasons to reject these positions. I have 
tried to find positive reasons to reject these positions in terms of their, what many would 
regard as, false and unjustified implications for meta-epistemological concerns. 
In this chapter, I will do attempt to do this for Gibbard and Field’s theories. I will 
ask what would follow, logically, if this theory of the nature of epistemic and intellectual 
judgments were true. I will argue that rationally unacceptable consequences follow and, 
therefore, that their views constitute a false and rationally unacceptable understanding of 
the nature of epistemic judgment and reasoning itself. Thus, their views about the nature 
of epistemic judgments ought to be rejected. Since these views about the nature of moral 
judgments follow from the same considerations, this shows that their meta-ethic ought to 
be rejected also. Thus, moral and epistemic realisms are again defended from the most 
direct attacks against them yet.  
7.2. Summary of the Arguments Against Classical Moral Irrealism. 
Before I turn to Gibbard and Field, I wish to summarize the main strategy of argument I 
have used against classical moral irrealists. I then note that other philosophers have used 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rationally unacceptable implications; if this is so, then this undercuts whatever arguments are given in their 
favor.  
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a similar strategy against many contemporary moral irrealists. I will then see if a 
comparable strategy will work against Gibbard’s and Field’s epistemic irrealisms.  
For each classical moral irrealist, I have observed that we can understand him, 
most simply, as arguing that, because moral judgments have certain features, his 
preferred version of moral irrealism is true. So, although each figure had more reasons 
than these, we might recall some of the main features of moral judgments that these 
philosophers focused on: e.g., Ayer observes that moral judgments are neither analytic 
nor empirically verifiable; Stevenson observes that moral discourse often has a 
“dynamic,” emotionally-engaging quality and suggests, along with Mackie and Hare, that 
moral judgments have a motivational “magnetism” about them; Hare claims that moral 
terms’ meanings are not adequately captured by descriptive theories of meaning; Mackie 
and Harman observe that there are fundamental moral disagreements; and Harman argues 
that moral facts do not explain any non-moral facts.  
From each of these kinds of premises, each irrealist concludes, either deductively 
or non-deductively, that moral judgments are never literally true, that moral realism is 
false. For each of these arguments, however, there were typically unstated premises that 
are essential to logically link up what we might even concede as true premises stated in 
the preceding paragraph to the various moral irrealist conclusions. I have suggested that 
the obvious candidate for this kind of premise is the universal claim that any judgment 
with these features is never literally true.6 Combine this premise with the claims above 
and we can conclude that moral judgments are never true.   
However, I have argued that epistemic judgments – judgments about what’s 
reasonable, justified, known, should or ought to be believed, must be concluded given 
one’s other beliefs, and so on – have these features identified above also. Clearly, 
particular epistemic judgments are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable; epistemic 
discourse often has a “dynamic,” emotionally-engaging quality to it; epistemic terms are 
not analytically equivalent to empirical terms; and there are fundamental epistemic 
disagreements. More controversially, I have argued that its plausible to think that 
epistemic judgments also have a motivational “magnetism,” that they also do not refer to 
                                                          
6 I never explicitly articulated this premise, but all my arguments could be recast in a form utilizing a 
premise like this.  
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sui generis terms, and that epistemic facts do not explain any non-moral facts either, 
especially if it is plausible to accept the analogous claim about moral judgments 
(although I have stated my doubts about some of these claims about the nature of moral 
judgments).   
If we combine premises that state these features of epistemic judgments with the 
major, general premises used, or presupposed, in arguments for moral irrealisms, these 
sets of premises yield comparable epistemic irrealisms on which no epistemic judgments 
are ever literally true either. This, however, is just a fact about the logic of the arguments 
for epistemic irrealisms. Those who accept epistemic realism (and think they are justified 
and doing so) might immediately reject these arguments against moral realism on 
recognition of this fact, since they believe that these premises yield false conclusions. On 
standard assumptions about reasoning and argumentation, this might be the proper 
response: if you see that a proposition that you justifiably believe is false, but that it 
follows from some principle, then that principle ought to be rejected as false also.   
But an important, and interesting, question is whether there is any way we ought 
to respond to these arguments, as an intellectual matter, once they are understood. Should 
we accept them? Would anyone be justified in believing that they are sound or unsound, 
strong or weak?  If a moral irrealist rejected my arguments them, must he then, at least, 
revise his major premises or reject some of my claims about the nature of epistemic 
judgments so that his beliefs do not validly imply epistemic irrealisms? If he did not, 
would that somehow be bad or worthy of some kind of criticism or disappointment? To 
answer any of these questions is to make an epistemic judgment, and epistemic irrealisms 
have interesting implications here.  
Each question above can be answered affirmatively or negatively. Negative 
answers have a surprising implication. Suppose there are no truths about what’s 
reasonable or justified or what you ought to believe.7 If that’s true, then it’s not true that 
anyone ought to accept moral irrealisms. This result undercuts any epistemic support for 
moral irrealisms; at least none of the moral irrealists I have discussed have wanted to 
                                                          
7 One suggestion that I won’t pursue here, due to its obscurity, lack of motivation and the fact that I 
discussed this view earlier in my chapter on Harman, is that there are epistemic truths but that they are 
“relative” truths, or there are epistemic truths “relative” to an epistemic framework. This view might 
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admit that their views are not reasonable, not justified, and not such that they should be 
accepted, from an intellectual point of view.8 All seem to want to maintain that there are 
such epistemic properties or facts and so that judgments about what has these properties 
can be literally true. And they maintain that their position about what’s a reasonable view 
about the nature of moral morality is the reasonable, justified one, not the views of moral 
realists. Perhaps what they say here is true, and evaluative epistemic judgments are never 
true, but I have argued that we have good reasons to reject that view. These reasons are 
stronger than the reasons to think that they, and even moral judgments, are never true.  
Positive answers to these epistemic questions about what’s reasonable and 
justified, however, might undercut the arguments for moral irrealism. Positive answers 
show that a major premise akin to the above claim that any judgment with these features 
is never literally true is a false premise: if there are true epistemic evaluations, then it’s 
neither true nor reasonable to believe that any judgment with these features is never 
literally true because epistemic judgments have these features and they are literally true. 
This result undercuts the crucial premise in arguments for moral irrealism.   
And suppose the existence of epistemic facts and properties shows a premise like 
this (that any judgment with these features is never literally true) is false, and false 
because there is an “epistemic reality” that makes our epistemic judgments true, when 
they are true. If there is an epistemic reality, i.e., objective facts and properties that make 
it such that we ought to believe certain things (given our experiences, and context, and so 
forth) and should reason in other ways, and, especially, if it is reasonable to believe that 
there is an epistemic reality, then it seems that there can be a moral reality also, i.e., 
objective facts and properties that make it such that we ought to do some things and not 
others and some states of affairs are more valuable than others, and so on. If it is 
reasonable to believe that there are evaluative or normative truths pertaining to belief and 
one’s mental operations, there is little reason why there are not evaluative or normative 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conflate “relative truth” with “belief” and this view would be highly revisionist. It is certainly not the kind 
of view that any traditional anti-realist, even Harman, wants to appeal to.  
8 Perhaps there are some moral anti-realists who advocate their views from such a perspective; perhaps they 
see the “point” of philosophical theorizing as some kind of entertainment or as an enjoyable way to 
provoke people (actually, the very small set of people that are interested in meta-ethics). In response to 
these possible perspectives I can only suggest that if they are looking to entertain and provoke, there are 
surely more entertaining and/or provocative things to do than meta-ethics. 
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truths pertaining to all that morality encompasses (e.g., moral evaluation of actions, states 
of affairs, characters, motives, and so on). 
I am not denying that this epistemic reality is semantically, metaphysically, 
psychologically and epistemologically mysterious and hard to understand. If, e.g., we 
epistemically ought to believe what, and only what, we have good evidence for, what 
makes this the case is, I think, not at all clear. I am only arguing that if we acknowledge, 
and should acknowledge, such an epistemic reality, then there is no reason to not 
acknowledge a moral reality also: each is mysterious and hard to understand in similar 
ways. So if epistemic facts and properties that make epistemic evaluations true are, at 
least, ontologically, semantically, psychologically and epistemically tolerable, there is 
little reason to think that moral facts and properties are not tolerable.9 
I have tried to develop these kinds of objections throughout my discussion of the 
arguments for the various classical moral irrealisms. I have argued that the main 
arguments for each position, in their own ways, suggest a rationally unacceptable and 
irrealistic understanding of the nature of epistemic and intellectual judgments. We have 
better reason to reject these understandings than accept them. Also, these epistemic 
irrealisms seem to be self-undermining: they undercut their own epistemic support in 
terms of it being true that anyone ought to believe it, or is justified in believing it or any 
other view, including moral irrealisms. If some epistemic irrealist said that her does not 
undercut its own epistemic support because, e.g., to say that something has support is just 
to express preferences or desires, we should agree that that might be true, but resist until 
strong reasons have been given to think that. I suspect that there are no such strong 
reasons.  
I have also sometimes argued that each moral irrealist presupposes a realistic 
understanding of such epistemic and intellectual judgments that is not easily reconciled 
with the premises used to argue for moral irrealism. I have tried to force a dilemma: 
either go irrealist all around (which has unacceptable implications, even from their points 
of view), or resist my arguments by rejecting the major premises used to defend moral 
                                                          
9 I have argued that admitting epistemic facts and properties is not only merely tolerable, but a precondition 
for argumentation and reasoning since their denial could not be coherently argued for by reflective people. 
So, if someone claims that “it is unreasonable to believe in any epistemic facts,” or “we are unjustified in 
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irrealism. This latter response is to reject current arguments for moral irrealism, to 
concede that they are weak, which, for those who wish to defend moral realism, is an 
acceptable concession. 
7.3. Shafer-Landau on Some Contemporary Moral Irrealisms. 
I wish to now note that these kinds of objections have been leveled against many 
contemporary moral irrealists, like Simon Blackburn, Mark Timmons, and Crispin 
Wright. Despite their innovations, the position has not been improved in this regard. In a 
thorough study of the contemporary arguments for moral irrealism, Shafer-Landau has 
(independently) argued for conclusions very similar to mine. I provide an extended quote 
from him to illustrate how our strategies and insights are similar. This is not intended as 
an argument from authority but rather to show that someone else who has thought at 
length about these issues has argued in similar ways as I have. He writes, specifically in 
response to arguments for contemporary non-cognitivisms: 
The ontological motivations that prompt the development of non-cognitivism 
should incline the non-cognitivist to be suspicious of all normative claims. If 
brute normativity is a problem in ethics, it should be a problem anywhere else. 
And this means the non-cognitivist must either try to [naturalistically] reduce such 
normative notions as reasons, rationality, legitimacy, justification, relevance, 
appropriateness, and warrant, or supply a non-cognitivist analysis of them. 10  
He then notes, as I have done, that naturalistic “reductions” or analyses of these epistemic 
notions would be as problematic, from non-cognitivists’ point of view, as naturalistic 
analyses of moral notions. Their objections to the latter would be equally strong 
objections to the former.  This leaves epistemic non-cognitivisms as the remaining 
option. But he offers this response to that option: 
Yet such [epistemic non-cognitivist] diagnoses seem far-fetched when it comes to 
the normative concepts just mentioned. Are we really doing nothing more than 
just expressing a non-cognitivist commitment when assessing a belief as justified, 
an inference as warranted, an argument as sound [i.e., perhaps, ought to be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
believing in epistemic properties,” that position is rationally self-undermining: someone who understands 
these positions must believe that believing these positions is not reasonable or justified.   
10 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism 36-37).  
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accepted11]? When a person believes a conditional and its antecedent, we say of 
her that she ought to believe the conclusion, that she is warranted in doing so, that 
she has good reason to accept the consequent. We certainly seem to be describing 
her situation, and conveying our assessment by means of beliefs. We think there 
really is such a thing as being epistemically justified; some agents and beliefs 
merit the tag, and when they do, we speak the truth by describing them as 
justified. If non-cognitivism is correct, however, then this picture is all wrong. 
There really aren’t any such things as reasons (for belief, for action, etc.). We talk 
and think as if there were, but there really is nothing in the ontology that answers 
to this notion. What we do when we deploy the concept is to express a favorable 
attitude toward something or other. And nothing more.12  
So Shafer-Landau’s strategy is similar to mine, although I think I do more to give reasons 
to think that epistemic realism is true. Also, I pay greater attention to the evaluative 
intellectual or epistemic presuppositions involved in reasoning and argumentation: e.g., 
moral irrealists tend to make all sorts of claims, as realists do, about what they must do in 
developing their arguments, how they should respond to various objections, how better 
explanations are preferable, how their views would be unjustified were they to not 
respond to various alleged problems with their views, and so on.  I have argued that these 
claims and presuppositions are ultimately inconsistent with their major premises used 
against moral realism, but that if claims like these can be (and are) literally true, then 
there no good reason to that that there are no moral truths either.  
 There is one challenge for understanding many contemporary moral irrealisms 
that I will briefly address. This challenge is that, unlike their classical counterparts, 
contemporary irrealists are often willing to say that there are moral truths, moral facts, 
and moral properties; some might even say that there are justified moral beliefs and moral 
knowledge. It used to be that only moral realists were willing to say things like this, and 
moral irrealisms could be defined, in part, by their rejections of claims like these. Many 
contemporary moral irrealists are now willing to use these terms, however, because they 
                                                          
11 Strictly speaking, Shafer-Landau should have found no problem here with assessing an argument as 
sound, since that is to say that has the perfectly natural property of being valid with true premises. Perhaps 
he was thinking that when we assess an argument as sound, we are also saying that we ought to accept it.  
12 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism 36-37).  
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have come to embrace “minimalisms” about these notions. On minimalism, there isn’t 
much to say about the nature of truth: on minimalism, the proposition that ‘p’ is true if 
and only if p. This explication contrasts with non-minimalist explications about truth to 
the effect of, e.g., the proposition that ‘p’ is true if and only if there is a fact that p and ‘p’ 
corresponds to that fact. Given the challenges involved in understanding and defending 
such non-minimal theories of truth, some have come to embrace minimalism since it 
might be all that needs to be said about the nature of truth.  
The upshot of accepting minimalisms (about truth, and other notions) is that to 
say that ‘p is true’ is just to say ‘p’.  The locution ‘is true’ does not convey any more 
information than just asserting ‘p’; it is just a way of making an emphasis. A result of this 
is that, for those who are willing to affirm moral sentences, i.e., say ‘p’, then they are also 
now able to affirm moral truths, properties, facts and so forth.  Moral irrealists who are 
willing to say ‘this is wrong’ can now say ‘it’s true that this is wrong’ or ‘this has the 
property of wrongness’ or ‘it’s a fact that this is wrong,’ and these all follow from the 
minimalist understanding of truth. 
 This willingness to say more things that moral realists are willing to say only 
complicates things. It makes the kinds of positions harder to distinguish. One result, 
however, is that if a moral irrealist is willing to say everything that a moral realist affirms 
then the positions cannot be distinguished. Since irrealists do want to distinguish their 
positions from realists’, although they are willing to co-opt much of the realist 
vocabulary. So, although Blackburn is, on the one hand willing to say almost everything 
a moral realist will say, he also writes that he is “opposed to giving an ontological status 
to moral and modal facts” and that his theory is “visibly irrealist, for the explanations 
offered make no irreducible or essential appeal to the existence of moral ‘properties’ or 
‘facts’; they demand no ontology of morals.”13 So minimalism results in moral irrealists 
being a bit cagey and saying things a bit hard to understand: e.g., although Blackburn will 
say that there are moral truths, he will sometimes deny that there are moral facts or 
properties. This might make for a hard to understand view since, on more traditional 
views, truths and truth-makers go hand-in-hand.  
                                                          
13 See Blackburn (Essays in Quasi-Realism 57, 175). 
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 Shafer-Landau has interesting observation about the consequences of irrealists’ 
minimalisms: 
According to Blackburn and Timmons [and Wright], ‘abortion is wrong’ (for 
instance) is true if and only if abortion is wrong. But they give us little help when 
it comes to understanding what it would be for the right hand to hold—what sorts 
of conditions would have to be fulfilled, what kinds of states of affairs would 
have to be realized in order for something like that to be the case. Given their 
naturalism, their rejection of any representational function of moral discourse, and 
their rejection of moral properties (of the sort whose instantiations could serve as 
truth-makers for moral claims), the nature of the right hand side of moral 
equivalences is quite mysterious.14 
Although minimalism provides moral irrealists with a principled reason to say that some 
moral judgments are sometimes true, to say that there are moral facts, and so on. But their 
views, ultimately, preclude any moral judgments being what we might call “literally” 
true, or some moral claim accurately describing how things are, morally.  
However, since irrealists are willing to use truth-talk, it is important to look at all 
the things that contemporary moral realists are willing to say to see if they mean the same 
things that realists are willing to say: the kinds of positions will have to be distinguished 
at other locations. If they do agree with everything realists are willing to say, then their 
positions are no longer irrealist. So, to evaluate the positions we need to look at where 
they disagree with realists.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss Gibbard’s and Field’s views. They 
are both minimalists about moral and epistemic truth, facts and properties. So they are 
willing to say almost everything moral and epistemic realists will say. However, I suggest 
that they should be understood as not making these claims in the literal way that a realist 
does. This should be kept in mind we as investigate their views.  
7.4. Gibbard’s Epistemic and Moral Norm Expressivism. 
In Gibbard’s Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, he develops a theory of what it is to judge or 
consider something to be rational: this kind of rationality has implications for both moral 
                                                          
14 See Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism 32).  
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and epistemic evaluations.15 He calls his theory the “norm expressivist analysis.” He 
claims that the notion “rational” is a part of a cluster of what he calls “normative” 
notions, and he thinks that a “notion is normative if we can paraphrase it in terms of what 
it makes sense to do, to think, or to feel.”16 Rationality is meant to pertain to moral 
evaluations (he relates moral rights and wrongs to the rationality of various sentiments, 
like guilt and resentment, e.g., that an act is wrong when, and because, it is rational to 
feel guilty about it17), to beliefs, and to anything else that might be appraised as rational 
or irrational. For belief, the notion of rationality has close connection to the notions that a 
belief “ought” to be held, is “warranted, and is “well grounded.”18  
So Gibbard has a general theory of what it is to call something “rational” which 
has implications for both moral and epistemic evaluations: his resulting analysis of both 
stand or fall together. What is it to call something “rational” on the norm expressivist 
theory? Gibbard’s answer, which he admits is “cryptically put,” is that to “call something 
rational is to express one’s acceptance of norms that permit it.”19 He explains that a norm 
is a “rule or prescription, expressible by an imperative,”20 which is neither true nor false. 
Thus, to put these two notions together, to call something rational to express one’s 
acceptance of rules, prescriptions, or imperatives that permit that thing.  
Gibbard elaborates on what it is to express a norm: 
Normative talk is part of nature, but it does not describe nature. In particular, a 
person who calls something rational or irrational is not describing his own state of 
mind; he is expressing it. To call something rational is not to attribute some kind 
of particular property to that thing—not even the property of being permitted by 
                                                          
15 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 8). Gibbard repeatedly claims that his theory is not a theory 
about what it is for something to be rational (9, 46). Apparently, it’s possible that his theory about what it is 
to judge something rational is correct, yet it completely misses what rationality really is. So this might be 
true: to judge something to be rational is to X, but for something to be rational is for Y (and not to X). This 
is an odd result; compare “this is what it is for (litterally) anyone to judge something to be good, but for 
something to be good is a totally different matter.” It’s hard to see how we could approach the thing itself, 
what it is to be something, but through our conception of it. But allowing that these can radically diverge 
opens up the possibility for a radical skepticism.  
16 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 35). 
17 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 6). He writes, “morality concerns moral sentiments: the 
sentiments of guilt and resentment and their variants. Moral wrongs are to be avoided on pain of these 
sentiments.”  
18 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 7, 49). He also relates “coherent” and “justified” to this set of 
concepts (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 32). Gibbard is fond of the term “notion”, hence my use of the term.  
19 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 7, 9). 
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accepted norms. . . . The analysis is non-cognitivist in the narrow sense that, 
according to it, to call a thing rational is not to state a matter of fact, either truly or 
falsely.21 
Gibbard spends much of his book attempting to explain what it is for norms to permit 
things and what it is to express norms. Understanding these notions is a challenge. Even 
he states that he suspects that “were all philosophers to turn to analyzing the ‘acceptance 
of norms,’ all would fail.”22 That he says this about his own theory is discouraging for 
those who would like to understand and evaluate it: if a theory’s creator thinks that all 
will fail, including himself, in trying to analyze his concept, then pessimism about 
understanding it in a satisfying manner might very well be warranted.  
Despite these difficulties in stating the view, Gibbard thinks his norm-expressive 
analysis of what it is to call something rational “strains the concept less than do the 
alternatives.”23 One kind of alternative includes naturalistic analyses: he argues these 
views are mistaken because they lose the “endorsement” carried with along calling 
something rational. He thinks that to call something rational is to “endorse” it, but to say 
that something has some natural property is not to endorse it, so naturalisms are mistaken 
in their understanding of the notion of rationality.24 This seems true for both ethical and 
epistemological naturalisms and related notions of rationality: e.g., saying of some action 
will produce the most pleasure, or saying that some belief is produced by a mechanism 
belief-forming reliable is not the same as saying that an action is right or that the belief is 
justified. The later have an endorsing function that the natural description lacks.  
As a self-proclaimed naturalist, Gibbard thinks that non-naturalistic theories of 
rationality are mistaken: He writes, “Nothing in a plausible, naturalistic picture of our 
place in the universe requires these non-natural facts and these powers of non-sensory 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 46). 
21 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 8). In his new book, Gibbard develops this theory by, among 
other things, incorporating “minimalism” and so being willing to speak of moral (and rational) truths, facts 
and properties. See Gibbard (Thinking How To Live x).  
22 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 55). 
23 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 32). 
24 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 6).  Gibbard thinks naturalism doesn’t capture the ordinary 
notion of judging something to be rational, but, oddly, seems to think that maybe his theory doesn’t either. 
He sometimes seems to say that he is merely stipulating a sense of the term that he find interesting and 
fruitful. He writes, “My real claim is not for the word ‘rational’, but for a meaning I want to exploit” (Wise 
Choices, Apt Feelings 49). 
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apprehension.”25 If naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories of what it is to judge or 
consider something to be rational are inadequate, and yet the notion of rationality “makes 
sense,” as Gibbard puts it, we likely are left with some kind of non-descriptivism. This is 
especially plausible if judgments about rationality have this “endorsement” function that 
cannot be captured by mere property attributions, whether natural or non-natural. 
A concise statement of the arguments given in favor of norm expressivism is not 
easy to provide. There is what I mentioned above, but Gibbard’s discussion is dense and 
the considerations for his position and against others are developed in subtle, not very 
explicit, ways. Much of his discussion, like Stevenson’s, is descriptive. It concerns what 
people would say, how they would respond in certain situations and what they assume; 
other parts of his discussion consist of speculations about how humans might have come 
to develop and accept various norms throughout evolutionary history and what various 
benefits would have come from that.  
Whatever the considerations Gibbard offers in favor of his norm-expressivism, 
however, and whatever the view’s exact nature, it clearly has epistemically irrealistic 
consequences for judgments about the rationality of beliefs. It implies that judgments 
about what’s rational to believe are neither true nor false, and that to judge that something 
is rational to believe is to not attribute a particular kind of property to that belief, or 
describe that belief, or attempt to state a fact. Norms that might permit beliefs are rules or 
prescriptions, expressible by imperatives, which are neither true nor false. Thus, norm 
expressivism yields a kind of epistemic or intellectual non-cognitivism, and so is an 
epistemically irrealist position: there are no epistemic truths, facts, propositions or 
properties.26  
As mentioned above, it’s possible that Gibbard has not given adequate reasons for 
his position: he suggests it, and sketches it, but does make a very good case for it. If 
that’s so, then perhaps it’s not true that anyone has good enough reason to accepting it 
(perhaps, including Gibbard). I do not intend to try to argue for this point, although I will 
                                                          
25 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 154). 
26 Although this is Gibbard’s received view, at times he might deny it: “Take the stock example of the man 
who has evidence his wife is unfaithful. Whether it is still rational for him to believe her faithful—whether 
such a belief would be warranted—depends on his evidence, and on his evidence alone [although it might 
be emotionally desirable for him to believe otherwise] .. The rationality of belief and its desirability, then, 
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argue that careful reflection on Gibbard’s position can reveal that there is not good reason 
to accept it: there is little reason for a reflective moral realist to accept his theory.  
However, thinking about whether the theory ought to be accepted in light of a 
vivid awareness of the theory’s implications, including its implications for thinking about 
whether the theory ought to be accepted, I argue yields an undercutting defeator for 
accepting the theory, reasons to think that the theory is not true. This strategy will not 
yield a direct argument that norm expressivism is false, but rather that many people who 
understand it, but do not already accept it, have no good reason to accept it and good 
reason to reject it.27 If nearly any reflective person who understands Gibbard’s theory can 
be in this situation then, for nearly anyone who considers his position, there is no good 
reason to accept it. If this is true, then norm expressivism is no threat to moral realisms: 
it’s not true it ought to be preferred over realism. This is especially the case if this 
reasoning suggests that Gibbard’s analysis of what it is to judge something rational is just 
mistaken, and so there’s more to these judgments than the mere expression of norms, and 
so Gibbard’s norm expressivism is false.28 I have developed this reasoning earlier: I 
argued that epistemic judgments have features that are better understood on a realistic 
model and that epistemic expressivisms have an especially hard time accommodating 
these features.  
To see this kind of objection we must work through the implications of norm 
expressivism for whether we, or anyone, should accept norm expressivism. Gibbard 
apparently thinks that norm expressivism is epistemically rational to accept, at least for 
him. He presumably thinks it would be rational for others to accept, were they to 
carefully read his book and consider the arguments fairly and honestly. After all, he is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
are different, if ordinary thought is to be trusted (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 36-37). Perhaps Gibbard is 
also “expressing a norm” in this case, so there is no tension between it and his main theory.  
27 This strategy, however, will suggest that the norm expressivism analysis is false as an understanding of 
what we are doing when we judge something to be rational. We can endorse norms, but wonder if our 
endorsements are rational. We can express norms that permit some thing, but wonder if it is rational to do.  
If we can sensibly do these things, this suggests that norm expressivism is false, as a view about what it is 
to judge or consider something to be rational. Although we are never given a precise claim about what it is 
to express such norms, so this is hard to tell, it seems that when we do express norms, it’s at least often an 
“open question” as to whether our expressions are rational or not. Perhaps a safer observation is this: one 
can even recognize that one has expressed norms in favor of something, but still wonder if one really 
judges something to be rational: perhaps one’s emotions got in the way and one is not judging as one ought. 
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offering a rival theory to, at least, moral and epistemic realisms, and so he must think that 
realisms have various liabilities that should be avoided, and he thinks that his theory 
avoids them better than the other options.  
Someone who understands norm expressivism, however, understands that, 
according to Gibbard’s theory, when Gibbard, or anyone, judges that he ought to accept 
norm expressivism, Gibbard has expressed his acceptance of norms that permit his 
believing his own theory. He has not said anything that is true, or described the theory or 
himself vis a vis his believing the theory (as it having some properties such that it ought 
to be believed by him, etc.) or stated a fact about the theory’s epistemic status. Similarly, 
if Gibbard judges that moral realists (even just those familiar with his theory) ought to 
drop their theories and accept his, again, he has again not said anything that’s true or 
factual. He has expressed norms that do not permit believing moral realism. 
  Suppose we are reflective realists and vividly understand these points just made. 
Suppose we ask Gibbard to explain why we should accept norm expressivism, perhaps to 
start over from the beginning and explain all his assumptions that he used in arguing for 
the view. Say we also tell him that we had a hard time understanding his book and that 
we are seeking, again, the basic reasons, as plain and as simple as can be, for why we 
should accept epistemic expressivism. Suppose Gibbard provide these further reasons, 
these further claims about why the view “makes sense,” as he puts it. He might say that, 
given various basic intellectual goals and methods to achieve them (such as a goal to 
understand the world in the simplest way possible, with theories that explain as much as 
possible, in coherent and consistent manners) we should accept norm-expressivism, since 
it meets these goals best.29 If he did this then, on his theory, he has expressed “his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Below I argue that if we believe that evaluations of rationality have objective “authority” over us (this is 
Gibbard’s term), but we realize that norm expressivism implies that they really do not, then, we ought to 
reject norm expressivism. 
29 Jonathan Kvanvig argues that Gibbard’s arguments preuppose Occam’s Razor, but that since Occam’s 
Razor cannot be considered a truth on Gibbard’s view, his arguments are defective.  He writes, “arguments 
and explanations presuppose the truth of epistemic norms, and if the norms themselves are given nonalethic 
status, then the explanations are simply defective in virtue of the fact that their presuppositions are not 
true.” See Kvanvig (The Value of Knowledge 174). This objection, however, might be weak since, insofar 
as there can be, in some plausible sense, “valid” arguments with an imperative as a major premise, 
arguments of comparable logical ‘validity” can be given regarding what we would ordinarily consider to be 
epistemic matters.  Below I object to Gibbard by arguing that extended reflection on a diversity of 
incompatible epistemic norms and the fact that, on Gibbard’s view, none are in any way objectively 
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acceptance of higher order norms that tell everyone to accept [the] lower order norms” 
that permitted his accepting norm expressivism, as well as the more basic judgments that 
norm expressivism is based on. 
 A reflective person will want to know why to accept any of these norms, at all 
levels. A reflective person will realize that, on Gibbard’s theory, that, again, none of 
these norms are true or factual: all are equally lacking in truth or factuality or correctness.  
She might even accept these norms, but wonder if she ought to: they might seem to 
“make sense” but she might wonder if they really do make sense. She might wonder what 
their, as Gibbard puts it, “claim to authority” is: why should she accept them and 
whatever is permitted by them?30 If she asks this about her own norms, she might also 
wonder what claim to authority Gibbard’s norms are and what claim to authority his 
norms should have over her. She might think that Gibbard has his norms, she has her 
norms, they are different and so it’s not true that she ought to accept anything Gibbard 
says, especially since she realizes that this would be just another expression of a norm 
that permits something. If she thought that this train of thought was leading her 
somewhere that she didn’t want to go (perhaps towards mistrust and a rejection of what 
other thoughtful people say) and that she ought not to have these attitudes or responses to 
others, she would recognize that as another expression of norms. Yet going down that 
previous track, and thinking that it was the rational way to be reasoning, would have just 
been to express a different norm. Would either expression of norms have been better or 
worse?  She realizes that, on Gibbard’s theory, an answer is yet another expression of 
norms.  
Thinking through normative judgments on Gibbard’s account can lead to 
normative vertigo: when we see that norms are accepted only on further norms, and that 
to judge norms is just to invoke further norms, we can lose confidence in any of them, 
since to judge a norm as better or worse is just to express further norms. We accept 
norms, but we can ask whether we ought to accept these norms, especially when we 
recognize that others express contrary norms. We have our norms, others have different 
norms, and there are conflicts, but no norms are ultimately any better or worse. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
superior to any other can undercut the sense of a norm’s objective authority. From this position of 
normative vertigo, we see that, on Gibbard’s theory, there is no reason to endorse his theory. 
30 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 173). This chapter is entitled “Normative Authority.” 
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Recognizing the contingency that although I currently express some norms that permit 
some things yet, were my situation only slightly different, I probably would have 
expressed different norms with still different permissions, can suggest that one’s norms 
“track” nothing objective: they are merely the norms I have, but they are no preferable to 
any (or many) others I might have had. This provides reason to doubt one’s own norms: I 
have my norms, further norms that support this norms, and still further norms, but there 
needn’t be anything better or worse about any other set of norms that anyone else might 
accept. Judgments that there are better norms are just further expressions of norms, which 
would raise the same concerns about arbitrariness.   
But at least realists believe that some norms (both moral and epistemic) are better 
than others, and necessarily so: norm expressivists say this, but reflection reveals that all 
they can say is that some norms are licensed by higher-order norms. If realists believe 
what they do this reasonably, then they have reasons to reject Gibbard’s account. It 
appears that norm expressivism cannot as plausibly or as simply accommodate the sense 
that some norms are better than others. This gives realists reason to reject it: the force of 
whatever reasons Gibbard provides for norm expressivism is not greater than the reasons 
to think that some norms are necessarily better than norms and so there are some literal 
normative truths, or facts, or properties.   
 Let us return to Gibbard’s claim that realists would be justified in accepting norm 
expressivism, or that they would not be justified in accepting realism were they to 
carefully examine his theory. Gibbard has expressed a norm. He claims that norms 
demand influence: if a normative judgment is made (and someone hears it), this should 
influence the speaker. Why is this? His answer seems to bridge an ‘is’ to an ‘ought.’ He 
claims that making demands of each other this is part of conversation, and is part of a 
social practice that has evolved to support human life. He writes: 
To claim authority [as we do in making judgments about what’s rational] is to 
demand influence, and influence is part of what leads normative discussion to 
consensus. I say, implicitly, ‘Accept these norms!’ and if you accept them 
because I have made a demand, I have influenced you. If we influence each other, 
that moves us toward consensus in the norms we accept.31  
                                                          
31 See Gibbard (Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 173). 
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This might be the last straw for our reflective moral realists. They see that, ultimately, 
Gibbard’s position about what we ought to do and what we ought to believe rests upon an 
order, a command (with an exclamation point at that!). Is this what reasoning comes to?  
The realist thinks not. Suppose someone ordered that contrary norms be accepted. On 
Gibbard’s view, to say that one set of orders are the rational one’s to follow (and 
preferable than a contrary set) is to express one’s norms that permit those orders, not the 
other orders; why we should accept this involves further orders: it is orders and 
commands all the way down.  
A realist might respond that if there are no truths, no facts, no way things ought to 
be here, then none is genuinely preferable and so there’s no good reason to prefer 
Gibbard’s theory over any other, especially her own. Gibbard can say that what’s 
“genuinely preferable” for someone is that which ranks higher by the norms the speaker 
accepts, but this seems to lead to mere contingency and relativism for that which is 
genuinely preferable. It is contingent in that it depends on whatever norms someone 
happens to accept, and it is relative in that different people can accept differing and 
inconsistent ultimate norms. This could, on Gibbards view, result in contradictory 
judgments about rationality, and hence morality, and no position could be judged as 
stance-independently superior or inferior.  
For someone committed to the view that there are some necessary truths about 
morality, epistemology and rationality, this consequence provides reason to reject 
Gibbard’s views. So this person rejects norm expressivism, whatever epistemic and moral 
consequences it might have, and keeps realism, and it does not appear that Gibbard can 
truthfully say that she has made any mistake. Again, he might express norms against 
coming to this conclusion, but it is not at all clear why his norms should have any 
purchase over at least those who understand his theory but reject his norms.   
7.5. Field’s Epistemic and Moral Evaluationism or Non-Factualism. 
Hartry Field claims to take inspiration from Gibbard’s norm expressivism in developing 
his own ethical and epistemological “evaluationism” or “non-factualism.”32 However, the 
view is actually quite similar to, nearly identical to, to the later version of Harman’s 
moral relativism, and so subject to similar objections. It has none of the complications of 
                                                          
32 See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 243) and Field (“Apriority as an Evaluative Notion” 370).  
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Gibbard’s theory, since it is not a non-cognitivism, but it inherits the obscurities of 
Harman’s “relative truth.” 
Let us first understand the view. Consider two sentences that Field considers 
“evaluative”:  
“Voting for the lesser of two evils is a bad idea,”  
and  
“Belief in quarks is justified on current evidence.’33  
He claims that these claims have a “not-fully-factual” status; they are true, but true or 
factual (or false or not factual) only relative to a norm.34 The judgment that “we morally 
ought to respect our neighbors” is true relative to some norms, but false on other norms; 
on some norms, the judgment that “belief in quarks is justified” is true, but on other 
norms it is not. But no norms, of any kind, are, strictly speaking, correct, “objectively 
correct” or a correct in a non-relative manner.35  
Some of us prefer some norms over other norms, but these judgments about 
what’s preferable are also licensed only relative to norms: they are not objectively correct 
either. Field writes that, “we can say that an evaluative utterance is disquotationally true 
for me iff it is true relative to the norms I regard appropriate to associate with the 
evaluative terms,”36 and this applies to norms about norms also. Two parties who accept 
different norms can disagree about, e.g., particular evaluative judgments, even when they 
both realize that one judgment is true on one set of norms (e.g., my norms), but also true 
on a different set of norms (e.g., your norms): this is a disagreement in “attitude,” not a 
factual disagreement. 
 Field’s main argument for his view is that “we can accommodate all the [relevant 
moral and epistemic] phenomena using only the norm-relative notions, together with both 
preference among norms and norm-relative beliefs.”37 By denying that there are 
epistemic and moral properties (in his view, ‘reasonableness’ is not a ‘factual property’38) 
                                                          
33 See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 242). 
34 Field has a technical explanation of what a norm, a “complete,” and an “incomplete” norm are, but an 
intuitive notion of a norm is adequate for my purposes here. See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 
244). 
35 See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 248). 
36 See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 247). 
37 See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 249). 
38 See Field (“Apriority as an Evaluative Notion” 381). 
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he can also avoid challenging epistemological questions for how we might detect them. 
In response, a factualist, i.e., a moral and epistemic realist, claims that Field’s 
evaluationism yields an “impoverished caricature of evaluative discourse,” but Field’s 
opinion is that “the nonfactualist will win” the debate.39 
 Thus, Field judges that non-factualism or evaluationism is the more reasonable 
view. On the theory, however, this is for Field to say that, relative to his norms, 
evaluationism is justified. That might be true, but what about those who understand what 
Field has said in favor of non-factualism, but reject it, perhaps because we do not share 
all of Field’s norms? Relative to Field’s norms, our belief in, say, realism, will be 
unjustified; relative to realists’ norms, realism will be justified.  
Although, intuitively, different people can be justified in accepting different 
views, the situation changes when they get together and try to share their evidence and 
reveal their norms and engage in critical discussion. Non-factualism says that all 
evaluations are true or false only relative to a norm, and that all evaluations of norms are 
true or false only relative to a norm, and that no norms are necessarily correct. 
Recognizing this would seem to result in one thinking that one’s moral and epistemic 
evaluations are merely one’s own, with no authority for those who do not accept the 
norms that you accept: each moral and epistemic evaluation is (or often is) true relative to 
the speakers’ norms, and that’s as good as it gets. And if each speaker has got what’s as 
good as it gets—the truth relative to his or her own norms, then there is no room for 
improvement, except for mere change in relation to a new set of norms that, although 
might be preferred, are not objectively preferable to any others.   
Field recognizes that non-factualism seems to have these implications and that it 
might lead to a conclusion he rejects: 
A view like this raises the specter of extreme relativism.  For mightn’t it be the 
case that different people have different basic standards of evaluation? If so, 
aren’t I saying that there is no fact of the matter as to which standard of evaluation 
is correct? And doesn’t that mean that no standard is better than any other, so that 
those who ‘justify’ their belief in reincarnation on the basis of standards that 
positively evaluate just those beliefs that they think will make them feel good 
                                                          
39 See Field (“Factually Defective Discourse” 250). 
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about their cultural origins are no worse epistemologically than those with a more 
‘scientific’ basis? That of course would be a totally unacceptable conclusion. 
To provide Field’s answers to his questions, he thinks that it might be the case, and in 
fact probably is the case, that different people have different basic standards of 
intellectual and moral evaluation. And he clearly thinks that there is no fact of the matter 
as to which standard of evaluation is correct, at least no objective fact or fact apart from a 
set of norms. But he does think that, e.g., reincarnationists are worse off, epistemically, 
compared to those who accept a scientific world view.  
Is what he thinks here true?  Since this is an epistemic evaluation, it is true only to 
a set of norms. And Field says that he accepts intellectual norms and goals that, first, lead 
to more truth and less falsehood than the reincarnationists’ norms, and so his evaluation 
of their practice presupposes this norm. Is a standard relating what is justified or what we 
ought to believe with the truth (and not with what feels good) correct, and those that deny 
it incorrect?  Field responds: 
I doubt that any clear sense could be given to the notion of ‘correctness’ here. If 
there were a justificatory fluid that squirts from evidence to conclusions, we could 
say that correct standards were those that licensed belief in proportion to the fluid 
that they received from available evidence; but absent that, it is hard to see what 
can make standards correct or incorrect.40 
It is not so hard to see what could make epistemological standards correct: one obvious 
candidate is their relation to truth. To preserve the intuition that meeting epistemic 
standards needn’t entail truth, we might plausibly think that epistemological standards are 
standards for belief that, if followed (or if our beliefs conform to it) our beliefs will 
probably be true, or it is likely they will be true, or they will cohere well with what seems 
true to us and not conflict with that which seems false. All these suggestions have been 
developed in great detail, so it is not so hard to see what could make standards correct or 
incorrect. At least, we can develop some good general ideas to address the issues.  
So, apparently, on Field’s view, scientific standards, or norm, are not more correct 
than the reincarnationists’ standard. However, Field says that we can say that some 
standards are correct, in terms of achieving certain goals, and insofar as we adopt these 
                                                          
40 See Field (“Apriority as an Evaluative Notion” 383). 
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goals, we will say that some standards are better, but it is not correct that there are any 
goals that objectively ought to be adopted, or any goals that are better, objectively-
speaking.  
 Field realizes that some might think his view comes down to an “extreme 
relativism,” but perhaps it should be seen as a kind of nihilism. It implies that no moral or 
epistemic norms or standards are objectively true, and that no moral or epistemic 
judgments are true, objectively. All there is is truth-relative-to-a-norm (and norms 
relative to norms), but a nihilist can allow for that, in terms of allowing there to be logical 
relations between particular judgments and sets of principles, yet no truth to any of the 
judgments beyond the statement of the relation (“It’s true that this follows from my norm, 
but the norm is not true and neither is the judgment”).  
 The important question is what a moral or epistemic realist should think of Field’s 
arguments for his view that realism is unjustified. Again, his argument is based on the 
claim that “we can accommodate all the phenomena using only the norm-relative notions, 
together with both preference among norms and norm-relative beliefs,” together with the 
claim that his theory has metaphysical and epistemological advantages that should be 
taken advantage of. A realist who understands his theory should see that Field has only 
stated that, relative to his norms, realism is unjustified. A realist might not be troubled by 
that; a realist might think, “Field thinks that, but that’s not my problem. Since I accept 
realism, apparently I don’t accept Field’s norms, so that’s no worry for me.” A realist 
might also think that, on Field’s theory, realism is often justified for those who accept the 
norms that realists accept.  But if that’s so, then the realist should wonder why she should 
consider dropping realism in favor of non-factualism, since realism is justified for her.  
A realist of a more “evangelical” persuasion might wish to try to “convert” Field 
to realism; she might help him articulate his norms, and his norms about norms, and show 
that when he thought realism was false relative to his norms, he had made a mistake. The 
process of thinking through norms, and norms about norms, and still further norms for 
norms, might lead Field to the kind of normative vertigo I tried to induce earlier. 
Furthermore, many of the reasons I gave earlier against epistemic expressivisms point 
toward understanding some epistemic judgments as objectively true: e.g., relativism 
doesn’t as easily accommodate the sense that we can make epistemic mistakes, can 
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accept the wrong epistemic standards, can engage those who accept different standards in 
actual debate, and various other concerns that are better understood on the model of 
epistemic realism.  
Although Field has various norms, and cares about these norms, and cares that he 
cares about these norms, and so on, he might come to see that, on his theory, no norms 
are genuinely preferable: he might continue preferring his, but see no sense in which 
others ought to prefer his norms. If he came to think that, then he wouldn’t (as easily) 
think there realists were unjustified in accepting realism.  
But this normative vertigo might lead him to the rejection of non-factualism, since 
it really seems that some norms are preferable than others, and necessarily so: it does not 
seem that these norms merely are those that would be sanctioned by higher norms and 
still higher norms. A careful, reflective evaluationist cannot say that without denying her 
theory. If a norm to the effect of “if something that seems clearly true conflicts with your 
(controversial) theory then you should drop the theory” is true (and, especially, if it’s 
objectively true) then perhaps Field should drop his theory in favor of a realistic view that 
better captures the seeming necessity and objectivity of moral and epistemic norms.  
7.6. Conclusion.  
In this chapter I have summarized my main kind of argument against what I have called 
classical moral irrealists. I noted that this kind of argument has been raised against a 
number of contemporary moral irrealists. I discussed the views of Allen Gibbard and 
Hartry Field, the only figures who advocate, in print, both moral and epistemic irrealisms. 
I argued that reflection on Gibbard’s expressivism and Field’s relativism and application 
of the theory to the claim that moral and epistemic realists should accept either of these 
theories and drop their own realistic theories reveals that this claim should have no force 
for realists since it simply is not true or preferable to its denial. Since that is the case, 
realists should find no threat in Gibbard’s and Field’s theories and the considerations they 
present in their favor.  
 To summarize the entire work, throughout this dissertation I have defended moral 
realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” 
Epistemic realism, again, is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some 
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belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes 
true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties.  
While one might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is 
obviously true and nearly universally accepted, there are influential arguments against 
moral realism, which is analogous to epistemic realism: moral realists think that moral 
judgments, e.g., that something is morally good, or ought to be done, are sometimes true 
because there are stance-independent moral facts and properties. Moral irrealists deny 
this for a variety of semantic, metaphysical, psychological and epistemological reasons. 
They argue that moral judgments are neither true nor false since they are non-cognitive 
expressions of emotion or commands, or are never true since they fail to refer, or that 
their truth is “relative.” 
Drawing on the moral irrealisms of Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Mackie, Harman, and 
more recent thinkers, I have constructed parallel arguments for epistemic irrealisms. On 
these views, epistemic judgments are also merely expressive, a kind of command, always 
false, or relativistic in truth conditions: even “epistemic platitudes” like “justified beliefs 
are better than unjustified beliefs” and “ideally, one’s beliefs ought to be consistent” are 
understood not as epistemic propositions that might be believed (much less believed 
truly), or as attempts to accurately represent epistemic facts, or as attributions of 
epistemic properties.  
I have argued that the implications of these claims are highly at odds with 
common epistemological assumptions, even those that moral irrealists tend to accept, and 
athwe have reasons to reject these implications. I argue that these implications are 
rationally unacceptable and that, therefore, the premises that support them should be 
rejected. Since these premises are those given in defense of moral irrealisms, I thereby 
defend both moral and epistemic realism. Thus, I argue that “oughts,” “shoulds” and 
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